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Abstract 
Energy is a strategic product cutting across a variety of domains including (geo)politics 
and economics, as well as climate and the environment. The achievement of a secure, affordable 
and sustainable energy supply is at the heart of any economy. In this context, changes in global 
energy markets have a decisive impact on energy politics, calling for a coherent and consistent 
governance approach in order to remain competitive. Yet, as for the EU, the achievement of 
consistency is one of its greatest challenges, notably when it comes to external policies. This is 
also an issue with respect to energy. In fact, recent developments in the global energy landscape 
and international events such as climate change increasingly involve the Union in relations of 
interdependence with its neighbouring countries, including those located to its south. However, 
whilst energy has always been a key area of cooperation in EU-southern Mediterranean 
relations and although the Union has long recognised the region’s potential in this regard, past 
efforts at building a fruitful energy relationship have been rather disappointing. This is 
problematic in so far as a shift in traditional energy policy cooperation in the region has been 
observed in recent years, mirroring deep geopolitical change. Adding to this, the perceptibility of 
EU energy policies in the region is overall low. Against this background, this dissertation 
examined policy (in)consistency in EU energy governance towards the southern Mediterranean, 
using Morocco as a case study. In fact, Morocco is not only the EU’s most important partner 
country within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework but is also of utmost 
importance for the EU’s energy and climate interests, notably when it comes to a clean energy 
turnaround. Moreover, the country has long been neglected as a research subject in the 
literature and is therefore or academic interest. 
The aim of this research was to explore whether and to what extent the EU is consistent in its 
energy governance approach towards Morocco and to determine the reasons for consistency or 
inconsistency, the context in which a total of three factors have been identified, namely 
competencies, interests and interdependencies. To assess consistency, this research used 
coordination as a proxy variable for consistency, whereby, inspired by the Les Metcalfe 
methodology, it attempted to investigate the coordination mechanisms of the different actors 
involved in EU energy governance towards Morocco, including the horizontal, vertical and 
diagonal dimensions as well as in the EU multilevel system and at the third-country level. As one 
outcome of this analysis, it has transpired that coordination (and thus consistency) takes place 
with regard to different aspects (strategic/political or functional, i.e. when it centres around 
financial or technical issues). Whilst strategic/political coordination takes place mainly in the EU 
multilevel system, functional coordination takes place in both the EU multilevel system and at 
the third-country level. Another outcome is that strategic/political coordination is overall more 
extensive in the horizontal and diagonal dimensions, but less extensive in the intergovernmental 
and vertical dimensions, whereas functional coordination seems to run smoothly in all 
dimensions. One reason for the extensive horizontal and diagonal coordination seem to be the 
clear delimitation of competencies. The extensive functional coordination in the 
intergovernmental and vertical dimensions is due to converging energy interests across the EU 
institutions and member states. By contrast, the less extensive strategic/political coordination in 
these two dimensions can be explained by diverging policy interests as regards EU energy 
governance towards Morocco and interdependencies between the member states and Morocco.  
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Part One – Introduction  
This first Chapter of the dissertation serves as the foundation of the study. It seeks to 
provide some contextual background and introduces the research problem, relevance and 
questions. It then discusses the scope of the study and outlines the structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Context 
 
‘Without heat, light and power you cannot build or run the factories and cities that provide 
goods, jobs and homes, nor enjoy the amenities that make life more comfortable and enjoyable’.4 
                                                             VOSER Peter, Energy Community Leader of the World Economic Forum 
Energy is a strategic product cutting across a variety of domains such as (geo)politics and 
economics, as well as climate and the environment and the achievement of a secure, competitive 
and sustainable energy supply is at the heart of any economy – not only in the so-called 
developed or industrialised world, but also in developing and emerging countries. As the 
‘oxygen’ or ‘lifeblood’ of the economy, energy contributes to economic growth (and thus social 
progress) in two ways; first, by creating economic value as an independent sector, namely 
through the production of energy goods and services and second, by serving as input to other 
sectors (industry, agriculture…).5  
Ultimately though, the management of energy resources has been increasingly challenged by far-
reaching developments taking place in the global energy landscape – having been in a process of 
continuous transition over the past couple of years, today, the global energy sector is, as 
highlighted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010), ‘characterized by an unprecedented 
degree of uncertainty’, which, so Szulecki and Westphal (2014:1), is ‘linked to shifting patterns of 
energy supply and demand’. And indeed, with the 21st century, energy markets have entered a 
period of intense transformation in which world leaders find themselves compelled to react to 
radical changes occurring on both the supply and demand sides, changes that will at the same 
time create geopolitical challenges and opportunities be it for energy exporters or importers.  
On the supply side, one major challenge is the volatility of crude oil prices coupled with 
instability in traditional oil and gas supply regions, above all the Middle East: in fact, oil being 
traded on a global market (primarily via sea routes), supply disruptions in one region (even 
though they may be artificial as in the case of Saudi Arabia in 2014) have a direct impact on the 
world market and have in this context certainly contributed to the emergence of new suppliers 
like the US, or the arrival of new technologies like fracking.6 Along with climate change and the 
transition towards low-carbon energy systems as a response to it, energy is – with over 70% –
 
4 World Economic Forum (Accessed on 24 February 2018).  
 
5 World Economic Forum (Accessed on 24 February 2018).  
 
6 In fact, thanks to fracking or hydraulic fracturing, a methodology aimed at extracting so-called shale oil and gas by ‘injecting water, 
sand, and chemicals under high pressure into a bedrock formation via the well’ in order to ‘create new fractures in the rock’, the US 
which used to be a net importer of gas for a little more than 60 years, managed to become a net gas exporter in 2018. Shale oil and 
gas are considered unconventional sources of energy. (USGS) (Accessed on 17 July 2018); MALIK, Naureen S. (10 January 2018), U.S. 
Becomes a Net Gas Exporter for the First Time in 60 Years, Bloomberg (Accessed on 17 July 2018).  
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the single largest source of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs).7 These developments are forcing 
or will force countries and multinationals to increase investment in the development and 
exploitation of alternative and renewable energy sources (RES).8  
On the demand side, the greatest challenge is the worldwide increase in energy consumption as 
an outcome of both demographic and economic developments, whereby consumption will 
notably be driven by non-member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), above all China and India. Finally, and as a result of this process of 
continuous transition, more and more countries will join the international energy markets,9 
exacerbating competition over scarce energy resources (MOMETE, 2015:468) and contributing 
to the aggravation of global warming and climate change, if these resources are not renewable. 
Voilà, a vicious cycle that, as further explained later, can only be broken by intelligent global 
energy governance, including enhanced cooperation between the different players involved in 
the global energy landscape.  
In this context, energy is expected to come more and more into the focus of international 
relations and the EU as the world’s biggest energy importer, notably of the fossil fuels, oil and 
gas – in fact, not disposing of any significant energy reserves, the Union’s dependency on energy 
imports stood at 54% in 2016 –10 will naturally be impacted by these developments. Most 
importantly, the EU is likely to be increasingly involved in relations of interdependence with 
non-EU member states and neighbouring countries to its east and south, a shift that will with no 
doubt challenge its governance capacities (as rising interdependencies create vulnerability), 
whereby each angle of its so-called energy policy triangle, comprising security, sustainability 
and competitiveness aspects, is thought to be affected (SZULECKI and WESTPHAL, 2014:39). 
Basically, it will have two options, namely a) to secure its energy supply by diversifying or 
deepening its energy relations with suppliers and/or b) to drastically reduce or change its 
energy consumption patterns (in total or at least of fossil fuels). Both options are mirrored in the 
European Energy Security Strategy of 2014 (COM/2014/0330 final), as well as in the 
Communication for a European Energy Union of 2015 (COM/2015/080 final) which, setting out a 
framework for a resilient Energy Union based on an integrated internal energy market,11 has 
served as the starting point for this dissertation.  
Both documents present the southern Mediterranean as a top priority for EU energy policies 
which is not surprising given that energy has always been a key issue in EU relations and 
prospects for a general revival of cooperation have, considering the ongoing wars in Libya and 
 
7 IEA (Accessed on 24 February 2018). 
 
8 EIA (Accessed on 01 October 2014). 
 
9 For example, in recent years, a number of new gas fields have been found off the coasts of Egypt, Israel and Cyprus (Zohr, Leviathan 
and Tamar natural gas fields in 2015, 2010 and 2009, respectively), attracting International Oil companies (IOCs) such as Italian Eni 
or Russian Gazprom to build up new partnerships with these countries, whereby their interests naturally differ from one another. In 
fact, whilst with respect to importing natural gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the region, Italy aims at increasing its own as 
well as European energy supply security, Russia seeks to uncover new revenue opportunities for state-owned Gazprom REED, 
Stanley (28 October 2015), A Gas Discovery in Egypt Threatens to Upend Mideast Energy Diplomacy, New York Times (Accessed on 
17 July 2018); COHEN, Josh (23 February 2016), Why Russia may be a smart business partner for Israel, Reuters (Accessed on 17 
July 2018). 
 
10 The dependency rate shows the extent to which an economy relies upon imports in order to meet its energy needs. EC (Accessed 
on 29 November 2018). 
 
11 and aiming at giving ‘EU consumers – households and businesses – secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy’ 
(COM/2015/080 final). 
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Syria and the associated migration crisis,12 increasingly moved up the political agenda. As 
regards energy and climate change though, the region’s importance lies above all in its role 
regarding energy supplies, both for fossil fuels and potentially for renewables (COM/2011/0539 
final). Indeed, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt or the southern Mediterranean or 
North African region is a fundamental energy supplier that holds considerable amounts of the 
world’s oil and natural gas reserves and has a vast renewable energy potential (SARTORI, 
2014:1). Moreover, it is an important and strategic maritime transit passage for oil and gas 
supplies from the Middle East, Russia and the Caspian Sea to Europe and the US (Suez Canal, 
Tanger-Med…), as well as for intra-regional trade between North Africa and Europe (SARTORI, 
2014:2). In line with this role in the global energy market, the region (above all, Algeria and 
Libya) provided around 9% of the EU’s oil and 14% of its gas needs in 2017.13  
However, although the EU has long recognised the region’s outstanding energy potential,14 past 
efforts at building a fruitful energy relationship have been rather disappointing and primarily 
centred around the gas sector (SARTORI, 2014:3). In fact, and as will be shown throughout this 
dissertation, relations mainly occur at the bilateral level, taking place between individual EU 
member states and North African countries and the few multilateral initiatives that have taken 
place, including the Desertec project and the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP), have only shown 
limited success so far. Against this background, and in view of the EU’s increasingly instable 
energy supply situation on its eastern borders (TAGLIAPIETRA and ZACHMANN, 2016:2) in the 
context of the deterioration of diplomatic relations with Russia due to the wars in Ukraine and 
Syria,15 numerous are those who assume that a closer energy cooperation with the southern 
Mediterranean will become indispensable for the promotion and securing of the EU’s energy and 
climate interests.16 At this point, it must be underlined that increased cooperation will not only 
be advantageous for Europe but also for the southern Mediterranean, as both regions face 
similar energy challenges such as decreasing energy production, high dependence on 
conventional energy sources, either for export or import,17 as well as climate change.18 Here, the 
 
12 The term notably refers to or is associated with the year 2015, when a rising number of refugees, either in an attempt to escape 
war and conflict or to seek better economic perspectives, came to Europe (from across the Mediterranean or through southeastern 
Europe) seeking asylum. Although the crisis reached a peak in 2015, it is still ongoing today and with the member states being 
divided over the question of how to address this crisis (‘east-west split’), it serves as a prime example of internal incoherence across 
the EU. EC (Accessed on 11 February 2019). 
13 EC (Accessed on 17 July 2018).  
14 For example, and as reflected in increased EU funding at that time, energy had already become an increasingly important aspect of 
EU-Mediterranean cooperation in the early 2000s (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:122). 
15 Russia is the EU’s largest single supplier of energy and although the country also depends on the Union as an important energy 
export market (MOMETE, 2015:464), it however has clearly greater bargaining powers. Here, notably the EU’s excessive natural gas 
dependence has proven to be problematic: for instance, in the 2000s, several disputes between Russian gas supplier Gazprom and 
the Ukrainian national oil and gas company Naftohaz Ukrayiny over gas supplies broke out, leading to the disruption of gas exports 
to the latter, as well as to several other European countries in 2006 and 2009. Consequently, first cracks in the EU-Russia energy 
partnership became apparent and Gazprom was not only perceived as an unreliable supplier to the countries concerned, but also as 
a threat to their energy security. Tensions continued to grow from 2010 onwards, creating ‘a rift between the EU and what has 
traditionally been its most important energy supplier’, which in turn fueled EU-wide discussions of diversification in energy supplier 
countries and routes. Following Russia’s de facto appropriation of Crimea in 2014, its ongoing shadow war in eastern Ukraine, and its 
military intervention in Syria, EU-Russian relations have reached their lowest point since the Cold War. Whilst the EU has responded 
in kind by setting up a series of crippling economic sanctions, the glaring weakness in this strategy however is the Union’s 
considerable dependence on Russian gas imports, reducing its leverage vis-à-vis its eastern neighbour significantly. Looking to patch 
this chink in its armor and to find a more reliable, as well as sustainable and competitive, source of energy when the future of 
relations with Russia appears uncertain, the EU has been increasingly looking to the energy-rich south during the past couple of 
years. DAUM Britta, STRICKLAND Emmett (01 October 2016), Stability: a decisive factor for ensuring energy security in North Africa 
and the EU, EuropeNext (Accessed on 18 July 2018); RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI (2015:384); BBC (Accessed on 28 
January 2018); EC, EC (Accessed on 17 November 2018). 
16 Evidence for this assumption is also given by the fact that, in parallel or addition to trying to set up the Energy Union, the EU is 
revising its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). DAUM Britta, STRICKLAND Emmett (01 October 2016), Stability: a decisive 
factor for ensuring energy security in North Africa and the EU, EuropeNext (Accessed on 18 July 2018). 
 
17 which is particularly true for Morocco and Tunisia.  
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potential pillars for cooperation are proximity, interdependence and complementarities19 
between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean. 
1.1.2 Problem 
 
In the history course of European integration, the EU has had to deal with numerous 
reproaches, with one of the most recurrent ones having been a lack of coherence or even 
incoherence, which as numerous examples show, is not without reason. In the past, the EU’s 
political landscape has often been divided by incoherencies which have spanned across all kinds 
of sectors, from foreign policy, to development policy, to agriculture and fisheries,20 as well as 
most recently, to migration in the context of the refugee crisis of 2015. This would in itself not be 
tragic if these divisions did not have such far-reaching effects. In fact, they are generally linked to 
political failures and widely associated with political and economic leverage which are often 
held responsible for the EU’s limited weight in international affairs21 (GEBHARD, 2017:105).  
There is consensus, not only in the literature, but also in policymaking that incoherence or 
inconsistency22 is an inherent, inevitable part of any policy and that in democratic systems, 
complete consistency is ‘neither feasible nor desirable’ (CARBONE, 2013:5; BODENHEIMER, 
GANDENBERGER and GRIESTOP, 2015:22; GEBHARD, 2017:139). At the same time, its 
occurrence in international relations is thought to be detrimental, as possibly undermining the 
achievement of common policy objectives, it may lead to weak policy performance23 and 
consequently to a loss of credibility of governments (PORTELA, 2009:17).24 Consistency in turn 
is positively correlated to efficiency & effectiveness (KOENIG, 2016:2), integrity (MISSIROLI, 
2001:2) or legitimacy (MARANGONI, 2014:25) and the transformation of inconsistency into 
consistency thus considered a ‘political’, and ‘economic imperative’ (CARBONE, 2013:4-5). And 
although consistency may, as highlighted by Marangoni (2014:25), come at a price (entailing for 
example a slow-down of processes or curtailing the individual freedom of certain actors), 
according to Hoebink (2005:13) aspiring to it should be a ‘general objective in all action taken by 
government’, including or especially in complex pluralist or multi-level governance organisations 
like the EU (KOULAIMAH-GABRIAL and OOMEN, 1997:2; PORTELA and RAUBE, 2009:5). Indeed, 
given that the EU in times of globalisation and interdependence is increasingly expected to 
behave like a unitary actor both domestically and internationally at partner country level, 
policymakers have regularly called for greater consistency within the Union, in the assumption 
that it serves as a condition for the enhancement of unity at all governance levels. In this context, 
the principle is overall firmly embedded in the European policy context and well embodied in EU 
strategies and documents, where the notion is often used synonymously with ‘coherence’, 
 
18 Increasing energy consumption also used to be a common energy challenge. However, for the last couple of years, the EU’s energy 
consumption has rather been on a downward trend, notably for energy efficiency reasons. EC (Accessed on 23 September 2017). 
 
19 IPEMED (Accessed on 17 July 2018). 
 
20 For example, on the one hand, the EU seeks to support economic development in developing countries, whilst on the other hand, it 
builds up barriers by giving preference to ‘domestic’ agricultural production (GATTI, 2016:9). 
21 The Council considers that reinforcing coherence of external action and realising its policy objectives are priorities if the Union is 
to pull its full weight in international affairs. EC (Accessed on 14 October 2017). 
 
22 Whilst coherence and consistency are often used synonymously, this dissertation will later attempt to provide a clear distinction 
between the two terms.  
23 In fact, with contradicting policies at risk ‘to cannibalise one another’, it may have a negative impact on the efficacy of policies. 
24 All the more, as it is one of the most often cited reasons for the EU’s ‘invisibility’ at the international stage.  
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‘continuity’ and ‘unity’ or is reflected in expressions like ‘acting as a whole’ (GEBHARD, 
2017:118) which can be notably found in the foreign policy context.25  
Inconsistencies may range from the international to the national spheres (OECD, 2005:29). 
However, they are generally very much topic-dependent and the likelihood that they occur is 
inevitably higher for ‘popular’ topics, i.e. topics that many different stakeholders are interested 
in rather than those that incite less interest or that are by nature based on a broad consensus 
(such as human rights) (DUKE, 1999:13). Factors determining whether a topic is popular or not 
are for example geographical proximity and security or political and economic interests (DUKE, 
1999:28). Here, strategic policy domains like the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) are more susceptible to divergencies than less sensitive domains like for example the 
EU’s Common Development Policy, which is indeed assumed to be relatively free of 
inconsistencies. One pertinent example with respect to the CFSP, other than its dealing with the 
Iraq War (2003),26 is the EU’s handling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
military intervention in Libya. In fact, whilst the US-led intervention was carried out with the 
participation of the United Kingdom (UK) and France, Germany abstained from voting on 
resolution n° 197327 which formed the legal basis for military action, a move which, as noted by 
Stavridis (2014:1, 3), fueled heavy claims of disunity. Overall, it must be noted that discrepancies 
are thought to be more pronounced at the external policy level (DE JONG, 2013:7; DEN HERTOG 
and STROSS, 2013:327) which clearly runs counter to the Union’s self-set objective of acting in a 
coordinated manner internationally (‘Speaking with one Voice’), a principle agreed on by the 
member states in 2006 (COM (2006) 105 final).  
Following this line of thought and given that energy is a highly strategic policy domain of utmost 
political sensitivity and thus subject to influences from various interest groups,28 one must 
assume that the EU’s external energy policy is hardly consistent. And indeed, past events have 
exactly shown this which is why scholars and policymakers have regularly called for an increase 
in consistency in the EU’s external energy relations, considering it as a precondition for the 
achievement of a secure, competitive and sustainable energy policy (JEGEN, 2014:8). According 
to them, the incapacity of the EU to achieve greater convergence in this regard is because its 
political energy landscape is riven by discord. Whilst one of the most prominent examples here 
is the EU’s energy approach towards Russia, inconsistencies do however also exist with respect 
to southern neighbourhood. In fact, in recent years, the EU’s energy policies towards the 
southern Mediterranean have increasingly been in the spotlight of criticism, with critics notably 
drawing on past regional energy-related experiences like the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) 
 
25 In fact, in view of the EU’s role in this regard, the need for consistency is particularly uncontested in European foreign policies, 
including energy, with related concepts such as coordination having been promoted in EU treaties and documents since the 1970s. 
For example, the so-called Luxembourg report first introduced European Political Cooperation (EPC) or European foreign policy 
coordination in 1970, whereas a clear reference to consistency first appeared in the communication of the Paris summit of December 
1974. Ever since the Paris summit, the principle has increasingly gained in importance – not only because the EU has grown 
internally, but also because it has multiplied its relations with foreign countries (DUKE, 1999:2). Driven by emerging challenges at 
the international level where the EU saw itself increasingly unable to cope with international crises such as the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union or the Gulf Wars, in 1992, policy consistency was introduced as a concept in European fundamental law in the 
framework of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), incorporating the Treaty of Maastricht and establishing a single institutional 
framework, namely, the EU. With this, and notably Article 13 of the TEU, the concept became legally binding and was somewhat 
institutionalised. Later, the request for consistency was legally and institutionally anchored in EU primary law with the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2007. CVCE (Accessed on 23 August 2019). 
26 The EU was riven by open discord over military action in Iraq, where notably Germany and France (which rejected any military 
intervention in Iraq) opposed the UK and Spain (LEWIS, 2008:5,9). 
 
27 Although not providing any military support, Germany did however support the objectives of the intervention. Bundesregierung 
(Accessed on 07 August 2018). 
28 that far exceed state agencies and attract a wide range of stakeholders, ranging from civil society to industry. 
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and Desertec projects as examples. A flagship project of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 
the goal of the MSP, as well as of Desertec, a Germany-based non-profit organisation, was or is to 
support the development of renewable energy sources (RES) and energy efficiency in the 
southern Mediterranean, partly to satisfy this region’s electricity supply needs, partly, to import 
some of this electricity and make it count towards the EU’s renewables targets. Whilst initially, it 
was believed that these projects would be crowned by success,29 since 2013, little news on the 
status of the MSP has been brought to the public. Likewise, the work of Medgrid, another 
industrial consortium, whose implementation strongly depended upon or was connected to the 
advancements of the plan (SARTORI, 2014:8), has been largely discontinued. Several problems 
also contributed to the discontinuation of Dii, a consortium made up of around 40 large 
multinational and international energy companies and with this to the provisional collapse of 
the Desertec project.30 In fact, by 2014, almost all the initial industrial shareholders of Dii31 had 
abandoned the initiative,32 which today no longer exists in its initial form33 but functions as a 
consultancy.34 Many factors having played a role here,35 the failure of these projects was in large 
parts because of disagreement amongst the different EU member states. In fact, struggling with 
its own electricity overcapacities at that time, in 2013, Spain vetoed a master plan for the 
implementation of the MSP (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:31), leading to 
its de facto dissolution.  
Summing up, it must be noted that all these projects have indubitably illustrated difficulties of 
the EU to find consensus on a common energy approach towards the southern Mediterranean, 
raising doubt about the consistency of the EU’s external energy relations (although caution is 
recommended against making any generalisations). Against this background, the literature 
warns that if the EU does not act with consistency, it might lose its leading role in its southern 
neighbourhood (SARTORI, 2014:9), a warning that is based on the assumption that consistency 
is a prerequisite for good governance.36 Indeed, as has been indicated before, there is 
widespread opinion not only among academic scholars (LEHNE, 2014:3; SZULECKI and 
WESTPHAL, 2014:44), but also among EU stakeholders that inconsistencies will inevitably result 
in unfulfilled policy goals. Therefore, numerous are those calling for greater consistency in the 
EU’s energy approach towards North Africa, a call that is even more important as one can 
observe that in recent years, the EU’s ambition to play a role or to exercise influence in the 
region has become increasingly difficult to realise, mirroring deep geopolitical change.  
 
29 notably because of the diversity of the stakeholders involved and because they were quite well received by the ‘supplying’ 
countries themselves. 
30 In fact, in 2013, the Desertec Foundation terminated its cooperation with Dii, following ‘many irresolvable disputes between the two 
entities in the area of future strategies, obligations and their communication and, last but not least, the managerial style of Dii’s top 
management.’ For the Desertec Foundation, the main reason for the split was a fear of being ‘dragged into the maelstrom of negative 
publicity about the management crisis and disorientation of the industrial consortium.’ CSP World (Accessed on 17 January 2018). 
31 including ABB, Bosch, Deutsche Bank, Münchner Rück and Siemens. In 2012 and 2013, respectively, Siemens and Bosch left Dii 
following their respective exits from the solar power business. Energymarketprice, PVTech (Accessed on 13 January 2018). 
32 Some of them had already been replaced before by Saudi Arabian ACWA Power or Chinese State Grid (SGCC), triggering 
discussions among the remaining European shareholders.  
33 In some countries like in France where Desertec was created in 2013, the initiative is now known under the name Desertec 
Alliance. 
34 Desertec (Accessed on 20 January 2018). 
35 such as a decreasing energy consumption and a growing renewable energy industry within the EU, having made the import of 
renewable energy into the EU superfluous (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:31), as well as the Arab Spring 
(TAGLIAPIETRA and ZACHMANN, 2016:4).  
36 In fact, the ‘struggle’ for consistency can be identified as one of the main hurdles to good (external) energy governance. E3G 
(Accessed on 30 October 2017). 
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1.1.3 Relevance  
 
As briefly indicated before, the launch of the European Energy Security Strategy in 2014, 
as well as the birth of the European Energy Union in 2015 have mirrored the increasing 
importance of energy in European (and international) politics and highlighted the renewed 
interest of both EU and national policymakers in the topic. This interest is obvious as more than 
half of all the energy the EU consumes, i.e. around 90% of its crude oil and 66% of its natural gas 
supplies,37 is imported, whereby much of this energy comes from Russia which accounts for 
around 27% and 40% of the Union’s petroleum oils and natural gas imports (the shares might be 
higher for individual member states).38 Against this background, and in the previously 
mentioned context of worsening diplomatic relations with Russia following the wars in Ukraine 
and Syria, as well as in an attempt to increase security of supply, competitiveness and 
environmental protection (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:122), the EU has started sharpening its 
focus on the integration of the southern Mediterranean into its regulatory space 
(COM/2015/080 final), a region that, as has been shown before, accounts for a considerable 
portion of the EU’s natural oil and gas needs.  
In this context, Algeria in particular has been identified as an ideal alternative to Russian gas 
supplies, able to provide a reliable portion of European energy supply.39 In 2018, the country 
exported the equivalent of 11.3% of the EU’s total gas imports,40 whereby overall, the southern 
EU countries make up for most of the Algerian gas exports, accounting for 28% (Italy), 22% 
(Spain) and 10% (France) respectively.41 Libya, in turn, is an important supplier of oil, 
accounting for around 6% of the Union’s total oil imports (supplying notably Italy, Germany and 
France).42 Egypt equally supplies some oil and has been tied to the EU by a Strategic Energy 
Partnership since 2008.43 By contrast, and not disposing of any relevant oil and gas resources of 
their own, Morocco and Tunisia do not play a role in the EU’s energy supply which, however, 
does not mean that they are not interesting from an energy perspective. On the contrary, what 
has been observed in recent years is that they have increasingly come into the spotlight of 
attention as regards their roles in renewable energies. In fact, it is notably44 in view of the threat 
of climate change that the EU has become increasingly aware of their vast and unused renewable 
energy potential, whereby the exploitation of these untapped resources is most advanced in 
Morocco which is the subject of this dissertation. Whilst the current situation and developments 
 
37 EC (Accessed on 21 January 2018). 
 
38 EC (Accessed on 26 August 2019). 
 
39 Dating back to the 1970s – a first natural gas import agreement between Algeria’s national oil and natural gas company Sonatrach 
and Italy’s energy company ENI was signed in 1972 – EU-Algerian trade relations have been relatively stable over the years, with 
Algeria also having become an important supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG), a composition of methane and a mixture of ethane 
used to convert natural gas to liquid form for ease and safety of storage transport. Indeed, despite some ups and downs between 
Algeria and some of its southern European clients, Algeria has never interrupted the supply of gas for any political, commercial or 
technical reasons, and not even in view of the potential threat of domestic terrorism. As stated by EU climate action and Energy 
Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete during a visit to Algiers in May 2015, it is therefore of utmost importance for Algeria to remain a 
privileged partner of the EU. In this spirit, the EU and Algeria signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the establishment 
of a Strategic Energy Partnership in 2013, including cooperation in conventional and renewable energies, while in 2015 during a 
High-level Energy Dialogue, both partners agreed to cooperate on gas, renewables, energy efficiency, energy market integration and 
energy infrastructure. Hydrocarbons Technology (Accessed on 28 January 2018); EC (Accessed on 27 January 2018); EC, EC, EC 
(Accessed on 17 November 2018);  
40 EC (Accessed on 26 August 2019). 
 
41 OEC (Accessed on 27 January 2018). Numbers as of 2017. 
 
42 EC (Accessed on 26 August 2019); OEC (Accessed on 27 January 2018).  
43 EC (Accessed on 27 January 2018). 
44 as well as in view of tightening global energy markets (rising energy demand…) and a context of rising oil prices. 
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along its southern flank are thus overall positive for the EU, there are still reasons to be 
concerned.  
As already mentioned, it must be highlighted that in recent years, the southern Mediterranean 
has been confronted with major geopolitical challenges, above all the Arab Spring which, 
according to the literature, has introduced ‘a series of dramatic political, socio-economic and 
security changes across the region’ (SARTORI, 2014:1) and has even revealed the boundaries of 
EU action as will be shown later.45 As a result, and in order to adapt to the new circumstances, 
the EU has been forced to revise its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), with the provisions 
of this revision extending to the energy sector. For example, whilst at their very beginning, 
relations were primarily centred around conventional fossil fuels (i.e. oil and natural gas), this 
began to change in the 2000s with growing concerns over global warming and the arrival of new 
technologies, leading to a stronger focus on RES both within and outside the EU (ESCRIBANO, 
2017:247-248). Nonetheless, and despite this new direction, the basis of relations remained the 
same, i.e. a supplier/buyer logic continued to prevail. A rethinking in this regard only took place 
in the 2010s after the failure of the MSP and Desertec, as well as in 2014 when the EU, in 
reaction to the Arab uprisings, started to show an increased interest in further developing its 
existing energy partnerships, as well as in creating new ones in the region.46 The catchwords 
today are mutual interdependence and exchange.  
The abovementioned geostrategic consequences of the Arab Spring have favoured ‘the 
emergence of new international actors in the Mediterranean energy game’ (SARTORI, 2014:2) or a 
new actor constellation: firstly, because the Mediterranean’s outstanding energy ressources 
attract an ever-increasing number of countries seeking new energy partnerships and investment 
opportunities and secondly, because the region itself is seeking to increasingly diversify its 
energy portfolios and relations. In this context, there is, as described by Zoubir and White 
(2015:367), a ‘rising dynamism of Gulf Arab state and non-state actors in the southern 
Mediterranean’, whilst ‘Russia has also extended its cooperation with North African countries to 
the energy sector.’47 On the EU side, member states like Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden or Portugal – which have never had a historical interest in North Africa – 
have signaled a growing interest in the region. In other words, whilst the latter used to be an 
issue to the southern EU member states Spain, France and Italy, it is now of interest to the EU as 
a whole.48 This recalibration of EU-North African energy relations is also the result of the 
ongoing migration crises linked to the civil wars in Libya and Syria (and the Arab uprisings in 
general). In fact, in view of rising awareness about the fact that war/migration and climate are 
inevitably connected, cooperation with the Northern African countries has increasingly moved 
up the political agenda within the EU.  
Further, and as revealed in a recent study carried out by MEDRESET, a ‘consortium of research 
and academic institutions focusing on different disciplines from the Mediterranean region to 
develop alternative visions for a new Mediterranean partnership and corresponding EU policies’,49 
 
45 TAGLIAPIETRA and ZACHMANN (03 October 2016), Can North Africa’s energy challenges become opportunities?, Bruegel 
(Accessed on 11 November 2017); ECFR (Accessed on 11 November 2017). 
 
46 EEAS (Accessed on 27 August 2019).  
47 GHANEM Dalia, KUZNETSOV Vasily (13 June 2018), Moscow’s Maghreb Moment, Carnegie Middle East Center (Accessed on 28 
August 2019). 
48 In fact, currently, the EU is no longer only challenged by divergent interests or parallel policies of the traditional member states 
active in the region but also by policies of new energy players.  
49 MEDRESET (Accessed on 27 August 2019). 
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the perceptibility of EU policies in the region is overall low, a verdict that includes the energy 
sector and was confirmed during early explorative interviews with key stakeholders in the 
region. Basically, ‘in most cases local respondents were unable to name even one of the energy 
policies, platforms or initiatives that the EU has put in place in the region’ (CEBECI, 2019:7). 
Similarily, and as for Morocco, another MEDRESET study assesses that ‘generally speaking, the 
impact of EU energy policies in Morocco is perceived as low or nonexistent’ (BIANCHI, 
COLANTONI, MASCOLO and SARTORI, 2018:21). The reasons brought forward for the EU’s 
‘limited involvement in the Moroccan energy sector’ being various (BIANCHI, COLANTONI, 
MASCOLO and SARTORI, 2018:21), there is consensus that maintaining this status is not an 
option but, as pointed out by Cebeci (2019:8), a serious problem to the EU, ‘especially in terms of 
actorness’. In fact, the EU’s lack of visibility may lead to a power vacuum that may be filled by 
other, external actors or in other words, ‘the EU’s actorness is limited in the region and susceptible 
to rivalry by other international actors that actually provide less than the EU but are more visible 
at the local level’ (2019:8). The risk of this happening is all the greater as the EU, in view of the 
abovementioned geopolitical developments in the southern Mediterranean, along with the far-
reaching changes in energy interests and strategies of the southern countries themselves, sees 
itself forced to cope with a bigger and more diverse number of energy stakeholders. This, in 
turn, provides a potential breeding ground for divergencies and inevitably has an impact on the 
EU’s ability to ‘Speak with one Voice’ or to speak one message with multiple voices – an ability 
that is however decisive to political power and a necessity if the EU’s visibility problem is to be 
tackled in a region of fast changes. In fact, only if the EU succeeds to act as a consistent entity 
capable of bringing together actors with different voices around one table, will it have an impact 
in the region and Morocco.  
Studying policy consistency in EU external energy governance towards Morocco is thus essential 
against this background, even more so, as in the past, the EU has not always acted in line with 
the principle of consistency as the aforementioned MSP and Desertec projects suggest. Indeed, 
these have allegedly shown that national priorities are considered to be more important or 
superior to shared concerns and have overall disclosed the existence of various bottlenecks. 
However, no study has ever investigated policy (in)consistency in the EU’s external energy 
approach towards this country, a gap that this dissertation seeks to fill.  
1.1.4 Research questions 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study EU energy governance towards Morocco, or 
policy (in)consistency in EU energy governance towards Morocco. With evidence given by both 
past and current policy developments, two main research questions arise: 
1) Is the EU consistent in its energy governance towards Morocco? 
 
2) How can this (in)consistency be explained?  
 
The dependent variable, i.e. the outcome variable is thus policy (in)consistency, whereas the 
independent variables or explanatory variables are factors that the author thinks explain 
variation in the dependent variable. They will be introduced or elaborated on in Chapter 3.  
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In fact, in view of the issues raised in the previous Chapters, one would expect that EU energy 
policies towards the southern Mediterranean or Morocco indeed lack a common or consistent 
approach. However, and as indicated before, this assumption has never been examined in an 
academic context which is why the author of this dissertation decided to concentrate on the 
issue of (in)consistency in EU energy governance towards Morocco. Consequently, the author 
seeks to explore whether there truly is an absence of consistency in the EU’s energy relations 
with Morocco and if yes, why.  
 
The overall goal hereby is to produce a comprehensive analysis that will serve as the basis for a 
contribution to EU external energy policy formulation by giving a comprehensive account of EU 
energy governance towards Morocco, with a view to identifying eventual windows of 
opportunity for the EU to improve its energy relations. Indeed, investigating consistency will 
help to determine whether, with respect to energy, the EU is internally cohesive enough to 
effectively act externally in a region that is of such vital importance.  
1.2 Scope 
 
The empirical focus of this dissertation is on (in)consistency in EU energy governance 
towards Morocco and excludes other North African or Maghreb countries from the analysis, not 
because they are irrelevant but because focusing on one case study only will allow for a more in-
depth analysis or understanding of the phenomenon. Further, and as has been revealed in the 
literature review, a large amount of EU external energy policy research has already covered 
energy security and supply countries. By contrast, in its role as a non-energy supplier to the EU, 
Morocco has, contrary to its neighbouring countries (Algeria, Tunisia,50 Libya and Egypt), 
received less academic attention so far.51 In fact, and as will become clear from the analysis of 
the literature, Morocco has only been dealt with academically in the context of multilateral 
cooperation.  
In addition to this, there are various empirical arguments that support the choice for Morocco 
which is indeed a unique case worthy of consideration:  
- Firstly, there is the role of geographics – strategically located at the crossroads between 
Europe, Africa and the Middle East, Morocco enjoys political stability and is not only a 
well appreciated partner of the EU, but also of a number of other countries in the region 
with which it maintains long-standing relations. In fact, on a general level, Morocco is an 
important trade partner to the EU and its most important partner country within the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework.52 Not acting consistently in this 
respect would (which is already the case as will be shown later) not only have dire 
consequences for the EU-Morocco relationship as such but also send negative signals to 
other potential partners in the region and ultimately have a negative impact on its 
stability. 
 
50 Although Tunisia has similar characteristics as Morocco, given this dissertation’s limited possibilities of research, it will not serve 
as a case study. 
51 Morocco is a country in the EU’s southern neighbourhood that is not directly relevant to the Union’s energy supply security. In fact, 
it is only indirectly relevant as a reduction of its regional energy imports would somehow increase the EU’s energy supply security 
by freeing up regional ressources. 
52 In fact, as will be shown later, it is the only country covered by the ENP that has been granted an advanced status. The issues of 
cooperation are security, terrorism, migration and climate change. 
 EP (Accessed on 23 August 2019). 
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- Secondly, at the energy level, Morocco is, unlike the other countries in the region not an 
energy supplier and thus struggles with similar energy challenges as the EU, such as, for 
example, high fossil fuel dependency and energy security concerns. At the same time, it is 
one of the largest energy markets in Africa and disposes of vast and under-exploited 
renewable energy potential, especially for solar and wind energy, as well as significant 
supposed oil and gas reserves (shale). Acting consistently in this view would not only 
allow to synergies to be used but also unlock market potential and opportunities.  
- Thirdly, equally at the energy level, Morocco is an active international energy partner 
that maintains a broad range of partnerships, whereby it strongly focuses on regional 
trade and shares the EU’s commitment to the fight against climate change and to the 
energy transition and continues to step up its role in international action on climate 
change.53 A self-proclaimed world leader in green energies, this is of great importance to 
the EU and its climate objectives and one reason why it should act in line with the 
principle of consistency.  
- Finally, the choice for Morocco is pragmatic and, in part, admittedly due to the limited 
possibilities for research in the other North African countries. 
 
As already indicated, the analysis examines the EU external energy policies and governance 
approaches towards Morocco of both the EU institutions and the EU member states. Whilst on 
the horizontal level, almost all actors involved in EU energy policymaking will be taken into 
consideration (corresponding actors will be identified over the course of this dissertation), the 
vertical focus will be on a selection of relevant EU member states. These are France, Spain and 
Germany which have all been identified as key players in the Moroccan energy landscape. 
1.3 Structure  
 
Aiming at responding to this PhD’s research questions, the dissertation comprises eight 
main parts which can be divided into four more theoretical and four empirical Chapters and the 
conclusion. They will be structured as followed: 
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to this dissertation and explores the research context, 
research problem, research relevance and the research questions, as well as the scope and the 
structure.  
Chapter 2 presents the state-of-the-art, well knowing that a comprehensive review of the 
available theoretical and empirical literature will actually help to build the theoretical 
framework of this thesis and to narrow down the research topic. The focus of the literature 
review is on two major streams, namely EU energy governance and policy consistency.  
Chapter 3 outlines the analytical framework of this dissertation. With the aim of providing 
appropriate clarification of the concept, it begins with the conceptual groundwork of policy 
consistency. Next, it tempts to operationalize the dependent variable policy consistency, 
whereby it introduces policy coordination as a proxy variable and identifies suitable methods of 
measurement. Then, and building on this, it looks into the independent variables or causes of 
 
53 In fact, as will be shown throughout this dissertation, Morocco has the potential to become a major player in the field of renewable 
energies and has already made a lot of progress towards the necessary energy transition of the southern Mediterranean. 
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policy consistency and also elaborates on the hypothesis. Finally, the fourth part describes the 
methodology used to empirically analyze (in)consistency in EU external energy governance.  
Chapter 4 marks the beginning of the empirical research. Before tackling the actual topic and in 
order to embed EU energy governance towards Morocco in a wider context, it makes use of an 
introductory section aimed at providing some contextual information on Morocco’s energy 
policy context. In fact, some background knowledge is given as regards Morocco’s current 
energy situation, including information and analysis of its energy profile, agenda, relations and 
stakeholders. The main focus is hereby on Morocco’s energy relations with third parties, i.e. with 
non-EU actors.  
Chapter 5 deals with the exploration of EU energy governance towards Morocco and aims at 
providing an illustration of the EU’s energy approach towards the Maghreb country. For this 
purpose, it begins with a background section aimed at sharing some contextual information on 
Morocco’s foreign policy context and its diplomatic relations with the EU. Next, it undertakes an 
examination of the status-quo of EU-Moroccan energy relations and their historical milestones, 
focusing on both multilateral and bilateral aspects. Finally, the third part is dedicated to the 
analysis of the institutional configurations and the in-depth investigation of the main European 
stakeholders present in the Moroccan energy landscape, including of their objectives and 
activities. 
Chapter 6 is dedicated to the assessment of consistency in the EU’s energy relations with 
Morocco and deals with the question whether the EU’s energy governance approach towards 
Morocco is consistent or not. In fact, the Chapter shows how consistency is implemented in 
different dimensions and at various levels and and seeks to detect the coordination patterns and 
processes of the main actors involved.  
Chapter 7 is based on the results of Chapter 6 and, dedicated to the variation in (in)consistency 
in the EU’s energy relations with Morocco, deals with the question how (in)consistency in the 
EU’s energy governance approach towards Morocco can be explained. Here and in an attempt to 
address the whys and wherefores of (in)consistency and to investigate the causes of 
(in)consistency or its underlying factors, it seeks to explore empirically-based justifications.  
Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation with a summary and synthesis of the key findings, as well 
as with a discussion on the strengths and limitations of this study. It finishes by pointing out 
potential directions for further research.  
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Part Two – State-of-the-art  
In what follows, this dissertation seeks to provide an overview of the state-of-the-art of 
previous and current literature, whereby, based on a review of earlier research, it aims to 
examine how the issue of policy (in)consistency in EU external energy governance has been 
addressed by a wide range of scholars so far. Given that up to the present, the problem has been 
primarily treated separately in the literature, the succeeding review will be divided into two 
sub-sections, one on EU external energy governance and one on policy consistency, whereby the 
focus will be both on theoretical and empirical literature.  
2.1 Literature related to energy governance  
2.1.1 Global energy governance  
 
Energy is a major, if not the most important global policy issue of the 21st century and a 
rather developed policy field, however, a review of the literature shows that it took some time 
for global energy governance (GEG)54 to emerge as an independent domain of political science.  
In fact, it was only in the context of concerns over energy supply security and climate change 
that research in GEG has grown over the the last few years, putting an end to three decades of 
‘relative neglect’. Indeed, following a peak in the 1970s in the context of the 1973 oil crisis, 
international political economy (IPE) research related to energy was, contrary to environment-
related research, rather limited in the 1980s and 1990s (KUZEMKO, BELYI, GOLDTHAU and 
KEATING, 2012:1; VAN DE GRAAF and COLGAN, 2015:2). This situation persisted until the 
2000s when international energy was, if at all, primarily studied from a realist or geopolitical or 
a liberal (market) perspective, rather than from a constructivist or GEG perspective (KUZEMKO, 
BELYI, GOLDTHAU and KEATING, 2012:2; PRONTERA, 2017:16). This lack of theoretical 
explanations for international energy relations was only eliminated in recent years (2010s), 
notably thanks to the emergence of authors like Florini and Sovacool (2009), Goldthau (2010), 
Lesage (2010), Leal-Arcas (2014, 2017), Colgan (2012, 2015) and Van de Graaf (2011, 2013, 
2015, 2016). 
Defined as the ‘international collective efforts undertaken to manage and distribute energy 
resources and provide energy services’ (FLORINI and SOVACOOL, 2009:Abstract), scholars 
engaged in the field of GEG deal with the question of how the global energy sector is governed.55 
The term GEG itself emerged in the mid-2000s within the group of the G8 nations and as a 
consequence of growing concerns over energy security in Europe and climate change (VAN DE 
GRAAF and COLGAN, 2015:1). It was based on a broad consensus that international energy 
cooperation is weak, a view shared in the literature according to which governance is mostly 
‘limited to the extraction, production and trade of fossil fuels’ (LESAGE and VAN DE GRAAF, 
2016:1), with the result being insufficient security of energy supply at the global level (LEAL-
ARCAS, FILIS and ABU GOSH, 2014:19). In this context, energy security or security of energy 
 
54 Characterised by a sustained level of interdependence between a multitude of actors, organisations and policies, this system is 
spurred by several trends such as globalisation and regionalisation. WB (Accessed on 05 January 2019). 
55 Overall, governance is ‘concerned with systems and processes through which multiple, inter-related policy areas are addressed’ 
(GREENWOOD, 2016:5). 
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supply and demand is indeed one of the five major objectives of the concept, whilst others are 
economic development, international security, environmental stability and domestic good 
governance (VAN DE GRAAF and COLGAN, 2015:3-4).  
There is a great degree of non-uniformity in the literature as to who governs the GEG system 
(KNODT, PIEFER and MÜLLER, 2015:25) and answering this question depends very much on the 
theoretical pathway chosen. In fact, depending on whether one follows a realist/geopolitical or 
liberal approach, the global energy sector is governed either by national states or international 
organisations. In the first case, scholars identify a long-standing hegemony of the US, whereby 
recent years have seen a clear shift towards more multipolarism (see for example the emergence 
of China as a net energy importer). In the second case, both the IEA and the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are often identified as key organisations (VAN DE GRAAF 
and COLGAN, 2015:4), although not unanimously. In any case, no matter which organization is 
considered the most important, there is consensus in the literature that there is not such a thing 
as a global energy body. On the contrary, each energy organisation pursues a different purpose. 
For example, whilst the IEA and the OPEC respectively have the objective to defend consumer 
and producer interests, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) aims to set regulation while the 
International Energy Forum seeks to reduce transaction costs. Overall though, it must be said 
that recent years have seen a move away from the realist/geopolitical or liberal towards a more 
comprehensive approach, with most academics agreeing that ‘GEG is formed by an interaction 
between international, national and subnational actors’, and that these ‘interactions are complex 
and characterized by multiple points of contact’ (VAN DE GRAAF and COLGAN, 2015:4-6).  
2.1.2 EU energy governance 
 
Energy has been a driver of the European idea (MOMETE, 2015:463) and the literature 
recognises the vital role energy has played in the emergence of the European Union which arose 
from an energy issue as demonstrated by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 
1952 and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) or EURATOM of 1957.56 At the same 
time, energy has often been a source of division and the literature acknowledges that European 
energy policy is far from being complete, a contradiction that is described by Morata and Solorio 
Sandoval (2012:1), who say that ‘it is fairly paradoxical that the integration process has never 
developed so far as to lay the foundations for a fully-fledged and coherent common energy policy, 
which has instead become one of the weakest policy areas’ to date. According to widespread 
opinion in the literature, but also amongst policymakers, this is particularly true for external 
energy policy and issues such as security of supply where ‘[…] cooperation of EU institutions and 
member states has proven to be weak […]’ (LEAL-ARCAS and WOUTERS, 2017:37, 46). Indeed, 
the EU has not been yet able to develop a common energy policy that is comprehensive enough 
to cover the external dimension and as a result, does not ‘speak with one voice’ on international 
energy issues, a shortcoming which, in turn, hampers it from achieving common external energy 
objectives (SCHUBERT, POLLAK and KREUTLER, 2016:202). As a result, integration has 
primarily taken place in relation to the internal energy market so far (JORGENSEN, AARSTAD, 
DRIESKENS, LAATIKAINEN and TONRA, 2015:914), whereas it remains modest as regards 
external energy policies, an area that, as of today, is largely considered one of conflict. This is 
justified in the literature mainly by the fact that EU external energy policymaking is a 
 
56 In fact, the ECSC and the EAEC having built the basis of the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and the European Economic Community (EEC). 
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particularly complex issue, involving a wide range of different actors from both the public and 
private sectors, which makes it difficult to achieve any harmony.  
Indeed, there is a considerable amount of literature on EU energy policy that focuses on the 
internal dimension of this policy, whereas studies have hardly focused on its external dimension. 
This ‘has remained virtually absent from studies on EU foreign policy’ (YOUNGS, 2009:5), a 
shortcoming that has only begun to be addressed in the context of recurrent concerns over the 
EU’s energy supply security situation on its eastern borders. And, indeed, recent years have seen 
the emergence of a whole body of works on the issue of energy supply security (HAGHIGHI, 
2007; YOUNGS, 2009). Despite this focus of the literature on energy security, energy 
sustainability-related aspects have also started to move up the academic agenda, notably in view 
of the threat of climate change. Given that each of these aspects (energy supply security, 
sustainability & environment) entails in itself a broad range of analysis and in view of this 
dissertation’s research topic, the following review will only examine recent international 
relations and political science literature on EU external energy policy towards Morocco. In this 
context, in order to better grasp the idea of policy consistency in EU energy governance towards 
Morocco, and before delving into the relevant literature, it is however first of all necessary to 
build up a basic understanding of the notion of EU external governance in general.  
The external dimension 
In order to achieve its internal objectives, no matter in which domain, the EU needs to promote 
its interests abroad, i.e. in its relations with third countries. To do so, it seeks to develop 
regulatory convergence between itself and third countries through what is called ‘external 
governance’, describing the expansion of its rules and norms beyond its formal borders through 
an institutionalised form of coordinated action (LAVENEX and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:795). 
Lavenex (2004:682-683), one of the leading authors in the field of external governance and its 
conceptualisation, hereby distinguishes between external governance and cooperation, arguing 
that the former goes beyond the latter as it seeks to expand the EU’s so-called ‘acquis 
communautaire’, i.e. its legal framework or internal rules abroad by offering a predefined set of 
incentives. According to this very basic definition, governance can be classified as a more intense 
form of cooperation and, based on the idea of ‘voluntarism’,57 is compared to cooperation, rather 
destined to a limited number of countries.  
According to Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009:796), expansion of the acquis can take place in 
three different modes, namely hierarchy, networks and markets and can be of different nature, 
legal, institutional, cultural etc. Moreover, it can (but not must), lead to the entry of the target 
countries into the internal institutional circle of the EU, i.e. to full integration into the EU or to EU 
membership. Whilst hierarchy implies a relationship of ‘domination and subordination’ and 
notably refers to legislation, networks and markets imply a relationship in ‘which the actors are 
formally equal’,58 referring in the case of networks, for example to negotiations and in the case of 
markets to mutual recognition (LAVENEX and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:797-799). Network 
governance, as opposed to hierarchy governance, does not take place top-down, but is ‘only 
 
57 For example, third countries may accept EU rules as ‘the normative reference point of their negotiations with the EU, or develop joint 
rules’, however, the possibility exists that in the end, they may not adopt or apply these rules (LAVENEX and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 
2009:801). 
58 implying a less top-down and more participatory expansion or transfer of the acquis (LAVENEX and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 
2009:796). 
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loosely coupled to the formal legislative organs of the Union’, and ‘takes place in decentralized, 
sectorally specialized governance institutions such as agencies, committees or policy networks’. 
Finally, market governance occurs as a ‘result of competition between formally autonomous 
actors’ (LAVENEX and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:797-799). 
EU external governance extends over different geographical zones and thematic areas of 
influence, with energy being only one part of it. Indeed, in view of the increasing global energy 
challenges ahead and the magnitude of its internal energy problems, over the past couple of 
years, the EU has increasingly sought to integrate energy into its foreign policy relations with 
third countries (YOUNGS, 2007:1), a move that has also been strongly motivated by the wish to 
exercise a certain influence internationally (NEFRAMI, 2012:157).59 Its ultimate aim hereby is 
the integration of third countries in its internal energy market through energy sector reforms in 
the partner countries, whereby it has identified its eastern and southern neighbourhoods as 
being equally important, seeking for both regions to become ‘full, important and equal players’ in 
its ‘internal gas and electricity markets’ (COM (2003) 262 final). To achieve this, it relies on 
external energy governance, an approach that is closely linked to its three main internal energy 
policy objectives, namely energy security, competitiveness and sustainability,60 as well as to its 
external policy interests (NEFRAMI, 2012:16) and puts strong emphasis on market access and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) considerations. The legal basis for this approach is the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) of 1998 (NEFRAMI, 2012:162) which developed in a context of insecurity 
over Russian gas supplies and used to be a nonbinding treaty bringing together around 52 
states61 with the aim of promoting international (or European) norms (for example, with respect 
to dispute settlement) in the energy sector.62 And whilst the southern Mediterranean countries 
are not members or only observers of the Energy Charter Conference,63 the EU’s energy policies 
towards this region are nonetheless embedded in an external energy governance framework 
with, as mentioned before, the purpose of extending the EU’s internal energy market in order to 
create a common regulatory area. In fact, through the transfer of the principles of its energy 
market, the EU seeks to convince its southern neighbours of the advantages of regional energy 
cooperation,64 whereby it is essential to avoid situations in which the member states do not 
‘speak with one voice’ on corresponding energy issues. The prerequisite for this is a coordinated 
approach at the EU level that translates into consistent communication outside of the EU which, 
as underlined by Alar Olljum, adviser at the European External Action Service (EEAS), is ‘about 
having one message and many voices, and sharing common narratives on key foreign policy issues 
in the geopolitics of energy’.65  
In terms of literature coverage, the picture as regards EU external energy governance is similar 
to that of GEG: academic output has only increased in recent years and is, as a rule, either 
generic, i.e. focusing, for example, on the challenges and limitations of this governance, or 
centred around the issue of energy supply security. Indeed, so far, research has been driven by 
a) global energy-related geopolitical changes and b) repeating energy supply security threats 
 
59 In this respect, the EU is a member of international energy organisations like the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
60 EC (Accessed on 02 April 2017). 
61 The founding members were, apart from the EU and its member states, nine eastern European countries (today, it has 11 
members). 
62 In 2004, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was transformed into a binding multilateral agreement under the Energy Charter 
Secretariat. 
63 Energy Charter (Accessed on 02 January 2019). 
64 EC (Accessed on 03 September 2017).  
65 Parlementaire Monitor (Accessed on 02 December 2019).  
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occurring notably in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, with prominent experts in this regard 
being, for example, Kuzemko, Belyi, Goldthau and Keating (2012). The focus has hereby 
principally been on natural gas, notably with respect to the eastern neighbourhood (ABBASOV, 
2014), except for Weber (2016) who, in his research on EU natural gas governance, included 
both the eastern (Azerbaijan) and southern (Algeria) neighbourhoods. At this point, it must be 
noted that researchers have generally rather focused on the EU’s energy relations with supplier 
countries, whereas the relations with transit countries have received less attention so far. This is 
surprising given the important role these countries play in ensuring the security of the EU’s 
energy supply and the fact that they share similar energy challenges as the EU. Further, research 
has clearly prioritised the eastern over the southern neighbourhood and to the author’s best 
knowledge, little research has been done so far as regards this region. Indeed, relations with 
Russia or Azerbaijan (neighbours of the neighbours) have been widely researched, particularly 
in the context of the Southern Gas Corridor. Another popular topic has been the Energy 
Community. Whilst this seems to be logical given the sheer importance the eastern 
neighbourhood plays in the EU’s energy supply, it by no means reflects current energy 
geopolitical developments. On the contrary, Algeria and Libya (as well as to a lesser extent 
Egypt) are also important energy suppliers to the EU. However, the bibliography on relations 
with these countries is limited. Moreover, the sparse existing literature on the EU’s southern 
neighbourhood has above all examined Euro-Mediterranean energy cooperation from a regional 
point of view (i.e. from the perspective of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), for example) 
(CAMBINI, 2014; TAGLIAPIETRA, 2016) with a focus on technical aspects (RUBINO, OZTURK, 
LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015). By contrast, bilateral energy relations have hardly been 
investigated which is astonishing given that the privileged focus on bilateral cooperation in EU-
Mediterranean relations has clearly been outlined in the literature. While gas supplier Algeria 
has received quite considerable attention, other fossil fuel suppliers like Libya or Egypt have 
only been covered very superficially66 and transit countries like Tunisia or Morocco have almost 
not been dealt with at all to the author’s best knowledge.  
Overall, the literature displays an EU-centric bias here as it primarily investigates EU external 
energy governance from a single-level point of view, focusing on the EU sui generis.67 In fact, 
whilst the focus is on the supranational level, the national level is hardly considered. Indeed, 
outside the multi-level governance framework, bilateral relations involving the EU member 
states are barely taken into account. An exception here are the so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, South Africa). For example, in their work on the challenges of EU external energy 
governance towards these countries, Knodt, Piefer and Müller (2015) also focus on their 
relations with Denmark, Germany, Spain and the UK. By contrast, and as regards the southern 
Mediterranean, bilateral energy relations between the countries of this region and the EU 
member states, especially the northern ones, have been covered insufficiently so far (‘north-
south split’).68 In fact, there are barely any authors that discuss or touch upon French-Moroccan 
and German-Moroccan energy relations and the joint energy policies of Germany and France 
towards Morocco have not yet been empirically analysed or compared to one another. In this 
 
66 It can be only speculated that this is because of current instability in this region, although this would be all the more reason to 
conduct corresponding research as the overall economic and political situation of North Africa might have a strong impact on energy 
cooperation with the EU. In fact, with each change in leadership, there is a risk that the new leading power might be tempted to 
explore other forms of energy cooperation.  
67 Latin, ‘of its own kind’. 
68 The ‘north-south split’ describes the phenomenon that EU-Mediterranean policies have been largely driven by the Mediterranean 
member states, as the Northern member states have shown less interest in this region (BEHR and TIILIKAINEN, 2016:25). 
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context, there is also a lack of a North African perspective i.e. the existing literature does not 
sufficiently investigate these countries’ perceptions of European energy policies towards them. 
Again, an exception here is the work of Rubino, Ozturk, Lenzi and Costa Campi (2015), who 
analyse how energy experts and regulators perceive the role of the EU and regulatory/technical 
networks like MedReg in energy rule adoption in the region. Another exception are the 
aforementioned MEDRESET work packages which sought to assess the effectiveness and 
potential of EU energy policies in Morocco (and the southern Mediterranean in general).69 
2.2 Literature related to policy consistency  
2.2.1 Policy coherence, consistency & coordination 
 
Research on policy coherence, consistency and coordination has been blossoming in 
recent years and although a scanning of the literature reveals that the main analytical focus has 
been on coherence so far, it is in fact difficult to actually grasp the amount of research done on 
each of the concepts as they are all closely related, with their terms, in view of a lack of 
conceptual clarity, being regularly used interchangeably. However, as a rule, there is a tendency 
to define coherence as a superordinate concept, whilst consistency and coordination are 
generally rather considered to be sub-concepts. Therefore, this review will not only focus on the 
literature on consistency but also include the concepts of coherence and coordination, as well as 
other related notions such as integration. 
The concept of policy coherence/consistency emerged in the 1990s and is thus a rather new 
approach, both in politics where it has become a pressing issue in view of globalisation and 
growing interdependencies in international relations, and in political science. However, and 
presenting an overall challenge in public administrations (MARANGONI, 2014:19), it has rapidly 
gained in prominence, especially from the late 1990s/ early 2000s onwards, notably through the 
publications of the OECD and the European Commission on Policy Coherence for Development 
(PCD). It is now widespread in governance (LEVI-FAUR, 2012), where it is associated with good 
governance, but can also be found in the literature on policy analysis and institutional analysis 
(MORGAN, CAMPBELL, CROUCH, PEDERSEN and WHITLEY, 2010), as well as in organisational 
literature such as intergovernmental management (AGRANOFF, 1986; 1996) and policy 
networks (KICKERT, 1997).  
The concept of policy coherence/consistency has been investigated extensively from a 
theoretical point of view (CHRISTIANSEN, 2001; MISSIROLI, 2001; ASHOFF, 2005; NUTTALL, 
2005; PORTELA and RAUBE, 2008; CARBONE, 2009 etc.), with Nuttall (2005) notably providing 
for a well-regarded historical and terminological introduction to the concept. By contrast, 
scholars such as Gauttier (2004) and Bertea (2005) offer some legal analysis, whereas others 
like Smith (2001) look into the institutional aspects. Overall, a large amount of research has 
traditionally been done in PCD (OECD, 2001-2015; HOEBINK, 1999; CARBONE, 2008) which, 
together with policy coherence in sustainable development, development cooperation, aid 
policies and poverty reduction, are by far the most researched fields of studies. As regards the 
EU, some more specific research has been done in trade (MORISSEY, 1999 or BRETHERTON and 
VOGLER in 2008 on external fisheries policies), security (PICCIOTTO, 2004) and migration 
 
69 MEDRESET, MEDRESET (Accessed on 02 December 2019).  
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(LAVENEX and KUNZ, 2009), with the issue of policy coherence having become a topic of 
recurrent interest in the study of EU policy-making and governance.  
In fact, there is a rapidly growing body of literature on the different types of 
coherence/consistency, with numerous scholars focusing on horizontal coherence, i.e. on 
coherence between the EU institutions (GEBHARD, 2011) and on the question of how the Treaty 
of Lisbon has brought about institutional changes to improve coherence at this level (GASPERS, 
2008; MARANGONI, 2012). Mainly adopting an institutionalist perspective, they concentrate on 
a departure from the pillar structure and the creation of the post of the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). Nonetheless, vertical coherence, i.e. 
coherence between the EU institutions and the member states has also been a topic of recurrent 
interest, and so has been external coherence. Indeed, given its centrality to the study of the EU’s 
external relations and actions, policy coherence is a popular topic in the literature on EU foreign 
policies (PORTELA and RAUBE, 2009; DEN HERTOG and STROSS, 2013; GEBHARD, 2017), 
where a number of papers have concentrated on legal analysis (CREMONA, 2008; DEN HERTOG 
and STROSS, 2013). For example, as far as external horizontal coherence is concerned, to be 
mentioned is the work of Dahlquist and Isendahl (2008), who investigated the reasons for 
horizontal coherence in the EU’s external activities, concluding that they lie within the pillar 
structure introduced by the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). Tulmet (2008) and Thaler 
(2015) by contrast deal with external coherence in the ENP and whilst Tulmet analyses the issue 
from a general perspective, Thaler specifically focuses on Russia. As for the southern 
neighbourhood or Morocco, one must highlight the work of Hoebink (2005) who demonstrated 
the existence of several inconsistencies in the EU-Moroccan relationship, notably as regards 
migration, agriculture and fishery. However, other policy areas have remained unexplored and, 
all in all, so Blockmans, Kostanyan, Remizov, Slapakova and Van der Loo (2017:132), ‘the 
amount of literature that explicitly analyses coherence in the ENP is rather limited.’ 
A rather new approach in politics, the concept of policy coordination has (just like policy 
coherence) only started to be extensively researched as of the 1980s when it slowly but surely 
began to grow into a real concern to governments. One the one hand, in the context of the 
emergence of new management models like New Public Management and, on the other hand, 
because of the recognition of problems like climate change that can not be resolved by individual 
governments but only jointly on a global scale (PETERS, 2018:2). As a result, nowadays, 
coordination covers a wide range of sectors and research can be found in various kinds of 
literature including that related to organisation studies (MINTZBERG, 1979; ALEXANDER, 1995) 
or that on political science and public administration (DIMITRAKOPOULOS and PASSAS, 2003) 
of which the study on coordination in the EU is but one strand. Several authors deserve to be 
mentioned here, above all Jordan and Schout (2008) whose work focuses on network 
governance mechanisms across the EU or Kassim, Wright and Peters (2001) who more 
specifically deal with the coordination of EU policies in the member states.  
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the previous literature suffers from certain shortcomings 
with one weakness being the fact that coordination has been generally primarily dealt with as an 
independent variable, whilst coordination as a dependent variable remains ‘largely under-
explored’ (DEBAERE, 2013:9). One exception here is Debaere (2013), who studied internal EU 
coordination for the G7, G8 and G20 as a dependent variable. Another weakness is the fact that 
although the body of literature is growing, research on coordination in the EU is rather general 
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or limited to the analysis of general coordination mechanisms or of coordination in certain areas 
such as external policies, whereby the focus is generally on the EU institutions (MARANGONI, 
2014). By contrast, the literature does not specifically assess coordination of external policies 
towards different geographical or policy areas (for instance, energy). 
2.2.2 Policy consistency in EU energy governance 
 
Whilst research on policy coherence/consistency in the EU covers almost all policy fields, 
the areas environment and energy have gained less attention so far and although there are some 
researchers focusing on the environment (PERSSON, 2002), this is less evident for energy, let 
alone external energy. In fact, overall, the literature has primarily focused on the internal 
dimension of EU energy policymaking i.e. on coherence or consistency within a policy (internal), 
within one institution between different policy areas (intra-institutional) or within a policy, but 
between different institutions (inter-institutional). For example, as regards inter-institutional 
coherence, worth mentioning is the study of De Jong and Schunz (2012) in which they assess 
coherence in energy security and climate change policies before and after the Lisbon Treaty. 
Similarly, Nilsson, Strambo and Mansson (2014) take a qualitative look at the coherence 
between EU energy security and climate change policies. Another important study was carried 
out by Iulii and Lenschow (2015) who focus on energy policy coherence and more precisely on 
energy security and environmental policy coordination within the European Commission. By 
contrast, to the author’s best knowledge, so far, research on coherence/consistency on the 
external dimension of EU energy policymaking, notably the EU’s external energy governance, is 
limited. An exception here is De Jong (2013) who addresses the issue of coherence in EU energy 
security governance, laying a focus on natural gas. This is the current situation although the EU 
external energy policy literature seems indicate an awareness of the issue of coherence, having 
notably identified the vertical dimension, i.e. the relation between the supranational and 
intergovernmental levels, as a major source for incoherence. However, one key limitation here is 
the fact that the issue has been principally tackled by looking at it as an independent variable.  
In fact, the lack of coherence/consistency has regularly been used as an explanation for 
ineffective energy policies, with scholars stating that it is internal problems that hamper the 
development and conduct of any efficient external energy policy (SZULECKI and WESTPHAL, 
2014:38). By contrast, scholars have not really or only to a limited extent, looked at the issue as 
a dependent variable, meaning they have not yet identified the causes for 
incoherence/inconsistency. Or to put it differently, whilst they have identified a lack of 
coherence as the main cause for the EU’s absence in the international energy landscape, they 
have never really investigated the reasons for this lack (coherence as a dependent variable).  
2.3 Limitations of previous research and novelty of the study 
 
Research on EU energy governance and policy consistency in EU energy governance is 
limited. A closer look into the literature has revealed a number of gaps and shortcomings with 
respect to the research topic.  
The first gap concerns the literature on EU energy governance, with the external dimension of 
this approach having been largely underexposed, notably when compared with the internal 
dimension. This is particularly apparent as regards the EU’s southern neighbourhood, a region 
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that has been considerably neglected in academic papers so far, whereby notably Morocco has 
received a particularly low level of attention (above all when compared with Algeria). Whilst the 
reasons for this failure are largely unknown, one may assume that it is because Morocco’s role as 
an energy supplier to the EU is limited. The second gap can be found in the literature on policy 
coherence/consistency. In fact, although research has illuminated policy coherence/consistency 
in EU policy-making, including internal and external energy policies, no study to date has 
examined the issue with regard to energy policies towards Morocco. Moreover, the review of the 
literature has shown that, to date, the issue of coherence/consistency in EU external energy 
policy has been principally looked at as an independent and not a dependent variable. The third 
gap concerns the literature on policy coordination. In fact, whilst research on EU coordination, 
including international organisations exists – noteworthy here is the dissertation of Debaere 
(2013) – it is, however, not comprehensive. In fact, so far, coordination has been primarily 
conceptualised as an independent variable and, as pointed out by Debaere (2013:47), ‘any 
systematic research of when and why EU member states coordinate is lacking’. Moreover, to the 
author’s best knowledge, no previous studies have so far investigated the role of coordination in 
the EU’s external energy approach. Overall, it can be concluded that no research has been 
conducted so far on EU energy governance towards Morocco, let alone on policy consistency in 
EU energy governance towards Morocco, a shortcoming that this dissertation seeks to address. 
Against this background, this dissertation seeks to provide added value to the academic 
literature in several ways:  
- First, by focusing on Morocco as a target country, this dissertation also takes into 
consideration more general governance mechanisms towards the southern 
Mediterranean.  
- Second, whilst this thesis’ primary research interest is to investigate policy consistency 
in EU energy governance towards Morocco based on the testimony of EU stakeholders or 
actors, its secondary research interest is to shed some light on how EU external energy 
governance is perceived by the target country, i.e. by Morocco itself. How does Morocco 
see or evaluate EU external energy governance, including that of the EU institutions and 
the member states, compared with the external energy governance approaches of the 
other actors active in the region? In other words, how does it evaluate EU policies in the 
wider geopolitical context of the region? This is important as the way this issue has been 
looked at in the literature so far has been very Euro-centric. 
- Third, this thesis conceptualises policy consistency as a dependent variable, seeking to 
analyse the causes of consistency, whereby it will take into consideration both internal 
and external factors that can be found at the EU, national and target country levels. In 
this context, it will seek to shed light on several aspects that have remained under-
estimated so far, notably the role of external factors such as the increasing involvement 
of international and regional actors like the US, China or the Gulf countries in the 
southern Mediterranean/Morocco. Likewise, the impact of these actors has equally 
remained under-researched (BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and 
VAN DER LOO, 2017:117). 
On the whole, and by seeking to fill the abovementioned gaps, the aim of this dissertation is to 
enrich the existing literature on policy consistency and EU external energy governance. 
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Part Three – Analytical framework 
The following Chapter lays down the analytical framework of this dissertation and 
elaborates on both its dependent and the independent variables, i.e. on policy consistency and 
its causes. It is divided into four sections.  
The first part of the Chapter is dedicated to the conceptualisation of policy consistency as the 
dependent variable, whereby it provides some conceptual background of the term and 
elaborates on its nature with the aim of agreeing on a working definition. Building on this, the 
second part discusses operationalisation or how to operationalise consistency, i.e. how to 
develop a research procedure that allows for empirical measurement of the concept or that 
results in empirical observations representing the concept (TOSHKOV, 2016:83). In this context, 
it introduces policy coordination as a proxy variable for consistency, as well as the variable’s 
different conceptual dimensions and a scale that typifies different levels of coordination in order 
to measure coordination. The third part is devoted to the development of an explanatory 
framework for policy consistency and introduces variables potentially able to explain 
consistency in EU energy governance towards Morocco. Concretely, the author looks into four 
main factors capable of explaining internal EU consistency, namely: competencies, interests and 
interdependencies. For each variable, the author will – as a result of the review of the literature 
and grounded in theoretical constructs – formulate a hypothesis which is to be tested in Chapter 
7. Finally, the fourth and last part presents the methodology adopted by this research in order to 
answer the research questions.  
3.1 Conceptualisation: determining the dependent variable 
 
The concept of policy coherence is highly complex and one reason why the author will 
refrain from looking at policy (in)coherence as the dependent variable but will rather look at 
policy (in)consistency instead. There are several reasons for this decision or choice, above all the 
fact that the question of complexity remains a serious challenge in the literature (THOMAS, 
2012:460). One major problem here is the fact that policy (in)coherence is cross-sectoral, i.e. for 
it to be measured, one would need to look at several policies or sectors at the same time. 
Another problem, so Ashoff (2005:40), lies in the ‘socio-economic and political development’ 
which implies that neither coherence nor incoherence are static; quite the contrary, what may 
seem to be coherent today, may turn out to be incoherent tomorrow (GATTI, 2016:36). Against 
this background and also because the EU itself largely refers to consistency rather than to 
coherence in official EU documents, the dependent variable the author of this dissertation seeks 
to investigate is consistency, or, to be more precise, consistency in EU energy governance 
towards Morocco. To measure consistency which, as will be shown later, is equally difficult to 
quantify, the author will hereby make use of a proxy variable, namely coordination.  
3.1.1 Consistency as dependent variable 
 
As just indicated, the overall purpose of this dissertation is to determine whether and to 
which extent EU energy governance towards Morocco is consistent or not, i.e. the dependent 
variable is policy consistency. However, policy consistency is, as shown before, closely related or 
linked to other concepts just as policy coherence which often contributes to conceptual 
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confusion and may also be an issue as regards the conduct of interviews (LAAKSO, KIVIMÄKI 
and SEPPÄNEN, 2007:43). Therefore, it is in the following necessary to provide a certain level of 
knowledge about the different terms which is why this Chapter, in an attempt to bring clarity to 
them, will provide a descriptive and critical overview of the terminological landscape.  
 ‘Despite its over-use in the literature and in political debate, the notion of coherence is among the 
most frequently misinterpreted and misused concepts in EU foreign policy’ (GEBHARD, 2011:123) 
and thus requires some terminological clarity. In fact, ‘coherence’ is ‘both a practical and 
intellectual concern’ (HYDEN, 2013:58) and coming from the Latin word ‘cŏ-haerĕo’ which 
means ‘to be united’, is not about eradicating or removing differences (CREMONA, 2008:32), but 
rather about avoiding negative spillovers and consequences while exploiting positive ones in 
order to achieve defined objectives. It is a relatively broad concept that, despite having been 
under continuous development, is characterised by literary ambiguity: one reason for this 
terminological confusion might lie in the literature where the terms ‘coherence’ and ‘consistency’ 
are considered to be either identical or different (ROGGE and REICHARDT, 2015:5-7), another 
might have been the translation of the word coherence into various other languages of the 
Community (GEBHARD, 2017:108).70 And although in this context some scholars are still divided 
as to whether any conceptual differentiation between the two terms is an analytical necessity at 
all (NUTTALL, 2005:93), most of them (especially legal scholars) however do distinguish 
between the two concepts (DEN HERTOG and STROSS, 2013:375), generally referring to 
coherence as the achievement of synergies, whereas they consider consistency to be the absence 
of contradictions (or adverse effects) (MISSIROLI, 2001:182; GAUTTIER, 2004:23; 
HOFFMEISTER, 2008:161; BLOCKMANS and LAATSIT, 2012:138). This was not always the case 
though and initially, scholars largely attributed coherence to ‘the absence of, or a reduction in 
contradictions between various aspects of public policy’ (KOULAIMAH-GABRIAL and OOMEN, 
1997:2). Only later did this become a minimum requirement and the concept was extended to 
the idea of creating a sort of added value (MISSIROLI, 2001:182) or complementarity (WESTON 
and PIERRE-ANTON, 2003:13) and can now be considered as ‘a policy whose objectives, 
strategies and mechanisms are attuned; these objectives should reinforce each other, or as a 
minimum not conflict with them’ (AGUIAR MOLINA, 2003:2044). Contrary to this, consistency 
has rather negative connotations and can be understood as a minimum condition for coherence 
or being subordinate to coherence (MISSIROLI, 2001:182; GAUTTIER, 2004:25; HILLION, 
2008:12), focusing according to Gebhard (2011:106), very much on the outcome of policy 
processes (‘goal-orientation’) and not as coherence on the quality of such processes. It can be 
best defined as ‘coordinated […] behaviour […] where comparable and compatible methods are 
used in pursuit of a single objective and result in an uncontradictory (foreign) policy’ (KRENZLER 
and SCHNEIDER, 1997:134). Consistency is, unlike coherence, more static, i.e. it involves less 
interaction between actors and policies (GAUTTIER, 2004:26) and is therefore much easier to 
measure (MISSIROLI, 2001:4). Indeed, whether a policy is considered coherent or not largely 
depends on the perception of the ‘receiving end’ of a policy (KOULAIMAH-GABRIAL and OOMEN, 
1997:6), whereas a policy is, as put by Missiroli (2004:1), either consistent or not.  
As this suggests, coherence is about harmonisation and positively related to effectiveness, with 
Aggestam, Anesi, Edwards and Hill (2008:12) defining it as ‘the ability to pull together diverse 
 
70 For example, whilst the German, French and Spanish respectively refer to coherence as ‘Kohärenz’, ‘cohérence’ or ‘coherencia’, the 
Dutch, Swedish and Danish consider coherence to be some sort of ‘connection’ (DEN HERTOG and STROSS, 2013:375). 
- 24 - 
 
strands of policy, and those responsible for managing them, into a single efficient whole, capable of 
action, and resistant to third parties’ attempts to exploit internal division’. And whilst Missiroli 
(2001:4) explains that ’by acting unitarily and with a common purpose, the EU becomes more 
efficient and effective’, with respect to the EU’s external actions, so Gebhard (2017:103), 
coherence can be understood as ‘the ambition and necessity to bring the various parts of the EU’s 
external relations together to increase strategic convergence and ensure procedural efficiency’ 
(GEBHARD, 2017:103). This coherence-effectiveness argument was examined more empirically 
by Thomas (2012:25) and Van Vooren (2012:287) who conclude that coherence does not 
automatically entail efficiency. On the contrary, as stated by Missiroli (2001:4), in the past, the 
EU was able to achieve unanimity at the expense of effectiveness and with respect to the 
widespread assumption that more coherence would enable the EU to better ‘pull its weight 
internationally’, Thomas claims that coherence is no guarantee for this. In order words, 
coherence and effectiveness may be positively correlated, but the occurrence of coherence is not 
sufficient per se for the EU to act effectively in international affairs. Other scholars like Natorski 
(2016:663) go even further, claiming that the requirement for effectiveness may even hamper 
policy innovation, something that according to him could have been observed in the case of the 
2011 Revision of the ENP. In fact, so Natorski, the review did not fundamentally change the 
objectives of the ENP because its authors thought too much in terms of coherence. Indeed, 
regarding the EU’s translation of the policy coherence objective into concrete legal obligations, 
Den Hertog and Stross (2013:378) point out that it ‘is not straightforward’ and in the case of 
conflict often ‘legally framed in the context of other principles.’ At this point, based on Nuttall’s 
idea of three-level conceptualisation with the banal understanding of coherence referring to the 
absence of contradictions (and so to consistency), the malign understanding to the function of 
internal power struggles and the benign understanding to the desirable way of interacting 
(GEBHARD, 2011:111), Cremona (2008:14-16) identifies three groups of legal principles, 
namely rules of hierarchy, rules of delimitation and rules of cooperation and complementarity. 
The rules of hierarchy are particularly important for the establishment of vertical coherence 
(DEN HERTOG and STROSS, 2013:383) and refer to the banal understanding of coherence. The 
rules of delimitation are particularly important to horizontal coherence but are also applicable 
to vertical coherence and concern the malign definition of coherence, referring to the principles 
of conferral and subsidiarity. Finally, the rules of cooperation and complementarity correspond 
most closely to the benign interpretation of coherence, i.e. to the creation of synergies, although 
as highlighted by Cremona (2008:16), real efforts towards synergy are rather promoted by the 
idea of complementarity than by the idea of cooperation. The rules of cooperation and 
complementarity are important for both horizontal and vertical coherence (DEN HERTOG and 
STROSS, 2013:382). Whilst the malign facet has a negative connotation and comprehends 
coherence as ‘a function of internal power struggles’, i.e. relates to turf battles between 
competing institutions, the benign facet has a positive connotation, reflecting ‘an effective and 
desirable way of interacting’. According to Den Hertog and Stross (2013:376), coherence in this 
sense requires ‘the active promotion of mutually reinforcing government actions on the basis of 
agreed overarching policy goals’. Conversely, and in the absence of any definition of ‘incoherence’, 
it can be concluded that an ‘incoherent’ policy is characterised by at least one of these faces, i.e. is 
either contradictory, suffers from internal power struggles or has an ineffective and undesirable 
way of interaction. Despite the terminological distinctions between coherence and consistency, 
there is still ambiguity in the use of the two concepts, be it within the academic or professional 
literature and this although as pointed out by Duke (1999:3), from a political perspective, they 
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both ‘point in the direction of coordinated activities’. One reason for this is that they link to a 
variety of other concepts such as policy integration which in turn is synonymous with holistic 
government or joined-up government (ROGGE and REICHARDT, 2015:6-7). Here, it must be 
admitted that there is no real clear-cut dichotomy between them and integration in the 
literature, however, what can be kept in mind is that coherence and consistency do not lead per 
se to integration. As this suggest, amongst all these concepts, integration is by far the most 
holistic (ROGGE and REICHARDT, 2015:17) and demanding one – indeed, whilst coherence and 
consistency can be both cross- and uni-sectoral, integration exclusively concerns the 
management of cross-cutting policies (MEIJERS and STEAD, 2004:2), covering both decision-
making and governance processes. As stated by Tosun and Lang (2013:8), it is ‘about policy 
making in certain policy domains that take policy goals of other – arguably adjacent – policy 
domains into account.’ It is thus a rather sophisticated concept and can be defined as a ‘process 
either of coordinating and blending policies into a unified whole…or of incorporating concerns of 
one policy into another’ (BRIASSOULIS, 2005:82) with the aim of harmonising the different 
objectives of these policies71 (its focus is thus rather on policy outcomes than on policy 
processes). According to Underdal (1980:10-12), one of the pioneers in this domain, a policy is 
integrated when ‘all significant consequences of policy decisions are recognized as decision 
premises, where policy options are evaluated on the basis of their effects on some aggregate 
measure of utility, and where the different policy elements are in accord with each other.’ For 
Underal, in order to achieve policy integration, three conditions must be met: 
comprehensiveness (the recognition of a broader scope of policy consequences), aggregation 
(the evaluation of policy alternatives from all perspectives) and consistency (the penetration of 
the policy in all policy levels and agencies) (UNDERDAL, 1980:162). According to this definition, 
policy integration is achieved when the objectives, goals, actors, procedures and instruments of 
policy A are in accordance with those of policy B.  
3.1.2 Coordination as proxy variable  
 
As indicated before, as for policy coherence, the assessment and evaluation of policy 
consistency in EU external energy governance presents major methodological challenges, with 
the biggest problem by far being the fact that consistency is largely conceptualised as an 
outcome, i.e. as reflecting the overall result of a policy in the literature (TULMETS, 2008:111). In 
fact, a policy can in theory be measured as an outcome (CARBONE, 2008:326), however, this is 
not a suitable methodology for the purpose of this research with one major issue here being a 
clear lack of quantitative and qualitative benchmarks against which policies could be measured 
in order to determine whether they are consistent or not (THALER, 2015:36).72 And whilst one 
way of bypassing this issue is, or would be, the measurement of perceptions (a particularly 
popular methodology with regard to measuring external consistency) (MARANGONI, 2014:59), 
this solution is not free from problems either, notably because of terminological obscurity which 
is why authors like Thaler (2015:37) propose looking at the process instead of the content or 
focusing on mechanisms rather than achievements (CARBONE, 2008:326).73 Applied to this 
 
71 Here, the literature distinguishes between positive and negative integration. Negative integration occurs when removing barriers 
whilst positive integration includes setting-up common rules (DE JONG, 2013:11). 
72 Indeed, as stated by Alexander (1995:83), the evaluation of effectiveness, of which consistency is a form, ‘is always a challenge, 
given the absence of any universal criteria of success’.  
73 given that coordination can be achieved through a number of ‘structural and procedural mechanisms’ (ROGGE and REICHARDT, 
2015:5-7). 
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dissertation’s research question this means that a clear answer to the question of whether the 
EU is entirely consistent in its energy governance approach towards Morocco will not be 
possible. By contrast, what will be possible is to determine whether the existing governance 
mechanisms in place contribute to consistency or not. Here, and with MLG creating ‘high 
demands of cooperation and coordination’ (KNODT, PIEFER and MÜLLER, 2015:20), this 
dissertation will look at policy coordination. In other words, coordination will serve as a proxy 
variable to measure consistency here with the rationale behind this being that the advent of 
coordination will, in fact, allow conclusions to be drawn as to the existence of consistency, true 
to the motto: the greater the coordination, the higher the likelihood of consistency.  
‘Coordination is one of the golden words of our time. Offhand, I can think of no way in which the 
word is used that implies disapproval. Policies should be coordinated; they should not run every 
which way. No one wants his child described as uncoordinated. Many of the world’s ills are 
attributed to a lack of coordination in government. But what does it mean?’ (WILDAVSKY, 
2017:130-131). As this citation suggests, coordination is a relatively broad concept and the 
literature does not provide any unified definition for the term and this although its basic 
meaning seems easy to grasp. In fact, like consistency, it is largely associated with effectiveness 
and efficiency, as well as with ‘reliability, consent and coercion’ (WILDAVSKY, 2017:132). In this 
context, it is about ‘avoiding bad things’ such as ‘duplication, overlapping, and redundancy’ 
(WILDAVSKY, 2017:131), whereby, goal-oriented, it seeks to make ‘an indispensable contribution 
to collaborative advantage’ (METCALFE, 1996). Coordination may mean different things in 
different disciplines or areas. For example, whilst strategic coordination refers to ‘the 
coordination of programs around broad strategic goals of government’ (PETERS, 2018:3), 
coordination can be understood, from a more organisational perspective, as ‘the process whereby 
two or more organizations create and/or use existing decision rules that have been established to 
deal collectively with their shared task environment’ (MULFORD and ROGERS, 1982:12). 
Furthermore, it may either have a positive or a negative connotation, whereby positive 
coordination is not only about avoiding conflict, but also about seeking ways of creating output 
that can benefit all the actors involved (BOUCKAERT, PETERS and VERHOEST, 2010:20; PETERS, 
2018:2). This does, as pointed out Debaere (2015:22), and contrary to what is often largely 
assumed, ‘not necessarily imply common EU action or a common EU position’. By contrast, 
negative coordination simply seeks to avoid conflict such as redundancy or lacunae for instance 
(BOUCKAERT, PETERS and VERHOEST, 2010:20; GREENWOOD, 2016:20). Requiring the 
different actors to compromise and give up some of their individual policy goals for the sake of 
the achievement of greater, common policy goals, there is agreement in the literature, that 
positive coordination is far more difficult to reach than negative coordination (BOUCKAERT, 
PETERS and VERHOEST, 2010:20). Next, coordination can be understood as either a policy goal 
or as a policy-making process, meaning that it can be either defined as an outcome, i.e. ‘the 
degree to which coordination is achieved’ or as a process, i.e. ‘the process of achieving this end 
result’ (DEBAERE, 2015:27). As regards the former definition, an outcome can be qualified as 
elaborate/less elaborate, binding/non-binding or successful/unsuccessful, whereby each 
qualification may mean different things to different people. For example, unsuccessful may at the 
same time refer to the achievement of no common position, as well as to the achievement of a 
very general position. As regards the second definition, it can be distinguished between 
interactive (coordination by programming) and noninteractive (coordination by feedback) 
processes. Interactive processes involve interaction between the different actors involved in the 
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coordination process, with Debaere differentiating between different degrees of interaction, 
including for example mere communication without any decision-making, as well as 
communication leading to decision-making. By contrast, noninteractive processes do, as 
explained by Debaere, primarily refer to formalised rules, policies and procedures, as well as to 
unilateral adjustment.74 Based on what has just been brought forward, this dissertation will 
focus on coordination as a process, but also take into consideration eventual outcomes. To this 
end, it will operate the following definition for the term: ‘…is the extent to which organizations 
attempt to ensure that their activities take into account those of other organization’ (HALL, 
1976:459), with, adding a positive connotation here, the aim of reaching ‘harmonious compatible 
outcomes’ (CHALLIS, 1988:25). 
Coordination can encompass various policymaking stages (policy design, policy implementation 
or policy management), whereby it can take place from the top-down or the bottom-up 
(LAAKSO, KIVIMÄKI and SEPPÄNEN, 2007:32; BOUCKAERT, PETERS and VERHOEST, 2010:21-
22). It may be ex-ante or ex-post (CAYLA, 2006:7) and can occur at two levels (GEBHARD, 2011: 
107-108), the strategic/policy-related and the functional levels. Finally, it may be of formal or 
informal nature (CHRISTIANSEN and NEUHOLD, 2012:502; KNODT, PIEFER and MÜLLER, 
2015:20).  
Policymaking stages: Coordination can take place at different levels of the policymaking process 
– at the planning, the decision-making and the implementation or action levels (LAAKSO, 
KIVIMÄKI and SEPPÄNEN, 2007:32; BOUCKAERT, PETERS and VERHOEST, 2010:22): 1) 
coordination of planning refers to the identification and analysis of preferences and objectives, 
2) coordination of decision-making refers to the definition of action, based on previously 
identified preferences and objectives and requires a lot of openness from all actors involved and 
3) although overall coordinated action of the policymaking process can often be achieved 
through coordination at the planning and decision-making levels, this is not a rule and hurdles 
can appear at both the implementation or action levels. 
Top-down/bottom-up: As pointed out by Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest (2010:21), the choice 
between top-down or bottom-up largely is a ‘political one’ and there is consensus in the 
literature that top-down coordination is generally more difficult to achieve. However, although it 
may not take into consideration all policy aspects, notably those ‘between the centre and the 
field’, it is as pointed out by Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest (2010:21), ‘likely to be more efficient 
than one that depends upon local bargaining’.  
Ex-ante/ex-post: Ex-ante coordination refers to a ‘rule system’, including formal agreements like 
pacts, treaties or regulations etc., that ‘has been determined upstream in order to fulfill an 
objective given by a superior principle’ (CAYLA, 2006:7). By contrast, ex-post coordination refers 
to coordination that happens downstream ‘as the consequence of interindividual coordinating 
processes’ (CAYLA, 2006:7). 
Strategic/selective or functional: Referring to policy objectives and agendas, strategic 
coordination concerns the pursuit of an overarching objective or common priorities, whereas 
selective coordination is ‘issue-oriented’ and ‘concerned only with certain stages of the policy 
 
74 Formalised rules, policies and procedures imply that an organisation may bring forward a common position based on the existing 
legislation (DEBAERE, 2015:26-27). 
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cycle’ (POST, 2014:114-115). Functional coordination in turn invokes administrative processes 
and largely serves as a precondition for strategic coordination. 
Formal/informal: Formal coordination refers to hierarchical command and control 
(ALEXANDER, 1995:84) and is linked to mechanisms such as departmentalisation & grouping, 
centralisation/decentralisation, formalisation & standardisation and planning (CHRISTIANSEN 
and NEUHOLD, 2012:502). Informal coordination by contrast usually describes coordination 
that is not bound by any hierarchical command or control and that may take place both ‘within’ 
(MARANGONI, 2014:55) or ‘outside a formal decision-making framework’ (CHRISTIANSEN and 
NEUHOLD, 2012:502). It can happen on an ad-hoc basis, i.e. when a specific issue arises or on an 
exchange basis (POST, 2014:116), which allows for great flexibility and ‘eases the negotiations 
and reduces the transaction costs’ (MARANGONI, 2014:55). Most often, informal coordination 
refers to lateral or cross-departmental relations as well as to informal communication which, 
including personal contacts, depends in turn very much on the willingness of some individual 
actors (MORSCHETT, SCHRAMM-KLEIN and ZENTES, 2010:158; CHRISTIANSEN and NEUHOLD, 
2012:502; POST, 2014:116). It may also happen through normative integration, i.e. through the 
‘building of an organisational culture of known and shared strategic objectives and values’ 
(MORSCHETT, SCHRAMM-KLEIN and ZENTES, 2010:158; POST, 2014:116). Overall, the 
literature does not have any preferences as to whether formal or informal coordination is better 
but considers both types to be equal parts of the decision-making process (MARANGONI, 
2014:56) which are thought to reinforce or complete one another. Here, Reh, Heritier, 
Bressanelli and Koop (2011:1115-1117) identify four areas in which formal and informal 
coordination differ from one another, namely nature and status of rules, boundaries of 
participation, scope of action and public access. In fact, one main difference between formal and 
informal rules is that formal decisions are, as opposed to informal ones, ‘structured by a 
configuration of codified rules’ and ‘can be enforced by a third party’ (REH, HERITIER, 
BRESSANELLI and KOOP, 2011:1115-1116). Another difference is that boundaries of 
participation are much wider in formal coordination mechanisms, for example, whilst 
membership in formal structures is ‘either inclusive or formally restricted’, it is ‘both restricted 
and noncodified’ in informal structures. Moreover, boundaries of membership are ‘neither 
formally drawn nor publicly known’ (REH, HERITIER, BRESSANELLI and KOOP, 2011:1116). 
Next, formal decisions target or lead to final outcomes, whereas informal decisions rather lead to 
‘intermediate outcomes’ (REH, HERITIER, BRESSANELLI and KOOP, 2011:1117). Finally, formal 
decisions are made available to the public, by contrast, informal decision ‘can be systematically 
secluded, and access can be denied without public justification’ (REH, HERITIER, BRESSANELLI 
and KOOP, 2011:1117) which is why scholars like Christiansen and Neuhold (2012:502) argue 
that informal coordination bears bear the risk of collusion75 as it is less transparent.76 
3.2 Operationalisation 
 
Policy consistency/coordination can come in many different forms and shapes and may 
for example concern the internal or external dimensions of a policy, with the establishment of 
the latter depending considerably on the achievement of the former. In this sense, and given its 
 
75 SGI (Accessed on 05 November 2018). 
76 a claim that is contested by some authors such as Marangoni (2014:56) who argue that formal coordination is not equal to 
transparency.  
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indivisibility from external consistency, internal consistency generally serves as precursor for 
external success (NEFRAMI, 2012:155, 172, 177). Indeed, concerned with the EU’s external 
representation and performance towards third parties or within a multilateral system (like the 
UN, NATO etc.), and closely linked to the idea of ‘Speaking with one Voice’, external consistency 
is, as already mentioned before, a direct indicator for international credibility and reliability. 
Policy consistency/coordination may also be of political, economic, institutional, administrative 
or even cognitive nature (HOEBINKK, 2015:19) and be concerned with strategic or procedural 
concertation. Further, it may be intended or unintended (KOULAIMAH-GABRIAL and OOMEN, 
1997:5), with intended inconsistencies for example arising when policy makers are aware that 
the objectives of a given policy A cannot be achieved due to the conflicting objectives of a policy 
B. Conversely, unintended inconsistencies occur when the policy makers in question are not 
aware of the fact that policies A and B pursue conflicting objectives (OECD, 2005:29) which 
implies that they can generally ‘easily be corrected’ (KOULAIMAH-GABRIAL and OOMEN, 
1997:5). Finally, consistency/coordination may also be structural or dynamic, with the former 
persisting over time, often affecting an entire policy or other policies (KOULAIMAH-GABRIAL 
and OOMEN, 1997:5). By contrast, dynamic inconsistency is limited over time and can be 
described as an ‘attempt to balance between what is good at a given moment and what is good in 
the longer term’ (LAAKSO, KIVIMÄKI and SEPPÄNEN, 2007:36). Contrary to unintended 
inconsistency, it is monitored.  
As this suggests, policy consistency/coordination is a broad concept and the reason why, in 
order to operationalise consistency, the empirical emphasis of this dissertation will be multi-
dimensional and concentrate on four inter-related governance levels or patterns (GEBHARD, 
2011:113; GEBHARD, 2017:112), namely the horizontal, vertical, diagonal and, of course, 
external dimensions.  
3.2.1 Dimensions 
 
As just indicated, to operationalise the dependent variable, this dissertation will look at 
the horizontal, vertical, diagonal and external policy dimensions (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Dimensions of policy consistency 
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Source: Own elaboration based on the reviewed literature.  
Horizontal consistency/coordination is often described as ‘cross-or inter-pillar’ consistency, 
i.e. as consistency between different pillars (PORTELA and RAUBE, 2012:5) within one entity or 
governance level. In this sense, it may refer to consistency between different geographical or 
sectoral divisions of a political authority (GREENWOOD, 2016:19-20), for example, between 
departments or agencies (BOUCKAERT, PETERS and VERHOEST, 2010:24). Here, bottlenecks 
may be driven by factors such as specialisation and individual target setting (MEIJERS and 
STEAD, 2004:7; BOUCKAERT, PETERS and VERHOEST, 2010:27; PETERS, 2018:4-5). However, 
horizontal consistency may also refer to consistency between different policy areas 
(MARANGONI, 2014:49), with one popular topic with regard to the EU being consistency 
between the CFSP and other external policy areas (DEN HERTOG and STROSS, 2013:381). 
Moreover, it also serves as a superset of both intra-institutional and inter-institutional 
consistency (GATTI, 2016:35), a circumstance that often creates conceptual confusion, requiring 
a clarification of the terms. In fact, although closely related to internal consistency, intra-
institutional consistency/coordination goes beyond the latter as it is not only concerned with 
consistency within one policy area,77 but with consistency between various policy areas within a 
political level or institution (PORTELA and RAUBE, 2012:5). When it comes to the EU, an 
example for intra-institutional consistency would be consistency between the EU’s development 
and agricultural or fisheries policies within the European Commission (SELIANKO and 
LENSCHOW, 2015:4). Intra-institutional cooperation takes place above all at the technical, 
rather than at the political level (GEBHARD, 2017:111). This stems from the idea that even if 
 
77 In fact, internal consistency is concerned with consistency within a policy and is generally relatively easy to achieve (unlike intra-
institutional consistency), as it does not deal with conflicting policy objectives. In this respect, it is more about technical, 
administrative and procedural development (GEBHARD, 2017:110). 
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policy objectives are decided unanimously, their implementation is not always automatically 
perfectly consistent (TULMETS, 2008:133). In other words, it is primarily an administrative or 
procedural issue (policy decision-making and implementation) (GEBHARD, 2017:111). By 
contrast, inter-institutional consistency/coordination is concerned with consistency between 
different political entities. An example would be consistency between the Commission and the 
Parliament regarding development policies. With respect to EU foreign policies, concerns over 
inter-institutional consistency notably refer to ‘the supranational and intergovernmental spheres 
at Union level’ and thus mainly exist between the Commission and the Council (GEBHARD, 
2017:109-110) since both of these institutions are in charge of the EU’s external relations 
(NUTTALL, 2005:92). However, this form of cooperation is also often referred to as belonging to 
the vertical dimension,78 whereas cooperation amongst the EU member states equally is an 
example for inter-institutional (or to be more accurate, of intergovernmental) coordination. 
Overall, and despite being primarily voluntary, i.e. it cannot be achieved through ‘recourse to 
hierarchical authority’ as shown before,79 horizontal consistency within the EU is, as pointed out 
by Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest (2010:24), generally easier to achieve than vertical 
consistency. Yet, it remains an issue which is critical, notably with regard to the EU’s external 
action with which it ‘appears to be consubstantial’ (GAUTTIER, 2004:Abstract).  
Contrary to horizontal consistency, vertical consistency/coordination refers to consistency 
between different institutions across different entity or governance levels (DEN HERTOG and 
STROSS, 2013:377), e.g. between higher and lower levels of government (BOUCKAERT, PETERS 
and VERHOEST, 2010:24). In the case of the EU, vertical consistency refers to consistency 
between the EU institutions and the EU member states (CARBONE, 2008:326; 2013:4), for 
example regarding their respective development policies. As stated by Nuttall (2005:98), it 
‘comes into play when one or more member states pursue national policies which are out of kilter 
with policies agreed in the EU’. The probability for this to happen is relatively high as decisions 
taken in isolation at the national level often turn out to be inconsistent once looked at on an 
aggregated level. Contrary to horizontal consistency, vertical consistency can be achieved 
through the ‘recourse to hierarchical authority’, suggesting that it is a matter of competencies 
(DEN HERTOG and STRAUSS, 2013:383). However, and although vertical consistency includes 
both the member states’ political compliance and technical compatibility with the EU treaties, it 
is more about strategic or political (shared objectives, compliance with EU norms, commitment 
to integration and solidarity etc.), rather than technical convergence (GEBHARD, 2017:113), 
which makes its achievement so difficult, notably as far as EU external policies are concerned. 
The reason for this is that the EU’s ability to ‘Speak with one Voice’ depends very much on the 
‘concertation of Member States positions and policies with and in respect of the overall consensus 
or common position at the Community or Union level’ (PORTELA, 2009:16; GEBHARD, 2011:123). 
Vertical consistency is thus closely linked to external consistency (GEBHARD, 2017:113), which 
is why it is considered to be one of the EU’s ‘greatest weaknesses’ by some scholars (GEBHARD, 
2017:113). Indeed, as observed by Blockmans, Kostanyan, Remizov, Slapakova and Van der Loo 
(2017:127), opinion in the literature is overall quite critical about vertical consistency in the 
ENP. One example often cited here is the EU member states’ behaviour in the context of the Arab 
Spring during which discrepancies amongst the member states notably existed as regards to 
 
78 For example, according to some scholars like Gatti (2016:36), vertical consistency is more about ‘ensuring synergy between the 
actions’ of the member states, rather than between an EU policy and national actions. 
 
79 reason for which it is often referred to as an indicator of democratic legitimacy. 
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whether to rather focus on short-term stability or on long-term reforms (BREMBERG, 2016:424; 
BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:4-5). In this light, 
vertical consistency is even more difficult to achieve in areas where the member states do retain 
a lot of sovereignty (GEBHARD, 2017:113) which, as will be shown later, is for example the case 
as regards energy. Indeed, whilst the EU and the EU member states generally agree on the main 
objectives and principles of EU energy legislation and policies, there is strong consensus in the 
literature that inconsistencies with respect to EU energy policies primarily occurs vertically (DE 
JONG, 2013:7). 
Diagonal or lateral consistency/coordination describes cooperation between the institutions 
at other governance levels and hierarchies or simply between ‘entities at different levels’ 
(DITTMER and MCCONNELL, 2015:139). With regard to the EU, it refers to the relationship of 
the EU institutions with sub-national actors or to the relations between the member states and 
sub-national actors (of other member states).  
Finally, and as already shown, external consistency/coordination refers to ‘an actor’s capacity 
to present itself as acting consistently and to the way the partners of this actor perceive its action’ 
(MARANGONI, 2014:50). In this light, it is strongly determined by internal consistency at the 
horizontal, vertical and diagonal levels.  
3.2.2 Measurement  
 
To investigate consistency, this dissertation seeks to find out if, how and with which 
results the EU and the member states coordinate their energy policies towards Morocco both 
internally and externally. To assess coordination, it is first of all necessary to identify a means for 
the measurement of coordination which is not an easy task as ‘for many decades, the 
measurement of coordination has been relatively weak’ (BIANCHI and PETERS, 2016:2). Indeed, 
as regards the measurement of coordination in governance, the focus has long been on the 
conceptualisation of governance, ‘rather than evaluating governance through consideration of 
outcomes’ (GREENWOOD, 2016:3). Nonetheless, several attempts have been made in the 
literature to measure coordination. Overall, two ways of measuring coordination qualitatively 
are proposed in the literature.  
One way of measuring coordination is through the examination of mechanisms that are 
‘dedicated to producing more coordination and integration’ (BIANCHI and PETERS, 2016:2) such 
as networks, collaboration and hierarchy (GREENWOOD, 2016:9; PETERS, 2018:5). Whilst 
networks generally refer to coordination from the bottom-up, collaboration refers to the process 
of creating a common framework or understanding of the coordination problem, which will then 
help the different actors to solve the issue. Contrary to networks, it is thought to be more 
difficult to achieve as it concerns ideas. However, if successful, it is considered a more effective 
means for coordination than networks. Hierarchy in turn refers to centralised priority setting, 
either through central organisations, i.e. supervising organisations or through cabinet 
committees or ministries that bring together a number of other ministries or related 
organisations (PETERS, 2018:5-8).  
Another way of measuring coordination is through the examination of the different levels of 
coordination that may be achieved, with one important contribution in this regard coming from 
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Les Metcalfe, who in 1994, and in order to understand coordination with the EU, developed a 
nine-point scale of coordination ranging from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ coordination. Based on the 
assumption that ‘individual organizations act independently and evolve means of managing 
coordination in response to increasing interdependence’ (METCALFE, 1996), this scale varies from 
independent decision-making by ministers to a unified strategy. And whilst it is a good starting 
point for the examination of coordination, it does, however, present several shortcomings. For 
example, whilst in theory, achievement of the highest levels of the scale depends on the 
effectiveness of its lower levels (METCALFE, 1996), in practice, this is not necessarily true as 
achievement of the lower levels does not automatically mean an overall successful outcome. On 
the contrary, not every coordination process results in a coordinated outcome (DEBAERE, 
2015:27), which may indeed also be a by-product of consultation, for example, rather than the 
result of any intentional actions (DEBAERE, 2015:23). Further, Bianchi and Peters (2016:2) note 
that the ‘classification’ of particular situations remains unresolved and application of the scale to 
real cases largely depends on the individual judgement of the researcher. Finally, as pointed by 
Debaere (2013:44), the scale mixes up coordination outcomes (in fact, Levels 1, 4 and 6-8 are 
outcomes) and processes.  
Yet, the Les Metcalfe scale is still useful to this research as it clearly illustrates the different 
processes, highlighting notably the ‘exchange of information’ and ‘consultation’ mechanisms 
(GEBHARD, 2017:110). Indeed, coordination generally starts with the sharing of information 
and data and then increasingly moves towards ‘identifying issues of common interest, setting a 
joint agenda, the exchange of good practices and joint decision-making’ (EUHES, 2007:24). Here, 
and inspired by Metcalfe’s process categorisation and based on the empirical research, this 
thesis will construct a six-point scale of possible processes: 1) no interaction, 2) information 
sharing, 3) consultation, 4) search for consensus, 5) establishment of common 
parameters/priorities and 6) unified strategy. Given that every process has a certain outcome 
(DEBAERE, 2013:45), these results will be applied against three different outcome categories 
(see Figure 2):  
1. No coordination: no coordination is as has been shown before, a possible outcome 
that can occur when coordination processes fail, or when the actors involved in these 
processes are not interested in achieving a coordinated outcome (DEBAERE, 
2013:43). It may be linked to no interaction, as well as to information sharing, as it 
‘does not aim to end in a common EU position’ (DEBAERE, 2013:45).  
2. Limited coordination: limited coordination may be linked to consultation, as it aims 
to end in a general EU position. 
3. Extensive coordination: extensive coordination is linked to the search for 
agreement and consensus. Its aim is to reach a specific or detailed EU position.  
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Figure 2: Six-point scale for the measurement of coordination  
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Source: Own elaboration based on METCALFE (1996).  
Although coordination does not equal consistency (given that the latter depends on a variety of 
factors), assigning the process results to the above categories is a primordial step as it will allow 
for indications as regards the existence of consistency to be identified, whereby it will be based 
on Marangoni (2014:57-58), and distinguish between three levels. 
1. Low consistency (inconsistency)/coordination: Low consistency describes 
situations in which some or all of the provisions of a policy/approach ‘contradict the 
primary objective(s)’. An indication of the existence of low consistency or 
inconsistency as regards coordination is the absence of any coordination 
mechanisms.  
2. Medium consistency/coordination: Medium consistency refers to situations in 
which the provisions of a policy/approach ‘do neither contradict the primary 
objective(s) nor significantly add to its (their) achievement’ (MARANGONI, 2014:58). 
An indication of the existence of medium consistency as regards coordination is 
limited coordination.  
3. High consistency/coordination: High consistency qualifies situations in which all 
the provisions of a policy/approach ‘fully support and further strengthen’ this policy’s 
‘primary objective(s)’ (MARANGONI, 2014:57). In this light, it is associated with 
extensive coordination, as the latter presumes that all levels of the coordination 
process have been achieved, all accomplishments that, in turn, reduce the likelihood 
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of coordination failures. To be more precise, the achievement of the highest levels or 
coordination reduces the likelihood of coordination failures such as redundancy or 
gaps, failures that may otherwise lead to inconsistencies.  
Against this background, this dissertation will measure coordination on the basis of existing 
coordination instruments, combining the two abovementioned approaches, and a) identify and 
examine the underlying formal and informal mechanisms in place that contribute or may 
contribute to coordination and b) and based on the author’s definition of coordination as a 
process, examine the different levels of coordination that may be achieved. To do so, it will make 
use of a social (or organisational) network analysis (SNA)80 which will help to detect 
relationship structures and interactions between the actors involved in EU energy governance 
towards Morocco (STEKETEE, MIYAOKA and SPIEGELMAN, 2015:461). The tool used hereby is 
net-mapping, which, based on participatory interviews with core stakeholders of the related 
field, contributes to a better understanding of a situation in which many different actors 
influence outcomes (SCHIFFER and WAALE, 2008) and focus is on the supranational, 
intergovernmental, national and sub-national levels.  
Actors of coordination: Building on the results of empirical research, this analysis will, as 
regards the horizontal dimension, focus on the most relevant EU institutions and investigate 
how they interact bilaterally and multilaterally with each other. As for the vertical dimension, 
the analysis will examine interaction between the EU institutions and the member states. Finally, 
as for the diagonal dimension, it will focus on interaction between the above-mentioned actors 
and sub-national or non-state actors.  
Levels of coordination: Consistency is sought at different layers of governance and to find out 
which coordination processes actually take place and where they occur, this dissertation will 
map coordination of EU energy policies towards Morocco across two levels: the regional or EU 
multilevel system and the local or third-country level, whereby focus will be both on 
strategic/policy and functional coordination aspects. 
To find out whether and to which extent the different stakeholders involved in EU energy 
governance towards Morocco cooperate with each other in a coordinated way, the research 
focus will be two-dimensional, i.e. it will take into account both hard and soft facts. In fact, whilst 
hard facts deal with real existing coordination measures, soft facts actually seek to shed light 
upon the perceptions of the actors presented above on the current state of policy coordination. 
Analysing coordination from the third-country perspective is of utmost importance here, as local 
views can reveal important aspects that are not necessarily observable in Brussels or are not 
meant to be seen there.  
 
 
80 ‘Social network analysis (SNA) is used for measuring and analyzing the structural properties of networks of interdependent dyadic 
relationships. Such relationships can be interpersonal relationships like advice seeking, friendship, or trust that characterizes 
interactions between individuals; or interorganizational networks that characterize the relationships between organizations as a whole 
– including relationships, such as joint collaborations, resource exchange, information exchange, or even membership in common 
organizations (e.g., trade associations)’ (STEKETEE, MIYAOKA and SPIEGELMAN, 2015:461).  
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3.3 Explanatory framework: main factors for explaining policy 
consistency in EU external energy governance 
 
In order to explain consistency, the following Chapter shall identify the explanatory 
variables for consistency in EU external energy governance. In fact, based on an in-depth review 
of the literature and the empirical research,81 the author will introduce a number of most 
relevant causal determinants. Overall, and derived from the theories shown in Table 1, a total of 
three explanations have been identified: 
1) Competencies  
2) Interests  
3) Interdependencies 
 
Table 1: Overview hypotheses 
Explanatory variables Theoretical framework
Assignment of competencies MLG, Intergovernmentalism
Diversity of interests MLG, Intergovernmentalism
Existence of interdependencies Liberal Intergovernmentalism  
Source: Own elaboration based on Koenig (2014:66). 
On the basis of these variables, the author will then formulate emanating hypotheses that will 
serve to test their relevance. 
3.3.1 Competencies  
 
Large parts of the literature perceive competencies – understood as legislative authority 
–82 as being closely linked to coordination (and thus consistency) (JOHNSON, 2005:144; 
DEBAERE, 2013:49) and as having ‘a decisive aspect determining the character of the emerging 
European polity’ (BENZ and ZIMMER, 2010:6), whereby scholars note that ‘in arenas where the 
European Union, because of historically determined structural features linked to the competition 
between intergovernmentalism and supranationality, demonstrates a diffuse division of labour, 
unclear competencies and a lack of distinct and homogeneous objectives, the European Union is 
claimed to be less influential than in arenas where it exhibits clear goals, concerted ambitions and 
distinct role assignments’ (ELGSTRÖM and JÖNSSON, 2004:219). In other words, the allocation of 
competencies plays a vital role in the achievement of coordination (and thus consistency), with 
unclarity and overlaps inevitably increasing the risk of coordination failures, a risk that is most 
elevated in highly complex multi-level governance systems (MLG) such as the EU which, 
embedded in a non-hierarchical, interconnected and overlapping framework of 
interdependence, ‘comprises a number of actors with diverging competences, agendas and 
interests, different also in their organisational set-up and modus operandi’ (ALBINYANA, 2016:1). 
This, so scholars, is an issue as there is ‘no clear-cut hierarchy’ (PORTELA, 2009:17), a lack that 
may lead to ‘gaps because no-one accepts responsibility’ (METCALFE, 1996). 
 
81 In fact, the expert interviews carried out at the beginning of this research project helped to identify potential causal factors.  
82 In the legal sense, competencies are understood as ‘the power of a person, business, court, or government to deal with something or 
take legal decisions’. Cambridge Dictionary (Accessed on 18 July 2019). 
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In fact, according to the literature, EU governance is framed by a MLG system (LEAL-ARCAS, 
FILIS and ABU GOSH, 2014:19), characterised by a diffusion of authority across multiple levels of 
governance and involving for example as regards energy, ‘the national, supranational and 
international levels as well as transnational energy relations’ (KNODT and PIEFER, 2016:75). First 
developed in 1993 by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, MLG is the by far youngest theory among 
all the European integration theories and although directly related to the European integration 
processes of the 1990s (Single Energy Act (SEA), Treaty of Maastricht), as of today, it is applied 
to the EU decision-making process as a whole (including policy formulation & implementation). 
Rooted in federalism, MLG, theoretical basis of which is still evolving (MAY ET. Al, 2006; 
NILSSON ET. Al, 2012:396), draws on various theoretical approaches, including the 
institutionalist, neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches,83 whereby it attaches 
great value to the role of both supranational and national actors.84 In this regard, it is defined by 
Schmitter (2004:49) as ’an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a multiplicity 
of politically independent but otherwise interdependent actors – private and public – at different 
levels of territorial aggregation in more-or-less continuous 
negotiation/deliberation/implementation, and that does not assign exclusive policy compétence or 
assert a stable hierarchy of political authority to any of these levels’. According to Marks 
(1993:401-402), this arrangement is the result of a ’centrifugal process in which decision-making 
is spun away from member states in two directions’, namely up to the European, and down to the 
subnational and transnational levels. Likewise, decision-making has also moved sideways, i.e. to 
non-state actors like industry groups or civil society85 which have developed direct vertical links 
with the EU institutions over time, not relying on the EU member states as gatekeepers anymore 
(as postulated in intergovernmentalism) (MARKS, 1993:402; HOOGHE, MARKS and WOLFE 
MARKS, 2001:4). This, however, does not mean that the EU institutions or the member states do 
not continue to play an important role (HOOGHE, MARKS and WOLFE MARKS, 2001:3). On the 
contrary, each territorial level is considered equally important as it holds important resources, 
such as information, for example. However, they no longer have a monopoly on decision-making 
powers, but are subject to collective decision making (MARKS and HOOGHE, 2001:2), a 
circumstance that naturally involves a certain loss of control, as reflected in the decision rule of 
qualified majority voting in the Council86 (HOOGHE, MARKS and WOLFE MARKS, 2001:4). In fact, 
in the view of MLG, all actors are closely entwined with one another, which, however, does not 
mean that they are not allowed to keep their independence and autonomy (STEPHENSON, 
2013:817).  
As this suggests, the delimitation of competencies within the EU is an extremely complex 
process as competencies do not exclusively lie with one actor but are shared by various actors at 
different levels, reflecting the EU’s multitude of institutions (PORTELA and RAUBE, 2009:10). In 
this line, the division of competencies has been ‘one of the most important issues in the discussion 
on the institutional reform and in the processes of Treaty amendment’ (BENZ and ZIMMER, 
 
83 In fact, conceptually positioned between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, MLG allows for a flexible understanding of 
European integration and fosters the inclusion of a wide range of different actors. 
84 MLG is three-dimensional, referring to both the horizontal and vertical, as well as the diagonal dimension and is, compared with 
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, rather actor-centred (STEPHENSON, 2013:820). 
85 In this view, ’multilevel governance emerges when experts from several tiers of government share the task of making regulations and 
forming policy, usually in conjunction with relevant interest groups’ (HAGUE and HARROP, 2007:282). The most obvious way for these 
groups to participate in EU policymaking is via the opening of lobbying offices in Brussels. Another means is the use of domestic 
channels. 
86 which is contested by intergovernmentalists who argue that the policy initiatives and treaty revisions are still subject to unanimity 
(HOOGHE, MARKS and WOLFE MARKS, 2001:5). 
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2010:5). Here, notably the Treaty of Lisbon has played a key role but whilst it was supposed to 
provide important support in this area, it was not able to address or eradicate the issue, and 
eventually even contributed to the problem (BRAUN, 2011:8). Thus, the risk of overlapping 
continues to persist on both the horizontal and vertical levels providing, in turn, for a fertile soil 
for turf wars on competence delimitation (BRAUN, 2011:8; DEBAERE, 2013:49). 
Horizontal level 
One risk of horizontal overlappings arises from the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has failed to 
clearly define or separate the EU’s external powers from one another, an issue that notably 
concerns the roles of the European Council, the Commission, the Council and the High 
Representative and/or the External Action Service (BRAUN, 2011:8). A second risk arises from 
the Lisbon Treaty entrusting various EU institutions, notably the Commission and the Council, 
with ensuring consistency. Here Portela and Raube (2009:8) note that ‘the combination of 
entrusting both Council and Commission with the task of ensuring coherence and the lack of ECJ 
jurisdiction was unable to eliminate the “grey areas” where the competences of Council and 
Commission overlapped. However, they go on, saying that despite overlapping competencies in 
the area of consistency, the Council is the sole organisation responsible for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), with the Commission having accepted the ‘loss of a certain portion of 
autonomy in matters where the Community and CSP competences overlapped’ (PORTELA and 
RAUBE, 2009:10). 
Vertical level 
Other than not having been able to properly address the issue of overlapping on the horizontal 
level, the Treaty of Lisbon also created a source of conflict with regard to the vertical level by 
setting-up a wide catalogue of different categories of competencies, ranging from exclusive to 
shared and sui generis87 (DEN HERTOG and STROSS, 2013:383-384), whereby relevant for this 
dissertation are however only the first two types.  
Exclusive: Exclusive competencies imply that ‘only the Union may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts’ (Art. 2 TFEU).88 Important domains in which the EU holds exclusive competence 
are the Customs Union or the Monetary Policy and Common Commercial Policy (Art. 3 TFEU).89 
Other than that, the EU shall also have exclusive competence ‘for the conclusion of an 
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is 
necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence’ (Art. 3 TFEU). 
Shared: Shared competencies90 imply that the EU ‘has competence to legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts in specific areas, while each Member State remains competent to act as long as the EU 
has not exercised its competence’ (Art. 2 TFEU)91 or as long as ‘the EU has chosen not to.’92 This, 
 
87 Sui generis (latin, ‘of its own kind’) competencies describe unique or special competencies whose ‘legal and institutional 
characteristics are intrinsic to this policy field’ (VAN VOOREN and WESSEL, 2014:94). One policy area that falls under this category is 
the CFSP (VAN VOOREN and WESSEL, 2014:95), which in Article 2 of the TFEU is explicitly separated from the other categories of 
competence (SCHÜTZE, 2015:276). Merriam Webster (Accessed on 20 July 2019). 
88 EC (Accessed on 10 December 2018). 
 
89 EC (Accessed on 10 December 2018). 
 
90 One sub-category of shared competencies is parallel competencies which not being explicitly mentioned in the treaties, refer to 
situations ‘where the exercise by the EU of its competence does not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.’ They 
are related to areas like research & technological development or development cooperation and humanitarian aid. EC (Accessed on 
10 December 2018). 
 
91 EC (Accessed on 10 December 2018). 
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however, does not mean that the member states must act independently from the EU. On the 
contrary, they are always under an obligation to inform and consult the EU institutions ‘so that a 
common strategy could be considered’ (HERTOG and STROSS, 2013:386). Moreover, for the case 
that their actions have a negative impact on Union action, they are in theory not allowed to act 
independently (HERTOG and STROSS, 2013:386). Shared competencies concern for example, not 
only the areas of freedom, security and justice but also energy (DEN HERTOG and STROSS, 
2013:384; Art. 4 TFEU).  
In line with what has just been brought forward, it is often assumed in the literature that 
coordination (and thus consistency) is more extensive in areas in which the EU disposes of 
exclusive competencies (as this would allow for a hierarchical mode of governance) 
(JORGENSEN and LAATIKAINEN, 2013:225), with its antithesis being that coordination is 
limited in areas in which the member states possess a lot of competencies.93 However, other 
scholars have concluded that the more competencies the EU disposes of, the more the member 
states dispose of corresponding control mechanisms (DEBAERE, 2013:49-50). Given this literary 
confusion, this dissertation will look at the variable ‘competencies’ from a different angle, 
arguing that coordination (and thus consistency) in a multi-level governance environment does 
not depend on whether the EU disposes of exclusive competencies or not, but rather on the 
exercise of competencies and the way these competencies are assigned. To put it simply, one 
must assume that coordination failures notably result from a lack of clear assignment or ‘the 
inadequate respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’,94 true to the motto: the 
unclearer the allocation of competencies, the higher the risk of disagreement and the more 
difficult it is to coordinate and to establish consistency (LEAL-ARCAS and WOUTERS, 2017:46). 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
(H1): The clearer the allocation of competencies between the different stakeholders involved in EU 
external energy governance, the more extensive the coordination (and thus the higher the 
consistency) of their energy policies.  
The operationalisation of the variable ‘competencies’ will be based on the European treaties, 
whereby focus will be on the assignment of competencies within the policymaking process, i.e. 
along the policymaking stages ‘agenda-setting’, ‘decision-making’, ‘implementation’ and 
‘financing & support’. The aim hereby is to examine whether there are any overlapping 
competence areas that may lead to frictions or whether competencies are clearly distinct from 
one another.  
 
 
 
92 EC (Accessed on 22 August 2018).  
93 According to the institutionalist theory, EU external governance is dominated by the EU institutions (which provide ‘the template 
for the externalization of EU policies’), with the general hypothesis reading that ‘the more precise, binding, and enforceable EU rules 
are, the more likely they will be selected, adopted, and implemented beyond EU borders’ (LAVENEX and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:802, 
804). In other words: the ‘effectiveness increases with legalization and/or legitimacy’, with the ‘hierarchical mode of governance being 
most likely to lead to the effective transfer of EU rules’ (LAVENEX and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:802, 804). Coordination is largely 
associated with hierarchy and central control here (METCALFE, 1996), a connotation that, in turn, is linked to the idea of 
competencies being equated with power (including bargaining powers). Similarly, from a neo-functionalist perspective, integration 
is achieved in a process in which ‘political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their national loyalties, 
expectation and political activities to a new and larger center’ (HAAS, 1961:367), and thus depends on ‘the degree to which 
competencies have been transferred to the supranational level’ (THALER, 2015:144). 
 
94 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Accessed on 16 January 2019). 
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3.3.2 Interests 
 
Throughout the literature, interests, defined as ‘something that brings advantages to or 
affects someone or something’,95 are considered as being one of the most obvious factors for 
coordination (and thus consistency) (MEIJERS and STEAD, 2004:7; JOHNSON, 2005:144; SMITH 
and VANHOONACKER, 2017:140; PETERS, 2018:5).  
As for an MLG system as the EU, there is a vast multitude of interests of various levels of actors 
and institutions and whilst this diversity of interests of the different stakeholders involved in a 
policy process has been largely deemed to be a ‘problematic yet well-accepted characteristic of 
EU foreign policy-making’ within the literature (THALER, 2015:149), interests are not perceived 
by all scholars as a threat to coordination per se. On the contrary, interests can be both 
converging or diverging and it is largely assumed that interests that are similar to each other 
support one another and that higher levels of coordination can be reached amongst like-minded 
groups (THALER, 2015:135). The basis for this assumption is the fact that so far, high levels of 
integration have notably been reached in areas of converging interests with 
intergovernmentalism – a theory developed in the 1960s by Stanley Hoffman as a counter-
argument to supranationalistic theories like neo-functionalism96 that brings the nation states 
back to the centre of analysis –97 defining integration as ‘…arrangements whereby nation states, 
in situations and conditions they can control, cooperate with one another on matters of common 
interest’ (NUGENT, 2006:558).98 Applied to this study, this means that the member states are not 
opposed to the idea of coordination in principle, but generally open towards it, at least as long as 
they are, as just stated, in control of the circumstances. 
By contrast, the problem is opposing interests, with Forster and Stokke (2013:24) stating: 
‘conflicting interests and values are the main cause of incoherence within most systems and at most 
levels’. Similarily, the OECD (2003) notes that coherence ‘has always been and will continue to be 
a function of competing and conflicting interests and values’.99 As for the EU, this assumption is 
not inappropriate given the wide heterogeneity of interests, whereby past inconsistencies have, 
as shown before, often resulted from divergencies in the vertical dimension (MEIJERS and 
STEAD, 2004:8).100 According to intergovernmentalism, this is because the nation or member 
states are the main actors within the EU and the main motivator for integration, so liberal 
intergovernmentalism (LI), a branch of intergovernmentalism which was first established in 
1998 by Andrew Moravcsik and combines liberal, intergovernmentalist and functional elements, 
is the protection of their national interest, defined as being driven by general geopolitical ideas 
and policy specific interests (MORAVCSIK and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:69). In other words, 
 
95 Cambridge Dictionary (18 July 2019). 
96 Compared to neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism considers international politics to be more important than regional politics 
and regional subsystems to have only ’a reduced autonomy’ (HOFFMAN, 1966:865). 
97 Contrary to neo-functionalism, the theory considers integration to be the result of the nation state’s own national interest(s), and 
not of spillovers (DIEZ, BODE and FERNANDES DA COSTA, 2015:19). Strongly building on the premises of realism in this regard, it is 
often proclaimed to be the equivalent of realism in the European integration debate. Like realism, intergovernmentalism is a state-
centric theory, considering the nation states to be the main actors in international relations and putting strong emphasis on the 
notion of national interest (LELIEVELDT and PRINCEN, 2015:32). However, despite these similarities, both theories need to be 
strictly distinguished from one another, notably because they fundamentally differ from each other with respect to their perception 
of the international relations system. 
98 Although this definition refers to the nation states it can be applied to any actor. 
99 OECD (Accessed on 07 January 2019). 
 
100 However, it must be stated here that the degree of heterogeneity differs greatly across policies: whereas EU climate change (at 
least regarding some sectors) and market policies are partly centralised and homogeneous, supply security policies are mostly 
centralised and homogeneous and energy efficiency policies are decentralised and heterogeneous.  
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integration is understood as the lowest common denominator of the national interests and the 
outcome of intergovernmental negotiations between the nation states (DIEZ, BODE and 
FERNANDES DA COSTA, 2015:190).101 In this context, the theory distinguishes between areas of 
so-called ‘low’ politics, i.e. areas considered compatible with the nation states’ national identity 
or interests (like economics and welfare) (ROSAMOND, 2000:77)102 and areas of so-called ‘high’ 
politics, i.e. areas considered to be incompatible with the member states’ national interest such 
external affairs and energy which is a highly sensitive domain (NEFRAMI, 2012:157).  
Indeed, as has been shown, energy is a strategic product vital to all sectors of the economy 
including international energy, climate/environment, trade, security and development103 and 
whose ‘omnipresence within the human life’ involves ‘multiple players with divergent interests’ 
(MOMETE, 2015:464). This is notably true for the EU where interests are driven by 28 
heterogeneous energy systems with different requirements. As a result, the picture of energy 
policies is diverse, with divergencies generally becoming most apparent at the external and 
vertical policy levels (DE JONG, 2013:7) (which does however not mean that there are no 
discrepancies at the horizontal level). Indeed, remaining a policy field highly sensitive to 
national considerations, the member states rather tend to think of it as a domestic policy 
domain. Here, one may assume that the likelihood of coordination (and thus consistency) is 
lower when the stakes are higher. For example, with Russia in its role as the EU’s most 
important energy supplier being a prime example of a highly politicized context, it stands to 
reason that convergence is difficult to achieve. Following this line of thought, it is plausible that 
coordination (and thus consistency) is more likely to occur when it comes to a non-energy 
producing transit country like for example Morocco where the stakes are lower. Yet, academic 
and empirical evidence has proved this to be wrong so far (notably as far as large-scale 
initiatives like Desertec and the MSP are concerned) and this is also the opposite of what is 
assumed in some of the academic papers which postulate that there is more coordination when 
vital interests are at stake (DEBAERE, 2013). Likewise, the intergovernmentalist theories 
assume that the more the member states have to lose, the more likely they are willing to make 
compromises. Given this unclarity in the literature, it can be noted against this background that 
whether coordination is extensive or not depends on whether interests are convergent or 
divergent (KOULAIMAH-GABRIAL and OOMEN, 1997:3; CARBONE, 2013:4-5). This leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
(H2): The less diverse the interests of the different stakeholders involved in EU external energy 
governance, the more extensive the coordination (and thus the higher the consistency) of their 
energy policies.  
The operationalisation of the variable ‘interests’ will be based on an assessment of the energy 
interests of the different actors involved in EU energy governance towards Morocco, whereby 
the focus will be on both converging and diverging interests as well as on the European and 
third country perspectives. This is important given that whether coordination takes place or not 
 
101 and not of supranational actions as proclaimed in the theory of neo-functionalism.   
102 Overall, LI is based on the idea of syncretism, i.e. on the idea that supranational institutions are necessary in order to provide 
durable cooperation: not only because they serve as a coordination platform but also as a protector against other and/or a guarantor 
of national preferences (as they provide states with information), and this particularly in times of insecurity (MORAVCSIK and 
SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:69). ‘Passive, transaction-cost reducing sets of rules’, they ‘contribute to minimise uncertainty by eliminating 
the risk of undesired outcomes’ (MORAVCSIK and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:72). 
103 with the political and economic survival of a state clearly depending on its access to it (TOSUN, BIESENBENDER and SCHULZE, 
2015:5). 
- 42 - 
 
in a multi-level environment, not only depends on the interests of the EU institutions and the 
member states but also on those of Morocco. 
3.3.3 Interdependencies 
 
As just elaborated, disagreement over policies can reflect ‘genuine differences in interests’ 
that, as pointed out by Collignon (2001:27), need to be sold ‘by negotiation and compromise’, 
whereby it must be highlighted that the member states do not simply follow their own 
individual policy interests (STRUNZ, GAWEL and LEHMANN, 2014:15). By contrast, guided by 
the principle of rationality, they prioritise their maximisation and/or optimisation and try to 
upload them to the higher (EU) level.104 This is done through intergovernmental bargaining 
which is when they may enter in competition with one another or with others, a circumstance 
that refers to the malign understanding of consistency, i.e. to internal power struggles or turf 
battles (THALER, 2015:151). And whilst such battles are usually hardly associated with the 
vertical governance level where ‘the distribution of power and hierarchy seems to be more or less 
clear’ (GEBHARD, 2011:112), caution is needed as regards energy given that it is, as shown 
before, a special case to look at.  
Although the above implies that any collective outcome is not more than ‘the result of aggregated 
individual actions based on efficient pursuit of these preference’ (MORAVCSIK and 
SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:68), such a result bears the risk of suboptimality which is why states 
sometimes seek to coordinate their preferences to achieve mutual benefits. The degree to which 
an actor favours grouping hereby largely depends on the potential gains it may expect from this 
and for coordination (and thus consistency) to happen in an area,105 benefits must outweigh the 
cost of losing political control. As regards the EU, this is notably the case in areas such as 
economic growth or environmental protection where it is in the member states’ interest to pool 
sovereignty (HOOGHE, MARKS and WOLFE MARKS, 2001:5). Yet, the likelihood for them to give 
up sovereignty is generally low in the energy area106 which, as shown before, is an area of ‘high’ 
politics and of particular sensitivity. Here, they are generally not willing to be compensated for 
their losses by benefits in other areas (HOFFMANN, 1966:882) for one simple reason: fearing 
eventual losses of resources, superiority, autonomy or stability, they are not willing to be 
replaced by the EU. By contrast, they rather pursue their own individual energy agendas, if 
necessary, over common interest or at the expense of ‘optimal’ collective results (CREMONA, 
2008:34). In other words, they seek to pursue their interests not through greater cooperation 
but through protectionist measures, a context in which, with regards to the external dimension, 
they usually maintain strong and highly interdependent bilateral relations with third countries 
(which, in turn, undeniably reinforces competitive thinking).  
In fact, often having, as indicated before, a clear advantage over the EU in terms of bilateral 
relationships, it may simply not be beneficial for a country to ‘sacrifice’ its relations with a third 
country (and vice versa) in the name of more coordination with EU policies, an attitude that is 
 
104 According to the neo-functionalist theory, the member states perceive supranational organisations as platforms that bundle and 
potentially multiply their national interests (BÖRZEL, 2013:28). 
105 Applied to the EU, this means that the member states are not opposed to the idea of coordination per se, but generally open 
towards it, notably in areas such as economic growth or environmental protection where, for cost-benefit reasons, it is in their 
interest to pool sovereignty (HOOGHE, MARKS and WOLFE MARKS, 2001:5). 
106 Or put differently, energy policy making largely depending on the political will of the member states (CARBONE, 2013:6), external 
energy policies and relations continue to be dominated by intergovernmental cooperation (YOUNGS, 2011:59-61). 
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very much based on a realist notion of power. Indeed, for coordination to be achieved, an 
exchange of information is required, however, in a system characterised by a high level of 
competition and therefore of mistrust and conflict (as postulated by intergovernmentalism), 
‘information is power so there is insufficient sharing of information’ (PETERS, 2018:5), even 
though this would facilitate the achievement of common objectives. This behaviour can be best 
explained with liberal intergovernmentalism which uses three concepts to explain European 
integration, namely, supranational institutionalism, intergovernmental integration 
institutionalism and national sovereignty, whereby of use for the purpose of this dissertation are 
above all the last two aspects. Intergovernmental integration institutionalism refers to the 
bargaining powers of the nation states, with Moravcsik arguing that these powers heavily 
depend on asymmetrical interdependence, i.e. on a) the availability of information about 
preferences which in turn depends on the relative power of the states involved and b) on the 
degree of dependence on the outcome of these negotiations (MORAVCSIK and 
SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:71). By contrast, national sovereignty describes the phenomenon that 
integration only occurs in areas where the nation states are willing to forfeit some of their 
sovereignty. 
At this point, it is to note that the member states’ relations with third countries strongly depend 
on these countries’ relations with the EU or impact those, whereby the respective level of 
interdependence between the EU and the third country is determined by several factors. Indeed, 
according to the power-based explanation of institutionalism, ‘external governance is determined 
by the EU’s power and its interdependence with regard to third countries as well as competing 
‘governance providers’ in its neighbourhood and at the global level’ (LAVENEX and 
SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:803). As this suggests, there are at least three external factors 
determining consistency in EU governance towards third countries, namely the interdependence 
between the EU and the third country, the presence of competing rival governance actors and 
regional dynamics. On this basis, the author of this dissertation assumes that the level of 
competition and thus the member states’ willingness to coordinate their energy activities 
depends on the bilateral relations they maintain or the nature of bilateral relationship or level of 
interdependence they have with the third country, whereby geographical, historical, cultural and 
foreign or diplomatic policy links based on ‘national specificities’ (SARTORI, 2014:5) are 
expected to play an important role. In fact, in the author’s opinion, the costs of losing political 
control are inevitably higher in cases in which the member states dispose of a close relationship 
or mutually interdependent relations with the third country (in this case, Morocco) as this 
implies that vital interests are at stake. Against this background, this study postulates:  
(H3): The less interdependent the intergovernmental relations between the member states and the 
third country, the more extensive the coordination (and thus the higher consistency) of their energy 
policies.  
To operationalise the variable ‘interdependencies’, this work will hereby look into the energy 
governance approaches of selected member states and examine how they interact with one 
another. Comparing these approaches will allow to determine whether they are aligned or not, 
whereby as the point of departure, policy objectives, initiatives and projects of the actors will be 
reviewed. Here, and to identify eventual bottlenecks, it is not only essential to understand the 
links between the member states themselves, but also the links between them and the target 
country. At this point, it needs to be highlighted that of course, the factors ‘interdependencies’ 
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and ‘interests’ are closly interlinked in some respect, however, for analytical reasons, they must 
be studied separately. 
3.4 Methodology  
 
The purpose of the following Chapter is to explain the methods used for this PhD 
research and to provide an overview of the approach used to respond to this dissertation’s 
research questions, including the instruments used for data collection. Overall, two approaches 
have been combined to respond to the research questions: desktop and empirical study. 
Desktop study 
For the analytical and theoretical part of this dissertation, the work was principally based on 
text analysis, whereby it was drawn on insights from both academic and grey literature, 
including official EU or state documents, covering legal and political high-level documents such 
as treaties, declarations and speeches. Notably EU pronouncements and records like European 
Council conclusions and Commission communications were assigned a high significance in this 
context, whilst additional information was collected from think tank and media coverage. The 
sources were official websites of the EU, the member states and Morocco, Google Books/Scholar, 
Academia and Researchgate.  
Empirical study 
Empirical evidence was gathered through the use of qualitative methods, i.e. through the 
consultation of key actors involved in EU energy governance towards Morocco. In order to 
identify the relevant stakeholders, the author relied on a stakeholder analysis, which, inspired 
by the principles of net mapping, helped to examine the networks of stakeholders operating in 
Morocco. In fact, by providing information about its key actors, this method helped to 
comprehend the energy network environment of Morocco – including influential actors, as well 
as their goals, linkages and influence upon the development of the Maghreb country’s energy 
policies (relations). Based on the outcome of this analysis, the author then conducted over 30 
interviews with both European and Moroccan actors either in person in Brussels and Morocco 
(Rabat) or by phone/email over the period 2015 to 2018, whereby a bottom-up approach in the 
sense of starting off with the local level (Morocco), was used.107 In this context, two field 
missions to Morocco (Rabat) have been carried out.  
The interviewees included representatives from the regional, national and local levels and 
involved both the public and private sectors, covering elites from the EU (EC and EEAS officials) 
and the member states’ governments (government or Parliament officials), as well as from the 
business (companies, Chamber of Commerce) and civil society (non-governmental and academic 
institutions) levels (see Table 2). Indeed, ‘administering a common EU approach is not only a 
matter of coordination between European actors and policy instruments, but also concerns diverse 
contacts ranging from multilateral ones to those between private actors and non-governmental 
organisations’ (LAAKSO, KIVIMÄKI and SEPPÄNEN, 2007:34). The underlying aim of the 
interviews was to examine how the various stakeholders cooperate with each other and 
 
107 This is even more important since, as will be shown later, there is a lack in the academic literature in this regard, and also in order 
to avoid Eurocentrism. 
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coordinate themselves at both the EU, national and local levels. Interviews were carried out in a 
semi-structured way based on a loose survey template or draft, given that qualitative interviews 
generally allow to see a topic ‘from the perspective of the interviewee’ (KING, 2004:11), an 
advantage that was of particular importance in the case of this dissertation, as the latter is 
focused on opinions and motivations (moreover, the semi-structured approach allows for 
greater flexibility). Here it is worth mentioning that interviews are not free from problems, on 
the contrary, interviewees may forget to mention information/details or consider them not 
important; moreover and, with regard to some questions, they may also be biased (MARANGONI, 
2014:68). However, they are a still a valuable source of information, notably in view of the 
sensitive character and complexity of the research topic. Given this sensitivity of the subject 
area, all interviewees were guaranteed anonymity and were not tape-recorded. The research 
results gained through these interviews will be reported and interpreted in detail in the 
following Chapters, whereas the recurrent interview questions can be found in the appendix. 
Table 2: Interview partners 
Interview partner Date Place Means
European External Action Service (EEAS) 2015 Brussels Phone
Federal Foreign Office (AA) 2015 Berlin Phone
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) 2015 / Phone
European Commission (EC) 12/11/2015 Brussels In person
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) 18/09/2016 Phone
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 28/09/2016 / Phone
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) 19/12/2016 / Phone
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 22/12/2016 Rabat In person
German Embassy to Morocco 23/12/2016 Rabat In person
French Embassy to Morocco 23/12/2016 Rabat In person
Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy (MASEN) 26/12/2016 Rabat In person
Agence Française de Développement (AfD) 27/12/2016 Rabat In person
Spanish Embassy to Morocco 13/01/2017 / Mail
German Embassy to Morocco 14/03/2017 / Mail
Federal Foreign Office (AA) 15/03/2017 / Mail
Federal Foreign Office (AA) 19/05/2017 / Phone
Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID) 21/06/2017 / Phone
European External Action Service (EEAS) 29/06/2017 / Phone
German Embassy to Morocco 20/07/2017 / Phone
German Embassy to Morocco 31/07/2017 Rabat In person
Desertec 01/08/2017 / Phone
European External Action Service (EEAS) 02/08/2017 Rabat In person
European External Action Service (EEAS) 02/08/2017 Rabat In person
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 02/08/2017 Rabat In person
European Investment Bank (EIB) 03/08/2017 Rabat In person
European External Action Service (EEAS) 29/08/2017 / Phone
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 01/09/2017 Barcelona Phone
Mediterranean Association of the National Agencies for Energy Conservation (MEDENER) 13/09/2017 / Phone
Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MedReg) 23/10/2017 / Phone
Mediterranean Transmission System Operators (Med-TSO) 31/01/2018 / Phone  
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Part Four – The Moroccan energy policy situation 
Before proceeding to this dissertation’s research topic and addressing the research 
question, i.e. consistency in EU energy governance towards Morocco and to fully understand the 
complexity of this governance, it is necessary to provide some general knowledge of the case. 
Thus, and to entirely comprehend the EU-Moroccan energy relations and challenges of the 
relationship, the following Chapter serves to contextualise the research question and to provide 
some background information on Morocco’s energy policy situation. The objective is hereby to 
gain some solid knowledge about the Maghreb country’s energy policies, stakeholders and 
relations with third parties. Indeed, as indicated before, the achievement of consistency in a 
multi-stakeholder environment not only depends on internal but also on external factors or the 
behaviour of the target country. In order to understand to what extent Morocco as the target 
country of EU external energy governance may contribute to inconsistency of the latter, it is 
absolutely imperative to explore the country’s wider energy context. The following Chapter will 
therefore examine the specific energy profile of Morocco, including an assessment of its energy 
challenges and ambitions, as well as a panorama of its energy relations and a mapping of its 
main energy institutions.  
4.1 Energy profile  
 
Although the Mediterranean can in itself hardly be considered homogeneous, its energy 
dynamics are similar, with notably the Northern African countries struggling with the same 
challenges. By far the most important challenge are rising energy and electricity demand needs, 
spurred, amongst other things, by GDP and population growth (see Figures 3 & 4).108 In Morocco, 
primary energy demand has been increasing rapidly since the early 2000s, by around 3.8% y-o-y 
on average, a trajectory that is expected to continue in the short- and mid-term, also because the 
economy is rather energy-intensive, i.e. its use of energy is not very efficient (MORATA and 
SANDOVAL, 2012:195).109 The same applies to electricity demand which has been increasing by 
around 6% y-o-y on average, driven, apart from economic and demographic parameters, by 
domestic policy initiatives aimed at increasing access to electricity, notably of the rural 
populations. For example, the Rural Electrification Programme (PERG), brought up the rate of 
electrification from 18% in 1995 to almost 99% in 2012.110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 going along amongst other things, with a higher demand in the transportation sector which acts as the main driver here. 
109 Concretely, energy demand is forecast to double by 2030, and to quadruple by 2040. AHK Morocco (Accessed on 06 June 2017). 
110 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 20 May 2017); ONE (Accessed on 05 June 2017). 
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Figure 3: Energy consumption and economic 
growth in Morocco from 2000 to 2017  
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from IEA and WB 
(Accessed on 09 January 2020). 
Figure 4: Electricity consumption and economic 
growth in Morocco from 2000 to 2017  
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from IEA and WB 
(Accessed on 09 January 2020). 
Morocco’s primary energy supply is the most diversified in North Africa. Next to oil accounting 
for around 64% of the total supply, coal, renewables and natural gas contribute to the national 
basket with around 22%, 9% and 5%, respectively (see Figure 5). Similarly, the country’s 
electricity mix is rather diversified, with around 53% of the electricity being generated from 
coal, whereas gas and oil each account for around 18% and 11% respectively, followed by 
renewables with around 15% (see Figure 6).  
Figure 5: Morocco’s total primary energy 
supply, 2017 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from IEA (Accessed on 
09 January 2020). 
Figure 6: Morocco’s total electricity generation 
mix, 2017 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from IEA (Accessed on 
09 January 2020). 
Given that Morocco is a non-energy producer and does not dispose of any significant proven111 
energy reserves,112 it is forced to import almost 96% of its primary energy needs,113 with 
supplies being geared towards few suppliers. The majority of oil comes from the Middle East, a 
region that is regularly subject to insecurities on the international oil markets and subsequently 
oil price volatility, whereas gas primarily comes from Algeria and coal from Russia (see Figures 
 
111 by contrast, as will be detailed later, the Sahara is thought to dispose of vast oil reserves.  
112 with the exception of some shale gas and coal deposits. IRAQI Fahd (08 August 2016), Importante découverte de gaz à l’est du 
Maroc, Jeune Afrique (Accessed on 20 May 2017); BP (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
113 In this context, rising energy and electricity needs are not only expected to increasingly threaten the country’s supply security, but 
also to put further pressure on its already strained national budget. For example, in 2016, the Kingdom’s energy trade deficit stood at 
around US$ 3.9 billion. IEA (Accessed on 20 May 2017); OEC (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
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7 & 9).114 Morocco is also forced to import around 17% of its electricity needs,115 most of which 
comes from Spain (see Figure 11) to which Morocco is linked via a 1.4 MW supply line (see 
Figure 12) and which is also an important supplier of oil products (see Figure 8).  
Figure 7: Morocco’s crude oil imports by origin, 
2015 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from OEC (Accessed on 17 
October 2019). 
Figure 8: Morocco’s refined oil product imports by 
origin, 2017 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from OEC (Accessed on 17 
October 2019). 
Figure 9: Morocco’s gas imports by origin, 2017 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from OEC (Accessed on 17 
October 2019). 
Figure 10: Morocco’s coal imports by origin, 2017 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from OEC (Accessed on 17 
October 2019). 
Figure 11: Morocco’s electricity imports by origin, 
2017 
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from OEC (Accessed on 17 
October 2019). 
Figure 12: Morocco’s electricity connection 
network, 2016 
 
Source: ONEE (Accessed on 21 October 2018). 
 
114 For example, Algeria supplies Europe, notably Spain and Portugal, via the Maghreb-Europe Gas (MEG) Pipeline, which stretches 
across Morocco. Serving thus as a transit country, instead of being paid a transit fee, Morocco, receives gas from Algeria. However, in 
recent years, Algeria has been struggling with diminishing energy production. 
115 IEA (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
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4.2 Energy agenda 
 
In view of the above, Morocco’s main energy challenges can be briefly described as a 
growing energy appetite and a high energy import dependence, notably regarding fossil fuels. 
Whereby apart from threatening the country’s security of supply, these parameters also 
negatively affect the national budget, as well as the CO2 balance which, as a matter of fact, is not 
in line with current ambitions to push forward the energy transition.116 At this point, it must be 
mentioned that Morocco is one of the countries in the world to be most heavily affected by 
global warming117 which is why the country has placed climate change and RES118 at the heart of 
its energy strategy. This is amongst other things demonstrated by the fact that it ratified the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1995), the Kyoto Protocol (2002) and the Paris 
Agreement (2016).119 Moreover, it was the first African UN member state to host the UN climate 
negotiations twice, once in 2001 (COP7) and the second time in November 2016 under the 
COP22 in Marrakech (one aim here was to consolidate regional leadership in this area). 
Moreover, under King Mohammed VI, Morocco has firmly anchored the right to sustainable 
development in its Constitution (Constitution, 2011:§31, 71, 152) and developed a National 
Charter for the Environment and Sustainable Development (CNEED) (Law n° 99-12).120  
In this light, the key elements of the national energy strategy (NES) presented by Mohammed VI 
himself in 2009, are: security of supply, accessibility of energy and environmental preservation 
(like the EU’s own energy objectives), as well as regional integration. Necessitating investments 
in additional transmission, distribution and storage infrastructure both at the national and the 
regional levels though (including, for example, a reinforcement of the electricity grid or the 
extension of existing import infrastructure for oil products (MORATA and SANDOVAL, 
2012:197), for all of these objectives to be realised, Morocco’s energy strategy requires above all 
an attractive legal and institutional framework,121 with key words here being market 
liberalisation/modernisation and diversification of the energy mix.  
The liberalisation/modernisation of Morocco’s energy sector (which is supported by the EU) 
was first initiated in the 1990s with the oil product market or the privatization of the oil refining 
& distribution sectors to be more precise.122 For example, in 1997, Morocco’s two domestic 
refineries, the Sidi Kacem and Mohammedia plants, were privatised123 and in 2002, product 
imports were liberalised. The latest step was the gradual phase-out of product subsidies124 in 
 
116 In fact, CO2 emissions, notably from the oil and the power generation and transport sectors have constantly increased since 2000. 
IEA (Accessed on 21 October 2018); IEA (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
117 The Mediterranean as a whole is one of the most vulnerable regions when it comes to climate change, with specific effects of 
global warming on Morocco being an increase in temperatures, along with reduced precipitation and extreme weather events. OECD 
(Accessed on 08 June 2017). 
118 i.e., solar, wind, hydro and biomass. 
119 OECD (Accessed on 08 June 2017). 
120 The CNEED, amongst other things, fixes the legal framework for foreign investments into Morocco CNEED (Accessed on 21 June 
2017), MEM (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
121 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 17 October 2018). 
122 Morocco used to have its own refinery, the SAMIR, which, located in the city of Mohammedia, was created in 1959 by the 
Moroccan state and the Italian energy company Eni, however, the refinery shut down in August 2015 due to financial problems. 
However, and as will be shown in the next sections, Morocco and Russia recently (in October 2019) signed an agreement for the 
construction of a refinery. SAMIR (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
123 The refinery was completely nationalised in 1973, but partly privatised again in 1997. (07 May 1997), Le Maroc vend ses 
raffineries à un homme d’affaires saoudien, Les Echos (Accessed on 19 October 2018). 
124 Subsidies on oil products used to be popular a policy measure in Morocco to reduce poverty, however, over the years, they have 
increasingly become unsustainable. The phase-out of 2014/2015 concerned gasoline, diesel and kerosene (BIANCHI, COLANTONI, 
MASCOLO and SARTORI, 2018:10). 
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2014 and 2015, as well as the full liberalisation of product prices in 2015, with the exception of 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).125 In parallel to the downstream sector, the Moroccan 
government equally began to review the terms for crude oil and gas exploration, resulting in the 
introduction of a new hydrocarbons code in 2000.126 As for the electricity sector, reforms equally 
started in 1994 with decree n°2-94-503127 and whilst electricity continues to be highly 
subsidised,128 like for the oil product market, attempts to bring prices closer to the cost of power 
production continue.129 However, despite these attempts to liberalise and modernise its energy 
sector, Morocco’s current energy situation, as well as its energy strategy requires an overhaul of 
the entire energy sector, including the power sectors. Therefore, in an attempt to reform the 
latter, in 2009, the Kingdom launched a process to reform the RES segment, with Law n°13-09 as 
the legislative basis.130 This law is the first of its kind to allow any natural or legal person to 
produce electricity out of RES, be it for their own use or to sell and even export it to a consumer 
of his/her choice (thus opening up to competition).131 In comparison, self-producers were 
previously required to feed their surplus into the national grid (Amendment Law n°58-15 to 
Law n°13-09) and export was only allowed in cases where the capacities of the national grid 
were insufficient.132 In extension of this law, in May 2016, the House of Counsellors adopted Law 
n°48-15, foreseeing the establishment of a National Authority for the Regulation of the 
Electricity Sector (ANRE) to monitor the liberalisation process and to ensure transparency and 
competitiveness of the sector.133  
Other than liberalisation/modernisation, the national energy strategy requires for the 
diversification of fuel types, with the general aim of diversifying both energy and electricity 
mixes by developing all types of energy sources including conventional, unconventional and 
alternative energy sources, whereby a clear focus is on RES and energy efficiency (for both 
economic and environmental reasons). This decision to make global warming and RES a top 
priority in the national energy agenda, has allowed Morocco to become the biggest producer of 
renewables in the Maghreb and a pioneer of the energy transition over the years. Hereby, it can 
rely on particularly favourable conditions for solar and wind energy, as well as for biomass 
(thanks to its huge agricultural waste). Whilst solar potential (3000 sunshine hours per year or 
20 GW)134 comes above all from the Sahara Desert, wind potential comes from the Moroccan 
coastline, notably Essaouira, Tangier and Tetouan (North) as well as Tarfaya, Taza and Dakhla 
(South) (7-11 m/s windspeed or 25 GW).135 Mainly thanks to the Atlas Mountains, Morocco also 
has a huge hydropower potential which has, however, already been largely exploited.136 Overall 
though, Morocco’s solar and wind energy potentials remain largley unexploited to date, due 
 
125 This was for social reasons as LPG is considered a sensitive product as it is mainly used by poor or remote households for 
domestic heating, cooking and lighting (BIANCHI, COLANTONI, MASCOLO and SARTORI, 2018:10); IEA (Accessed on 19 October 
2018). 
126 ONHYM (Accessed on 19 October 2018). 
127 IEA (Accessed on 31 May 2017). 
128 Planete Energies (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
129 IEA (Accessed on 19 October 2018). 
130 which came into effect in 2010.  
131 MEM (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
132 Overall, Law n°13-09 allows self-producers to produce green electricity, to have access to the national grid or to direct 
transmission lines, as well as to export green electricity. AHK Morocco (Accessed on 19 October 2018). 
133 This new independent agency will be mainly responsible for the regulation of the access of self-producers to the national grid 
MEM (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
134 French Development Agency (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
135MEM (Accessed on 20 May 2017); SIE (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
136 Morocco’s hydroelectric potential was already discovered in the early 1920s, as, due to a lack of coal, the government had decided 
to develop electric trains. The first hydropower plant came online in 1929. Planete Energies (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
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notably to a lack of capacity to store and integrate electricity generated out of these sources into 
the national power grid. Therefore, Morocco targets to install 42% of renewable energy capacity 
(compared to 34% in 2015) by 2020, a goal that includes the development of solar, wind and 
hydro capacity of 2 GW each (6 GW in total) (see Figure 13). In the context of the COP21 in Paris 
and as the 2020 targets are expected to be achieved (Interview, MASEN, 2016; Interview AFD, 
2016), the country has extended these, targeting an installed power capacity of 52% by 2030. In 
this way, Morocco hopes to reduce its energy dependence to less than 82% and its GHG 
emissions by 32% between 2016 and 2030.137  
Figure 13: Morocco’s renewable energy goals by 2020 and 2030  
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Source: Own elaboration based on information from MEM (Accessed on 21 June 2017).  
 
In this context, in 2009, the Moroccan government, strongly supported by King Mohammed VI, 
launched the Moroccan Solar Plan called NOOR, aiming at developing 2 GW of solar energy 
capacity by 2020, and 4.8 GW by 2030. Via MASEN, the national sustainable energy agency, 5 
sites for the location of solar power plants have been identified: Ouarzazate, Foum El Oued, 
Boujdour, Midelt and Tata (see Figure 14). With the solar power plants to be built on these sites, 
emissions are to be reduced by 3.7 million metric tons of CO2 oil equivalent.138 Apart from 
MASEN, national grid owner ONEE is also actively involved in achieving the Moroccan Solar Plan, 
having identified 3 sites for the location of solar power plants: Tafilet, Atlas and Argana. Whilst 
Atlas comprises 8 plants – three in the south (Tata, Tahla and Tan Tan) and 5 in the east (Outat 
El Haj, Ain Beni Mathar, Boudnib, Bouanane and Boulmane) – Argana is composed of 3 or 4 
plants in the regions of Errhamna, Tensift and Boumalen.139 Situated close to the Southern city 
Ouarzazate (located in the southeast of Marrakech), the Ouarzazate project is the biggest 
planned solar project in Morocco, with the world’s largest concentrated solar power (CSP)140 
complex being built there. The project comprises three phases: NOOR I and NOOR II & III, as well 
as NOOR IV & V. Once finalised, Ouarzazate will have a capacity of 580 MW, enough to provide 
electricity for around 1 million households. In addition to NOOR Ouarzazate, the Moroccan 
government is planning the launch of NOOR Midelt141 and Tata,142 as well as of NOOR Boujdour 
 
137 MEM (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
138 NOOR Ouarzazate (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
139 Spanish Embassy to Morocco. 
140 Concentrating solar power (CSP) techniques ‘concentrate energy from the sun’s rays to heat a receiver to high temperatures’ which 
is then transformed into electricity. Contrary to this, solar photovoltaic (PV) systems ‘directly convert solar energy into electricity’. 
IEA (Accessed on 12 August 2019). 
141 Midelt was added to MASEN’s solar project list in 2014, replacing Ain Beni Mathar which is situated south of Oujda and already 
disposes of parabolic mirrors with a capacity of 20 MW feeding into a combined cycle power plant. Located in the south of Fès, the 
site uses both photovoltaic (15-20%) and CSP (80-85%) technology and has a capacity of 600 MW.  
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and Laayoune.143 Construction of 160 MW NOOR I – a parabolic trough (using parabolic mirrors) 
power plant using CSP technology –144 started in 2013 and completed in 2016 when the complex 
was inaugurated in February 2016 by King Mohammed VI.145 The tender for this project 
(development) was won by a consortium made up of Saudi Arabian ACWA (95% participation 
interest) and Spanish Aries and TSK (5% participation interest each). Together with Moroccan 
MASEN, they formed a public-private energy partnership (PPP) under a Moroccan company set 
up for this purpose.146 Construction was carried out by Spanish Acciona, TSK and Sener. During 
the commissioning of NOOR I, in February 2016, phase two (NOOR II & III) of the Ouarzazate 
project was launched.147 Together, NOOR II & III will have a capacity of 350 MW (200 MW and 
100 MW). Just as for NOOR I, the project was secured by an ACWA-led consortium, with 
construction being carried out by Sener. NOOR II & III use the same CSP technology as NOOR I.148 
By contrast, both plants have a bigger storage capacity than NOOR I; 7.2 and 8 hours 
respectively. Finally, in November 2016, the ACWA-led consortium equally won the tender for 
NOOR IV, and the project was launched in April 2017. Unlike the first three complexes, NOOR IV 
uses photovoltaic technology and has a capacity of ‘only’ 70 MW. Contrary to NOOR I to III, 
NOOR IV it is based on an independent power producer model (IPP), i.e. ACWA is responsible for 
the conceptualisation, financing, construction, exploitation and maintenance of the project.149  
In parallel, the Moroccan government also launched the Moroccan Integrated Wind 
Programme in 2010, aiming at developing 2 GW of wind energy capacity by 2020,150 and 5 GW 
by 2030 (+ 4.2 GW between 2016 and 2030).151 Current (2016) installed wind capacity stands at 
0.8 GW.152 To achieve these objectives, the programme which is managed by ONEE, is composed 
of two parts: the Taza wind farm (150 MW) and the 850 MW wind project, comprising 5 sites 
(Tanger II 100 MW, Midelt 150 MW, Jbel Lahdid 200 MW, Tiskrad 300 MW and Boujdour 100 
MW) (see Figure 14). Unlike the solar projects, a lot of these wind projects are being or will be 
realised by the private sector. Indeed, ONEE, together with the Hassan II Fund and the Morocca 
investement company SIE, closely partners with industry. Operational since 2014, one 
particularly ambitious wind project in this context has been, for example, the 301 MW Tarfaya 
wind farm which was set up in a JV between a Moroccan energy company and the French energy 
company Engie and provides electricity for around 1.5 million homes.153  
In contrast to solar and wind, hydro has been used as a source of power since the 1960s and 
current installed capacity stands at around 1.3 GW.154 Just as for solar and wind, the Moroccan 
government aims at developing 2 GW of wind energy capacity by 2020 and 1.33 GW of capacity 
between 2016 and 2030. One major project planned in this context is the construction of a new 
 
142 Like Midelt, Tata, which is situated in the southeast of Agadir, was only recently conceptualised and replaces Sebkhate Tah, a 
combined cycle power plant situated in the south of Tarfaya. It also uses use both technologies and has a capacity of 600 MW.  
143 Boujdour is situated around 200 km south of Laayoune and both sites have a combined capacity of 100 MW. NOOR Ouarzazate; 
AHK Morocco (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
144 NOOR I is based on a technology with molten salt, allowing for a storage capacity of three hours. The gained heat is carried by a 
heat transfer solution (HTF) to a heat tank containing molten salts.  
145 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
146 In this company, ACWA held a 71.25% participation interest, MASEN 25% and Aries/TSK 3.75%. 
147 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
148 NOOR Ouarzazate (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
149 ACWA Power (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
150 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 05 June 2017). 
151 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
152 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
153 Engie (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
154 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 05 June 2017). 
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350 MW pumped storage power station in Abdelmoumen.155 In addition, several smaller hydro 
plants (100 MW) are planned (see Figure 14).156  
 
Figure 14: Morocco’s planned renewable energy (solar, wind, hydro power) projects  
Solar power projects Wind power projects Hydro power projects 
   
Source: MASEN (Accessed on 15 Octobeer 2019). 
 
Other than RES, and in an attempt to control energy demand, Morocco also accords high priority 
to the improvement of energy efficiency,157 as highlighted in the national Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan which foresees the reduction of energy consumption by 12% before 2020 and by 
20% by 2030, with notably the transport, industry and the construction158 sectors affording 
great potential here.159 In parallel to mobilising RES and energy efficiency, Morocco is turning its 
attention to conventional and unconventional fossil fuels, notably gas and coal, as well as to 
nuclear energy, aiming at diversifying both energy sources and suppliers and reducing its high 
dependence on gas imports from Algeria (MORATA and SANDOVAL, 2012:196).  
Oil: whilst in the long-term, the share of oil in the country’s energy and electricity mixes is 
planned to be reduced,160 for the moment, the Moroccan government continues exploiting its 
domestic oil reserves and as of December 2018, there were 12 energy companies active in 
Morocco’s conventional hydrocarbon sector,161 with the majority of them being British. Of 
particular interest here are Morocco’s offshore basins which according to the Moroccan 
hydrocarbon entity ONHYM ‘remain one of the least explored’,162 however, Morocco’s east is 
equally object to exploration activities. For example, in July 2018, British Sound Energy 
announced the discovery of important oil and gas deposits in the region of Tendrara close to the 
Algerian border.163 Furthermore, the Moroccan government is interested in recovering 
unconventional resources such as oil shale, with the exploration of this type of energy having 
already been started in Tanger in 1939 when the Société des Schistes Bitumineux de Tanger was 
created. Following the discovery of the Timahdit and Tarfaya deposits (in addition to the Tanger 
 
155 ONE (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
156 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 22 June 2017). 
157 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
158 See also Law n° 47-09. AHK Morocco (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
159 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 21 June 2017). 
160 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 18 October 2018). 
161 ONHYM (Accessed on 08 October 2018).  
162 ONHYM (Accessed on 19 October 2018).  
163 H24 (Accessed on 21 October 2018). 
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deposit) in the late 1960s, exploration activities further intensified in the 1970s in the context of 
the global oil crisis.164 Currently, there are 3 companies involved in oil shale exploration 
activities; one Moroccan (ZONATEC), one Irish (San Leon Energy) and one Emirati (TAQA) 
company.165 Finally, the Moroccan government is equally active with regards to its oil 
downstream sector, aiming at elaborating a vision or a strategic plan for its modernisation. In 
this context, it is trying to optimise the distribution of its strategic oil stocks on a regional level 
by developing additional oil product storage possibilities.166  
Gas: the share of gas in the country’s electricity mix is planned to reach 31% (from currently 
18%) under the roadmap for the implementation of the LNG Development Plan.167 Moreover, 
and being considered a clean energy source, gas is planned to represent around 11% of the 
installed electricity capacity by 2020.168 In this line, the 2025 gas strategy which was adopted in 
December 2014, requires for the installation of an additional 3 GW of combined-cycle capacity 
between 2021 and 2025,169 representing an investment of around US$ 4.6 billion.170 Overall, the 
Moroccan gas strategy targets both conventional and unconventional gas, with the latter sought 
to be used in electricity generation (~70%) as well as for industry uses and it also seeks to 
develop the existing gas infrastructure. In this context, setting up an LNG terminal is planned at 
Jorf Lasfar by 2020, which is supposed to be connected by a pipeline passing by Mohammedia, 
Kénitra and Dhar Doum.171 Government plans foresee the import of around 70-80% under long-
term contracts (the rest will come from the spot market).172 Apart from developing the existing 
gas infrastructure, the government also plans to develop the existing electricity infrastructure as 
will be shown throughout this dissertation.  
Coal: its share in the electricity mix is planned to be gradually reduced down to 44% by 2025,173 
it is still thought to make up for around 26% of the country’s installed electricity capacity in 
2020.174 As this suggests, the government foresees a role for coal in the future and there are 
currently more than 200 mine sites active in the country (BIANCHI, COLANTONI, MASCOLO and 
SARTORI, 2018:11). Jorf Lasfar (700 MW) and Mohammedia, two of the country’s largest power 
plants, are coal-fired and the Moroccan electricity provider ONEE is currently involved in the 
construction of four other important coal-powered plants: Safi coal power plant (1386 MW), 
extension of the Jerada thermal power plant (318 MW), extension of the Dakhla diesel power 
plant (16.5 MW) and extension of the Laayoune diesel power plant (72 MW).175 By far the 
biggest project is the Safi coal power plant which will be composed of two units of 693 MW each. 
Safi is being realised in cooperation with the private sector (Engie and Mitsui) and came online 
at the end of 2018. 
 
164 ONHYM (Accessed on 27 October 2018). 
165 ONHYM (Accessed on 08 October 2018). 
166 MEM (Accessed on 22 June 2017). 
167 MEM (Accessed on 18 October 2018). 
168 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 17 October 2018). 
169 And around 4.8 GW between 2016 and 2030. MEM (Accessed on 22 June 2017). 
170 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 22 June 2017). 
171 MEM (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
172 SAADI Dania (06 October 2015), Morocco to choose LNG providers amid energy diversification, The National (Accessed on 21 
October 2018). 
173 MEM (Accessed on 18 October 2018). 
174 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 17 October 2018). 
175 Spanish Embassy to Morocco. 
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Nuclear: finally, in addition to renewables and fossil fuels, Morocco is also seeking to develop 
nuclear energy with the aim of constructing a first nuclear centre by 2030.176 Morocco’s nuclear 
ambitions date back to the early 1980s, when French and Russian geologists first carried out 
nuclear studies in the country. According to these studies, Morocco disposes of vast resources of 
uranium, notably unconventional uranium, i.e. uranium to be recovered from phosphoric acid.177 
Hence, since 2000, Morocco disposes of a Nuclear Research Centre, the Centre of Maamora 
(CENM), located 22 km to the northeast of Rabat where in 2005 the country’s first research 
reactor (2 MW) was built in cooperation with the US and France. The reactor was built by US 
General Atomics which also accounted for around a third of its financing. By contrast, parts of 
the CENM’s infrastructure were built by French Technicatom and SPIE Batignolles.178  
4.3 Energy relations 
 
As stated in the initial problem of this dissertation, a shift in traditional policy 
cooperation patterns has been observed in the southern Mediterranean in recent years, 
mirroring deep geopolitical change in the region. This shift is not driven by one source alone but 
by various actors. On the EU-side, apart from the traditionally active southern EU member states 
France, Italy and Spain, some of the northern member states are equally showing growing 
interest. Whereas on the non-EU side, actors like the US, Russia, China or the Gulf states seem to 
be increasingly present as well, considering the region amongst other things as a stepping stone 
to engage in other parts of Africa. For example, even though the largest share of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) into North Africa’s energy sectors is still being made by multinational 
enterprises from European countries such as France, a lot of formerly active European investors 
have been divesting from the region (see Total in Algeria)179 while FDI from Asia (Japan) and the 
Middle East (UAE) is increasing. Finally, the region itself is changing with its countries having 
begun to demonstrate a strong appetite for developing their own networks of international 
relations and partners. Or as Balfour (2012:8) observes, ‘the EU and the US are no longer the 
privileged interlocutors of the southern Mediterranean countries’. According to Fernandez-Molina 
(2014:3), this can only be partly attributed to the Arab Spring as in her opinion, the ‘external 
behavior’ of the Arab states remains largely ‘unchanged’. However, and as will become clear in 
the following, it cannot be denied that the Arab uprising had a certain impact on the foreign 
policy decisions of the Arab leaders.  
In any case, the Maghreb countries’ opening-up towards new partners is a process that not only 
encompasses foreign affairs but also energy policies. Indeed, in a context of both growing energy 
and electricity demand, diversification of suppliers and routes constitutes an important aspect in 
these countries’ policies. This can best be seen in the example of Algeria which, in order to adapt 
to its current energy supply situation180 and to reduce its high dependence on the European 
market, is actively seeking to diversify its export options, for example, through expanding its 
LNG sales towards Asia (SARTORI, 2014:9-10).181 Morocco is no exception to this opening-up. On 
 
176 (01 March 2016), Morocco Seeks to Have Nuclear Power Capacity by 2030, Morocco World News (Accessed on 21 October 2018). 
177 World Nuclear Association, IAEA (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
178 L’économiste (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
179 Santander Algeria (Accessed on 21 October 2018); Santander Egypt (Accessed on 21 October 2018); Santander Morocco 
(Accessed on 21 October 2018); Unctad World Investment Report 2018 (Accessed on 21 October 2018). 
180 Algeria was heavily impacted by the fall of the oil price, focing the country to rethink its national energy strategy.  
181 In this context, the focus has notably been on China which, in view of its own growing population, has been reaching out towards 
Algeria as a future hydrocarbon supplier.  
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the contrary, it has been shown that the country’s national energy strategy clearly foresees the 
diversification of fuel origins. In this context, and to diversify its energy relations, Morocco has 
several instruments at its disposal, ranging from agreements and conventions to partnerships 
covering public-public, public-private and private-private cooperation dimensions. As this will 
without doubt have an impact on its energy partnership with the EU, an overview or panorama 
of Morocco’s most relevant (due to the limited scope) energy relations with third states will be 
presented in the following, whereby the author will not only focus on government policies, but 
also shed light on the interests and activities of non-state actors, i.e. of the private sector. 
Hereby, and given that foreign and energy policies are closely intertwined, particular 
consideration will be given to the conflict in the Sahara, a sparsely-populated desert region and 
disputed territory situated in Morocco’s south. Indeed, and as will be elaborated more in detail 
later, the Sahara issue – and ongoing conflict opposing Morocco to the so-called Polisario Front, 
an Algerian backed independence movement laying claims to the Sahara182 – is not only strongly 
linked to Morocco’s foreign affairs but also an important factor in the country’s external energy 
relations. 
United States 
 
Whilst North Africa is a strategic crossroads between Europe, Africa and the Middle East, this 
location has, as stated by Hemmer (2007), ‘proven to be a double-edged sword with regard to 
American foreign policy’ in the past as this has also meant that the region has often been of only 
secondary interest to the US and it is in this context that one can explain the US’s absence in or 
further withdrawal from the region following the outbreak of the Arab Spring.183 However, and 
contrary to what this may suggest, the US’s withdrawal does not mean that America does not 
continue to have significant influence and leverage in the region (BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, 
REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:100), a context in which Morocco is considered 
to be the ‘closest ally’ (HEMMER, 2007). In fact, having been the first country to recognise the 
US’s independence from Great Britain in 1786 (Treaty of Friendship)184, Morocco was naturally 
also one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the newly-born country and 
political and economic ties have been strong ever since. Nowadays, both states see each other as 
friends and allies and whilst the alliance with the US is a key priority area of Morocco’s foreign 
policy (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2014:4-5), the US’s Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes: 
‘U.S. officials view Morocco as a moderate Arab ally, welcome supporter of the global war against 
terrorism, constructive player in the Israeli Palestinian peace process, and leader in Arab efforts to 
reform and democratize’.185 Against this background, the US have been a valuable provider of 
both military and economic development assistance and Morocco is part of the ‘War on 
Terror’186 (HEMMER, 2007) and also became a NATO non-member ally (ZOUBIR, 2014:241, 
245). Although in this context, the US have certainly contributed to Morocco preserving its 
 
182 Whilst the Sahara is largely referred to as either Moroccan (by the Moroccan government) or Western (by the UN) Sahara, for 
neutrality reasons, the author of this dissertation will hereinafter refer to the territory as Moroccan/Western Sahara or simply 
Sahara. 
183 Other reasons like a Middle East ‘fatigue’ of course also played a role (COLOMBO, COATES-ULRICHSEN, GHABRA, HAMID and 
RAGAB, 2012:34). 
184 The 1786 Treaty of Friendship between the two countries has been in effect without interruption (it was renegotiated in 1836). 
185 CRS (Accessed on 23 May 2017). 
186 Simplified, the ‘War on Terror’ or ‘War on Terrorism’ describes ‘the American-led global counterterrorism campaign launched in 
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001’. It was a ‘multidimensional campaign’, entailing amongst other things the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as comprehensive military-assistance programmes. Britannica (Accessed on 13 August 2019). 
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military dominance over the Sahara, the country’s real role or position regarding the issue is 
however ambiguous and subject to controversy (KEENAN, 2013:300).  
On the one hand, having feared any influence of the Soviet Union in the region during the Cold 
War (AL-MANAR SLIMI, 2009; ZOUBIR, 2014:239),187 the US have traditionally sided with 
Morocco and not the Polisario and have for example played a vital role in the negotiations 
leading to the signature of the Madrid Accords leading to Spain’s withdrawal from the Sahara 
(AL-MANAR SLIMI, 2009). This was more than a barter deal, as the US were also convinced that 
a united Morocco would promote greater regional integration (HEMMER, 2007).188 On the other 
hand, over the years, the US have taken a more neutral stance in the conflict and from 1977 
onwards, have refrained from giving any political support (AL-MANAR SLIMI, 2009) and this 
even when, as noted by Hemmer (2007), former Secretary of State James Baker was the official 
UN envoy on the issue in the early 2000s. The rationale behind this is to ‘keep Morocco as a 
geostrategic ally without harming its economic interests in Algeria’ (AL-MANAR SLIMI, 2009).189 
In this line, the US refuse to explicitly recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara and keep 
insisting on the idea of holding a referendum in the region (RUBIN, 2015).190 Whilst this suggests 
that the US’s support is not necessarily unconditional, they do support Morocco’s autonomy plan 
though, considering it ‘serious, realistic, credible’191 and are overall one of Morocco’s most 
important partners or allies in the Sahara conflict (AL-MANAR SLIMI, 2009), but also in general. 
For example, in 2004, both countries signed a Free Trade Agreement that entered into force in 
2006 and was complemented in 2012 with the launch of a Strategic Dialogue on political, 
economic, security, and educational and cultural affairs.192 However, whilst the US undeniably 
continue to be an important import partner to Morocco accounting for around 5.1% of its total 
imports in 2017,193 they were surpassed by China in 2014 and also largely lag behind Europe, 
notably Spain and France. Similarly, with regards to energy, it must be noted though that 
relations are, compared with the US’s links with Libya and Algeria,194 much less pronounced.  
Indeed, so far, energy has only played a tangential role in the US’s investments into Morocco.195 
Nonetheless, Morocco imports refined petroleum, petroleum gas, petroleum coke, sulphur and 
coal briquettes from the US and in 2017, the US had a share of 20% in Morocco’s total refined 
petroleum imports, making it the second most important import origin of these products after 
Spain. Political energy cooperation was initially very much concentrated on clean energies 
 
187 Subsequently, Morocco became an integral part of Western alliances as of the 1950s and started to play an important proxy role 
in their fight against communism. In this line, it started defending US interests on many fronts, starting with the Gulf War in 1991, 
and the Bonsia War in 1992. In exchange, it was granted US support in the Sahara cause and the US, together with France helped for 
example funding the Sahara Wall (ZOUBIR, 2007:158; KEENAN, 2013:287; ABOURABI, 2015:589). 
188 CRS (Accessed on 23 May 2017). 
189 Algeria has been an important investment market for the US for a long time and in the early 2000s, both countries intensified 
their cooperation, notably on the War on Terror, as well as on energy (AL-MANAR SLIMLI, 2009; FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2015:84). 
190 Considering the Sahara issue a ‘matter for the United Nations to address’ (AL-MANAR SLIMI, 2009), in 2013, the Obama 
government made the proposal to expand UN monitoring of human rights in the Sahara and in April 2016, it was at the head of 
resolution n° 2285 to renew the mandate of the UN peace mission MINURSO. BENNIS Samir (12 May 2016), Why Morocco is 
Disappointed With the US Position on Western Sahara, Morocco World News (Accessed on 21 October 2018). 
191 Autonomy Plan (Accessed on 21 October 2018); (19 March 2016), U.S. supports Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara, 
Reuters (Accessed on 01 August 2018). 
192 Shared interests are for example: security & the fight against terrorism, free trade, Arab-Israeli peace, religious freedom etc. 
Moroccan American Center for Policy (Accessed on 25 May 2017). 
193 OEC (Accessed on 23 May 2017). 
194 The US, via the private sector, is strongly involved in both the Libyan and Algerian energy markets and its main investment area in 
Algeria is in energy. For example, American energy company Anadarko is the largest foreign oil producer in Algeria, having 
discovered numerous hydrocarbon fields between 1990 and 1994, including for example the Hassi-Berkine or Ourhoud (HEMMER, 
2007); Anadarko (Accessed on 01 August 2018). 
195 MCINET (Accessed on 30 July 2018). 
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though, with both countries having signed an agreement on training, investment and technical 
cooperation in the fields of renewables in 2002,196 followed in 2004 by the signature of a joint 
statement on environmental cooperation.197 In the same spirit, the US supported the 
construction of the nuclear research reactor at the Maamora centre in 2005.198 However, with 
the US’ discoveries of shale gas in the mid-2000’s, this focused has shifted and since 2014, both 
countries have been seeking to explore ways to strengthen cooperation in shale gas,199 a context 
in which LNG has also increasingly gained in importance,200 with Morocco showing interest in 
importing this form of natural gas from the US. For example, in October 2015, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with Cheniere Energy, a US energy company primarily engaged in LNG, 
was signed. Overall, at the industry level, US companies have primarily focused on fossil fuels, 
disregarding the political situation in the Sahara. For example, in 2001, US oil major Kerr McGee 
signed an offshore oil reconnaissance contract with Morocco (KEENAN, 2013:291),201 and 
primarily active in Morocco’s offshore oil and gas sector, energy player Kosmos Energy used to 
hold two licenses each in the Essaouira (75% interest) and the Boujdour blocks (55% interest), 
with the latter being located in the Sahara.202 By contrast, the only major US company active in 
the renewables sector is General Electric (GE) which has been present in Morocco for around 25 
years, supplying for example wind turbines to Morocco’s Energie Eolienne du Maroc (EEM).203 
Apart from GE, in 2000, Enercop installed a solar panel facility in the region of Casablanca.204 
Russia 
 
Whilst diplomatic relations between Morocco and Russia were already established back in 
1958,205 it was only in 2002 and with the signature of a declaration on a strategic partnership 
that the countries’ political and economic rapprochement began to intensify. For example, after 
Russian president Vladimir Putin visited Morocco in 2006, several agreements were signed and 
a Russian-Moroccan Business Council was created.206 One reason for this rather late re-warming 
of relations is the fact that originally, Algeria used to be Russia’s traditional partner in the 
Mediterranean region.207 However, following several points of disagreement, and taking into 
account current geopolitical developments, Russia has increasingly turned its geostrategic focus 
towards Morocco. Its primary interest here lies in the country’s access to the Atlantic, as well as 
 
196 Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
197 US Department of State (Accessed on 26 May 2017). 
198 Nuclear Engineering (Accessed on 17 October 2019). 
199 MEM (Accessed on 26 May 2017). 
200 MEM (Accessed on 08 July 2017); Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Accessed on 25 June 2017); Moroccan 
Energy Federation (Accessed on 26 May 2017). 
201 WATKINS Eric (25 October 2018), Kerr-McGee to continue work off Morocco, OGJ (Accessed on 06 October 2018). 
202 Kosmos Energy withdrew from Cap Boujdour in February 2018, stating that it would concentrate on new activities in West Africa. 
Apart from Kosmos Energy, American companies having been active in Morocco’s conventional energy sector were or have been: 
Heyco, Enercorp and Lone Star Energy. Kosmos Energy (Accessed on 25 May 2017); KASRAOUI Safaa (08 February 2018), Kosmos 
and Capricorn to withdraw from southern Morocco, Moroccoworldnews (Accessed on 13 August 2019); Moroccan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
203 Other US players active in Morocco’s power sectors are for example Eaton. GE (Accessed on 25 May 2017); Eaton (Accessed on 25 
May 2017). 
204 Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Accessed on 25 June 2017) 
205 Trade relations were first established in the 18th century and the first General Consulate of the Russian Empire was established in 
Tangier in 1897. Russia’s interest in Morocco was primarily based on the desire to exercise some influence in the Arab world taking 
into account the European alliances and deals at that time. Whilst relations were interrupted following WWI and its aftermaths, in 
1956, the USSR was the first country to recognise the Maghreb country’s independence. Moroccan Embassy to Russia (Accessed on 
21 May 2017). 
206 Also, Mohammed VI visisted Russia in March 2016. Moroccan Government. 
207 Algeria and Russia share the same socialist past, while in Morocco the Communist party was forbidden in 1961 (it only reemerged 
as the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) in 1974) and the country was aligned with the US during the Cold War. Moroccan 
Embassy to Russia (Accessed on 21 May 2017). 
- 59 - 
 
its connections with Sub-Saharan Africa (STRUYE DE SWIELANDE, 2013:152). In this context, 
although advocating a political solution negotiated within the UN framework (SEDDIKI, AZIRAR, 
ELHOUDAIGUI, TAOUIL and HANCHANE, 2012:64), it has also increased its support with respect 
to the Sahara question.208 On the economic front, Morocco is Russia’s second most important 
commercial partner in Africa and the Arab world after Egypt, but trade exchanges are weak and 
hardly diversified,209 which is reflected in Russian FDI into Morocco (SEDDIKI, AZIRAR, 
ELHOUDAIGUI, TAOUIL and HANCHANE, 2012:67). However, cooperation is at a turning point 
and whilst in the past, cooperation agreements had mainly concentrated on trade in general, in 
recent years, both countries decided to make agriculture, tourism and energy the strategic main 
focus of their bilateral relations (phosphate may be another) (SEDDIKI, AZIRAR, ELHOUDAIGUI, 
TAOUIL and HANCHANE, 2012:68). As regards energy, this seems logical as in the past, Russia 
has already been an important supplier of oil and coal to Morocco, a context in which, in October 
2017, both countries signed an MoU on energy cooperation.210 The prime aspects here are fossil 
fuels, allowing Morocco to import natural gas in the form of LNG from Russia. In fact, Morocco is 
not only highly interested in a transfer of know-how in the fields of LNG but also of shale oil and 
gas, oil prospection etc. Also, in October 2019, Moroccan company Mya Energy signed an 
agreement with Russian VEB bank for the financing and construction of a new 200,000 b/d 
refinery.211 Another opportunity for cooperation apart from fossil fuels is nuclear power. Whilst 
no definite plans been made, both countries have however demonstrated their interest in such 
collaboration212 and Russian Rosatom has been actively pursuing deals with Morocco.213 In this 
line, the Russian nuclear agency took part in the COP22, for example.214 Finally, renewable 
energy may also be a point of common interest and in the past, the Soviet Union/Russia, were 
involved in several renewable energy-related projects in Morocco, such as the hydroelectric 
power plants Jerada (1971), Al Mansour Dhabi (1972) or Moulay Youssef (1974).215 
 
Asia 
 
Apart from the US and Russia, Asia plays an important role in Morocco’s foreign policy approach 
and strengthening ties with both big (China, Japan, India and South Korea) and small (Malaysia, 
Brunei etc…) countries matters equally. Important platforms in this context are for example the 
Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD),216 the New Asian–African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) and 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)217 to which Morocco submitted its 
candidacy to become a sectoral dialogue partner in 2018,218 or the Asia-Middle East Dialogue 
(AMED). As far as the economic level is concerned, trade relations are excellent, with the Asian 
 
208 For example, during King Mohammed V’s visit to Moscow in March 2016, both countries declared officially that they would not 
‘support any temptation to accelerate or haste the political process, nor any violation of the parameters defined in the Security Council 
resolutions.’ However, at the same time, Russia supports the right of self-determination. (15 March 2016), Russia supports Morocco’s 
position on the Western Sahara, Morocco World News (Accessed on 07 April 2019); LUGAN, Bernard (2017), Liberté Politique 
(Accessed on 21 May 2017). 
209 Moroccan Embassy to Russia (Accessed on 21 May 2017). 
210 MEM (Accessed on 21 October 2018). 
211 (24 October 2019), Maroc-Russie: Accord pour la construction d’un complexe pétrochimique au nord du Maroc, LesEco (Accessed 
on 29 October 2019).  
212 World Nuclear Association (Accessed on 21 May 2017). 
213 World Nuclear Association (Accessed on 21 May 2017). 
214 Rosatom (Accessed on 21 May 2017). 
215 Moroccan Government. 
216 ACD (Accessed on 04 October 2018). 
217 ASEAN (Accessed on 04 October 2018). 
218 (14 February 2018), Morocco Wants to Become ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partner, The North Africa Post (Accessed on 04 October 
2018).  
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continent accounting for around 14% of Morocco’s exports, and around 16% of its imports.219 
Most important countries in this context are China and Japan.  
Whilst early contacts with China were already established in the 15th century – the great 
Moroccan traveller Ibn Battuta first arrived in China in 1446 – diplomatic relations between 
Morocco and China have existed since 1958 when Morocco was the second African country to 
recognise China’s independence.220 Ever since, and based on the principle of South-South 
cooperation,221 Sino-Moroccan relations have remained untroubled,222 a stability that can be 
best explained by the fact that both countries are politically aligned, with one important aspect 
here being their common understanding of the notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
non-interventionism. In fact, until today and despite its close ties with Algeria, China by not 
recognising the SADR, has adopted a rather neutral stance on the Sahara question, making the 
Asian country therefore an important ally in the UN Security Council.223 In return, Morocco has 
stuck to the ‘One-China Policy’, i.e. has remained neutral regarding the Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang 
issues (SHINN and EISENMAN, 2012:236; ABOURABI, 2015:598).224 In this context, the 
respective visits of King Mohammed VI and President Hu Jintao in Beijing and Rabat in 2005 and 
2006225 marked the beginning of a process of a diplomatic rapprochement between Morocco and 
China (SHINN and EISENMAN, 2012:236) and ties further intensified following a high-level visit 
of King Mohammed VI to President Xi Jingping in Beijing in May 2016, leading to the 
establishment of a Strategic Partnership and the signature of several agreements.226 Driven both 
by economic227 and geopolitical interests, China, through its ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative 
(OBOR),228 aims to establish a trade route connecting it with Europe and Africa, a context in 
which Morocco has been seeking to place itself as a (Western) anchor point. And indeed, from a 
geostrategic perspective, the Maghreb country is of interest to China because of its harbour 
Tanger Med and because it may serve as an entrance point to the French-speaking parts of the 
continent,229 as well as to the Middle East.230 In line with this, trade has steadily increased in 
recent years and in 2017, China was Morocco’s third biggest import partner after Spain and 
France, accounting for 8.4% of Morocco’s total imports.231 By contrast, exports to China only 
 
219 OEC (Accessed on 18 October 2019). 
220 Chinese ambassador to Morocco. 
221 Both Morocco and China had experienced colonialism in their past and were classified as developing countries. Further, it was for 
example through Morocco that China supported Algeria’s war of independence. Chinese ambassador to Morocco. 
222 and this despite Morocco’s already mentioned anti-communist political direction during the Cold War.  
223 For example, on April 29, 2016, China abstained from any vote on UN resolution 2285 renewing the UN MINURSO mandate. (15 
March 2016), Russia supports Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara, Morocco World News (Accessed on 07 April 2019). 
224 However, given its close ties with Algeria, as well as with countries that support Algeria in the Sahara question (such as Angola, 
Nigeria and South Africa), China’s future treatment with the Sahara question remains open. BENNIS Samir (19 May 2016), The 
Morocco-China partnership and its impact on Western Sahara, Al Araby (Accessed on 23 October 2018). 
225 Moroccan Government. 
226 All Africa (Accessed on 30 April 2017).  
227 With its GDP growth having slowed down in recent years, China has started to increasingly search for investment opportunities 
abroad (JOHNSTON, 2016). 
228 The ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, which was first developed in 2013, refers to the idea of reestablishing China’s ancient 
Silk Road by adapting it to the economic conditions of the 21st century, thus combining the establishment of a land route with the 
establishment of a maritime route. In this spirit, apart from trade and commerce, plans include infrastructure, development and 
financing policies (JOHNSTON, 2016). 
229 Traditionally, Algeria used to play this role, however, in recent years, China has started to extend its policy of economic opening-
up towards other Maghreb countries. In fact, since both countries have experienced socialism, they share sort of the same past and 
have been bound to each other by strong military ties – indeed, China, together with Russia, is Algeria’s most important arms 
supplier. Furthermore, both countries cooperate in the areas security (terrorism), economy (industry, tourism) and trade and the 
2000s have equally seen a rapprochement concerning energy issues, with energy relations having grown slowly, but surely. 
230 See Morocco’s close ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with their members being important energy suppliers to China. 
BENNIS Samir (19 May 2016), The Morocco-China partnership and its impact on Western Sahara, Al Araby (Accessed on 23 October 
2018). 
231 OEC (Accessed on 29 April 2017). 
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accounted for 2.5% of Morocco’s overall exports.232 However, whilst China’s role as an investor 
in Morocco remains modest and in 2018, the country only ranked 26th in terms of FDI,233 the 
Moroccan market has become increasingly attractive to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs), of which there are currently around 30 present in the infrastructure, industrial, plastics, 
fishing or automotive sectors.234 With respect to energy, the two countries share similar issues; 
above all their high dependence on imports. In November 2014, they signed an MoU on 
energy235 which was complemented in May 2016 with the signature of a cooperation agreement, 
under which China primarily intends to invest in solar energy. Agreements include, for example, 
the construction of a production unit for photovoltaic cells,236 as well as for solar water-
heaters.237 In this line, in November 2016, MASEN chose China’s Chint Group Corp Ltd. (next to 
Saudi Arabia’s Acwa Power International) to design, construct and operate NOOR IV, NOOR 
Laayoune and NOOR Boujdour.238 In addition to renewables, China is also interested in fossil 
fuels with for example ONEE having received a loan of around US$ 300 million from China’s 
Exim Bank to finance a coal-fired power plant in Jerada (318 MW) in 2014. Construction of the 
plant was carried out by China’s Sepco and in May 2016, both ONEE and Sepco signed an 
agreement to study the possibility of extending Jerada.239 Finally, China’s plans to export nuclear 
energy in the context of the OBOR initiative might also play a role in Morocco approaching the 
Asian country which is able to provide both financial and technological support in this regard. 
And indeed, both countries have already carried out a pre-project study for the construction of a 
10 MW reactor at Tan-Tan, which is supposed to provide power for a desalination plant.240 
Bilateral relations between Morocco and Japan are overall good and the Asian country is an 
important partner with regard to the Sahara issue and does not recognise the SADR.241 Relations 
were first established in 1956, and from then on, Japan has played an important role with 
respect to development aid and was the 8th biggest donor of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), before the US and Spain in 2015.242 In this line, it has been notably present in Morocco via 
its development agency, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) with which 
Moroccan Agency for International Cooperation (AMCI) had signed an MoU in 2013. The 
purpose of JICA is not only to transfer ODA, but also to identify business opportunities for 
Japanese investors and reinforce economic bilateral ties. In 2015, Morocco accounted for 18.4% 
of JICA’s programmes in the Middle East, being the most important North African country in this 
regard.243 Whilst the commercial exchange between these two countries is relatively weak 
compared to others – in 2017, Japan accounted for only 1.2% of Morocco’s exports and for 3.8% 
of its imports –244 and barely diversified,245 Japanese FDI into Morocco has been steadily 
 
232 OEC (Accessed on 29 April 2017). 
233 Preliminary data. Moroccan Exchange Office (Accessed on 12 April 2019). 
234 YACOUBA BARMA (23 March 2017), Chine-Afrique: le Maroc désormais au cœur de la «route de la soie», La Tribune (Accessed on 
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235 Moroccan Government. 
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increasing in recent years.246 As both countries seek to reinforce their economic relations, with 
Japanese investors being primarily attracted by Morocco’s automotive and energy sectors. For 
example, Japanese company Sumitomo announced plans to set up a pilot project on the 
construction of a CSP solar plant of 1 MW to be installed in Ouarzazate as part of the solar plant’s 
R&D platform. The project, which will be carried out in cooperation with MASEN was launched 
in 2016 and Sumitomo plans to install another plant of 20 MW.247 Apart from Sumitomo, Mitsui, 
one of the world biggest energy companies in the world, has been present in Morocco since 
1961. In 2014, Mitsui completed the construction of the Jorf Lasfar power plant (700 MW, 
together with South Korean construction company Daewoo)248 and, together with French Engie, 
is involved in the construction of the Safi coal-fired power plant (1386 MW)249 and the Taza 
wind farm (150 MW). Mitsui is also interested in exploring possibilities of investments regarding 
LNG (and is highly encouraged by Morocco in this regard).250 By contrast, intergovernmental 
energy cooperation has mainly focused on electricity, especially ‘green’ power. For example, the 
Japanese government made a donation of US$ 7.4 million for the installation of the Assa-Zag 
photovoltaic power plant (800 Kw) in 2010.251 This was followed by a donation for 170 electric 
cars in 2013 which was extended by another 60 to 70 cars in 2017.252 While JICA has not yet 
been active specifically in the energy sector, it has supported several projects in the 
environment and water sectors.253 Moreover, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation acted 
as lender for the Safi project.254  
Middle East 
‘Facilitated by religious, cultural, and linguistic links’ (COLOMBO, COATES-ULRICHSEN, GHABRA, 
HAMID and RAGAB, 2012:III), relations between Morocco and the countries of the Middle East 
have traditionally been strong. Morocco has regularly called for a strengthening of joint Arab 
economic action255 and joint Arab development initiatives in Africa256 and its diplomacy is 
aligned with that of the League of Arab States (LAS), although slightly nuanced by a more 
pragmatic policy regarding Israel, the US and Europe (ABOURABI, 2015:286). Primarily based on 
personal ties (EL-KATIRI, 2016:187),257 relations have been particularly strong with the Persian 
Gulf States, and Morocco has been one of the biggest profiteers of financial aid provided by the 
Gulf Corporation Council (GCC), an intergovernmental organisation composed of Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its overarching aim 
being the maintenance of stability in the Arab world, following the outbreak of political unrest in 
the North African region in the context of the Arab Spring, the GCC has signalled its intention to 
leverage a broad financial basis to address or fight the causes of the uprisings (COLOMBO, 
 
245 at least as far Moroccan exports towards Japan are concerned; animal products account for almost 60%. OEC (Accessed on 29 
April 2017).  
246 Moroccan Exchange Office (Accessed on 12 April 2019). 
247 Sumitomo (Accessed on 03 May 2017). 
248 Notably interested in the LNG, electricity and renewable sectors, Daewo itself has been considering the possibility of setting up a 
local representation in Morocco which would highly welcome such plans. Mitsui (Accessed on 02 May 2017); MEM (Accessed on 08 
July 2017). 
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256 Morocco World News of 18 April 2017 (Accessed on 26 July 2018). 
257 Personal ties have particularly been strong between former Moroccan King Hassan II and the Gulf leaders. FERANDEZ-MOLINA 
(2014:5); BOUKHARS Anour (25 May 2011), Does Morocco Have a Place in the GCC?, Carnegie (Accessed on 24 October 2018). 
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COATES-ULRICHSEN, GHABRA, HAMID and RAGAB, 2012:IV) and to become increasingly 
involved in political affairs (BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER 
LOO, 2017:102). In this context, the GCC invited Morocco and Jordan to apply for membership in 
2011 and although Morocco rejected the offer,258 it however included a deepening of Islamic or 
Arab cooperation as one of the main strategic directions in its new constitution of 2011 
(Constitution 2011:Preamble).259 Finally, in 2012, it accepted strategic alignment with the GCC 
(SROUR-GANDON, 2014:6). 260  
Coping with similar socio-economic challenges as the old monarchic regime in Morocco, notably 
the GCC member countries Qatar and Saudi Arabia have actively endeavoured to preserve the 
only Sunnite monarchy in the Maghreb region.261 Important financial contributors in this 
context, not necessarily in direct aid terms, but as regards to loans, have been the Saudi Arabia-
based Islamic Development Bank (ISDB),262 the OPEC Fund for International Development 
(OFID),263 as well as the Kuwait-based Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
(AFESD), although to a lesser extent.264 Given these developments, Colombo, Coates-Ulrichsen, 
Ghabra, Hamid and Ragab (2012:34) note: ‘Saudi Arabia is stepping well beyond its traditional 
sphere of influence and encroaching on what has traditionally been US (and European) territory’. 
Paradoxically though, and despite this ‘rediscovery’ of North Africa and the ‘redirecting of 
investments’ to Morocco in the context of the Arab Spring (COLOMBO, COATES-ULRICHSEN, 
GHABRA, HAMID and RAGAB, 2012:IV, 10), the Gulf countries continue to occupy a low middle 
ranking as regards to trade with Morocco, reflecting the (still) low level of economic integration 
which certainly was one of the reasons for Morocco’s decision to become strategically aligned to 
the GCC (SROUR-GANDON, 2014:6). Common areas of interest concern for example market 
integration and infrastructure development.265 In this context, investment continues to be a key 
pillar of cooperation.266 As far as energy is concerned, the Arab countries (which are among the 
worlds’ most dominant actors in the oil and gas industry) have contributed to the development 
of the Moroccan energy sector with more than US$ 3 billion under the ISDB. In fact, loans for the 
PERG programme have already amounted to US$ 150 million, making up 15% of the 
 
258 The reasons for Morocco deciding not to join the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) were multiple, amongst which, for example, 
physical distance and cultural differences, as well as divergences in terms of economic profile. Another reason is political opposition, 
especially in view of the fact that the Gulf countries were ‘politically at odds with the ‘democratizing’ image it [Morocco] intended to 
project to the international community’ (FERANDEZ-MOLINA, 2014:4). HAMDAN Sara (25 May 2011), Gulf Council Reaches Out to 
Morocco and Jordan, The New York Times (Accessed on 24 October 2018); BOUKHARS Anour (25 May 2011), Does Morocco Have a 
Place in the GCC?, Carnegie (Accessed on 24 October 2018). 
259 Indeed, whilst in the past, financial support has been primarily destined to Morocco’s agricultural, economic and social sectors, its 
development, educational and cultural sectors have been increasingly targeted since 2011 (SROUR-GANDON, 2014:4; DUPRET, 
2016:423; EL-KATIRI, 2016:195). 
260 The Gulf States had already invited Morocco and Jordan to join the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) in 2011, however, Morocco 
refused to become a full member. Nevertheless, relations between both sides have grown stronger ever since, resulting in Morocco 
becoming a strategic partner in 2012 (DUPRET, 2016:423, EL-KATIRI, 2016:195); Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance 
(Accessed on 03 May 2017). 
261 Whilst in this context, they (notably Saudi Arabia) have gained a ‘status of counter-revolutionary actor’, in parallel, they have also 
shown great interest in pursuing or establishing political and economic cooperation with the new regimes put in place 
(BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:102; COLOMBO, COATES-ULRICHSEN, GHABRA, 
HAMID and RAGAB, 2012:III). 
262 Since 1974, the Islamic Development Bank (ISDB) has provided Morocco with loans and other forms of financial support (such as 
trade financing or technical assistance) of around US$ 6.6 billion (as of end 2016). ISDB (Accessed on 17 May 2017). 
263 Since 1977, the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) provided Morocco with loans of around US$ 396 million (as of 
28 May 2017). OFID (Accessed on 28 May 2017). 
264 Since 1974, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) has provided Morocco with loans and grants of more 
than US$ 4.2 million. AFESD (Accessed on 17 May 2017) Further, in 2015, it was the fourth biggest donor of ODA, with US$ 164 
million. OECD (Accessed on 17 May 2017). 
265 GCC (Accessed on 09 May 2017). 
266 In fact, relations today are still primarily based on the idea of the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) providing financial support in 
exchange of security assistance (EL-KATIRI, 2016:193-195). 
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programme’s total costs.267 Similarly, the AFESD and the OFID have provided loans totalling US$ 
227 and US$ 172 million, respectively.268 Their focus is hereby clearly on electricity-related 
projects. 
Saudi Arabia has been one of Morocco’s oldest friends and closest allies (not only in the Middle 
East, but also in general) and whilst relations were officially first established in 1957, in reality, 
they go far back into the 18th century269 and ties are primarily based on the relationships 
between the political elites. Since the start of relations, one major focus has been on military and 
security cooperation and Morocco has regularly supported Saudi Arabia in related matters (EL-
KATIRI, 2016:193-194), amongst other things, in exchange for Saudi support in the Sahara 
question (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2014:8) – Saudi Arabia has been supporting Morocco in the 
Sahara question since the 1970s and does not recognise the SADR.270 In this light, and although 
relations have recently become strained,271 FDI from Saudi Arabia accounted for 2.5% in 
2018,272 and the country is one of Morocco’s most important crude oil suppliers, having 
accounted in average for almost 50% of the country’s total imports over the last 15 years. Apart 
from that, energy ties are overall close and the Gulf Kingdom has, just as the UEA, been an 
important supporter of Morocco’s attempts to become more energy-independent by financially 
supporting the creation of the SIE. In this light, both partners have been seeking to explore ways 
of strengthening cooperation in the power and water sector (or the environment in general) for 
several years.273 By far the most productive outcome of this cooperation has been the 
cooperation between MASEN and Saudi water and power company Acwa Power on Ouarzazate. 
Whilst the Acwa Power International consortium was already responsible for the construction of 
the first phase of Morocco’s solar power plant (i.e. NOOR I),274 it will also develop and operate 
NOOR IV together with the Chint Group. The project was signed in November 2016 at the COP22 
in Marrakech and launched in April 2017.275 Acwa Power, via its subsidiary UPC Renewables, 
also holds a stake in the 120 MW Khalladi Wind Farm.276  
Just as Saudi Arabia, the UAE is an old friend and and important diplomatic ally to Morocco and a 
firm supporter in the Sahara question, advocating a UN-framed solution and supporting the 
Moroccan Autonomy Plan.277 It is also an important economic partner, accounting for around 
1.6% of the latter’s total imports and for 0.6% of its total exports.278 Although this appears to be 
little at first sight, notably in the global context, it must be noted that the UAE is Morocco’s 
second most important Middle Eastern commercial partner (after Saudi Arabia), and the two 
countries’ trade exchange is on an upward trend. Moreover, with 13.8% in 2018, FDI from the 
 
267 Other projects included, for example, crude and product trade financing, also for the SAMIR refinery. ISDB (Accessed on 17 May 
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on 26 October 2018). 
270 For example, it has been part of Saudi Arabia’s coalition to fight the Islamic State (IS) and has supported the Gulf Kingdom in its 
military actions in Yemen (EL-KATIRI, 2016:193-195); ARBAOUI Larbi (09 March 2016), Saudi-Arabia to invest in Western Sahara, 
supports Morocco’s sovereignty, Morocco World News (Accessed on 07 April 2019). 
271 over the so-called Gulf crisis – describing the event of 12 Arab or Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE severing 
diplomatic relations with Qatar in June 2017, accusing the Emirate of state-sponsoring terrorism – in which Morocco decided to take 
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Golfe, Middle East Eye (Accessed on 25 October 2018). 
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UAE into Morocco is extremely high,279 with a lot of these investments being carried out via the 
Emirati Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD). Overall, since 1976, the ADFD has financed 
more than 80 projects worth AED 9 billion, with electricity and water accounting for 9.6% of the 
project portfolio. Projects concern for example rural electrification or the development of power 
plants280 and overall, energy cooperation with the UAE which like Morocco is considered to be a 
clean energy pioneer, focuses almost exclusively on renewables. In this respect, the UAE 
basically operates through Masdar, a renewables-focused subsidiary of the state-owned 
Mubadala Company which has been bound to the Moroccan Ministry of Energy, Mines and 
Sustainable Development (MEM) by an MoU since 2013.281 However, more recently, in 2014 and 
2015, an expansion of the UAE’s energy activities in the form of agreements between ONEE and 
MASDAR and between ONHYM and Mubadala Company regarding Morocco’s hydrocarbon,282 
and electricity sectors have been observed. To be mentioned here, for example, is the Morocco 
Solar Home Systems (SHS) project, an initiative between ONEE and Masdar to provide 19,438 
solar home systems in more than 1000 rural villages.283 In 2015, the governments of both 
Morocco and the UAE, as well as ONEE and Masdar confirmed their wish to closely cooperate on 
renewables, whilst MASEN and Masdar agreed on an MoU in the fields of solar energy.284  
Morocco and Qatar first established diplomatic relations in 1972 and whilst Emir Hamad bin 
Kahlifa al-Thani’s seizure of power in 1995 was not met with enthusiasm by Hassan II (BOUM 
and PARK, 2016:214),285 the relationship soon stabilised and has, with some exceptions,286 
largely remained untroubled ever since. With respect to the Sahara question, Qatar equally 
supports the Moroccan Autonomy Plan although it maintains close ties with Algeria. On the 
economic side, trade volumes are small. However, the two countries are constantly making 
efforts to increase their bilateral exchange through new forms of cooperation, for example, with 
regard to maritime transport and via the establishment of a shipping line between their 
respective ports.287 In this context, over the years, Qatar has become one of Morocco’s most 
important sources of FDI. In 2018, Qatari FDI into Morocco accounted for 6.3%, making this Gulf 
country the seventh biggest investor and the second biggest Arab investor after the UAE.288 Also, 
and in order to fund infrastructure projects, the Qatari sovereign wealth fund and Morocco 
entered into a JV in 2011.289 On the topic of energy, cooperation is, notably when compared to 
the UAE, less specific, with Qatar seeking to explore ways of strengthening cooperation in fossil 
fuels, renewables and water. In April 2016, the governments of both Morocco and Qatar signed 
an MoU on cooperation in oil, gas, renewables, electricity and energy efficiency.290 Here, offshore 
exploration of hydrocarbons in particular is an area of interest to Qatar’s national oil company 
Qatar Petroleum291 and both countries have been exploring the possibilities of LNG exports 
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towards Morocco.292 Finally, in 2015, Morocco also signed a Framework Cooperation Agreement 
on Renewables and Energy efficiency with Kuwait.293  
Africa 
 
Based on shared geographical, historical (i.e. experience of colonisation), cultural (language) and 
religious (Islam) ties, Morocco’s relationship with Africa or African countries has traditionally 
been strong and the promotion of African unity is deeply anchored in the Moroccan 
constitution.294 In this light, Morocco was a founder of the African Unit (AU, formerly 
Organization of African Unity) back in 1963, however, withdrew in 1984 in response to the 
organisation’s recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and the Sahara as 
an individual member state.295 Nonetheless, and in the spirit of South-South cooperation, 
Morocco has remained strongly involved in African diplomacy, with its Africa policy having 
started to take a new direction with the enthronement of Mohammed VI (ABOURABI, 
2015:595).296 In this light, since 2013, Morocco has been exercising a policy of widening political 
influence, with Moroccan diplomats having geographically been particularly active in Western 
Sub-Saharan Africa (EL-KATIRI, 2015:1).297 In January 2017, this new strategy cumulated in the 
Kingdom’s request to rejoin the AU.298 A condition for this is the organisation’s revision of its 
position on the status of the Sahara.299  
Whilst on a political level, Morocco has a diplomatic presence in 27 African countries,300 on an 
economic level, the Kingdom has more than 500 bilateral economic agreements with over 40 
countries,301 a context in which private cooperation has, as mirrored in Moroccan FDI towards 
Sub-Saharan Africa, increasingly become relevant. After South Africa, Morocco is the second 
largest investor in Sub-Saharan Africa, with its FDI towards the region having accounted for 
around 28% of the Kingdom's total FDI in 2018.302 A large part of this FDI went to Western Sub-
Saharan Africa (Mali, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso etc), making Morocco the first investor in this 
region,303 whereby the energy sector is of increasing interest. Overall, or against this 
background, Morocco positions itself as a gateway to Africa, capitalising on the abovementioned 
connections and letting economic numbers speak for themselves. In 2017, Morocco’s trade with 
the continent represented around 3% of its total import value and around 5% of its total export 
value304 and whilst the Moroccan-African trade potential is far from being fully realised, its 
 
292 Bloomberg (Accessed on 17 May 2017). 
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exploitation is a key priority of both Morocco and the African Development Bank (AFDB) of 
which Morocco is a member, and with a portfolio worth US$ 2.5 billion as of 2016, it is one of 
their biggest ‘clients’.305 In this context, and having accounted for 38.7% of the portfolio in 2016, 
the energy sector clearly constitutes an area of priority and as laid down in the AFDB’s Morocco 
Country Strategy, one of the pillars of intervention for the 2017-2021 period is the support of 
Morocco’s green industrialisation,306 notably through the development of renewables. Whilst in 
order to move forward its renewables agenda, Morocco regularly receives high-level loans, 
including for NOOR and various wind projects,307 this assistance is not one-sided as Morocco 
also regularly provides development aid to other African countries.308 Indeed, the Maghreb 
Kingdom notably supports its neighbours in their development efforts with respect to 
renewables, whereby aiming at exporting its energy model in order to prevent other African 
nations from energy and electricity supply cuts, it signed MoUs and cooperation agreements 
with Gabon (1999, 2010), Guinea-Bissau (2015), the Ivory Coast (1999), Mali (2014), Mauritania 
(2013) (with which a feasibility study for an electricity connection project is currently being 
carried out), Nigeria (2014), Tunisia (2009, 2012) and Senegal (2013, 2015).  
Compared to its links with Sub-Saharan Africa, Morocco’s links with the Maghreb countries are –
despite strong historical, cultural, religious and linguistic ties – not very well-developed and the 
region is one of the least integrated regions in the world (BEHR, 2010:2). Leaving it unprepared 
for confronting the manifold and complex challenges of the 21st century such as climate change, 
it is partly against this lack that one can explain the political opening-up and the economic 
diversification of the region (ABOURABI, 2015:582). Indeed, although sharing some important 
economic complementarities, cross-border commerce or trade is rather limited309 and overall, 
relations have, due to both structural and political factors (BEHR, 2010:2), ‘swung between 
conflict and cooperation’ (WILLIS, 2014:265). In fact, dominated by the Moroccan-Algerian 
partnership, they have been negatively affected by lasting tensions over the Sahara conflict, with 
Brookings writing on this subject: ‘the hostility and distrust between these two power houses, 
which together account for over two-thirds of the region’s GDP and three-quarters of its 
population, has been so destructive that it has dragged the whole region into a vicious circle of 
collective suspicion, counterproductive rivalries, and self-defeating policies’.310 The consequences 
are disastrous, including apart from a vicious arms race,311 a lack of political and economic 
integration (ZOUBIR, 2007:159; ABOURABI, 2015:576-577). Here, the best example by far is the 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), an intergovernmental organisation created by Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania in 1989 (WORRALL, 2017:145) with the aim of formulating a 
common approach in diverse policy areas,312 including energy (WORRALL, 2017:148). Yet, 
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2012:12). 
- 68 - 
 
negotiations have regularly failed,313 with the last Presidential Council (the executive body)314 
meeting having taken place in 1994 (WORRALL, 2017:150). As a result, as of today, intra-
regional energy cooperation is restrained (Interview, EC, 2015), and this despite the region’s 
vast energy resources and their huge economic potential. As stated by Seznec (2016:Summary), 
‘instead of cooperating to enhance the economic and industrial prowess of the region, the majority 
of energy-rich states have pursued a go-it-alone approach in developing their energy-export 
capabilities, and have mostly targeted markets outside the region.’ By contrast, technical 
cooperation seems to work well, demonstrated, for example, by the fact that a specialist energy 
committee on electricity and renewables exists, the Comité Maghrébin de l’Electricité 
(COMELEC) (WORRALL, 2017:149).  
For example, as regards Moroccan-Algerian energy relations, they are ‘derailed by geopolitical 
rivalries’ (SEZNEC, 2016:Key Findings) and negatively affected by the Sahara conflict and this 
although in terms of energy supplies, the two countries mutually depend on each other– as 
shown before, Algeria is Morocco’s most important supplier of gas and, to some extent, was also 
a considerable supplier of refined products in the past.315 For example, in 2011, ONEE and 
Algerian energy major Sonatrach signed a 10-year agreement for the sale of 640 million cubic 
meters of gas to be supplied via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline316 (the construction of which had 
been frequently prevented by the Sahara conflict (SEZNEC, 2016:5)).317 Apart from these gas 
supply contracts though, cooperation is however poor, especially as regards the political 
dimension and coordination almost exclusively takes place at the technical level (Interview, EC, 
2016; FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2015:76), resulting for example in low utilisation rates of the 1.5 
GW Moroccan-Algerian electricity connection.318 However, in March 2017, Morocco and Algeria 
have communicated their interest in reinforcing bilateral energy cooperation, notably on RES 
and electricity. In this context, there are many that see such cooperation (ABOURABI, 2015:581) 
as a potential bridge towards a further rapprochement (Interview, EEAS, 2015). As for 
Moroccan-Mauritanian energy relations, Rabat and Nouakchott pursue ambitious plans, 
aiming at linking their respective countries to each other via an electricity connection line. Still 
under study, the objective of such a line is twofold, namely to enhance the development of 
renewables in the region and to enhance the flexibility of the Moroccan and Mauritanian power 
systems by linking the European (via the Morocco-Spain line) and West African electricity 
networks.319 Moroccan-Libyan energy relations have been primarily restricted to the import of 
oil products and electricity in the past, however, in the mid-2000s, the two countries showed 
interest in cooperating together in the fields of phosphates320 and oil. For example, in 2007, 
Tamoil Sakia, a Moroccan-Libyan oil company headquartered in Laayoune Morocco, announced 
 
313 In fact, as will be shown in the following sections, the creation of the AMU was only possible because of the reconciliation between 
Tunisia and Libya in 1987 and the stabilisation of relations between Morocco and Algeria in 1988 (BEHR, 2010:26). As of today, the 
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(Accessed on 04 June 2017).  
319 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 19 September 2018)  
320 In May 2008, the Cherifien Phosphates Office (OCP) and Libya Africa Investment Portfolio signed an MoU (20 May 2008), 
Phosphates: Le detail du grand projet maroco-libyen, L’économiste (Accessed on 23 October 2018). 
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that it would invest around US$ 150 million in oil exploration and distribution activities in the 
south of Morocco.321 At the same time, oil major OiLibya entered the Moroccan downstream 
market by acquiring retail sites from Exxon Mobil and is now active in the sale of retail fuels and 
lubricants.322 Moroccan-Egyptian energy relations aim at developing a stable economic 
partnership covering several domains including energy323 and the environment.324 In this 
context, and although Morocco has imported some marginal amounts of oil from Egypt in the 
past, future energy cooperation will rather focus on renewable energies.325 With Tunisia, which 
is an old friend and ally, Morocco has signed more than 5 energy agreements, focusing notably 
on renewables, above all solar, energy efficiency and environmental issues.326 Moreover, 
Morocco reportedly plans to export electricity to Tunisia, together with Algeria.327  
4.4 Energy stakeholders 
 
The development and implementation or conduct of any energy policy involves a variety 
of actors, ranging from governmental bodies and legislators to special agencies and interest 
groups. This also applies to Morocco which, in order to face its energy challenges and to realise 
its energy agenda, relies on a wide network of different kinds of actors, all of which are required 
to closely collaborate with one another. To shed light on these networks, the roles, influence and 
participation of the different stakeholders implicated in Moroccan energy policymaking will be 
presented in what follows, before taking a closer look at their cooperation or relationship 
patterns with third actors in Chapters 5 and 6. The most important energy actors in Morocco by 
far are the Royal palace, the MEM, ONHYM, ONEE and MASEN (see Figure 15) but to realise its 
energy strategy, Morocco also relies on several other institutions and niche bodies, some of 
which have been especially created for this purpose. In fact, as underlined by Vidican (2015:229-
230), the Royal palace, i.e. the royal family and its advisors, exercise the biggest influence on the 
energy sector, with the King being the ultimate agenda-setter and ‘the supreme institutional 
power’ (DAADAOUI, 2011:62). In this light, he nominates the General Directors of ONHYM/ONEE 
and MASEN which are all under direct supervision of the Royal Palace. It is therefore not 
surprising that it was Mohammed VI himself who at the end of 2015,328 decided to modernise 
Morocco’s national legal energy framework, leading to the government adopting several 
legislative revisions on the institutional reorganisation of the country’s renewable energy sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
321 HAIMOUD Atika (17 December 2007), Pétrole: Les Libyens investissent 150 millions de dollars dans les provinces du Sud, Maroc 
Aujourd’hui (Accessed on 23 October 2018). 
322 OiLibya (Accessed on 23 October 2018). 
323 (10 October 2017), Elalamy: Maroc-Egypte, un partenariat économique toujours solide, La Nouvelle Tribune (Accessed on 23 
October 2018). 
324 MEM (Accessed on 23 October 2018). 
325 Moroccan Ministry of Culture and Communication (Accessed on 23 October 2018). 
326 Moroccan Government (Accessed on 26 May 2017). 
327 In the past, Tunisia has already imported electricity from Algeria and Libya. (15 July 2018), Electricité: l’Algérie et le Maroc 
approvisionneront la Tunisie, Algérie Presse Service (Accessed on 23 October 2018). 
328 Extraordinary General Meeting of 28 November 2015. 
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Figure 15: Morocco’s institutional energy framework  
Government/MEM
Royal Palace
ONHYM
/ONEE
MASEN
AMEE SIE IRESEN
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the reviewed literature and empirical research. 
The primary responsibility for the development and implementation of Morocco’s national 
energy strategy lies within the ‘Ministère de l'Energie, des Mines, de l'Eau & de 
l'Environnement’ (MEM) (Ministry of Energy, Mines and Sustainable Development) although 
compared to other energy actors, it plays a less strategic and a more administrative role. Whilst 
by this token, it is not under direct supervision of the Royal Palace, but of the head of the 
government, together with the King, it however officially represents Morocco on the 
international level (and is thus responsible for negotiating energy contracts with foreign 
countries). Further, it has under its supervision AMEE, SIE and IRESEN329 and closely cooperates 
with MASEN (from which it is independent), whereby it however ‘merely provides technical input 
and executes higher-up decisions’ (VIDICAN, 2015:229). The MEM is also in charge of the national 
energy efficiency policy, sharing responsibilities with the Ministry of Economics and Finance, the 
Ministry of General Affairs and Governance and the Ministry of the Interior.330  
The ‘Office National des Hydrocarbures et des Mines’ (ONHYM) (National Bureau for 
Hydrocarbons and Mines) is a public entity that arose from the merger of the ‘Office National de 
Recherches et d’Exploitation Pétrolières’ (ONAREP) with the ‘Bureau de Recherches et de 
Prospection Minières’ (BPRM) in 2005. A key player in the hydrocarbons upstream sector, its 
mission is to promote the development of the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas in 
cooperation with the private sector,331 with its activities being framed by the Mining Code (1954, 
2015), the Hydrocarbons Code (1958, 1992, 2000) and the Minor Status (1960).332 ONHYM acts 
on behalf of the government and its activities are primarily carried out via so-called 
reconnaissance or petroleum agreements (OXFORD BUSINESS GROUP, 2012:239), allowing it to 
maintain a 25% interest share.333 The ‘Office National de Electricité et de l'Eau Potable’ 
(ONEE) (National Office of Electricity and Potable Water) is Morocco’s national electricity and 
water provider whose mission is the generation or production, transmission and distribution of 
 
329 Chraibi Karim, Massolia (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
330 IEA (Accessed on 21 October 2018). 
331 ONHYM (Accessed on 07 October 2018). 
332 ONHYM (Accessed on 27 October 2018). 
333 ONHYM (Accessed on 27 October 2018). 
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water and electricity.334 Like the ONHYM, it is a public entity that can be divided into two 
branches, one for electricity and one for potable water. Whilst the electricity branch was already 
set up in 1963 under the National Office of Electricity (ONE),335 the water branch under the 
National Office of Water (ONEP) only saw its birth around 10 years later in 1972. In 2012, ONE 
and ONEP were consolidated (Law n°40-09), to form ONEE.336 Today, ONEE dominates the 
electricity market with a share of 55%337 and between 2017 and 2018, its electricity production 
capacities increased by +24% y-o-y, resulting in a total installed electricity capacity of almost 
10.9 GW with the majority (~66%) having come from thermal energies, followed by wind 
(~11%), hydropower (~11%)338 and solar power (~6%).339 And whilst in May 2016, the King, 
under Law 48-15, set up the Moroccan National Authority for the Regulation of Electricity 
(ANRE) to ‘ensure the well-functioning of the free market for electricity generated from renewable 
sources’,340 for the moment, ONEE remains the regulator of both the electricity and gas markets 
(BIANCHI, COLANTONI, MASCOLO and SARTORI, 2018:9). 
Together with ONHYM and ONEE, the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy (MASEN) is 
one of the dominating actors in Morocco’s energy sector. Set up in a context of a global review of 
Morocco’s energy policy and sector under Law 57-09 in 2009 (Interview MASEN, 2016),341 
MASEN is a private company, but with public capital342 held by the state, the Hassan II Fund for 
Economic and Social Development and the SIE. Apart from that, financing is channelled through 
climate finance,343 as well as through grants and loans from international financial institutions. 
The most important donors are currently (not in this order): the WB (World Bank), the EIB 
(Energy Investment Bank), the AFDB (African Development Bank), the German Reconstruction 
Loan Corporation (KfW), the French Development Agency (AFD), the European Neighbourhood 
Investment Platform (NIP) and the Clean Technology Fund (CTF).344 In this context, the EIB or 
the KfW are most often the project leaders (‘chef de file’) (Interview MASEN, 2016). MASEN not 
only acts as a lender but also as a borrower (and shareholder). In fact, as a public-private 
company, it has easier access to international financing, a circumstance that it takes advantage of 
in order to redistribute its received financial means to a project company on preferential terms. 
In this context, it usually holds a 25% share in the project company, alongside other investors 
(Interview MASEN, 2016)345 Overall, if a foreign company wants to install itself in Morocco, it 
can only do so through MASEN. Whilst MASEN’s initial focus was on solar energy only – as 
reflected in its name at that time: the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy – its competencies were 
expanded in the context of the modernisation of Morocco’s national legal framework in summer 
2016,346 namely from solar to sustainable energy and the agency is now responsible for 
 
334 Official Bulletin (Accessed on 01 June 2017). 
335 Official Bulletin (Accessed on 01 June 2017). In the 1990s, ONE took the lead in the Rural Electrification Programme (PERG), 
which as shown before, was a great success. ONE (Accessed on 05 June 2017). 
336 Official Bulletin (Accessed on 01 June 2017). 
337 ONE (Accessed on 05 June 2017). 
338 The National Office of Electricity and Potable Water (ONEE) is also responsible for managing the Integrated Wind Programme.  
339 ONE (Accessed on 05 June 2017). 
340 MEM (Accessed on 25 August 2019). 
341 Official Bulletin (Accessed on 01 June 2017). 
342 The National Office of Electricity and Potable Water (ONEE) does not act as a shareholder. 
343 In November 2016, MASEN issued its first green bond, destined for the construction and operation of NOOR IV, NOOR Laayoune 
and NOOR Boujdour. MASEN (Accessed on 03 June 2017). 
344 Here it must be stated that in the past, the number of donors was much higher. However, as their backgrounds and consequently 
their requirements were extremely heterogeneous, they were harmonized in a process of management facilitation. In this context, 
the interests of the most important donors like the EU, for example, were taken into account (Interview MASEN, 2016). 
345 Under a power purchase agreement, the project company is guaranteed the purchase of power for 25 years based on a fixed tariff 
rate. Noorouarzazate (Accessed on 03 June 2017). 
346 Extraordinary General Meeting of 28 November 2015; Government Council of 24 June 2016 (Accessed on 24 June 2017). 
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promoting all kinds of renewable energy sources, including solar, wind and hydro power347 (Law 
37-16).348 As stated by the agency itself, these readjustments were necessary and done in order 
to better reflect today’s institutional, economic, technological and managerial parameters.349 In 
this context, MASEN has also become a limited company with a Board of Directors, as well as a 
Supervisory Board whose chairman is the director general of ONEE. In fact, with ONEE acting as 
MASEN’s end customer,350 the agency is responsible for identifying and developing new or 
potential renewable energy production capacities in the framework of the national grid owner’s, 
i.e. ONEE’s power plan.351 MASEN has several subsidiaries, one of which is MASEN CAPITAL 
which offers construction services for solar power plants352 and which since 2017, and as 
stipulated by Decree n°2-17-220, is authorised to become a shareholder in companies created in 
the context of the NOOR programme,353 whereby its share cannot exceed 25%.354  
Based on Law n°16-09, the Agency for the Development of Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency (ADEREE) was established in 2010, replacing the Renewable Energy Development 
Centre (CEDR).355 However, in the context of the legislative revisions of summer 2016 and under 
Law n°39-16, all of ADEREE’s renewable energy competencies were transferred to MASEN and 
the agency was transformed into the Agence Marocaine pour l’Efficacité Energétique (AMEE) 
(Moroccan Agency for Energy Efficiency) which other than its predecessor and as its name 
suggests, focuses exclusively on energy efficiency, instead of both energy efficiency and 
renewables.356 Responsible for implementing Morocco’s energy strategy regarding energy 
efficiency and building up a national expertise in this field, AMEE is in charge of the promotion of 
energy efficiency, for example by creating widespread public awareness, both among public and 
private, as well as national and international stakeholders. But the design and steering of 
structural programmes is also under the agency’s responsibility, including, for example, the 
development of national and regional plans for energy efficiency, ranging from the development 
of standards to the support of R&D and training.357  
Founded in 2011, the ‘Société National d’Investissement’ (SNI) or the Society for Energy 
Investment (SIE) is a limited company and the government’s financial arm (which is currently 
being restructured).358 Its Board of Directors is presided over by the Minister of Energy, whereas 
other board members are the Minister of the Economy and Finance, the Chairman of ONEE and 
the President of the Hassan II Fund.359 Overall, the state holds 71% of the shares and the Hassan 
II Fund 29%.360 SIE had a start capital of US$ 1 billion from the Energy Development Fund (FDE). 
Here it is to be noted that whilst US$ 200 million out of this sum came from the Hassan II Fund, 
 
347 By contrast, the development of pumped storage power station will remain under the responsibility of ONEE. MEM (Accessed on 
22 June 2017). 
348 Official Bulletin (Accessed on 01 June 2017). 
349 MASEN (Accessed on 01 June 2017). 
350 To simplify, the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy (MASEN) is supposed to supply the National Office of Electricity and 
Potable Water (ONEE) with green power at a competitive price, with ONEE then selling this power through its grid. 
351 Its mission hereby is to contribute to the development of green electricity and of a national expertise and its competencies are 
extensive, englobing the entire project cycle, from identification and formulation to implementation and evaluation. Further, they 
also include financing and maintenance. Noorouarzazate (Accessed on 03 June 2017); MEM (Accessed on 22 June 2017). 
352 MASEN (Accessed on 27 October 2018). 
353 i.e. in ACWA Power Ouarzazate IV, ACWA Power Laayoune, ACWA Power Boujdour, NOMAC Ouarzazate IV, NOMAC Laayoune and 
NOMAC Boujdour. Official Bulletin (Accessed on 27 October 2018). 
354 Official Bulletin (Accessed on 27 October 2018). 
355 Official Bulletin (Accessed on 01 June 2017). 
356 Government Council of 24 June 2016 (Accessed on 24 June 2017). 
357 AMEE (Accessed on 01 June 2017). 
358 SIE (Accessed on 06 December 2019).  
359 SIE (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
360 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
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US$ 500 million were provided by Saudi Arabia and US$ 300 million by the UAE.361 SIE’s 
objective is to acquire shares in energy producing entities for the purpose of promoting and 
developing renewable energy and energy efficiency projects.362 In this line, it is supposed to 
support both ONEE’s Integrated Wind Programme, as well as MASEN’s Solar Programme.363 
Apart from wind and solar energy, SIE seeks to invest in biogas and energy efficiency.364  
Created around 10 years ago, NAREVA is a private entity and part of SIE365 and controlling 
around 2.5 MW of production capacity, active in both the renewable energy and conventional 
energy sectors. For example, in a JV with Engie, it set up the 301 MW Tarfaya wind farm366 and 
has units in Akhenfir (100 MW), Haouma (50 MW) and Foum El Oued (70 MW).367 Together with 
Enel and Siemens, it (acting as consortium leader) has also won a tender to build 5 wind farms 
(850 MW) in Tarfaya (300 MW), Essaouira (200 MW), Midelt (150 MW), Tangiers (100 MW), 
and Boujdour (100 MW, located in the Sahara).368 Finally, via its subsidiary Safi Energy Company 
(35%), it is constructing the 2x693 MW coal-powered SAFI power plant in cooperation with 
Engie and Mitsui.369  
Set up in 2011 by MEM, the Institut de Recherche en Energie Solaire et Energies Nouvelles 
(IRESEN) or Research Agency on Solar Energy and Renewable Energies is a research institute 
which serves to support the national energy strategy by funding R&D projects in the fields of 
solar and renewable energy sources, whereby focus has so far been on photovoltaic energy. In 
order to create synergies, the institute works closely with all actors in the Moroccan energy 
sector, a fact that is reflected in the composition of its Board of Directors. It also cooperates with 
various international partners such as the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 
the Fraunhofer Institute, Mines Paris Tech or Ciemat.370  
Created in 2015, the Vocational Training Institute of RE and EE (IFMEREE) is a training 
institute focused on offering training in the fields of renewable energy sources and energy 
efficiency and a joint project of the Moroccan energy industry and the European, German and 
French development cooperation.371 IFMEREE is 20% owned by MASEN, ONE and AMEE, who 
hold 20% each, as well as by the Federation of Electricity, Electronics and Renewable Energies 
(FENELEC) and the Federation of Mechanical, Metallurgical and Electrical Industries (FIMME).372  
 
 
361 Invest in Morocco (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
362 SIE (Accessed on 31 May 2017). 
363 With a share of 25%, the Society for Energy Investment (SIE) has been a principal investor in the Moroccan Agency for 
Sustainable Energy (MASEN) until summer 2016 when the society’s Board of Directors decided to withdraw from the sustainable 
energy agency’s capital. Energies renouvelables Afrique (Accessed on 03 June 2017). 
364 SIE (Accessed on 31 May 2017). 
365 The SNI is a holding company founded in 1966 and headquartered in Casablanca which is principally owned by SIGER, a holding 
of the royal family. IRAQI Fahd (20 January 2016), Maroc: les 7 chantiers capitaux de Hassan Ouriagli, Jeune Afrique (Accessed on 04 
June 2017). 
366 Engie (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
367 MICHBAL Medhi (31 May 2015), Reportage: le parc éolien de Tarfaya apporte un nouveau souffle au Maroc, Jeune Afrique 
(Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
368 (10 March 2016), UPDATE 1-Nareva-led group wins US$ 1.2 bln wind power deal in Morocco, Reuters (Accessed on 04 June 
2017). 
369 Engie (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
370 IRESEN (Accessed on 04 June 2017). Other partners are for example KIC InnoEnergy or KOICA.  
371 Energymed (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
372 IFMEREE (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
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Part Five – Legacy of EU energy governance towards Morocco 
Having explored Morocco’s current energy policy situation, a more in-depth 
examination of the country’s (foreign) political environment and its relations with the EU as well 
as of the latter’s energy governance approach towards the Maghreb country will be presented in 
the following. To this end, this Chapter will begin with a contextualisation of EU energy 
governance towards Morocco and provide some background information on Morocco’s foreign 
policy context and its foreign relations with the EU. Next, it will elaborate on their energy 
relations, including a construction of the historical milestones and an overview of the current 
status quo, whereby the focus will be on both multilateral and bilateral aspects. Finally, it will 
look into the configuration of actors involved in EU energy governance towards Morocco, before 
moving on to a more detailed interaction analysis of these actors in Part 6. 
5.1 The Moroccan foreign policy context 
 
Surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean to the north and west and 
bordered by Spain,373 Algeria and Mauritania to the north, east and south, Morocco is Africa’s 
most northwesterly country and an Arab Muslim country with a rich history, sharing a strong 
historical and cultural inheritance with Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Part of the Maghreb, 
Morocco is the only monarchy in the region and this monarchy is one of the most ancient in the 
world with dynasties dating back to the 8th century.374 Since 1962, the Moroccan monarchy has 
been a constitutional monarchy (BOUDAHRAIN, 1994:11) and although it has a Prime Minister 
and a multi-party system,375 the Chief of State, however, is King Mohammed VI who, succeeding 
his father Hassan II, came to the throne in 1999 and remains the dominant religious 
(Constitution 2011:§41) and political authority (Constitution, 2011:§46).  
Morocco is not only an integral part of the Arab, European and African world but also one of the 
countries with the most diverse foreign relations in the region that benefits from a strong 
presence in various international organisations. Member of the United Nations (UN) since 1956, 
Morocco joined the League of Arab States (LAS), the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1958, as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995376 and 
has diplomatic representations in 27 African, 23 European (including Russia, Ukraine and 
Turkey), 14 Asian, 11 American and 12 Middle Eastern countries.377 Overall, it has signed 56 free 
trade agreements with various countries, including with the EU and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries, the US, Turkey and all the Arab countries.378 And whilst notably its 
association with the EU, as well as its alliance with the US are key priority areas of Morocco’s 
foreign policy (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2014:4-5), at his inaugural speech in 1999, King 
 
373 At the narrowest point, the country is only separated from Spain via the 14 km wide Strait of Gibraltar. 
374 Since the 8th century, Morocco has been ruled by seven dynasties, the Idrissids (789-974), the Amoravids (1060-1147), the 
Almohads (1145-1266), the Marinids (1244-1465), the Wattasids (1472-1554), the Saadians (1549-1659) and the Alaouites (1666-
today). Herodote (Accessed on 10 October 2018). 
375 A constitutional monarchy, the constitution naturally builds the basis of power, establishing the executive, legislative and judicial: 
the executive is led by the Monarch, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers; the legislature is made up of the Parliament, 
which consists of two chambers, the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors and the judicial consists of several of 
courts. Moroccan Ministry of Culture and Communication (Accessed on 11 October 2018). 
376 Further, Morocco was a founding member of the African Union (AU) in 1963 and is a member of the African Development Bank 
(AFDB). In 2016, it also became an associated country to the International Energy Agency (IEA). IEA (Accessed on 25 August 2019). 
377 Moroccan Diplomacy (Accessed on 16 June 2017).  
378 AMDI (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
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Mohammed VI made the further diversification of external relations a top priority (FERNANDEZ-
MOLINA, 2015:20).379 And indeed, under his reign, Morocco was to enter a new era of 
multilateralism380 translating into an expansion of its bilateral relations at the political and more 
notably, economic levels.381 Overall, it must be assumed that Morocco’s decision to engage in a 
new era of multilateralism naturally has or will have an impact on the country’s foreign 
relations, including with long-standing partners such as the EU which is why the following 
sections attempt to look into the current state of Morocco-EU foreign policy relations. 
At the political level, the diversification of external relations started with King Mohammed VI’s 
accession to the throne. It included a rapprochement with the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa as well 
as Latin America (ABOURABI, 2015:569) and was, as observed by Abourabi (2015:281), 
boosted, amongst other things, by the Arab Spring which had led to the adoption of a new 
constitution in 2011.382 At the economic level (‘Economic diplomacy’), the foundation for this 
new policy of openness was already laid with a liberalisation programme launched in 1993 
under Hassan II which aimed at adressing the country’s economic and social development needs 
and adapting to globalisation (SEDDIKI, AZIRAR, ELHOUDAIGUI, TAOUIL and HANCHANE, 
2012:8). As a result of this programme, under Mohammed VI, Morocco has experienced a period 
of high macroeconomic stability, with GDP growth having stood at around +4% between 2000 
and 2018.383 Apart from GDP growth, positive effects have also been reflected in FDI and ODA 
flows, particularly into the industry, finance,384 tourism, energy and telecommunication 
sectors.385 In fact, whilst FDI inflow into North Africa has been rather stagnant in recent years, 
(following political instabilities linked to the Arab Spring), FDI inflow into Morocco has been 
growing more steeply386 and overall, and as investigated by the UN, in 2018, Morocco figured 
amongst the top 5 hosting economies for FDI in Africa,387 with energy and mining being one of 
the main invested sectors, accounting for around 7% of total FDI into Morocco in 2017.388 At this 
point, it can be highlighted that the Maghreb Kingdom notably seeks to attract FDI by playing its 
competitive advantage of being, economically speaking, one of the most promising countries of 
North Africa to invest into. This is notably thanks to its geostrategic location between Europe 
and Africa and its access to the Atlantic Ocean, allowing the Kingdom to position itself as a 
regional economic and trade hub,389 as well as a gateway to Africa, for example, via its port 
Tanger Med.390 Apart from its geographical position, Morocco affords both political and 
economic as well as financial391 stability and security, a context in which it is generally 
considered as business-friendly392 and since 2009, the country disposes of an Investment 
 
379 The objectives in this context were the promotion of economic development (along with the integration of the national economy 
in the global economy) or the promotion of the country’s image (of a democratic and modern nation and model of stability in the 
region) etc. (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2015:20).  
380 Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance (Accessed on 27 May 2017). 
381 Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance (Accessed on 27 May 2017). 
382 In fact, having endangered domestic stability, the adoption of the new constitution has certainly been motivated by considerations 
of power preservation. 
383 WB (Accessed on 11 October 2018). 
384 Notably thanks to Casablanca’s ’Finance City’ (CFC), a project launched in 2010 with the aim of transforming Morocco into a 
financial hub for Africa. Casablanca Finance City (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
385 Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance (Accessed on 30 April 2017). 
386 with the exception of 2016 which according to the Moroccan government saw an increase of loan repayments and of mergers 
operations. UNCTAD (Accessed on 09 August 2019); Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
387 UNCTAD (Accessed on 09 August 2019). 
388 Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
389 Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance (Accessed on 30 April 2017). 
390 Located at the crossroads between Europe and Africa, Morocco is linked to 160 ports worldwide. 
391 See Casablanca Finance City. 
392 Morocco ranked 68 (out of 190 countries) in the 2017 World Bank’s (WB) ranking. WB (Accessed on 30 April 2017). 
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Development Agency (AMDI) dedicated to promoting and developing investment.393 However, 
and despite these overall positive developments, the Moroccan economy faces numerous 
challenges, amongst which high public spending leading to a significant budget deficit, as well as 
unemployment rates, currently standing at 9% in 2018,394 along with poverty. Further, the 
economy is hardly diversified and highly dependent on the agricultural sector.395  
5.1.1 Shifting alliances: from EU focus… 
 
Although often associated with colonisation, relations between Morocco and Europe go 
far beyond the 19th century, stretching back to the pre-medieval period (WILLIS and MESSARI, 
2007:1). Following its independence from France in 1956, relations have been overall good and 
as indicated before, Morocco’s association to the EU is a key priority area for the country’s 
foreign policy. Little known to the public, Morocco even tried to join the predecessor of the EU, 
the European Economic Community (EEC), in 1987396 and although not being considered ‘a 
European state’,397 it saw its request rejected,398 this episode, however, did not put any serious 
damage to the EU-Moroccan relationship which can nowadays be best described as strategic and 
mutually interdependent. In fact, whilst Morocco depends on the EU economically and as a 
development partner, the EU relies on Morocco which is considered a reliable partner and a 
stabilising anchor in a region marked by conflict and instability (KAUSCH, 2009:166). In this 
context, in recent years, notably cooperation in the fields of security, terrorism and migration 
have been in the foreground of the partnership, with Morocco as a transit country for drugs and 
migrants/refugee flows from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe having become a partner of utmost 
importance in the fight against illegal immigration (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2016:120). At the 
economic level, Morocco was the EU’s 22nd most important trade partner in 2017, whereas the 
EU was Morocco’s most important partner, having accounted for 64.6% of its exports and for 
56.5% of its imports.399 Further, in 2016, the EU accounted for 51% of Morocco’s FDI400 and is 
Morocco’s most important tourist market.401  
As far as the multilateral dimension402 of the EU-Moroccan relationship is concerned, early 
attempts to establish relations within a regional framework date back to the 1970s when the 
European Economic Community (EEC) started addressing development concerns with some of 
the Mediterranean countries (MAHNCKE, AMBOS and REYNOLDS, 2004:279; SARTORI, 2014:5). 
Relations were strengthened in 1976, with France notably having pushed for the launch of the 
Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) on commerce and the economy (MAHNCKE, AMBOS and 
REYNOLDS, 2004:279; SARTORI, 2014:5). Although it appeared to be promising (also because 
economic cooperation was seen as a precursor to political reform),403 this policy format had 
little success globally (SARTORI, 2014:5), primarily because priority was given to internal 
 
393 AMDI (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
394 WB (Accessed on 09 August 2019). 
395 WB (Accessed on 11 October 2018) 
396 The 1987 application had been preceded by an informal application in 1984 (HOEBINK, 2005:42). 
397 EP (Accessed on 11 October 2017). 
398 EC (Accessed on 18 November 2017). 
399 Imports are dominated by machinery and transport equipment (40.4%), agricultural products (23.0%) and textiles and clothing 
(19.3%). Similarly, the EU primarily exports machinery and transport equipment to Morocco (37.7%), followed by fuels, metals and 
minerals (23.4%), agricultural products (7.3%) and textiles and clothing (8.1%). EC (Accessed on 09 August 2019). 
400 Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance (Accessed on 20 May 2017). 
401 EC (Accessed on 29 October 2018). 
402 Multilateral cooperation is defined here as ‘three or more actors engaging in voluntary and institutionalized international 
cooperation governed by norms and principles, with rules that apply equally to all states’ (BOUCHARD and PETERSON, 2010:10). 
403 EP (Accessed on 29 October 2018). 
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European integration (COLOMBO and NUR ABDELKHALIQ, 2012:7).404 However, in 1990, and 
driven by the 1986 enlargement of the European Communities by Spain and Portugal (HOEBINK, 
2005:26), it was followed by the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP), which sought to 
provide ‘additional financial support to regional cooperation programs and environmental 
protection’ (MAHNCKE, AMBOS and REYNOLDS, 2004:279).405 Whilst the RMP introduced some 
new ideas, it was however equally of ‘limited impact’, in part due to the fact that the EU was 
increasingly distracted with problems at its eastern borders (Yugoslav wars etc…) (which by the 
way incited southern EU member states such as Spain to carry out ‘more serious efforts’ to ‘put 
the relationship on more solid ground’ (BEHR, 2010:36)). Finally, and in parts as an answer to 
increasing security threats in the Mediterranean (see Algeria) (HOEBINK, 2005:26), in 1995, the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was launched (under the so-called Barcelona Process), a 
general foreign policy framework that includes a political & security, economic & financial and 
socio-cultural Chapter (see Table 3).406  
Aspiring to political and economic reform in the Mediterranean by providing an institutionalised 
framework,407 the EMP called upon its partner countries to pursue both horizontal and vertical 
integration (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2016:105-106), with one sub-aim here having been the 
establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) by 2010 (BEHR, 2010:12). 
However, practically none of its ambitions have been fulfilled,408 with several structural and 
political factors having limited its (and the EMFTA’s)409 efficacy,410 and most importantly the fact 
that it tried to bring countries under one umbrella without considering their bilateral 
relationships (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2016:108). A classic example here are Israel’s strained 
(political) relations with most of the countries of the Arab world.411 For this reason, and to 
replace the EMP, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), an intergovernmental organisation 
headquartered in Barcelona was launched in 2008. In fact, by including more co-ownership412 
and excluding political conditionality413 (YOUNGS, 2009:61), the aim of this Pan-Mediterranean 
policy initiative, which like the GMP was strongly pushed by French diplomacy, was to enhance 
cooperation between the member countries by better taking into account their individual policy 
interests (DIEZ and TOCCI, 2017:90). However, as with the EMP and although meant to be a 
bottom-up organisation (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:131), the UfM brings together countries 
that are hostile to or in conflict with each other (see Israel/Palestine or Greece/Cyprus), a 
 
404 Other than that, regional cooperation also suffered severe setbacks in the aftermath of the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979, as well as 
during the debt crisis of the 1980s (BEHR, 2010:36). 
405 In the same year, the so-called 5+5 Dialogue was set up, an informal forum comprised of Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia whose aim was the enhancement of relations between these countries. The focus 
was primarily on security and migration. West Mediterranean Forum (Accessed on 23 November 2017); FERNANDEZ-MOLINA 
(2016:109). 
406 EC (Accessed on 26 October 2019). 
407 For example, at the initiative of France and Egypt, in 1994, in the margin of the Barcelona process, the Mediterranean Forum was 
created, a regional institution aiming to facilitate intergovernmental dialogue and exchange at ministerial level. It today regroups 11 
Mediterranean countries (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2016:106); MEDEA (Accessed on 23 November 2017). 
408 YOUNGS Richard (18 May 2015), 20 Years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Carnegie Europe (Accessed on 13 October 
2018) 
409 Progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) has been slow so far and primarily limited to agricultural products 
(BEHR, 2010:12). 
410 Reflected, as pointed out by Behr (2010:40), on the political (lack of political reforms…), economic (lack of economic 
improvement…) and social levels (tensions in the context of 9/11, social inequality…).  
411 For example, over the past decades, Israel and Lebanon have been regularly involved in wars against each other (see, for example, 
the Seven-Day War of 1993 or the April War of 1996) and since its founding in 1948, Israel has been subject to an official boycott by 
the Arab League. 
412 UfM (Accessed on 25 July 2018). 
413 such as any references to democracy and human rights. 
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circumstance that according to the literature deprives it from achieving far-reaching political 
breakthroughs.414  
Table 3: Euro-southern Mediterranean cooperation framework  
Morocco Algeria Tunisia Libya Egypt
UfM 2008 2008 2008 / 2008
EMP 1995 1995 1995 / 1995
Revision of the ENP 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015
Strategic Energy Partnership 
(signed; entered into force)
/
2013; 
2015
/ / 2008
Action Plans
2005; 
2013
/* 2005 / 2007
ENP 2004 2004 2004 / 2004
AA (signed; entered into force)
1996; 
2000
2002; 
2005
1995; 
1998
/
2001; 
2004
Multilateral level 
Bilateral level 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from different sources, amongst others EC (Accessed on 12 October 2018). *The EU has not 
agreed on an Action Plan with Algeria415 and Libya yet, with both countries thus remaining outside the ENP framework.  
 
Bilateral relations between the EU and Morocco started in 1969 with the signature of a 
commercial agreement linking Morocco to what was then the EEC. Another agreement, which 
was signed in 1978 and entered into force in the same year, added economic and financial aid 
aspects. Around thirty years later, in 1996,416 the EU and Morocco signed a so-called Association 
Agreement (AA),417 replacing the previous cooperation agreements of the 1970s (see Table 3).418 
Aiming at providing a suitable framework for political dialogue and seeking to promote regular 
exchange on political and security matters, economic, trade and financial cooperation, as well as 
social and cultural cooperation and on educational matters,419 the AA added political, security 
and cultural aspects to the bilateral relations for the first time.420 Having entered into force in 
2000, it also formed the basis for the launch of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA),421 and until today represents the legal basis of the Euro-Moroccan partnership422 
which has subsequently been further strengthened by the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). In fact, initially launched in 2003 in the context of the upcoming wave of enlargement of 
 
414 For example, at its beginnings, Algeria was not at all interested in participating in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), neither 
through policymaking nor funding. This was, amongst other things, due to the fact that the UfM was born on the initiative of France 
with whom relations have been low since 2005 as well as because Israel is a member state in the UfM. However, in recent years, 
Algeria seems to have reconciled a little bit with the UfM, confirming more and more its commitment for its activities (DARBOUCHE, 
2010:5-6); UfM (Accessed on 22 April 2017). 
415 Despite having signed an AA with the EU in 2002, Algeria has not signed any Action Plan (AP) until today which is however 
necessary for the AA to be fully implemented as it sets out commitments for both parties. In fact, it took 3 years and a renewed ENP 
policy to convince Algeria to agree on elaborating an AP in 2011. Negotiations took place in 2012 (first round) and 2013 (second 
round), with progress having particularly been made in trade (Agreement on Revising the schedule of tariff dismantling on 
agricultural and industrial products) and science (Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation). However, until today, the 
plan has not been signed and in recent years, Algeria has increasingly showed its dissatisfaction with certain EU-backed actions just 
as the NATO intervention in Libya. Overall, and against this background, Algeria is considered the EU’s most ‘awkward’ partner in 
North Africa (DARBOUCHE, 2010:71); Boston University School of Law (Accessed on 22 April 2017).  
416 in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or Barcelona Process. 
417 ‘An association agreement is a bilateral agreement between the EU and a third country. In the context of accession to the EU, it serves 
as the basis for implementation of the accession process.’ EC (Accessed on 16 October 2019); EC (Accessed on 23 November 2017).  
418 EEAS (Accessed on 12 November 2017). 
419 EURLEX (Accessed on 12 November 2017). 
420 EEAS (Accessed on 12 November 2017). 
421 Whilst negotiations over the DCFTA had been frozen since 2014, plans are now on the table to relaunch them. European Council 
(Accessed on 16 November 2019); EC (Accessed on 12 November 2017). 
422 EEAS (Accessed on 12 November 2017). 
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2004 to support the EU’s eastern neighbours in their political and economic transitions, the ENP 
finally and notably under pressure from France, also included the EU’s southern neighbours 
(COLOMBO and NUR ABDELKHALIQ, 2012:8).423 Whilst the ENP does not give any prospect to 
membership (COLOMBO and NUR ABDELKHALIQ, 2012:8), it does, however, pursue a principle 
of ‘more for more’, built on the values of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and social 
cohesion, whereby progress primarily depends on the target countries’ own efforts. In other 
words, the more the target countries implement market reforms, the more the EU will grant 
financial support, as well as other concessions such as access to its internal market or visa 
facilitation.  
Based on the AAs, the ENP seeks to strengthen the EU’s bilateral relations with its neighbours 
through more tailor-made non-binding Action Plans (APs) which cover all areas of 
cooperation424 and which are financed by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). 
Without the APs, which cover a timeframe of 3 to 5 years and define ‘a series of social, economic 
and political reforms with short- and medium-term priorities’, the AAs cannot be fully 
implemented. EU assistance takes place within Annual Action Programmes (AAPs), which are 
funded by the ENI, or within regional cooperation programmes.425 Morocco is the largest 
recipient of ENI funding which amounted to € 189.9 million in 2017426 and enjoys the most 
privileged position within the ENP overall. This position is above all reflected in the fact that it is 
the first country granted a so-called advanced status in 2008, implying an opening-up to high 
levels of cooperation, including notably the strengthening of dialogue in the areas of politics and 
security, as well as the progressive integration of Morocco into the EU internal market through 
legislative and regulatory convergence.427 However, this does not mean that its relationship with 
the EU is free from differences of opinion. On the contrary, serious points of divergence certainly 
exist with respect to political reforms (KAUSCH, 2009:173), above all in the fields of democracy 
and human rights. Further, this designation not only mirrors the EU’s unilateral efforts made 
towards stronger cooperation (in which the ‘old’ colonial powers France and Spain certainly do 
play a role) with the Maghreb Kingdom but also the latter’s own commitment to the EU-
Moroccan partnership (FERNANDEZ-MOLINZ, 2016:100-101). As stated by Fernandez-Molina 
(2016:96), the ‘exclusive nature of the political, economic, social and cultural ties inherited from 
colonial times has been an unwavering desire of independent Morocco […]’ and the ‘will to have 
privileged relations with Europe’ has been regularly expressed at the highest level, i.e. by the 
monarchs themselves.428  
5.1.2 …towards emancipation from Europe 
 
Whilst the EU continues to be a main actor in the southern neighbourhood, be it with  
regard to security, political, economic or trade aspects (BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, 
SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:100), it must be acknowledged that in the past, Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation has not always been successful429 and that it lacks substantial impact 
 
423 Other partner countries to the south are: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. Partner countries to the east are: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. ENPI (Accessed on 15 November 2017). 
424 EEAS (Accessed on 12 November 2017). 
425 EC (Accessed on 21 November 2017). 
426 EC (Accessed on 09 Augusts 2019). 
427 In 2013, Morocco was also the first country with whom the EU signed a Mobility Partnership. EEAS (Accessed on 12 November 
2017); EC (Accessed on 29 October 2018). 
428 See for example speech by Mohammed VI on 20 March 2000 in Paris. 
429 Especially when compared to the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. 
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or as formulated by some, ambition.430 Added to this, scholars like Escribano (2017:7) have 
observed a ‘growing sense of Euro-Mediterranean fatigue’ on both sides of the Mediterranean in 
recent years, whereby notably the Arab Spring and the European financial crisis have revealed a 
‘lack of EU strategic vision for the Mediterranean.’ In fact, as outlined in a Parliament report, both 
the ‘Arab revolutions and the European crisis have changed the situation and the keys to regional 
integration’, highlighting amongst other things the necessity of south-south integration (aiming 
at finding new investors, also to make up for the ‘European slowdown’) and foreign aid.431 In this 
context, or in parallel, relations have started to be challenged by macroeconomic and 
geopolitical developments. The reasons for this are twofold: internally, reduced investment 
activities in the context of the economic crisis have hampered the EU from investing abroad, 
whilst externally, the EU has seen itself a) obliged to cope with the de facto disengagement of the 
US from the region (COLOMBO, COATES-ULRICHSEN, GHABRA, HAMID and RAGAB, 2012:VI) 
and b) increasingly confronted with the emergence of new actors, such as the Gulf countries or 
China (SROUR-GANDON, 2014:4), some of which have also started to appear at the political 
level. In this line, and although the EU still accounts for much of the FDI into Morocco, its share 
has been decreasing in recent years, whereas the share of partners such as the UAE which 
occupied the first place in 2018, has, as shown before, been rising.432 The same pattern can be 
seen in ODA, although less pronounced.  
These transformations represent both a chance and a risk for the EU: a chance because they may 
provide a window of opportunity for the EU, allowing it to play a greater or more relevant role in 
North Africa and to boost multilateral cooperation based on the introduction of new ‘north-south 
cooperation models’ (SARTORI, 2014:1). Indeed, the deepening of regional market integration is 
a top priority for the EU as it might help to achieve both broader top-down (climate change, 
trade, investment…) and bottom-up (food, employment, infrastructure…) goals (GODZIMIRSKI, 
2016:32-33) in the region. And a risk because the EU as the ultimate regional player will be 
increasingly challenged by the emergence of new players in the region,433 with the countries of 
the latter being eventually tempted to try out new forms of cooperation with new international 
partners. Whilst it seems appropriate to assume that these developments would have forced the 
EU to reconsider the way it looks at and cooperates with North Africa (BALFOUR, 2012:7), there 
is agreement in the literature that none of the launched policy initiatives have brought about any 
structural changes. Criticism is particularly pronounced with respect to the establishment of a 
regional framework, with Escribano (2017) claiming that the UfM has not really provided any 
‘added value’ and that none of its projects have succeeded in ‘taking off’, an opinion that is shared 
by Aliboni (2012) who affirms that ‘the UfM proved to be a non-starter before the Arab Spring and 
has since lost any residual credibility.’434 Similarly, the set-up of bilateral policies is equally 
heavily criticised and some scholars go as far as to claim that the Arab uprisings even reflected a 
failure of the ENP, notably with respect to democracy and human rights promotion. In this 
context, Escribano argues that the ENP had already been rendered ‘obsolete years ago’, i.e. long 
before the Arab turmoils. In fact, although in response to the geopolitical changes of 2011 and 
 
430 TEEVAN Chloe (30 June 2019), EU-Morocco: a win-win partnership?, Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (Accessed on 16 
November 2019).  
431 EP (Accessed on 28 October 2018). 
432 Santandertrade (Accessed on 30 April 2017). 
433 Or as put by Youngs (2015), ‘the growing influence of non-Western rising powers in the Middle East compounds competition for 
strategic alliances, geo-economic gain and access to energy supplies.’ YOUNGS Richard (18 May 2015), 20 Years of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, Carnegie Europe (Accessed on 13 October 2018). 
434 ALIBONI Roberto (2012), EU multilateral relations with southern partners: reflections on future prospects. ISS (Accessed on 14 
September 2018). 
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with the aim of putting a greater focus on security, the economy and migration,435 the ENP436 
was reviewed twice, in May 2011 (COM(2011) 303 final) and in November 2015 (JOIN (2015) 
50 final), Escribano, as well as other scholars criticise that the revision has ‘failed to extricate’ the 
EU from its ‘identity crisis’.437  
Apart from lacking any impact or vision, the EU’s foreign policy approach towards its southern 
neighbourhood is equally criticised for being inconsistent. For Bicchi (2003:13), this is above all 
reflected in the fact that the EU’s political presence in the southern Mediterranean or North 
Africa has been characterised by either activity (e.g. 1970s, 1990s, 2000s) or inactivity (e.g. 
1980s). Moreover, it is reflected in the general paradox that whilst the EU seeks to overcome 
barriers to convergence, it constantly creates new ones, which in the case of Morocco, and 
according to Hoebink (2005:41-61), are particularly visible in the fields of market access and 
migration. Market-related inconsistencies primarily refer to agriculture and fishery, because 
whilst on the one hand, the EU pursues the objective of integrating Morocco more strongly into 
European markets, on the other hand, and in view of Morocco’s competitive advantage in these 
areas, it has regularly made it difficult to import certain products, notably agriculture and 
fishery products.438 In this context, there have been regular discussions in the literature on 
inconsistencies between the EU’s development policy, aiming at the reduction or eradication of 
poverty,439 and its agricultural and fishery agreements policies, with some authors arguing that 
the latter counteract the objectives of the former. According to scholars, the EU’s development 
objectives have been regularly counteracted by agricultural and fisheries-related measures, 
‘hamper[ing] the development of the agricultural sector in Morocco’ (HEBINCK, SLOOTWEG and 
SMITH, 2008:203), and thereby economic growth and employment. As for migration, the EU’s 
approach towards Morocco has also been in contradiction to its development policies, for 
example, whilst under EU influence, Morocco has increasingly become the ‘watch dog of 
Europe’,440 policy has focused exclusively on security, without taking into account any 
development aspects-related policies (HOBINCK, SLOOTWEG and SMITH, 2008:203). However, 
by far the most inconsistent EU policy towards Morocco in the opinion of Moroccan policy 
makers is the EU’s fishery policy, because it is, as the following sections will show, strongly 
related to the Moroccan/Sahara issue.  
In this context, it must be noted that Morocco’s diversification of foreign relations away from 
Europe may partly have been motivated by the insufficient Euro-Mediterranean integration – in 
fact, Morocco has for many years envisioned a closer relationship –441 as well as by growing 
internal conflicts within the EU-Moroccan partnership. In fact, not only does the literature certify 
this partnership a general lack of consistency but, in recent years, this partnership has also 
started showing cracks, with fights over some trade agreements cumulating in the unilateral 
suspension of any contact with the EU by Morocco in February 2016. This decision was taken 
 
435 Euromedrights (Accessed on 25 November 2017). 
436 by contrast, the UfM did not see any reform.  
437 In this context, scholars also criticise that following the Arab Spring, ‘the EU has sent many rather mixed messages to various 
regimes, ranging from praise and support to outright condemnation of the different regimes’ responses to growing public demands for 
greater political, economic and social rights’ (SCHUMACHER, 2013:117). 
438 For example, through the imposition of protectionist measures, giving preferential trade agreements to its member states rather 
than to Morocco and restricting access of Moroccan products to the EU market. 
439 EC (Accessed on 09 September 2017). 
440 receiving huge financial compensation in exchange for setting-up of measures that prevent migrants from entering the EU via 
Spain. 
441 In this regard, the limits of the existing relationship partly contributed to Morocco focusing on diversifying relations. TEEVAN 
Chloe (30 June 2019), EU-Morocco: a win-win partnership?, Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (Accessed on 16 November 2019). 
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shortly after the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had invalidated the association and 
liberalisation (which covers agricultural, agro-food and fisheries products) agreements of 2000 
and 2012 in December 2015. According to the court’s ruling, the two agreements were ‘not 
applicable’ to the Moroccan/Western Sahara (as the treaties did not specifically refer to the 
region).442 As Morocco’s reaction suggests and as indicated before, this territory plays a highly 
important role in Moroccan politics and the assessment of the ECJ highlights how particularly 
heavy the issue weighs on the EU-Moroccan relationship, perfectly reflecting the old dilemma of 
tension between the geopolitical, nationalist and pro-European soul within Moroccan foreign 
policy (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2016:97).443 Against this background, and in view of the fact that 
Morocco is diversifying its energy relations as shown before, it is in the following necessary to 
examine if and how this impacts the EU-Moroccon energy relations. 
5.2 Status quo of EU-Moroccan energy relations 
 
In order to achieve its objectives with regard to third countries, the EU relies, as 
indicated before, on a multilateral market-governance approach, as opposed to a geopolitical 
approach like its member states (YOUNGS, 2009:174-175). The legal basis for this approach is 
the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (NEFRAMI, 2012:162) which was signed in 1994 and came into 
force in 1998.444 Based on the principle of mutual interdependence, this treaty’s main goal is the 
achievement of energy security through the convergence of markets based on the harmonisation 
of legislative frameworks, whereby, as explained by Escribano (2017:252), joining this treaty 
implies the ‘adoption of the EU’s energy acquis’. On the basis of the ECT, a more specific foreign 
policy framework was set up in 2005: the Energy Community is an international organisation 
that aims at exporting the EU’s energy acquis or its internal market to the south-eastern 
neighbourhood in order to provide a common regulatory framework, particularly in the fields of 
power networks. Over the years, the community has been given more and more competencies 
and they now also include aspects like security of supply and energy efficiency (SCHUBERT, 
POLLAK, KREUTLER, 2016:222). Indeed, in the context of global warming and climate change 
(see the Kyoto Protocol or the COP21), environmental aspects have become increasingly present 
in the Union’s energy relations with foreign countries. Until today, the mandate of the 
community only covers the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, however, its expansion to the south 
remains a priority:445 ‘The Southern Mediterranean is strategically important for the EU in terms 
of security of gas and oil supplies from some of the countries but also more broadly in terms of 
transit from the region and beyond. There is clear potential for building an EU-Mediterranean 
partnership in the production and management of renewables, in particular solar and wind energy, 
and in having a joined-up approach to ensuring energy security. Joint renewable energy 
investments in the Southern Mediterranean in line with the EU's 2050 decarbonisation scenario 
could offer EN 10 EN the possibility of a new partnership provided that the right market 
 
442 According to the ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of December 2016, the association (2000) and liberalisation (2012) 
agreements between the EU and Morocco were ‘not applicable’ to the Moroccan/Western Sahara, as the treaties did not specifically 
refer to the region. Similarly, a ruling of 27 February 2018 confirmed that the EU’s fisheries agreement with Morocco is only valid as 
long as it does not include the Moroccan/Western Sahara. EP (Accessed on 04 November 2017); FOX Benjamin (27 February 2018), 
Morocco fisheries pact must not include Western Sahara, EU court confirms, Euractiv (Accessed on 21 September 2018). 
443 Relations remained strained until 2019 when the European Parliament (EP) adopted an amendment to the liberalisation 
agreement in January and the European Council and Morocco agreed on renewing the EU-Moroccan relationship during the 
fourteenth association Council in June. TEEVAN Chloe (30 June 2019), EU-Morocco: a win-win partnership?, Moroccan Institute for 
Policy Analysis (Accessed on 16 November 2019). 
444 Energy Charter (Accessed on 28 January 2018).  
445 and this despite the fact that Russia is not a member. EC (Accessed on 29 October 2017). 
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perspective is created for electricity imports’ (COM/2011/0200 final). As this reflects, the EU 
considers the southern Mediterranean as an indispensable strategic partner and consequently 
has a strong interest in maintaining and strengthening cooperation, with energy having been an 
important aspect (be it financial or technical) of development aid in the past (NEFRAMI, 
2012:165). And indeed, from a development perspective, the energy sector – vector of social, 
political and economic development – is of utmost importance given its contribution to overall 
growth and to competitiveness of the North African economies. The EU’s energy interest in the 
southern Mediterranean includes Morocco not only as a strategic partner in general but also as 
regards energy, and this from both a security of supply and a sustainability perspective. The 
country’s important role in the EU’s overall energy supply is acknowledged in the Commission’s 
2007-2013 country strategy paper (CSP), establishing a strategic aid and cooperation 
framework.446 In fact, although not an energy supplier to the EU, at least not in the classical 
sense of the term like Algeria, for example, Morocco serves as a transit country for Algerian447 
and eventually Nigerian gas (Interview EEAS, 2017) though – a gas pipeline is currently being 
planned to run from Nigeria to Morocco.448 Further, it also trades some electricity with Spain and 
in terms of sustainability, it is, as shown, a pioneer in the fight against climate change and the 
development of RES. Therefore, and in view of its electricity connection with the Iberian 
Peninsula, the EU has, as will be shown more in detail throughout this dissertation, regularly 
considered the possibility of importing renewable electricity from Morocco.  
5.2.1 Multilateral relations  
 
As has been shown, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation dates back to the 1970s, with 
energy having been a pivotal aspect of this cooperation right from the beginning. For example, a 
feasibility study for the construction of a gas pipeline connecting Algeria to Italy (via Tunisia), 
the Trans-Mediterranean Natural Gas Pipeline, was first conducted in 1969449 and the first Euro-
Arab Dialogue was launched in the context of the oil crisis in 1973. Further, due to the proximity 
to Portugal, Spain and Greece and interdependence to and with the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean, energy also became a key aspect of cooperation in the context of these countries’ 
accession to the EEC (COLOMBO and NUR ABDELKHALIQ, 2012:7). Indeed, with energy, i.e. oil 
and gas, representing the bulk of trade within this region, the EU was already very keen to 
establish a common energy market from early on, notably through the harmonisation of policies 
and regulation. The key concepts here were and are market framework, liberalisation and 
regulation (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:25; HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 
2018:127).  
The general legal basis of EU multilateral external energy governance is the ECT, with its 
political foundation being the European Energy Charter which was signed in 1991 in The Hague 
and whose focus was on the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, whereas North Africa as a region was 
not a contracting party.450 Therefore, energy relations were, as of 1995, framed by the EMP 
whose aim was to ensure consistency and which was supposed to cover all energy sources, be it 
conventional or renewable (and electricity), and expand across the entire energy supply chain, 
 
446 EC (Accessed on 29 October 2018). 
447 EEAS (Accessed on 19 November 2017). 
448 The planned pipeline is around 5,700 km long and to connect with around 12 African countries. It would be a continuation of the 
already existing West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP). Hydrocarbons Technology (Accessed on 28 February 2019). 
449 Pipelines International (Accessed on 13 October 2018). 
450 EC (Accessed on 29 October 2017). 
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i.e. from exploration and production, via transportation and refining, towards distribution and 
marketing, as well as trade. However, there is consensus that the EMP has shown overall limited 
success (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:27)451 and, until 2008, was not 
followed by any significant or more specific energy policy initiative (COLOMBO and NUR 
ABDELKHALIQ, 2012:7). Attempts to extend the ECT to the southern neighbourhood were 
reiterated in the mid-2000s and, in reaction to the Arab Spring in 2011 (RUBINO, OZTURK, 
LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:29), resulted in Morocco signing the European Energy Charter in 
2012.452 Having thus become a de facto observer to the Energy Charter Conference in February 
2015, the Maghreb country also expressed its intention to entirely adhere to the charter,453 
being the EU’s only southern neighbour to have done this so far. By contrast, Algeria (as well as 
Tunisia and Egypt) are only observers by invitation to the conference (since 2015).454  
Against this background, and in the absence of any legal leverage, the EU has sought to achieve 
the extension of its energy acquis and the convergence of markets by other means, namely 
through outward Europeanisation (ESCRIBANO, 2017:249). In this context, since the 2000s, the 
integration of the Maghreb gas and electricity markets and their harmonisation with the EU 
internal market has been identified as a priority energy goal (see 2003 Euro-Mediterranean 
Energy Ministers Conference in Athens), resulting in 2004 in the launch of the Rome Euro-
Mediterranean Energy Platform (REMEP), whose priority action plan spawned a relatively 
advanced set of common energy goals. Three years later, in 2007, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Energy Ministers Conference held in Limassol launched the Euro-Mediterranean Energy 
Cooperation, a priority action plan for Euro-Mediterranean energy cooperation.455 However, as 
stated by Sartori (2014:5), the Limassol initiative was not very fruitful though and most of the 
proposals remained largely ‘confined at the declaratory level’ and it was followed in 2008 by the 
UfM under which energy was defined as a key priority area. Focus was put on alternative 
energies456 or the ‘mass-scale production of renewable energy sources (RES) with view to creating 
a vast Euro-Mediterranean green energy market’ (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:122). In this 
context, the UfM has sought to reinforce cooperation in this matter through a number of policy 
initiatives, including the MSP457 which, as mentioned before, was its flagship project and a 
common initiative of the Commission, the Investment Bank, the AFD and the KfW.458 However, 
and as shown before, the MSP, as well as similar initiatives like Desertec and Medgrid have all 
shown only limited success so far, amongst other things because of disagreement between the 
EU member states (SARTORI, 2014:5).459 As will be detailed later, in 2015, and partly in reaction 
to the Arab Spring (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:Abstract), the UfM therefore started a new 
 
451 also because of irregular meetings (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:27). 
452 ECT (Accessed on 02/04/2017). 
453 In 2015, Morocco also hosted the II Rabat Energy Charter Forum. Energy Charter (Accessed on 25 July 2018). 
454 Energy Charter (Accessed on 25 July 2018). 
455 Key points were, apart from the harmonisation and integration of the markets and legislation, the promotion of sustainable 
development and the development of initiatives of common interest in areas like infrastructure, investment financing and research 
and development. EC (Accessed on 20 July 2018). 
456 As indicated before, in a context of strained relations with Russia, North Africa was initially primarily singled out as a potentially 
suitable replacement source for Russian gas supplies, but also increasingly gained in importance with respect to EU attempts to 
accelerate the global energy transition.  
457 European Council, Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean ministerial conference, Final declaration, Marseille, 3-4 
November 2008. 
458 It was financed by the so-called Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) of the Commission and between 2010 and 2013, was 
complemented by the latter’s technical assistance project ‘Paving the Way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan’ (PWMSP). EC (Accessed 
on 20 January 2018). 
459 Apart from disagreement among the member states, Algeria was also rather reluctant to pursue the Mediterranean Solar Plan 
(MSP), fearing that it would make itself dependent on importing energy technologies (DARBOUCHE, 2010:5-6). 
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initiative – a high-level political dialogue on energy matters, setting up three energy platforms, 
with the overall goal of achieving electricity and gas supply security, as well as to enhance 
climate change mitigation and adaptation.  
The goal of the MSP was or is to support the development of renewable energy sources (RES) 
and energy efficiency within the southern Mediterranean countries by developing 20 GW of 
renewables production capacities and achieving significant energy savings by 2020460 and to 
strengthen regional electricity connections through the development of integrated regional 
markets. By contrast, created in 2009 and comprising a large network of politicians, economists 
and scientists in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), the Desertec Foundation is a 
non-profit organisation that is based in Hamburg, Germany. Having been initiated within the 
German Club of Rome, its aspiration is to develop RES, above all solar, in the world’s desert 
regions – for local use, but also to export part of this green energy to Europe.461 In this context, 
the Sahara was, given its size, as well as its geographical proximity to the European continent, 
identified as an ideal location. Subsequent to its creation, a group of industrialists picked up the 
vision of the Desertec Foundation and together formed the Desertec Industrial Initiative (Dii), a 
consortium made up of around 40 large multinational and international integrated energy 
groups.462 The mission of this initiative was to develop solar and wind energy in North Africa in 
order to provide the EU with 15% green electricity by 2050, as well as to cover a substantial part 
of the North African green power demand.463 To realise this aim, Dii entered into a partnership 
with the Desertec Foundation, earmarking a total budget of around € 400 billion.464 Inspired by 
the Desertec vision, 2010 also saw the launch of Medgrid, another industrial consortium created 
under French initiative465 and uniting 21 companies active in the production, transmission and 
distribution of electricity, infrastructure financing and climate change.466 Medgrid’s ultimate aim 
was to provide renewable electricity to the countries of both the northern and southern shores 
of the Mediterranean. More specifically, its mission was to design and promote a transmission 
network between Europe and North Africa that has a generation capacity of 20 GW and an 
export capacity of 5 GW in order to ‘facilitate large-scale electricity trading between the north and 
south, in addition to inter-grid trading throughout the region’.467 Just as the MSP, Medgrid was 
also set up within the framework of the UfM, with which it signed an MoU in January 2012. In 
fact, by elaborating a master plan for the electrical trans-Mediterranean connections, Medgrid 
was originally conceived to complement the MSP, as well as the Desertec Foundation and Dii 
with which it signed an MoU on 24 November 2011 and in March 2012 respectively.468  
 
460 UfM; MSP (Accessed on 31 October 2018). 
461 Desertec Foundation (Accessed on 27 January 2018). 
462 The majority of shareholders were German entities, including companies such as Siemens, E.ON, RWE, Deutsche Bank and Munich 
Re. Other European shareholders were ABB (Switzerland), Saint-Gobain Solar (France) and Abengoa Solar (Spain). Dii (Accessed on 
20 January 2017). 
463 Desertec (Accessed on 30 September 2017). 
464 STONINGTON Joel (13 November 2012), Quagmire in the Sahara: Desertec’s Promise of Solar Power for Europe Fades, Spiegel 
(Accessed on 13 January 2017). 
465 In fact, interested in high-voltage direct current transmissions across the Mediterranean, on 20 November 2009, the French 
government came up with an initiative to study the feasibility of such a project, in the context of which the Medgrid consortium was 
created one year later. EC (Accessed on 11 January 2018). 
466 Founding companies were: Abengoa, AFD, Alstom grid, Areva Renouvelables, Atos WorldGrid, CDC Infrastructure, EDF, Ineo, 
Nemo, Nexans, Nur Energie, ONE, Pan Med Trading and Investment, Prysmian, Red Eléctrica, RTE, Siemens, Soitec Concentrix Solar, 
Taqa Arabia, Terna and Walid Elias Establishment. EC (Accessed on 11 January 2018). 
467 EC (Accessed on 11 January 2020).  
468 EC; UfM; IPFS (Accessed on 11 January 2018). 
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Whilst, as shown before, the abovementioned projects were largely discontinued, it can be noted 
that the logic of the just mentioned projects has changed over the course of time, away from 
their initial purpose of importing green energy from North Africa into the EU. Indeed, by 2013,469 
they were rather motivated by the idea of exchanging solar and wind electricity through an 
integrated regional electricity grid.470 Given recurrent setbacks in realising such plans on a large 
scale though, from 2013 onwards, they then focused on simply supporting RES and energy 
efficiency initiatives. However, there is currently a revival of interest in the initial essence of the 
MSP plan, suggesting that the Desertec idea continues to persist (Interview EC, 2015; Interview 
KfW, 2016), Interview Desertec, 2017). For example, in the context of the signature of the Paris 
Climate Agreement in November 2015, TuNur Limited, a British solar plant developer, 
announced plans to import 4.5 GW of solar power from Tunisia to the EU (via Italy and 
France).471 Further, in the context of the COP22 in November 2016, a joint declaration to 
establish a roadmap for facilitating sustainable renewable electricity trade (Sustainable 
Electricity Trade, SET)472 between the European internal energy market and northern Africa was 
signed under the EC’s Climate Action and Energy initiative.473 The signatory parties apart from 
Morocco were Germany, France, Spain and Portugal which, in December 2018, signed another 
joint declaration including more concrete plans to facilitate cross-border trade under power 
purchase agreements (PPA).474 However, notwithstanding the beforementioned attempts to 
institutionalise Euro-Mediterranean energy cooperation through the ECT, for example, and the 
acceleration of corresponding initiatives such as the UfM platforms, the EU’s multilateral energy 
policy towards the Mediterranean is, as shown before, regularly met with heavy criticism for its 
low perceptibility (CEBECI, 2019:7) and for not having any concrete impact (TAGLIAPIETRA and 
ZACHMANN, 2016:1,2,3,5; DIEZ and TOCCI, 2017:90).475 This reproach is based on the fact that 
plans to establish a common energy market which was thought ‘to bring advantages both in 
terms of efficiency and in terms of economic growth, security, and political stability’ (RUBINO, 
OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:24), have never materialised (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 
2018:127). Likewise, so the critics, the integration of the gas and electricity markets has 
‘remained a distant perspective’ (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:123), reflecting the EU’s general 
‘limited capacity to engage’ the North African countries (SARTORI, 2014:3). And indeed, it has 
been noted before that although countries such as Morocco, and, to a certain extent Algeria, have 
undertaken courageous energy reforms, most of the North African energy sectors still struggle 
with substantial energy problems. According to the literature, the lack of integration is largely 
due to a lack of international legally-binding rules and effective institutionalisation, with both 
Algeria476 and Libya having never formally committed to adopting the energy acquis (BOENING, 
KREMER and VAN LOON, 2013:104). Here, the EC’s Review of the ENP, which equally deplores 
the slow progress regarding the building of an integrated energy market, clearly points out the 
need for better coordination of energy interests in the EU’s neighbourhood, with evaluations 
 
469 and in view of the EU’s capacity to cover the majority of its internal renewable energy needs on its own.  
470 CALDERBANK Selwa (31 May 2013), Desertec abandons Sahara solar power export dream, Euractiv (Accessed on 14 January 
2018). 
471 Nur Energie (Accessed on 14 December 2017); Cleantechnica (Accessed on 14 December 2017). 
472 EC (Accessed on 27 January 2018). 
473 RenewableWatch (Accessed on 25 November 2017). 
474 CMI (Accessed on 11 July 2019). Prior to February 2019, voices had become loud that relativised the political relevance of the 
November 2016 agreement, arguing that it was signed in a context of high international pressure and media coverage and was thus 
not backed by any ‘real’ interest (Interviews). 
475 In this context, Bicchi and Gillespie (2014:200) interpret for example the EU’s Strategic Energy Partnership with Algeria as a 
recognition of the ENP’s failure to make any significant contribution to EU-Algeria energy cooperation.  
476 This is interesting, given that, in the past, Algeria proved to be perfectly able to act in multilateral cooperation structures and often 
even initiated corresponding platforms (see African Energy Commission and APPA) (BICCHI and GILLESPIE, 2014:200). 
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suggesting, for example, that the coordination of political regional and bilateral programmes, as 
well as private sector investment facilities, is suboptimal (JOIN (2015) 50 final). Overall, failures 
on both sides of the Mediterranean can be denounced. For example, on the EU side, and as for 
the realisation of the integrated electricity market, the idea of importing green electricity from 
the energy-rich south has become less appealing owing to the long-lasting effects of the 
economic crisis and a projected decrease in energy demand. At the same time, the credibility of 
the EU in that regard has been damaged, as the Union itself does not serve as prime example of 
regional electricity integration (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:131-132). On the Mediterranean 
side, one often cited reason for why regional energy initiatives do not deliver is the low level of 
political & economic integration (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:29). In any 
case, and as a result, energy cooperation has, until today, above all been bilateral. 
5.2.2 Bilateral relations  
 
The basis for bilateral energy relations between the EU and Morocco is the Association 
Agreement (AA) of 1996, but cooperation objectives are also formulated in the Action Plans 
(APs) (see Figure 17). The focus is hereby very much on renewable energies, energy efficiency 
and electricity (see Figure 16) and certainly includes a development component.  
Figure 16: Energy cooperation under the EU-Morocco Association Agreement (AA) 
Morocco: Article 57: Energy 
Energy Cooperation shall focus on:  
(a) renewable energy;  
(b) promoting the saving of energy;  
(c) applied research relating to networks of databases linking the two Parties' economic and social 
operators;  
(d) backing efforts to modernize and develop energy networks and the interconnection of such networks 
with Community networks. 
Source: Own elaboration based on EU-Morocco Association Agreement (Accessed on 21 October 2019).  
Notwithstanding the early focus on energy in the EU-Morocco relationship, the literature 
emphasises that energy cooperation was very broad and ‘very poor in this initial phase’, with 
awarded funding having been detached from Morocco’s sectoral reform progress (BOENING, 
KREMER and VAN LOON, 2013:104).477 According to Boening, Kremer and Van Loon (2013:104), 
this was notably due to a low institutional density, for example, meetings only took place at the 
highest political level and on an ad hoc basis. However, in the mid-2000s, and under the ENP, 
cooperation became more substantial and more functional and is, now centred mainly on 
technical and financial assistance (BOENING, KREMER and VAN LOON, 2013:105). Further, 
cooperation began to take different forms (MoU, contractual, ad-hoc) (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 
2018:122), for example, in 2003, both partners signed an MoU on the progressive integration of 
their respective electricity markets,478 an objective that was also taken up in the AP of 2005-
2010. Overall, cooperation was boosted through a joint declaration of the Commission and 
Morocco on energy priorities in 2007479 and in 2008 when Morocco was granted an advanced 
 
477 At the beginning of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Action Plans (APs) with the southern Mediterranean were 
rather general with respect to energy and did not reflect the existing real energy problems and issues within the region (for example, 
especially, the energy security aspects only moved up the EU’s political energy agenda with the gas crises of 2006 and 2009). Two 
counter this, in the mid-2000s, the EU started to develop several more tailored energy cooperation tools for its southern neighbours, 
offering for example both Algeria and Egypt so-called strategic energy partnerships (GODZIMIRSKI, 2016:38). 
478 EU Monitor (Accessed on 18 November 2017). 
479 at the EU-Morocco Association Council. EC (Accessed on 19 November 2017). 
- 88 - 
 
status. From that moment onwards, priorities were increasingly extended requiring Morocco to 
implement energy strategies compatible to those of the EU and aligned with the Union’s energy 
objectives, namely, energy security, competitiveness and sustainable development (AP of 2013-
2017). In this context, and compared with the previous AP, objectives became far more 
ambitious, touching upon areas like renewable energies, energy efficiency and even oil shale and 
shale gas, as well as nuclear safety cooperation and regional energy cooperation (notably in the 
field of infrastructure). In fact, the AP reflected Morocco’s strong interest in the promotion of 
renewables, the development of energy infrastructures and the export of green electricity to the 
EU (BARBE and HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2013:91). Its ultimate objective is the integration of the 
Moroccan energy market into the EU internal energy market, which forcibly entails a reform of 
the Moroccan energy sector, with the overall aim of deepening and accelerating the convergence 
of energy policies as well as legislative, institutional, organization and technical settings within 
the EU framework. However, so far, and as mentioned before, the impact of EU energy policies 
towards Morocco has been perceived as moderate (BIANCHI, COLANTONI, MASCOLO and 
SARTORI, 2018:21). 
Figure 17: Timeline of bilateral EU-Morocco energy cooperation  
1996: 
Signature AA
2000: Entry 
into force AA
2003: MoU on 
the 
progressive 
integration of 
the Moroccan 
electricity 
market in the 
EU internal 
electricity 
market
2005-2010 AP
2007: Joint 
declaration 
on energy 
priorities
2008: 
Advanced 
status
2013-2017 AP
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the reviewed literature. Whilst the AP 2005-2010 expired in 2010, it was only replaced in 2013 by 
the 2013-2017 AP. For the interim period, both parties had agreed to continue to apply the AP 2005-2010. French Senate (Accessed 
on 31 October 2018). 
5.3 Actors of EU energy governance towards Morocco 
 
As demonstrated before, EU energy governance towards Morocco is framed by a multi-
level governance system encompassing the supranational, national and subnational levels of 
policymaking. To shed light on these levels, the author seeks to map the EU’s energy architecture 
and the key players involved. Here, the following actors have been identified as relevant 
throughout this dissertation’s empirical research process: the European Council, the Council of 
the European Union (Council), the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (EC), 
the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), as well as 
a number of financing and regional organisations, whereby it must be said that some of these 
actors play a more pronounced role than others or are more visible than others.  
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5.3.1 European Council, Council of the European Union, European 
Parliament, European Commission and European External Action Service  
 
Created in 2009 and composed of the Heads of State of the EU’s national governments, 
the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, the role of 
the European Council is to represent the interests of the member states and to provide political 
input by identifying the strategic objectives of the Union (Art. 15 § 1 TEU). Its president, which is 
is elected for a once-renewable term of two and a half years, represents the EU externally,480 a 
context in which the European Council plays a major role in EU external energy policymaking 
(BRAUN, 2011:4) although its priority is not on energy.481 In fact, the body is generally only 
involved in highly political and strategic issues, with its ownership with regard to a technical 
topic like energy being limited. In this context, it was for example involved in the development of 
the 2030 energy and climate framework482 and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of the Council 
of the European Union, based on the conclusions of the European Council of 19/20 March 
2015,483 adopted conclusions on EU energy diplomacy.484 Further, in March 2014, and as regards 
the EU’s southern neighbourhood, its conclusions called on the Commission to ‘conduct an in-
depth study of EU energy security and to present by June a comprehensive plan for the reduction of 
EU energy dependence’.485 In response to this, the Commission published its European Energy 
Security Strategy (COM/2014/0330 final) in May 2014, which, as shown in the introduction to 
this dissertation, presents the southern Mediterranean as a top priority region (RUBINO, 
OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:34). Here, the European Council does exercise some 
influence on the Commission’s energy policy towards Morocco although the non-energy supplier 
does not really fall under its scope of interest (EGENHOFER and VAN SCHAIK, 2006:178).  
Established in 1958, the Council of the European Union or Council is composed of the national 
states’ government ministers and, like the European Council, its role is to represent the interests 
of the member states. The main mission of the Council is the coordination of the member states’ 
policies as well as the development of the EU’s foreign & security policy, a context in which it 
acts unanimously with the European Council and is entitled to conclude agreements between the 
EU and third countries.486 In this context, and together with the Commission, the Council 
undoubtedly plays the most major role in EU external energy policymaking, notably when it 
comes to energy security policies. Meetings take place in different thematic Councils which are 
all chaired by the Presidency, with the exception of the FAC which is chaired by the HR, and are 
held around every two months, whereby decisions are taken by qualified-majority voting 
(except in foreign policies).487 Apart from within the FAC which discusses external energy issues 
to some extent,488 its work is carried out in different thematic Councils.489 The main Council here 
 
480 EEAS (Accessed on 14 July 2019). 
481 The main topics discussed are generally governance and macroeconomics, with the 2006 and 2014 European Councils having 
clearly been an exception. In 2011, the European Council equally initiated a thematic discussion on energy in 2011, a move that was 
well received by DG ENER. CHRYSSOLEGOS Angelos (November 2016), The EU’s Crisis of Governance and European Foreign Policy, 
Research Paper, Europe Programme, Chatham House; European Council (Accessed on 22 December 2018); (BRAUN, 2011:4).  
482 Council (Accessed on 11 November 2017). 
483 in which the latter recognised the importance of the external dimension of the Energy Union and asked the Commission and the 
Council for a greater role of the EU in external energy activities, including for instance the establishment of strategic energy 
partnership with producing and transit countries. European Council (Accessed on 03 December 2017). 
484 EEAS (Accessed on 03 December 2017).  
485 EC (Accessed on 19 November 2018). 
486 Europa (Accessed on 08 November 2018). 
487 EEAS (Accessed on 14 July 2019). 
488 Europa (Accessed on 08 November 2018); EEAS (Accessed on 14 July 2019). 
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is the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council (TTE), which is composed of the 
member states’ energy ministers. However, the TTE only meets around three or four times a 
year490 and core energy issues491 are rather discussed within the Council’s so-called Working 
Party on Energy which unites experts from each member state and is chaired by the Delegate of 
the country that holds the Presidency of the Council.492 In fact, covering both internal and 
external policy issues, as well as all sources of energy, this Party examines the legislative 
proposals by the Commission and then forwards them to the TTE. The topics of interest are 
security of energy supply and energy efficiency or the integration of the internal energy market, 
but the Party is also interested in negotiations with third countries and international 
organisations.493 Participants come together about once a week for discussion (EGENHOFER and 
VAN SCHAIK, 2006:178).494 
Founded in 1952 and made up of 751 members elected in the EU member states and a President, 
the European Parliament (EP) or Parliament represents the interests of the EU citizens495 and 
is, together with the Council, part of the EU’s bicameral legislature. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
EP, whose members are elected every five years in EU-wide general elections,496 has seen a lot of 
its foreign policymaking powers extended and it also plays a role, albeit limited, in EU external 
energy policymaking and EU energy governance towards Morocco.497 Indeed, whilst EU external 
(energy) policymaking remains remains a core competence of the Council and the Commission, 
the EP has regularly pushed for the creation of a common external energy policy (NATORSKI and 
HERRANZ SURRALLES, 2008:78; KUZEMKO, BELYI and GOLDTHAU, 2012:71), as well as for 
multilateral energy cooperation (DYER and TROMBETTA, 2013:291). Further, and equally a 
strong advocate of energy security policies, with the aim of reducing energy dependence and 
diversifying suppliers and routes, the EP has also shown recurrent interest in linking energy 
security to development policies (NATORSKI and HERRANZ SURRALLES, 2008:78). The most 
important unit in this regard has been ITRE, the Committee on Industry Research and Energy 
(EGENHOFER and VAN SCHAIK, 2006:181) which in the past has regularly expressed its interest 
in electricity generation from RES in the Mediterranean region or Morocco (an interest that does 
not include the Sahara, a question over which the EP is deeply divided).498 For example, the 
Desertec idea or project first received support from some members of the Parliament after the 
Desertec Foundation presented its white book for energy, water and climate security at the 
Parliament in 2007.499 Apart from ITRE, AFET, the Committee on Foreign Affairs has also started 
to serve increasingly as a forum for the exchange on external policies. AFET is the EP’s largest 
 
489 The agendas of the Councils are prepared by two sub-committees, the Permanent Representatives Committees COREPER I and 
COREPER II (‘Comité des Représentants Permanents’ in French). Both committees are composed of the Head or Deputy Head of 
mission from the member states in Brussels and whilst COREPER 1 largely deals with domestic issues, COREPER 2 primarily focuses 
on external affairs (DUKE, 2006:15). 
490 Council (Accessed on 11 November 2017). 
491 Politically and strategically less relevant energy issues may also be discussed in other Working Parties like the one on agriculture 
or the environment (EGENHOFER and VAN SCHAIK, 2006:179). 
492 EU Monitor (Accessed on 05 November 2019).  
493 Council (Accessed on 15 November 2018). 
494 Working parties, also known as the Council preparatory bodies are specialised committees in charge of studying proposals, with 
the outcome of their work to be presented to Coreper. They can be permanent or temporary/ad-hoc. Council (Accessed on 15 
November 2018).  
495 Euromedrights (Accessed on 25 November 2017). 
496 EEAS (Accessed on 14 July 2019). 
497 In fact, although the Parliament already used to have several control functions in this policy domain, some of which were only 
added by the TFEU. 
498 EP (Accessed on 17 August 2017).  
499 The Greens EFA (Accessed on 18 January 2018). 
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committee and responsible for controlling or monitoring the activities of the Council, the 
Commission, the EEAS and the HR/VP.500 
Composed of a President and 28 commissioners501 from each of the EU member states, the 
European Commission (EC) or Commission is the EU’s executive and as such, is supposed to 
represent the interests of the EU as a whole and plays an important role in integrating national 
policies.502 Together with the Council, it plays one of the greatest roles in EU energy governance 
towards Morocco, notably because its competencies apply to both the internal and external 
dimensions of EU policies, making it by far the most powerful actor with respect to European 
foreign policy making. In this context, it ‘is at the heart of the EU’s external action and the external 
dimension of the EU’s internal policies and is involved in all stages of policy-making’ (KEUKELEIRE 
and DELREUX, 2014:75). In fact, the Commission represents the EU internationally (Art.17 § 1 
TEU),503 conducts negotiations with third states and international organisations (Art.218 TFEU) 
(if authorised to do so by the Council) and drafts and proposes the APs (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 
2016:116). These foreign policymaking powers apply to all areas of EU external action, including 
energy, where with the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the institution has seen its 
competencies substantially extended, for example, as regards the EU’s import dependency which 
is now dealt with at EU level (LEAL-ARCAS and WOUTERS, 2017:40). Here, and as part of its 
external energy policy responsibilities, the Commission is in charge of the enhancement of the 
EU’s external energy relations and has played a major role in the EU’s plan of 2015 to set up a 
comprehensive energy diplomacy, including the strengthening of ‘common messages and energy 
diplomacy capacities’.504 Here, its competencies clearly outrank those of the EEAS. For example, 
projects of ‘Common Interest’ in the field of external energy – such as the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan (MSP) – fall under the mandate of the Commissioner for Energy and Climate Action and not 
of the HR (BRAUN, 2011:4-5).  
In this light, it was Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete who in May 2015 travelled to 
Algeria and Morocco to deepen energy and climate ties and to present the EU-Mediterranean 
energy platforms and not the HR.505 Overall, and as indicated before, the southern 
Mediterranean plays an important role with respect to the EU’s security of energy supply506 
which as stated in the Commission’s Green Paper ‘Towards a European strategy for the security of 
energy supply’ of 2000, extends to both fossil fuels and RES.507 One aim of the Commission’s 
external energy strategy ‘The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders’ in 
this context has been the import of renewable electricity from the southern Mediterranean into 
the EU or the integration of the southern Mediterranean and European energy markets (notably 
gas and electricity).508 In this context, it proposed the establishment of an EU-South 
Mediterranean Energy Community in order to enhance sectoral cooperation.509 The EC’s energy 
interest in the southern Mediterranean also includes Morocco with which bilateral cooperation 
 
500 EP (Accessed on 14 August 2017). 
501 The Commissioners of the European Commission are appointed by the President of the European Commission who in turn is 
appointed by the European Council. Both the appointment of the Commissioners and the President must be approved by the 
European Parliament. 
502 Euromedrights (Accessed on 25 November 2017).  
503 with the exception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
504 EEAS (Accessed on 03 December 2017). 
505 EC (Accessed on 19 November 2017). 
506 a traditional focus of the EC (NATORSKI and HERRANZ SURRALLES, 2008:75) 
507 Eurlex (Accessed on 26 October 2019). 
508 EC (Accessed on 26 October 2019). 
509 EC (Accessed on 26 October 2019). 
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takes place within the framework of annual and multi-annual plans (Interview EC, 2017), with 
common propositions and objectives wich have been translated into a wide range of policy 
measures.  
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI): the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 
which strives to support the ENP, is the EC’s most important European financial instrument to 
support cooperation with Morocco. It replaced the former European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2014 and will run until 2020,510 with one of its objectives 
being the achievement of progressive integration into the EU internal market. Aid under the ENI 
comprises both technical and policy support and mainly takes the form of bilateral assistance 
programmes, but the instrument may also cover or finance regional programmes.511 Total 
assistance for the period 2014-2017 stood between € 728 million and € 890 million,512 whereby 
final allocations generally depend on Morocco’s progress in the implementation of common 
cooperation targets. One target for 2017 was the promotion of the development of sectors 
creating employment, with energy, above all RES, being considered as a particularly promising 
area in this regard. In 2014, the RES segment received aid through a € 10 million 
SME/employment programme.513 Overall, support is given in the following ways:  
a) Twinning/Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX): 
Twinning, an instrument for institutional cooperation, exists since 1997 and ‘aims to 
provide support for the transposition, implementation and enforcement of the EU 
legislation’ by building up capacities in the target countries.514 The basis in this context 
are the objectives defined in the APs and advice is provided by experts from the member 
states. The instrument was first used in Morocco in 2003 (TULMETS, 2008:128) and, in 
2016, the country accounted for 4% of the EU’s overall twinning projects.515 Twinning 
projects are aimed at the long-term and the instrument is therefore complemented by 
TAIEX, which, initially introduced in 1995 in order to provide technical assistance to the 
Central and Eastern European candidate countries,516 has included the southern 
neighbourhood since 2006 and is largely demand-driven. Compared to twinning, TAIEX 
is more short-term oriented and tailor-made. Assistance takes place within workshops, 
expert missions or study visits. Energy topics mainly cover market liberalisation 
(regarding oil, gas and electricity), as well as renewable energy sources and energy 
efficiency.517  
b) Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC): the CBC, which was first introduced in 2007 under 
the ENPI, primarily seeks to promote economic and social development and address 
common challenges in border areas in order to reduce disparities in living standards518 
and ‘prevent new diving lines’ along the EU’s external borders (TULMETS, 2008:128). One 
objective in this context is to foster people-to-people cooperation, which aims at building 
 
510 The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) replaced MEDA which was the EU’s principal financial 
instrument to implement the Euro-Mediterranean partnership between 1996 and 2007, in 2007. ENPI at that time combined both 
MEDA and TACIS (funding instrument for the East) and was supposed to be much more flexible. It ran until 2013. EC (Accessed on 25 
November 2017).  
511 EU (Accessed on 26 November 2017).  
512 As a comparison, assistance stood at € 1.4 billion for the 2007-2013 period. EC (Accessed on 21 August 2017). 
513 EEAS (Accessed on 21 August 2017). 
514 EC (Accessed on 26 November 2017). 
515 EC (Accessed on 26 November 2017).  
516 Eur-Lex (Accessed on 26 November 2017).  
517 EC (Accessed on 26 November 2017).  
518 EC (Accessed on 26 November 2017). 
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sectoral networks and increase the participation of the EU’s neighbouring countries in 
EU programmes. As regards Morocco, the Maghreb country took part in the Spain 
External Borders 2008-2013 Cross-Border Cooperation Programme, for example. One 
aim of this programme was the sustainable management and use of energy resources.519 
At the same time, Morocco, i.e. Oriental, Taza-Al Hoceima-Taounate, Tanger-Tetouan 
regions to be more precise, also took part in the ENI Mediterranean Sea Basin CBC 
Programme 2007-2013, which was extended to 2014-2020, with one priority being 
environmental protection, climate change adaptation and mitigation.520  
Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF): one key instrument of the ENI is the 
Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) which uses a) budget support and b) co-
financing:  
• Budget support, i.e. direct financial transfers, is part of the EU’s 
development aid and seeks to support Morocco in pursuing development 
policies and reforms. Contrary to other development instruments (like co-
financing), budget support is bound to political conditionality. For example, it 
is mandatory for a potential beneficiary to adhere to the EU’s fundamental 
values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Further, potential 
beneficiaries must meet certain eligible criteria, like, for example a stable 
macroeconomic framework. Budget support is also performance-related, i.e. 
additional support is only provided if pre-defined targets are met. Budget 
support is granted through good governance & development contracts, sector 
reform contracts and state-building contracts521 and is accompanied by 
policy dialogue on judicial, regulatory and organisational aspects.522 Between 
2005 and 2012, Morocco benefited from overall budget support amounting to 
€ 3.58 billion, 3.3% of which went to the energy sector (which over the years 
has increasingly gained in significance).523  
• Co-financing is carried out by the NIF, with the strategic objectives for the 
period 2014-2020 being the following: energy security, connectivity and 
market integration, the fight against climate change and environmental 
threats, as well as the promotion of sustainable and inclusive growth.524 
Launched in 2008, its purpose is to finance ‘critical infrastructure, public 
services and private sector development’, the context in which the facility 
seeks to provide complementary funding, i.e. it tries to mobilise additional 
capital for projects ‘funded by European financial institutions and other public 
and private partners, which would be unlikely to materialize without NIF 
support’.525 To this end, it puts together capital from the EU budget and the 
EU member states in order to use it to leverage grants from the EFIs (which 
 
519 EC (Accessed on 26 November 2017).  
520 ENPI (Accessed on 24 August 2019). 
521 EC (Accessed on 11 November 2018). 
522 EC (Accessed on 11 November 2018). 
523 EC (Accessed on 11 November 2018). 
524 EC (Accessed on 24 August 2018). 
525 EC (Accessed on 24 August 2018). 
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can decide to finance the investments alone or in cooperation with other 
EFIs),526 as well as from the partner country itself.527  
The NIF is a so-called ‘blending’ instrument, which combines EU grants with loans from 
third public and private funders (which otherwise, i.e. without NIF, might not invest, as 
too risky), with a view to achieving the EU’s external policy objectives.528 The rationale 
behind this is that, as an EU mechanism, the NIF has much easier access to loans from the 
EFIs, which it then redistributes to partner countries eligible for funding. Projects must 
be piloted by the EFIs.529 Recognised EFIs and the main donors, in general are apart from 
the Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), the AFD and the KfW. As this suggests, the projects to be financed under the NIF 
– which span across all kinds of sectors, including energy – are generally quite capital-
intensive.530 Here, it is worth pointing out that the NIF not only or exclusively funds 
projects via grants but also provides technical assistance (TA). Other possibilities include 
investment grant & interest rate subsidy, risk capital or guarantees.531 Its own funding 
comes primarily from the EU budget, or, to be more precise, from the ENI, as well as from 
contributions from the EU member states (via the NIF Trust Fund) which are managed 
by the EIB. The biggest contributor in 2016 was Germany with € 34 million, followed by 
France with € 27 million.532 
In fact, the NIF is supposed to support the partner countries’ national energy goals and to 
contribute to projects that enhance both these countries’ and the EU’s own energy 
security. To achieve the objectives of the Energy Community Treaty, it hereby seeks to 
contribute to Projects of Common Interest (PCI), whereby the focus is on RES, energy 
efficiency and energy savings.533 With respect to Morocco, the NIF pursues the aim of 
achieving both the EU’s external energy policy objectives as well as the Maghreb 
country’s national energy policy goals themselves at the same time and this ideally in 
coherence with other aid. Between 2008 and 2016, Morocco benefited from NIF-backed 
energy funding worth € 145.7 million (with energy accounting for around 66% of this 
sum).534 As shown in Table 4, with more than € 90 million, the lion’s share of funding 
went hereby to the Ouarzazate project for which the NIF stipulated the participation of 
the EIB, the AFD and the KfW. While these three actors account for around 60% of the 
overall cost of the solar project, the facility itself supports, for example, NOOR I with € 30 
million (€ 106.5 million for the whole complex).535 Further, the NIF has supported 
Morocco’s energy sector in the context of regional and multilateral initiatives or projects 
such as the UfM or the Southern Mediterranean Investment Coordination Initiative 
(AMICI), which is managed by the Directorate for Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations (DG NEAR).536 The aim of this initiative is to achieve better coordination of 
 
526 Bankwatch (Accessed on 10 December 2017).  
527 EC (Accessed on 28 November 2017).  
528 The NIF mainly funds public projects, it may also fund the private sector. EC (Accessed on 28 November 2017). 
529 Bankwatch (Accessed on 10 December 2017).  
530 EC (Accessed on 19 November 2017). 
531 EC (Accessed on 19 November 2017). 
532 EC (Accessed on 24 August 2018). 
533 EC (Accessed on 11 November 2018). 
534 For comparison, Morocco’s regional neighbor, Tunisia, ‘only’ benefitted from € 16.3. Only Egypt received more – € 168.9. EC 
(Accessed on 19 November 2017). 
535 EIB (Accessed on 19 November 2017). 
536 EC (Accessed on 28 November 2017).  
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EU investment programmes, including those related to energy, in order to maximise 
their impact. At the EU level, corresponding initiatives are coordinated by both the ENI 
and the NIF, whilst at the regional level coordination involves, apart from the partner 
countries, the EC, the EEAS, the EFIs, the MS, the UfM, international finance institutions 
and other donors.537 As this shows, the NIF is an important instrument of donor 
coordination which, in September 2017, was transformed into the Neighbourhood 
Investment Platform (NIP), becoming an integral part of the European Fund for 
Sustainable Development (EFSD).538 
Table 4: Investments and loans granted to Morocco by the NIF/NIP from 2011 until 2016 
Loan Amount 
(in €)
OUARZAZATE III (TOWER) Signed Renewables 2014 43.700.000
OUARZAZATE II (PARABOLIC) Signed Renewables 2014 40.800.000
INTEGRATED WIND PROGRAMME Signed Renewables 2013 15.300.000
ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION SYSTEM (RESEAUX III) Signed Electricity 2012 15.300.000 (+TA)
OUARZAZATE Signed Renewables 2011 30.600.000
Total
Investments granted to Morocco by the NIF/NIP from 2011 until 2016
Name Status Field Date
 
Source: Own elaboration based on EC (Accessed on 24 August 2018). 
In terms of structure, the EC is organised ‘by the specialization principle’ (MARANGONI, 
2014:42), with its operative work being carried out by different administrative departments, the 
so-called Directorate Generals (DGs) (33 in total) which are led by the commissioners. Whilst the 
DGs are primarily active at the technical level, they may also have a political say (Interview 
EEAS, 2017). The most important DGs as regards to EU external energy policy are the 
Directorate General Energy (DG ENER) and DG NEAR. 
The Directorate General Energy (DG ENER) is the main DG for all energy questions and issues 
and is, as such, under the political authority of the Vice-President of the European Commission 
and in charge of the Energy Union and the Energy Commissioner.539 It was set up with the Treaty 
of Lisbon as ‘part of a re-compartmentalization scheme meant to address inconsistencies, overlap 
and gaps in the Commission’s governance of energy’ (BRAUN, 2011:4) and is organised into five 
directorates. It is accountable for the development and implementation of both EU internal and 
external energy policies and its overall aim is a secure, sustainable and competitive (affordable) 
supply of energy, as well as the achievement of the 2020, 2030 and 2050 energy targets and the 
realisation of the Energy Union.540 On the internal level, it seeks for example to endorse the 
integration of the internal energy market (including the set-up or reinforcement of the necessary 
infrastructure), to enable the markets to exploit their conventional and renewable energy 
sources in a safe and competitive manner, to provide for a legal framework for the use of nuclear 
energy, to promote the moderation of internal energy demand (including decarbonisation), and 
to encourage energy innovation and technology etc.541 On the external level, it seeks to complete 
 
537 EU Neighbours (Accessed on 28 November 2017). 
538 EC (Accessed on 27 February 2019). 
539 EC (Accessed on 12 November 2019).  
540 EC (Accessed on 07 November 2018). 
541 EC (Accessed on 15 August 2017). 
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the integration of third countries in the internal energy market and to strengthen energy 
relations with third countries and international energy companies (KNODT, MÜLLER and 
PFIEFER 2015: 61). As regards the Energy Union, one key objective is the diversification of 
external suppliers and routes, as well as the enhancement of the ‘conditions for secure energy 
supply in a spirit of solidarity between Member States’.542 The overall aim in this context is to 
improve coordination of the EU member states’ national energy policies in order to enable the 
EU to ‘Speak with one Voice’ on external energy issues.  
The Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) is 
under the political authority of European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy 
and Enlargement Negotiations and headed by his Director General.543 Officially in charge of the 
realisation of the ENP, the DG is responsible for the management of the relations between the EU 
and its neighbouring countries, whereby it is required to promote EU values, policies and 
interests and to support political and economic reforms. Further, and together with the EEAS, it 
represents the EU’s interests externally, with corresponding tasks including the preparation of 
policy propositions and reports, the conduct of negotiations and the management of policy 
assistance etc.544 Its working focus hereby covers all domains of external action, including 
energy, whereby it has a particularly strong interest in regional energy & climate cooperation 
and the promotion of a regional regulatory energy framework, notably with regard to natural 
gas, electricity from RES, and energy efficiency.  
Created under the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and established in 2011, replacing the Directorate-
General for the External Relations (DG RELEX) (VAN VOOREN and WESSEL, 2014:458), the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) is the EU’s diplomatic service,545 a role in which it is 
officially responsible for the conduct of the EU’s foreign diplomacy and the management of its 
diplomatic relations & strategic partnerships with third countries.546 An autonomous body 
separate from the Council Secretariat and the Commission, it reports to the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) (Art. 27 TEU) who at the same time 
serves as Vice President (VP) of the Commission of which it is a member. The EEAS, despite itself 
lacking any energy-specific competencies (KNODT, MÜLLER and PFIEFER, 2015:63),547 is one of 
the most important actors in the conduct of the EU’s external energy policies and ‘plays an 
important role in integrating energy considerations into EU foreign policy and coordinating with 
Member State's foreign affairs ministries’,548 with its strategy being to ‘streamline energy into 
external relations’ (KNODT, MÜLLER and PFIEFER, 2015:63). Its central administration is 
located in Brussels and is organised in directorates-general which comprise 5 geographic and 
 
542 EU Monitor (Accessed on 07 November 2018). 
543 EC (Accessed on 08 December 2019). 
544 DG NEAR (Accessed on 15 August 2017). 
545 Euromedrights (Accessed on 25 November 2017). 
546 In fact, the EEAS and the HR, together with the diplomatic services of the member states, represents the EU in international fora 
and is responsible for the dialogue with third countries (Art. 27 TEU). This is done on the basis of a common position adopted by the 
member states (Art. 34 TEU). EEAS (Accessed on 26 October 2019). 
547 given that as shown before, the member states are generally not willing to transfer any or only little energy diplomacy-related 
competencies (KNODT, MÜLLER and PFIEFER, 2015:63; CARTA, 2016:204). 
548 Eurlex (Accessed on 26 October 2019).  
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several thematic desks549 and are composed of officials and experts from the Council and the 
Commission, as well as of the national diplomatic services.550  
On the external level, the EEAS is represented and supported by a worldwide network of EU 
embassies or delegations551 which are the first responsible for the implementation of the EU’s 
cooperation programme ‘in the field’ or in third countries, a context in which they are supposed 
to closely coordinate with the rotating presidencies.552 Although some of the staff directly report 
to the Commission,553 since the Treaty of Lisbon, the delegations formally report to the EEAS.554 
In this regard, they receive instructions from both ‘the relevant Commission services as 
appropriate’ and the HR/EEAS,555 a context in which, in case of contradictory instructions, the 
Head of Delegation, may, as stated by Gatti (2016:296), serve as an ‘emergency break’. The Head 
of Delegation is accountable to the HR and in charge of ensuring coordination of all actions of the 
Union.556 Ever since the shift from Commission delegations to EU delegations under the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the latter have taken on a wide range of responsibilities, amongst which are 
coordination, representation and reporting.557 The EU delegations are strongly involved in 
bilateral programming, participating for example in the drafting of ENP Partnership priorities, 
policy positions and agendas ahead of meetings such as the Association Council, the Association 
Committee and/or its sub-committees558 and playing a key role with respect to political 
monitoring (BOENING, KRMER and VAN LOON, 2013:105). Further, EU delegations also play a 
financial role,559 with their power of financial implementation deriving from the Commission 
(which maintains the right to withdraw it at any time). This means that, in terms of budget 
implementation, they must comply with Commission rules,560 whereby financial responsibility 
lies with the Head of Delegation (GATTI, 2016:293). EU delegations are separated into a political 
and an operational section and whilst the former oversees the conduct of political dialogue, the 
latter is responsible for the management of cooperation programmes, including the 
management of financial and technical assistance (GATTI, 2016:286).561 As for Morocco, the EU 
delegation in Rabat acts as the first local point of contact with the EU and, as such, is expected to 
be in permanent contact with local ministries, agencies, bodies and NGOs, to inform them about 
EU-activities and to provide input to the higher levels.  
5.3.2 Union for the Mediterranean  
 
As shown before, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was set up in 2008 in Paris as 
an intergovernmental organisation comprising of the Commission and the member states, as 
well as 15 Mediterranean countries from both the northern and southern shores: Albania, 
 
549 EEAS (Accessed on 16 August 2017). 
550 Given this proximity between the EEAS and the member states, the former’s activities are closely monitored and controlled (for 
example, through the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) or COREPER), which in turn limits the ‘discretionary power of the EEAS’ 
(BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:4-5, 127); EEAS (Accessed on 26 October 2019). 
551 EU delegations are functionally similar to diplomatic missions (GATTI, 2016:286); Europa (Accessed on 09 November 2018). 
552 Euromedrights (Accessed on 25 November 2017); Council (Accessed on 10 November 2018). 
553 In fact, most EU delegations also comprise Commission staff (HELWIG, IVAN and KOSTANYAN, 2013:67). 
554 Euromedrights (Accessed on 25 November 2017); Council (Accessed on 10 November 2018). 
555 Every time the Commission issues instructions to delegations, it must, in parallel inform the Head of Delegation and the EEAS 
Central Administration (2010/427/EU); Euromedrights (Accessed on 25 November 2017); Council (Accessed on 10 November 
2018). 
556 EEAS (Accessed on 26 October 2019). 
557 EP (Accessed on 05 December 2018). 
558 Euromedrights (Accessed on 16 August 2017). 
559 In this regard, EU delegations are, for example, in charge of the management of EEAS funding at the local level. 
560 The EEAS budget is a separate part of the EU budget, with the Parliament having a right of scrutiny over it.  
561 Euromedrights (Accessed on 25 November 2017). 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monaco, Montenegro, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Palestine and Syria. Whilst its presidency is held by the EEAS and 
one member country from the southern shore of the Mediterranean,562 based in Barcelona, its 
Secretariat is managed by the Secretary General, as well as by six Deputy Secretary Generals 
(DSGs), which are each responsible for one sector.563 It consists, amongst other things, of experts 
from its member states, as well as from the Commission, the Investment Bank and the French 
Caisse des Dépôts.564 More than 50% of the budget is provided by the EU565 and members meet 
on a regular basis at the level of Senior Officials (SOs).566 The focus is on regional initiatives, i.e. 
initiatives that involve multiple partners, whereby it is worth pointing out that decisions and 
projects are non-binding, with their implementation entirely depending on the political will of 
its members (Interview UfM, 2017). This is, amongst other things, a reason for which the UfM 
has often been described as ‘slow-moving’ (BERGASSE, 2011:1) and ‘irrelevant’ in the literature 
(ESCRIBANO, 2017:4).  
The aim of the UfM is to reinforce economic and social ties in the Mediterranean region, which is 
supposed to be achieved through policy guidance, policy dialogue and project cooperation on six 
priority areas, with energy and climate action being one of them. In this context, the UfM has 
been an active driver of the MSP whose success has, as shown, been limited though. Nonetheless, 
and despite this failure and widespread scepticism amongst scholars regarding the its ‘ability to 
manage the Mediterranean’s climate, energy and environmental resilience’ (ESCRIBANO, 2017:9), 
the organisation soon came up with a new energy initiative in line with the Energy Union 
strategy. In fact, with the latter increasingly shifting focus to the Mediterranean and its role in 
European energy security (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:34), in May 2015, 
the Council567 and the Commission initiated three regional energy cooperation platforms: on gas 
(Gas),568 electricity (REM) and renewable energy and energy efficiency (REEE).569 All the 
platforms are fully under the auspices of the UfM570 and financed through DG NEAR and DG 
ENER and investment support provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and other sponsors (Interview UfM, 2017). Whilst the first two platforms 
were already launched in June571 and October 2015,572 the third was not launched until 
November 2016 with one year of delay,573 suggesting eventual planning or implementation 
problems. The specific aim of the platforms is to develop and integrate the Euro-Mediterranean 
 
562 EEAS (Accessed on 07 January 2018). 
563 The sectors are: Business Development & Employment, Social & Civil Affairs, Higher Education & Research, Water & Environment, 
Transport & Urban Development and Energy & Climate Actions. 
564 UfM (Accessed on 01 January 2018). 
565 UfM (Accessed on 07 September 2017).  
566 The Senior Officials (SOs) are, amongst other things, in charge of approving the budget and work programme of the UfM 
Secretariat and of coordinating its work, as well as preparing the UfM Ministerial Meetings (the context in which decisions must be 
taken by consensus). UfM (Accessed on 01 January 2018). 
567 The idea of the platforms had its origins in the gas platform (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:133). 
568 Building on the European Council Conclusions of March 2014, the UfM platforms or the UfM gas platform to be more precise was 
first initiated in July 2014 on the occasion of a meeting of the Energy Ministers of the EU and the Mediterranean countries. It was 
confirmed in November 2014 in Rome, the context in which electricity and RES were equally put back on the agenda. All three 
platforms were agreed upon in March 2015 when steering committee meetings began (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 
2015:34), OME (Accessed on 04 January 2018). 
569 In fact, taking full advantage of differences in power generation, interconnected electricity markets contribute to a (more) optimal 
development of RES through higher flexibility.  
570 The renewable energy and energy efficiency (REEE) platform is co-chaired by the EU and Jordan. MEDENER (Accessed on 02 
January 2017). 
571 The first meeting of the gas platform took place in March 2016. EC (Accessed on 19 March 2017); OME (Accessed on 06 January 
2018). 
572 EC (Accessed on 19 March 2017). 
573 EC (Accessed on 19 March 2017). 
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electricity and gas markets, allowing for the exchange of electricity and the supply of gas, and to 
develop and deploy renewables and energy efficiency.574 To this end, they target the 
harmonisation of legal frameworks, the promotion of investment frameworks, the identification 
of projects, as well as the support of RES and EE.  
Apart from the energy platforms, the UfM has also been involved in negotiations on the SET 
agreement, as well as in December 2018, in the declaration on the progressive opening-up of the 
renewable electricity markets.575 Although the agreement is in content very similar to the MSP 
and thus theoretically doomed to failure, several developments over the past 8 years suggest, 
however, that this might not be the case (Interview UfM, 2017). First, there is the degree of 
power interconnectivity between the EU member states, which initially rather low, is about to 
increase in coming years due to a variety of measures and projects and better technology.576 And 
indeed, in its European Energy Security Strategy of 2014, the Commission foresees, for example, 
the extension of its 10% electricity interconnection target by 2020 to 15% by 2030 and has even 
set up a group on electricity interconnection to this end.577 Also, in 2015, the Commission, 
France, Spain and Portugal signed an MoU setting up a so-called High Level Group for South-
West Europe on interconnections, with the aim, amongst other things, of increasing the capacity 
of electricity exchanges between France and Spain to 8 GW by 2020.578 Second, between 2013 
and today, a shift in consciousness or a ‘greening’ of consciousness has taken place. Not only are 
policymakers more or better aware of the geopolitical risks that an overdependence on gas 
entails but also of the threat of climate change. This is true for both European and 
Mediterranean policymakers, with the countries of the latter being particularly hard hit by the 
impacts of climate change. Consequently, over the last 5 years, renewable energy sources and 
energy efficiency have increasingly moved up the policy agendas on both the northern and 
southern shores of the Mediterranean (with investments in the Southern Mediterranean being 
available despite instability) (Interview UfM, 2017).  
5.3.3 EIB & EBRD  
 
Apart from the institutions described in the previous Chapters, the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are equally 
decisive actors with respect to the EU’s external action, with the EIB claiming to have a 
‘multiplier effect in direct support of the European external action and development effort.’579 This 
is also true for EU energy governance towards Morocco where both banks are the most 
important financial EU actors in Morocco (and among the most important in general). They 
finance projects in support of EU policies and are involved both in budget support and co-
financing. 
Founded in 1958 and headquartered in Luxembourg, the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
which is jointly owned by all of the 28 EU member states, is the EU’s most important financing 
institution whose mission is to ‘fund viable projects that deliver the EU’s policy objectives within 
 
574 UfM (Accessed on 25 February 2019). 
575 CMI (Accessed on 25 February 2019). 
576 MedReg (Accessed on 19 December 2017). 
577 EC (Accessed on 19 March 2017). 
578 EC; EC (Accessed on 17 December 2017). 
579 EIB (Accessed on 21 November 2018). 
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Member States’ (Art. 309 TFEU).580 Supposed to ‘contribute [ ] to European integration, 
development and cohesion by financing projects in support of EU policies’,581 it borrows money on 
capital markets and lends it on favourable terms to eligible projects.582 In order to receive 
funding, projects must meet 3 requirements: a) EU policy objectives, b) technical criteria and c) 
added value (Interview EIB, 2017), whereby consistency plays a major role. In fact, projects 
must be consistent with the EU’s wider regional approach towards the corresponding region,583 
as well as with the target region’s own strategy and technical operational guidelines.584 Overall, 
the EIB is the world’s largest multilateral borrower and lender and often one of the most 
important funders of projects, both within and outside of the EU, where it is supposed to 
contribute to the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It operates 
worldwide and has a presence in 150 countries, where it works with a wide range of actors such 
as national governments, public investors, private industries and civil society.585 However, the 
bank’s working focus clearly is on Europe – indeed, in 2016, 90% of the projects financed were 
located in Europe and only 10% outside of Europe, with infrastructure development constituting 
an extremely important pillar (Interview EIB, 2017).586 In 2017, around 14.6% of the bank’s 
lending capacity was devoted to the energy sector,587 whereby the focus lay on energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, energy networks, research and innovation, as well as the transition to a low-
carbon global economy.588 The overall aim is the promotion of secure, competitive and 
sustainable energy, as well as the fight against climate change589 which, in recent years, has 
become a key priority.590  
The EIB’s green working focus also applies to the Mediterranean591 where the bank has been an 
early supporter of energy initiatives addressing regional environmental and climate issues.592 
Already in 2002, the EIB created the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and 
Partnership (FEMIP) which aiming at opening-up the Mediterranean economies, soon developed 
into the bank’s financial arm in the Mediterranean countries and contributed for example 
significantly to the financing of the MSP.593 Indeed, as noted by Tagliapietra (2016:181), ‘FEMIP 
brings together the whole range of services provided by the EIB to assist the economic development 
and the integration of SEMCs, with the aim to accompany the region along a path of sustainable 
and socially-inclusive development.’ Here, the bank also manages the FEMIP Trust Fund (FFT), 
 
580 EIB (Accessed on 11 February 2018). 
581 EC (Accessed on 26 August 2017). 
582 Lending accounts for about 90% of the bank’s total financial commitment, whereas the remaining 10% are covered by other 
services such as technical assistance (advising) or a combination with other investments from public and private partners 
(blending). 
583 Therefore, Decision No 1080/2011/EU lays out several general objectives to be followed across all regions and countries (i.e. 
social and economic infrastructure, climate change mitigation and adaptation or local private sector development). Nevertheless, and 
despite these restrictions, the Investment Bank is rather independent in the choice of the projects it wants to support, at least what 
concerns financial and technical considerations. EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017).  
584 Overall, the bank’s external action is supported by Council decision 2006/1016/EC, granting it a Community guarantee against 
losses under loans and loan guarantees outside the Community. Eurlex (Accessed on 24 August 2019). 
585 EC (Accessed on 26 August 2017). 
586 EU (Accessed on 27 August 2017). 
587 EIB (Accessed on 21 November 2018). 
588 EIB (Accessed on 03 December 2017). 
589 EIB (Accessed on 26 August 2017). 
590 Indeed, in the context of the COP21, the bank increased the proportion of its climate-related lending in developing countries from 
25% to 35%. EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017). 
591 Overall, the EIB has intensified its activities in the southern Mediterranean in recent years, reflecting EU action in the context of 
the Arab Spring (UJVARI, 2017:10). 
592 EIB (Accessed on 03 December 2017).  
593 In fact, since 2008, EIB support has also been channeled through the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), with which the bank 
signed an MoU in 2011. EC (Accessed on 22 November 2018). 
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which set up in 2004,594 serves to carry out climate actions through Climate Action in the Middle 
East and North Africa (CAMENA).595 However, the EIB has also financed energy projects related 
to fossil fuels in North Africa.596 Indeed, from 1956 until 2017, 61% of its loans (in financial 
terms) into this region went to natural gas and LNG projects, and only 7% to renewable energy 
(including hydro) initiatives.597 Under the EIB’s new guidelines, this is however expected to 
change, with evidence for this assumption being given by the fact that at the COP22 in 
Marrakesh, the bank announced plans to strengthen its support for the Green for Growth Fund 
(GGF).598 Initially initiated by the EIB and the KfW, the GGF seeks to promote renewable energy 
and energy efficiency initiatives, amongst other things, across North Africa, as well as Lebanon, 
Jordan and the Palestinian Territories.599  
As regards Morocco, where the EIB first became active in 1979 and has had its own office since 
2005,600 projects worth € 400 million per year are financed with energy-related projects 
accounting for around 20% of this sum (Interview EIB, 2017), whereby the bank mainly 
operates through co-financing601 and primarily supports projects in the fields of energy 
infrastructure, renewable energy sources and energy efficiency (see Table 5). Indeed, apart from 
the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, the EIB supports for example the Ouarzazate project and having 
contributed to its first phase, NOOR I – for which it was the lead financial institution – with a € 
100 million loan, it is also committed to contribute to the second phase NOOR II (€ 100 million) 
& III (€ 82.1 million). In this context, and overall, the EIB is bound by EU policies, a provision 
that also includes the Union’s position on the Sahara question and explains why the bank 
decided to take a rather neutral stance in the conflict and refrains from investing in projects 
located in this region.602  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
594 In 2015 and 2016, respectively 43% and 3% of the loans signed with the southern neighbourhood targeted the energy sector. EIB 
(Accessed on 03 December 2017); EIB, EIB (Accessed on 05 December 2017). 
595 EIB (Accessed on 03 December 2017).  
596 comprising Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. 
597 EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017). 
598 EIB; EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017). 
599 GGF (Accessed on 27 August 2017). 
600 EIB (Accessed on 26 August 2017). 
601 It generally accounts for one third or the costs of a project. EC (Accessed on 26 August 2017). 
602 (03 January 2014), Western Sahara dispute dims Morocco’s solar hopes, Euractiv (Accessed on 03 December 2017). 
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Table 5: Investments and loans granted to Morocco by the EIB from 1956 until 2018 
Investments and loans granted to Morocco by the EIB from 1956 until 2018
Loan amount 
(in€)
Green for Growth Fund III Signed Renewables 18/07/2018 250.000
OUARZAZATE III (TOWER) Signed Renewables 16/11/2016 32.100.000
OUARZAZATE II (PARABOLIC) Signed Renewables 22/12/2014 100.000.000
OUARZAZATE III (TOWER) Signed Renewables 22/12/2014 50.000.000
ONEE - PROJET EOLIEN Signed Renewables 30/12/2013 200.000.000
ONEE - RESEAUX ELECTRIQUES III Signed Electricity 14/12/2012 180.000.000
CENTRALE SOLAIRE DE OUARZAZATE Signed Renewables 19/11/2012 100.000.000
ONE -RESEAUX ELECTRIQUES II Signed Electricity 12/05/2008 170.000.000
ONE PROJETS HYDROELECTRIQUES II Signed Hydro 27/12/2007 150.000.000
ONE ELECTRIFICATION RURALE II Signed Electricity 14/12/2006 170.000.000
ONE PARC EOLIEN DE TANGER Signed Renewables 11/04/2004 80.000.000
ONE DEPOLLUTION CENTRALE MOHAMMEDIA Signed Electricity 11/04/2004 40.000.000
ONE INTERCONNEXIONS II Signed Electricity 16/10/2002 120.000.000
ONE CENTRALE POMPAGE AFOURER Signed Energy 16/07/2001 90.000.000
PARC EOLIEN DE TETOUAN Signed Renewables 05/11/1998 20.000.000
ONE - TRANSPORT D'ELECTRICITE Signed Electricity 23/04/1998 75.000.000
MAGHREB-SPAIN GASLINE MOR. SECTION Signed Natural gas 22/12/1995 94.048.404
MAGHREB-SPAIN GASLINE MOR. SECTION Signed Natural gas 22/12/1995 95.565.314
MAGHREB-SPAIN GASLINE MOR. SECTION Signed Natural gas 10/05/1994 161.160.354
LIAISON ELECTRIQUE MAROC-ESPAGNE Signed Electricity 21/06/1994 80.000.000
ONE - RENFORCEMENT RESEAU ELECTRIQUE Signed Electricity 15/06/1993 60.000.000
ELECTRIFICATION RURALE Signed Electricity 22/06/1989 30.000.000
COMPL. HYDRO-ELECTRIQUE AIT CHOUARIT B Signed Hydro 18/07/1984 34.000.000
Total 2.082.124.072
Name Status Field Date
 
Source: Own elaboration from EIB (Accessed on 21 November 2018). 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development or EBRD in short is a multilateral 
development bank headquartered in London whose aim is to ‘[…] develop open and sustainable 
market economies in countries committed to, and applying, democratic principles’.603 Despite 
being partly owned by the EU, the EU member states and the EIB which together account for a 
combined share of 62.8% in the bank’s total capital,604 the EBRD is contrary to the EIB, not an EU 
institution, however, it has considerable impact on EU policies (MCCORMICK, 2015:229). Set up 
in the context of the political turmoil of 1991, its initial mission was to support the transition 
processes in Central and Eastern Europe,605 by contrast, its geographical mandate was only 
extended to Southern Europe in 2011 in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.606 Its main activity 
being financial investment, comprising loans, equity investment and guarantees,607 the bank also 
offers advisory services  such as capacity building and technical assistanc and also engages in 
policy dialogue,608 an area in which it strongly relies on the EU though.609 Generally, it funds up 
to 35% of the total cost for a greenfield project,610 which means that project investments are 
usually carried out in cooperation with commercial partners, a context in which it principally 
 
603 EBRD (Accessed on 13 February 2018).  
604 The EU and the EIB each hold a 3.05% share. Overall, 66 countries have a share in the EBRD. The biggest single shareholder is the 
US. EC (Accessed on 06 December 2017); EBRD (Accessed on 11 February 2018). 
605 where, as of today, it is the single largest investor EBRD (Accessed on 07 December 2017); (MCCORMICK, 2015:229). 
606 EBRD (Accessed on 06 December 2017). 
607 EIB (Accessed on 05 December 2017).  
608 EBRD (Accessed on 05 December 2017). 
609 EBRD (Accessed on 05 December 2017). 
610 EIB (Accessed on 05 December 2017).  
- 103 - 
 
serves as leverage for the mobilisation of foreign capital, with investments primarily going into 
the private sector (BRONSTONE, 1999:28; MCCORMICK, 2015:229).611 Its working focus is 
multi-sectoral, with its project portfolio spanning a wide range of different topics, from 
agribusiness to transport,612 whereby there is a strong focus613 on the energy sector614 which 
accounted for 23% of the bank’s total financing in 2016.615 Whilst the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean accounted for 13% of the sum,616 Morocco made up for around 26% of this 
share.617  
A country of operations since 2012, Morocco is a crucial partner to the EBRD in the Euro-
Mediterranean basin618 and home to three of the bank’s permanent offices. Whilst the first office 
was opened in Casablanca in 2015, the second one was opened in September 2017 in Tangier619 
and the third one in December 2019 in Agadir,620 reflecting the bank’s attempts to increase its 
outreach in the country. All in all, the EBRD has invested in more than 44 projects in Morocco at 
a cost of more than € 1.6 billion since 2012,621 whereby around 12% (or 148 million) of this sum 
went to Morocco’s power and energy sectors, with a clear focus on sustainable energy622 as 
Table 6 shows. In fact, one priority in Morocco is to support the country’s efforts to reform its 
energy sector and its sustainable energy strategy, a context in which the bank notably seeks to 
contribute to the development of the regulatory and institutional frameworks of the Moroccan 
and energy and electricity markets and notably engages with ONE.623 As regards funding of 
related projects, an important financing mechanism is the Morocco Sustainable Energy 
Financing Facility (MorSEFF) which, developed by the EBRD and co-financed by the EIB, the AFD 
and the KfW, is a credit line of € 110 million dedicated to Moroccan private companies active in 
the fields of energy efficiency and small-scale renewable energy investments. Funding is 
available in different forms, including grants and leasing, whereby the facility provides an 
investment subsidy of 10%, as well as technical assistance.624 So far, MorSEFF has allowed for 
the financing of renewables projects worth around € 3 million.625 
 
 
 
 
 
611 EC (Accessed on 06 December 2017). 
612 EBRD (Accessed on 13 February 2018). 
613 Further, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is currently in the process of developing a new energy 
sector strategy. See Energy Strategy 2013 and Sustainable Energy Initiative; EBRD (Accessed on 22 November 2018). 
614 In total, since its creation in the 1990s, the latter has financed 265 projects or the equivalent of around € 11 million related to 
energy. EIB (Accessed on 05 December 2017).  
615 EC (Accessed on 06 December 2017). 
616 EBRD (Accessed on 05 December 2017).  
617 as of 2015. 
618 Morocco was for example one of the few North African founding members (together with Egypt and Tunisia). EBRD (Accessed on 
08 December 2019). 
619 given the promising economic potential of the the Tangier-Tétouan-Al Hoceima region (notably because of the port of Tangier). 
EBRD (Accessed on 17 February 2018). 
620 EBRD (Accessed on 08 December 2019). 
621 EBRD (Accessed on 17 February 2018). 
622 EBRD (Accessed on 15 February 2018). 
623 EBRD (Accessed on 08 December 2019). 
624 Moroccan partner banks are BMCE Bank and Banque Populaire. MORSEFF (Accessed on 17 December 2018). 
625 MORSEFF (Accessed on 17 February 2018). 
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Table 6: Investments and loans granted to Morocco by the EBRD from 2012 until 2016 
Loan Amount 
(in €)
KHALLADI WIND FARM Signed Renewables 15/09/2015 52.557.671
ONEE Hydro Rehabilitation Signed Hydro 29/07/2015 35.000.000
ONE - RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AND SMART METERING Signed Electricity 05/09/2012 60.000.000
Total 147 557 671
Investments and loans granted to Morocco by the EBRD from 2012 until 2016
Name Status Field Date
 
Source: Own elaboration from EBRD. 
5.3.4 Regional regulators and associations: MedReg, Med-TSO, OME, 
MEDENER & RES4MED 
 
Regional energy cooperation is, on the regulatory and technical levels, reinforced by the 
Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MedReg), the Mediterranean Transmission System Operators 
(Med-TSO), the Mediterranean Energy Observatory (OME), the Mediterranean Association of the 
National Agencies for Energy Conservation (MEDENER) and Renewable Energy Solutions for the 
Mediterranean (RES4MED). On the industrial level, it used to be, as shown before, backed by 
initiatives like Desertec and Medgrid.626  
Whilst the overriding aim of these organisations is similar, namely the integration of Euro-
Mediterranean energy markets, each operator nonetheless pursues its own individual targets 
according to its strategic focus (see Table 7).  
Table 7: Overview of regional energy initiatives in the Mediterranean 
Association Focus Vision/Mission Objectives
MedReg Sustainable energy (energy 
efficiency)
 'Provide a level playing field for all 
Mediterranean energy actors '              
a) 'promote a greater compatibility of the energy markets 
and legislations and seek progressive market integration in 
the Euro-Mediterranean region ' and                                          
b) 'foster sustainable development in the energy sector 
through greater efficiency and integration of energy 
markets based on secure, safe, cost-effective and 
environmentally sustainable energy systems '
Med-TSO Electricity ‘Being the reference professional and 
strategic body for every technical, market 
and policy issues related to the 
Mediterranean electricity systems: a 
competent, prepositive and proactive guide 
to which European and Mediterranean 
institutions and stakeholders could refer ’
 'Support all the technical and institutional initiatives 
aiming at the development of an integrated, secure and 
sustainable regional electricity transmission grid, in order 
to facilitate the creation of a Mediterranean energy 
market '
MEDENER Energy conservation & 
sustainable energy 
(renewable energy sources 
& energy efficiency)
‘Create an interface with public and private 
actors in the Mediterranean region ’ in 
order to ‘establish synergies in the national 
discussions between institutional and 
private actors ’ 'to facilitate the 
implementation of energy and sustainable 
urban development projects ’
a) 'ensure project quality by developing common 
standards, labels, tool and methods ' and
b) 'organise skill-building for MEDENER members and 
partners with a view to streamlining investments ' and                   
c) 'support the implementation of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy projects using MEDENER's collective 
expertise to identify and qualify these projects '
RES4MED Renewable energy sources ‘Function as a bridge between members and 
partners of emerging markets for an 
exchange of perspectives and expertise ’ 
 'Promote the deployment of large-scale and decentralized 
renewable energy (RE) and energy eciency (EE) solutions 
in Southern-Mediterranean markets to meet local energy 
needs for growth '
Regional energy initiatives in the Mediterranean
 
Source: Own elaboration based on MedReg, Med-TSO, MEDENER and RES4MED (Accessed on 08 February 2018). 
 
626 Here, Algeria and Libya participate (contrary to the Association Agreements (AAs)). 
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There is consensus that MedReg and Med-TSO are the most relevant players as regards the 
enhancement of regional energy cooperation, given that one way of achieving energy 
cooperation is via market reform which, in turn, calls for the harmonisation of rules and the 
establishment of regulators.627 Moreover, they, like the regulators and non-profit organisations 
in general, are well respected as they are ‘widely seen as above private interests’ and ‘as not 
involved in current political conflicts’.628 Respectively established in 2007 (in Paris, but under 
Italian law) and 2012 (in Rome),629 MedReg and Med-TSO are non-profit bottom-up 
organisations that act as platforms for the voluntary exchange of knowledge and are not 
entrusted with any powers to issue legally binding decisions. By contrast, they can only give 
policy orientations for best practices and whilst their fundamental characteristics are quite 
similar, they do however address different issues and provide analysis on different topics.  
Having been started in 2006 as a voluntary working group, the Mediterranean Energy 
Regulators (MedReg) transformed into a permanent organisation in 2007 and, as of today, is 
regularly cited as the most successful example of regional energy cooperation (SARTORI, 
2014:6), the context in which it was granted an observer status in the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Mediterranean (PAM) in 2008.630 Based in Milan, MedReg consists of 25 Mediterranean 
energy regulators (9 of which are located in the MENA region) aiming at promoting ‘a 
transparent, stable and harmonized legal and regulatory framework in the Mediterranean 
region.’631 Its major challenges are the productivity of the energy and electricity sectors as well 
as a lack of energy efficiency.632 In order to meet this challenge, MedReg seeks to attract 
investment, whereby it faces great hurdles, ranging from the elimination of energy subsidies to 
the protection of low-income population groups. In order to respond to these challenges, it seeks 
to foster sustainable development through environmentally sustainable energy systems and 
greater energy efficiency.633 To this end, it has set up specific working groups (WGs), with one 
WG focusing on electricity (ELE WG), one on gas (GAS WG) and one on the environment, RES and 
EE (RES WG).634  
In order to realise its objectives sustainably, MedReg strongly advocates the establishment of 
independent national regulatory agencies for energy systems and energy market competition in 
each of its member countries, whereby it uses a bottom-up approach, i.e. it is generally the 
‘target countries’ themselves who take the initiative and contact the organisation for expertise 
and support. This also applies to Morocco which is an official member but does not yet have an 
official energy regulator (Interview MedReg, 2017),635 a role that is currently assumed by the 
MEM.636 Aware that this cannot be a long-term solution though and recognising that the lack of a 
veritable regulator has been considerably limiting the attractiveness of the Moroccan energy 
market to private investors (BIANCHI, COLANTONI, MASCOLO and SARTORI, 2018:22), the 
Moroccan government has on various occasions expressed its interest in establishing a 
 
627 EP (Accessed on 22 November 2018). 
628 EP (Accessed on 24 November 2018). 
629 Both MedReg and Med-TSO were strongly promoted by the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy (AEEGSI). 
630 MedReg (Accessed on 30 December 2017). 
631 MedReg (Accessed on 19 December 2017)  
632 MedReg (Accessed on 10 February 2018). 
633 IEA (Accessed on 20 December 2017). 
634 MedReg (Accessed on 30 December 2017). 
635 Morocco and Tunisia are the only North African members of MedReg without a regular regulator (Interview MedReg, 2017). 
636 MedReg (Accessed on 19 December 2017). 
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regulator.637 In this context, MedReg has sought to promote an exchange of know-how with 
MEM, where it has started to provide specialised training and capacity-building activities on all 
the aspects of energy regulation and market integration,638 often in cooperation with the GIZ. It 
does not maintain any official contacts with either MASEN or the ONEE (Interview MedReg, 
2017).  
Headquartered in Rome, the Mediterranean Transmission System Operators (Med-TSO) was 
founded in 2012 and is a ‘technical platform for facilitating the integration of the Mediterranean’ 
composed of 20 Mediterranean Transmission System Operators (TSOs) for electricity from 18 
Mediterranean countries. Inspired by the work of the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E),639 Med-TSO’s overall mission is to develop an 
‘integrated, secure and sustainable electricity transmission grid, in order to facilitate the creation 
of a Mediterranean energy market.’640 The member operator from Morocco is ONEE. In order to 
achieve its aim, Med-TSO seeks to establish a multilateral platform for energy cooperation in the 
Mediterranean and the set-up of a harmonised energy framework in order to attract investment. 
Subsidiary objectives in this context are regional security and socio-economic developments 
such as the reduction of CO2 emissions in the Mediterranean region. As this implies, renewable 
energy sources are not an objective per se, but rather seen as input or a starting point for grid 
stability (Interview Med-TSO, 2017). Med-TSO sees itself as a technical platform that ‘uses 
multilateral cooperation as a strategy of regional development’641 and as such, it promotes 
regional projects that aim at ‘increasing security and quality of power supply’ and at ‘facilitating 
the integration of new energy sources’.642 An example here is the so-called Mediterranean Project 
which seeks to achieve ‘progressive harmonization and strengthening of the electricity markets in 
the Mediterranean region’643 and for which the organisation received three-year financing from 
the EU.644 Prior to this, in 2013, Med-TSO was also entrusted with the realisation of the Master 
Plan for the Mediterranean Electricity Interconnections in the context of the MSP. Its main 
responsibility was the collection and analysis of the National Development Plans (NDPs) of the 
power systems of the Mediterranean countries.645 By contrast, Med-TSO was never part of the 
Desertec project (Interview Med-TSO, 2017). 
Launched in 1988, the Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie or Mediterranean Energy 
Observatory (OME) is a nonprofit association based in Paris whose aim is the promotion of 
energy cooperation in the Mediterranean region. Associated partners are the Mediterranean 
agencies for energy efficiency (in the case of Morocco, AMEE) and RES4MED646 and the 
association’s network of business and policy partners spreads over a total of sixteen countries, 
whereby it acts both as a platform for exchange and as a provider of energy data and 
information or think tank. Here, and contrary to MedReg and Med-TSO, OME strongly focuses on 
private sector cooperation and has a particular close link with the industry,647 a context in which 
 
637 MedReg (Accessed on 21 December 2017). 
638 MedReg (Accessed on 19 December 2017). 
639 whereby it must be noted here that Med-TSO does not aspire to replicate the ENTSO-E experience in the Mediterranean, given the 
vast diversity of its member countries (Interview Med-TSO,2017). 
640 Med-TSO.  
641 Med-TSO (Accessed on 04 February 2018). 
642 Med-TSO (Accessed on 30 December 2017). 
643 Med-TSO (Accessed on 30 December 2017). 
644 MedTSO (Accessed on 30 December 2017). 
645 Med-TSO (Accessed on 31 December 2017). 
646 OME (Accessed on 04 January 2017).  
647 OME (Accessed on 06 January 2017). 
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it counts amongst its members energy majors like EDF, Enel, Edison, Engie, Eni, Shell and Total, 
etc. The association does not specialise on one energy topic but covers a wide range of different 
energy issues (ranging from LNG to sustainable energy in the context of climate change),648 
regularly carrying out studies and organising conferences, workshops and trainings.649 At the 
international level, it participates in UN and EU projects and works closely with the UfM. Indeed, 
apart from regularly participating in the UfM’s Ministerial Meetings,650 it is strongly involved in 
the organisation’s three energy platforms. For example, whilst running the Secretariat of the gas 
platform, it is also a stakeholder in the REM and REEE platforms via specialised task forces. For 
example, it organised the initial meetings of the first two UfM Gas Platform Working Groups, 
whose aim is to carry out two studies on different gas issues in the Mediterranean.651 OME is 
made up of four committees on a) Energy Transition, Sustainability & Climate Change, b) 
Hydrocarbons & Energy Security, c) Investment Needs & Financing of Infrastructure and d) 
Strategy & International Cooperation Committee through which it is connected with Moroccan 
ONEE, which acts as its Chair. Apart from ONEE, OME also cooperates with MEM with which it 
signed an MoU in the context of the COP22 in Marrakech.652 The focus hereby lies on energy 
statistics, perspectives, studies and the exchange of energy relevant information.653 
Collaboration also exists with IRESEN.654 
The Mediterranean Association of the National Agencies for Energy Conservation 
(MEDENER) was established in 1997 in Tunis as an international non-profit organisation 
bringing together 14 Mediterranean agencies in the field of renewable energy sources and 
energy efficiency655 with their overall aspiration being the achievement of an energy transition 
through the promotion of sustainable energy projects. The member agency of Morocco is AMEE, 
whereby it is to be highlighted that MEDENER uses a bottom-up approach, meaning that it is 
AMEE who contacts MEDENER in case it needs support. To realise its objectives, MEDENER 
seeks to assist the Mediterranean countries in the development and implementation of their 
energy management policies by sharing and transfering experiences, know-how, best practices 
and technologies through training, partnerships and conferences. An important conference to be 
mentioned here is the organisation’s annual International Conference on Energy Transition, 
which it hosted for the fifth time in November 2017 and in which apart from its member 
agencies, representatives from the Commission, the UfM and the Regional Centre for Renewable 
Energy and Energy Efficiency (RCREEE) participated.656 As part of its mission, MEDENER has 
also created an observatory for energy efficiency in order to monitor the development of 
corresponding policies and to identify related opportunities.657 Moreover, MEDENER 
participates in concrete landmark projects initiated by the EU such as the MSP or, as shown 
before, the UfM energy platforms, as well as in smaller joint projects. In fact, as pointed out by 
 
648 OME (Accessed on 06 January 2018). 
649 OME (Accessed on 04 January 2017). 
650 OME; OME (Accessed on 06 January 2018). 
651 Further, and in cooperation with the Mediterranean Association of the National Agencies for Energy Conservation (MEDENER) in 
the context of the renewable energy and energy efficiency platform, it developed an energy transition scenario for the Mediterranean 
by 2040. Its objective hereby is the achievement of a 30% reduction in energy demand, a 27% share of renewable energy in the 
energy mix and a 38% reduction of CO2 emissions. OME (Accessed on 06 January 2018). 
652 Within the framework of OME, the MEM organised several side events in cooperation with ONEE, the French Environment and 
Energy Management Agency (ADEME) and MEDENER. OME (Accessed on 06 January 2018). 
653 OME (Accessed on 06 January 2018). 
654 OME (Accessed on 06 January 2018). 
655 Registered in Madrid, its presidency is held by its member agencies on a rotating basis. MEDENER (Accessed on 08 December 
2019). 
656 MEDENER (Accessed on 02 January 2017). 
657 MEDENER (Accessed on 02 January 2018). 
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Bergasse (2011:10), the MSP project actually followed the recommendations of MEDENER, 
which in this context, closely worked with OME, the RCREEE and the Mediterranean Renewable 
Energy Centre (MEDREC).  
Launched in 2012, Renewable Energy Solutions for the Mediterranean (RES4MED) is a 
Rome-based non-profit association, bringing together 18 agencies, industries, research institutes 
and academia from both the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Its mission is 
to promote the deployment of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency in the 
Mediterranean region with the aim of meeting local needs.658 To achieve this, its focus is on 
exchange and knowledge transfer, a context in which the association seeks to act as a platform 
for dialogue & strategic partnerships, to provide technical support & market intelligence and to 
lead capacity building, training and innovation efforts.659 In this context, it regularly organises 
exhibitions, seminars, workshops and advanced training courses, dedicated to improving 
cooperation between the different stakeholders in the Mediterranean energy landscape and to 
creating synergies. Further, it regularly publishes reports and carries out studies aimed at 
improving the understanding of the business situation in the region, such as the ’Survey on the 
main barriers affecting investments in RE capacity in the Mediterranean’.660 As far as Morocco is 
concerned, RES4MED counts amongst its permanent partners ONEE, SIE and IRESEN with which 
cooperation was only formalised in July 2017 through the signature of an MoU on collaboration 
in the field of research and innovation. Further, the organisation has contacts with MEM, MASEN 
and AMEE, as well with the private player NAREVA.661  
 
658 Its geographic scope was extended towards sub-Saharan Africa in 2015. RES4MED (Accessed on 06 January 2018). 
659 RES4MED (Accessed on 07 January 2018). 
660 Topics of cooperation is the transition towards clean or sustainable energy in the Mediterranean and Africa as a whole. RES4MED 
(Accessed on 10 January 2017).  
661 RES4MED (Accessed on 10 January 2017). 
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Part Six – Assessing consistency in EU energy governance 
towards Morocco 
The purpose of this dissertation is the examination of consistency in the EU’s energy 
governance towards Morocco. Given that consistency is difficult to measure, this study hereby 
aims at finding out if, how and with which result the EU and the member states coordinate their 
energy policies towards Morocco. Relying on a social network analysis (SNA), this Chapter thus 
deals with the ‘if, how and with which result’ aspects and investigates the coordination patterns 
and mechanisms on the horizontal, vertical and diagonal dimensions.  
6.1 Horizontal dimension 
 
The following Chapter seeks to examine coordination (and thus consistency) in the 
horizontal (intra-institutional, inter-institutional and intergovernmental) dimension, whereby it 
distinguishes between the EU multilevel system and the third-country level as well as between 
strategic/political and functional aspects.  
6.1.1 EU multilevel system 
 
As was demonstrated in Part 5, there are a number of European institutions and bodies 
involved in EU energy governance towards Morocco, whereas in the following, and with regard 
to the EU multilevel system, the focus is on the European Council, the Council, the Parliament, 
the Commission, the External Action Service and the Investment Bank.  
As laid out in Part 3, intra-institutional consistency/coordination is concerned with 
consistency between one policy area or various policy areas within a political level or institution, 
whereby as regards the EU, the Commission is often cited as a risk for or source of inconsistent 
behaviour in the literature, basically because inconsistencies may occur both between the 
Directorate Generals (DGs) and between the DGs and the commissioners (MARANGONI, 
2014:42). For this reason, and in the spirit of collective responsibility of the Commission, several 
mechanisms have been put in place to avoid frictions, with ‘inter-service consultation’ being key, 
meaning that all directorates concerned by a proposal must be consulted ex ante and their 
positions must be taken into account (MARANGONI, 2014:53). In this regard, and as for the 
Directorate General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), the 
latter is required to work closely with the line DGs in charge of thematic priorities, i.e. including 
the Directorate General Energy (DG ENER). Interviews with DG NEAR in Morocco confirmed this 
and attest to an extensive level of inter-service coordination (and thus high consistency) 
between the two directorates with both actors pursuing a unified strategy. In fact, they do not 
act independently from one another but regularly share and exchange information, consult one 
another and even establish common priorities (see Figure 18).  
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Figure 18: Intra-institutional coordination in the EU multilevel system 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
As presented in Part 3, inter-institutional consistency/coordination is concerned with the 
consistency between different political levels or institutions. Here, the European Council is one 
of the most important institutions when it comes to establishing external consistency 
(GEBHARD, 2017:109), the context in which it seeks to maximise the EU’s impact ‘by improving 
coordination and coherence between the main fields of EU external action, such as trade, energy, 
justice and home affairs, development and economic policies […]’ (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 26/27 
June 2014 Conclusions). Next, the Commission is equally responsible for ensuring consistency in 
external areas outside of the CFSP, whereby it is thought to be assisted by the HR and the EEAS 
who play a key role in ensuring external consistency and has become the ‘principal channel for 
Commission participation in EU external relations’ with the Treaty of Lisbon (DAGAND, 
2008:6).662 Contrary to the abovementioned actors, the Parliament does not play a direct role in 
ensuring consistency, but an indirect one. This is reflected in the fact that it must give consent on 
legally binding agreements or in its monitoring powers such as budgetary control. In this light, 
so Van Vooren and Wessel (2014:461), its role may be ‘crucial in ensuring coherence between EU 
energy interests and values.’ For example, ‘to leverage in negotiations with energy producing and 
consuming countries’, it insisted on the need to ‘Speak with one Voice’ and even advocated that 
the Commission should be in charge of this (NATORSKI and HERRANZ SURRALLES, 2008:79). 
Moreover, since its set-up, the Parliament has equally been a strong supporter of the EEAS, a 
context in which it has also tried to create synergies between the EU delegations and the EU 
member states’ diplomatic services, ‘both in terms of practical arrangements (sharing quarters) 
and in terms of sharing information to avoid duplication’.663  
As just mentioned, the Commission plays a vital role in guaranteeing consistency between the 
internal and external dimensions of energy policy, as well as between energy and other policies 
(Art. 280I Treaty of Lisbon). Here, it is widely acknowledged in the literature that coordination 
 
662 Apart from the Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) also participates in 
the work of the European Council (albeit without being a member) and provides support to the Council as will be detailed later. In 
fact, it is the European Council with the agreement of the President of the Commission and the approval of the Parliament, which 
appoints and discharges the HR.. In turn, the EEAS is appointed by the Council which must act on a proposal of the HR after 
consulting the Parliament and after obtaining the Commission’s consent (Art. 27 TEU). 
663 EP (Accessed on 05 December 2018). 
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between the Commission and the European Council with regard to energy is extensive (and 
consistency high) (see Figure 19) and that the cabinet of the Commissioner and the cabinet of 
the European Council President maintain ‘close relations’, with ‘concerted action’ having led to 
‘unprecedented progress in the field’ from 2005 onwards (THALER, 2016:16). This overall close 
energy relationship is also reflected in the frequent exchanges taking place between the 
Secretaries General of both institutions as well as between DG ENER and the Secretariat of the 
European Council (THALER, 2016:16). As for the coordination between the Commission and the 
External Action Service, there is equally consensus in the literature that it is extensive (and 
consistency high) (BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 
2017:127), notably because the Action Service’s main responsibility is, as shown before, to 
coordinate the Commission’s work on external relations and to ensure consistency (see Figure 
19). Indeed, as stated in Article 3 of the Council decision establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service, the EEAS shall cooperate with the services 
of the Commission and consult them ‘on all matters relating to the external action of the Union in 
the exercise of their respective functions, except on matters covered by the CSDP’664 (HELWIG, 
IVAN and KOSTANYAN, 2013:46). This includes, amongst other things participation in the 
Commission’s preparatory work and procedures and it is worth repeating that overall, the EEAS 
heavily relies on the technical expertise of the DGs. In general, so the literature, the coordination 
with the DGs functions well, but ‘could be improved’ (BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, 
SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:4-5, 134). To support this claim, Blockmans, Kostanyan, 
Remizov, Slapakova and Van der Loo (2017:127) cite the March 2011 Communication of the 
ENP. In fact, whilst the communication aimed at inviting the southern ENP member countries to 
join the Energy Community Treaty, this policy objective was not supported by DG ENER.665 
However, and as regards Morocco, there is no friction whatsoever and most coordination takes 
place between the EEAS and DG NEAR which serves as the first point of contact for the EEAS 
(Interview EEAS, 2017).666 One important tool to ensure unity is the ENP as it allows for the 
EEAS to regularly assist in the NIP negotiations and meetings in which it is encouraged to 
actively participate (Interview EEAS, 2017). Apart from DG NEAR, the EEAS also cooperates with 
DG ENER and the Directorate General Climate (DG CLIMA), depending on the field. For example, 
in the case of the organisation and preparation of the COP22, DG CLIMA clearly was the most 
important contact. Apart from the Commission, the EEAS is, according to the beforementioned 
Article 3 also supposed to work in cooperation with or to extend cooperation to the Parliament 
to which it is highly accountable, notably in terms of information-sharing and reporting 
(HELWIG, IVAN and KOSTANYAN, 2013:50; VAN VOOREN and WESSEL, 2014:23).667 For 
example, the Heads of EU delegations are required to speak in front of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (AFET) before taking up their posts in a third country to inform and exchange 
information about policy priorities to be conducted in this particular country.668 Moreover, they, 
as well as the desk officers, regularly participate in meetings of the parliamentary delegation to 
 
664 EEAS (Accessed on 30 October 2019).  
665 In fact, whilst discrepancies between the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Directorate General Energy (DG ENER) 
may arise, DG ENER is likely ‘to emerge as the winner’ from this, as it can usually count on the support of the Council’s Working Party 
on Energy (HELWIG, IVAN and KOSTANYAN, 2013:47). 
666 Cooperation with the Directorate General Energy (DG ENER) is overall less pronounced, notably when compared with the 
Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR). EC (Accessed on 05 November 2011); EC 
(Accessed on 10 December 2017). 
667 EEAS (Accessed on 30 October 2019).  
668 EP (Accessed on 14 August 2017). 
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the third states669 (HELWIG, IVAN and KOSTANYAN, 2013:56) (see Figure 19). Finally, and 
recognising the important role the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) plays when it comes to 
bringing together important actors around one table and attracting investors and coordinating 
investments (Interview EEAS, 2017), the EEAS also coordinates internally with the organisation 
(Interview EEAS, 2017) (see Figure 19).  
Inter-institutional coordination is equally extensive (and consistency high) between the EU 
institutions and the European Investment Bank, which, jointly owned by the EU institutions and 
the EU member states, serves as the EU’s financing arm and therefore falls under the category of 
inter-institutional cooperation (see Figure 19). As claimed by Tagliapietra (2016:200), the EIB 
has a role of utmost importance in the Mediterranean, as it is the only institution capable of 
delivering financing mechanisms able to attract or leverage new investments (thanks to its 
financing capacity & reputation) – a role that cannot be assumed by any of the other 
stakeholders in the region. In terms of consistency between the EU institutions and the EIB, the 
latter is, in line with Article 19 (§ 2) of its statute, obliged to request the former’s opinion on all 
financing operations outside the EU.670 However, the EIB’s organisation structure forms the 
actual institutional basis for the permanent exchange of information. In fact, the bank has four 
statuary bodies, 1) the Board of Governors, 2) the Board of Directors, 3) the Management 
Committee and 4) the Audit Committee,671 with management responsibilities lying within 1) - 3). 
The Board of Governors consists of 28 Ministers (usually Finance Ministers) of the member 
states and is in charge of defining general lending policies and deciding on the bank’s external 
activities (including outside the EU).672 By contrast, the Board of Directors673 is composed of 29 
Directors – 28 from each member state and one from the Commission – as well as of 19 
Alternate Directors and meets around 10 times a year. It is, amongst other things, responsible 
for authorising the granting of loans.674 Decisions are generally675 taken by one third of its 
members, representing at least 50% of the subscribed capital.676 As this shows, the composition 
of the EIB’s governance system allows for a certain degree of consistency between EU policies 
and EIB projects thanks to the participation of the Commission and the member states. 
Nonetheless, this cooperation framework is complemented by various bilateral agreements to 
ensure alignment and compatibility. For example, in order to facilitate coordination between the 
Commission and the EIB and improve consistency between the EU’s external policy objectives, 
the Commission and the EIB signed an MoU on the strengthening of coordination of EU external 
lending policies on May 26, 2008 (see Table 8). Measures under the MoU have for example 
included the reinforcement of dialogue and planning between the two institutions,677 with the 
Commission having been assigned a ‘key role’ here.678 In this regard, Article 6 (§ 1) of Decision 
No 466/2014/EU requires for the EIB to be in a regular exchange of information with both the 
Commission and the EEAS on strategic documents or other policy and operational aspects. Here, 
it is interesting to note that apart from referring to consistency, and contrary to what is 
 
669 The Parliament maintains one Delegation for Relations with Maghreb countries (DMAG) which is comprised three Joint 
Parliamentary Committees of which one deals with Morocco. EP (Accessed on 08 November 2019).  
670 EIB (Accessed on 07 December 2017).  
671 EIB (Accessed on 11 February 2018). 
672 EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017). 
673 The Board has under its supervision the Management Committee, the bank’s executive so to speak, with 9 members. EIB 
(Accessed on 27 August 2017). 
674 EC (Accessed on 26 August 2017). 
675 Exceptions exist in certain policy areas.  
676 EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017). 
677 EC (Accessed on 06 December 2017). 
678 EIB (Accessed on 07 December 2017).  
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generally the case in EU documents, Article 6 contains a clear reference to coherence (‘[…] with a 
view to maximize synergies between EIB financing operations and Union budgetary resources 
[…]’). This, in turn, implies a high level of coordination, reaching a least the establishment of 
common parameters on the Metcalfe scale. Apart from the Commission and the EEAS, the EIB 
also closely cooperates with the UfM which is, amongst other things, reflected in the fact that the 
bank is represented in the UfM Secretariat.679 Further, in January 2011, the EIB and the UfM 
signed an MoU on cooperation in the fields of economic, social and sustainable development 
with the aim of implementating a global and regional development strategy. As part of the MoU, 
both partners agreed to cooperate in the exchange of information in order to ‘avoid any possible 
overlapping and trying to complement the other party’s views in order to increase the value added 
of the final outcome’.680 Another provision is network-building, where the EIB is asked to 
establish contacts between the UfM and the industry (other banks, chambers of commerce, think 
tanks, NGOs etc.). In return, the intention was for the EIB to play a role in the UfM energy 
platforms which, however, has not materialised so far.681 The MoU was renewed in 2014.682 
Table 8: Coordination between the EIB and other European institutions 
Coordination between the EIB and other (European) institutions
Date Agreement
02/05/2016 MoU with the EBRD
05/11/2014 Decision No 466/2014/EU of the EP and the Council
08/04/2014 Renewal of MoU with the UfM
17/01/2011 MoU with the UfM
03/01/2011 MoU with the EC, the European Investment Fund and the EBRD
26/5/2008 MoU with the EC, based on Council Decision 2006/1016/EC
13/7/2009 Decision 633/2009/EC of the EP and the Council 
19/12/2006 Council Decision 2006/1016/EC 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
679 EIB; UfM (Accessed on 01 January 2018). 
680 EC (Accessed on 22 November 2018). 
681 EIB (Accessed on 01 January 2018).  
682 UfM (Accessed on 22 November 2018). 
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Figure 19: Inter-institutional coordination in the EU multilevel system 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
Concerned with consistency between two or more governments, intergovernmental 
consistency/coordination is, as shown before, not only considered a critical issue in the 
literature – prime examples of a lack of consistency here are disagreement amongst the member 
states as regards a common energy approach towards Russia or as regards the Mediterranean 
Solar Plan (MSP) – but also in empirical research. Indeed, the latter attests to limited 
coordination (and thus medium consistency) between the member states when it comes to EU 
energy governance towards Morocco (see Figure 21). The main institution in charge of interstate 
coordination or political coordination amongst the member states is the Council (GEBHARD, 
2017:109). Indeed, whilst overall, both the Commission and the Council are in charge of 
ensuring consistency between the EU and the member states, much or most of the interstate 
coordination happens within the Council (DUKE, 2006:27), with Article 32 TEU consolidated 
foreseeing, for example, for the member states to ‘consult one another within the European 
Council and the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to 
determine a common approach’ and to ‘show mutual solidarity’. Whilst its Presidency, as well as 
its COREPER are the main institutions in this context (TRAUNER, 2011:22-24), the body in 
charge of ensuring continuity between the Councils is the General Affairs Council (Art. 9C Treaty 
of Lisbon)683 which holds a number of administrative and budgetary competencies involving the 
CFSP. As regards Morocco, the most important Council though is the FAC’s ‘Maghreb/Mashreq’ 
(MaMa) Working Party which de facto contributes to setting the Council's agenda towards the 
Maghreb country (SCHUBERT, POLLAK and KREUTLER, 2016:133-134; Interview EEAS, 2017). 
The FAC and the MaMa do not interact with each other directly but via the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), a body that is composed of the ambassadors of member states to the EU and is 
chaired by the EEAS.684 One of the aims of the PSC685 is to coordinate common European foreign 
policy matters and to prepare the FAC (in fact, it is the main preparatory body for the Council 
and formally reports to COREPER II). It is divided into several sub-categories, one of which is 
responsible for the Maghreb and the Mashreq regions – the MaMa group which, as an entity 
specialised on the North African region, serves as a useful provider of political expertise with 
 
683 Europa (Accessed on 08 November 2018). 
684 In fact, the national diplomatic services being represented by ambassadors based at their respective country’s Permanent 
Representation in Brussels, one ambassador is generally assigned to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). 
685 The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is, amongst other things, also responsible for monitoring the international situation. 
Europa (Accessed on 09 November 2018). 
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respect to common foreign and security policies (see Figure 20). For example, based on 
proposals made by the EEAS, it is entitled to agree on priorities (or Action Plans) within the ENP 
and also to examine legislative proposals made by the EC. Meetings are held on a regular basis 
twice a week686 and by providing a platform for a regular dialogue between the member states 
on main political and economic developments, they allow for political exchange and 
coordination. As mentioned before, energy topics are usually also discussed within the 
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council (TTE) and the Working Party on Energy, 
however, as regards energy policies towards Morocco, these bodies play a subordinate role. 
Figure 20: Foreign energy policy relevant bodies within the Council 
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Source: Own elaboration based on information from Euromedrights (Accessed on 07 August 2017) and Hill, Smith and 
Vanhoonacker (2017:112). 
Figure 21: Intergovernmental coordination in the EU multilevel system 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
6.1.2 Third-country level 
 
As regards the horizontal dimension on the third-country level, the focus is on the 
Commission or DG NEAR, the External Action Service or the EU delegation, the Investment Bank, 
the UfM as well as the member states embassies (which represent the state in 
intergovernmental relations). 
 
686 Euromedrights (Accessed on 07 August 2017). 
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The EU delegation being responsible for representing the External Action Service at the local 
level, intra-institutional consistency/coordination on the third-country level is concerned 
with consistency between these two bodies. Here, interviewees at the delegation in Morocco 
attest an extensive level of coordination (and thus high consistency), with both actors pursuing a 
unified strategy (see Figure 22).  
Figure 22: Intra-institutional coordination on the third-country level 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
As for inter-institutional consistency/coordination on the third-country level, DG NEAR 
plays, as mentioned before, a key role in the coordination of EU energy policies towards 
Morocco. In fact, together with the EEAS, it plays a strong coordinating role when it comes to EU 
financial and technical assistance to the neighbourhood and enlargement countries and has a 
key position in designing and implementing financial and technical assistance activities (its main 
instruments hereby are the ENI and the NIP).687 In this context, it has been identified as the 
leading and most visible DG when it comes to the energy dialogue between both European and 
Moroccan stakeholders by this dissertation’s respondents. It operates in both the EU multilevel 
system and on the third-country level and is in direct contact with both European and Moroccan 
stakeholders. Other DGs that potentially might have a say in the conduct of EU external energy 
policies like DG TRADE (TRADE) and DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) or even DG 
CLIMATE (which played a main role during the COP22 in Marrakech) have been identified as 
less relevant in this regard. In fact, energy is not a focus of the trade relations between the EU 
and the Maghreb country (Interview EC, 2017; EEAS, 2017).688  
Indeed, whilst DG ENER acts, as shown before, as the interface between the EU and the member 
states, DG NEAR acts as the interface between the EU and third countries (Interview EEAS, 
2017). In this regard, it works closely with the EU delegation in Morocco (Interview EEAS, 2017) 
which apart from the Commission, is also required to ‘provide logistical and administrative 
support to members of other institutions, including the European Parliament’.689 By contrast, 
whilst cooperation of the Investment Bank with both the Commission and the EEAS is supposed 
 
687 Euromedrights (Accessed on 25 November 2017). 
688 DG TRADE (Accessed on 15 August 2017). 
689 Council (Accessed on 10 November 2018). 
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to be carried out on a region-by-region basis, including on Union delegation level,690 research 
has shown though that on the local level, there is little contact with the delegation. Likewise, 
coordination between the delegation and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is rather 
moderate and cooperation only takes place occasionally, for example in the context of events like 
the launch of the energy platforms (Interview EEAS, 2017) (see Figure 23).  
Figure 23: Inter-institutional coordination on the third-country level 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
As regards intergovernmental consistency/coordination on the third-country level, this 
study suggests that inter-member states’ relations are as good as non-existent and that there is 
no framework for the coordination of positions, i.e. a framework that goes beyond the exchange 
of information, let alone a framework for joint actions. This reality is openly admitted by most of 
the interviewees with research having identified an overall lack of information as regards the 
various national energy governance approaches and policies (see Figure 24). In fact, as various 
interviews with the national embassies have revealed, not all the member states are or seem691 
to be aware of or have a comprehensive overview of the energy activities of their fellow member 
 
690 EIB (Accessed on 01 September 2019).  
691 In fact, for strategic reasons, they may also just pretend to not be aware.   
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states and whilst there seems to be some rough knowledge, it remains overall rather vague. This 
is also true for the activities of third states, suggesting that the member states do not consider 
them to be a threat to European affairs (what is more as they did not seem to understand why, in 
view of the geopolitical changes ahead, it is important to cooperate). Further, or in the same 
light, only a small number of the employees of the national embassies is aware of current 
coordination practices and there seems to be a lack of consensus as regards to the necessity of 
coordination or its added value, with only a few actors considering the ermergence of third 
actors as a threat to European governance interests. 
Figure 24: Intergovernmental coordination on the third-country level 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
6.2 Vertical dimension 
 
The following Chapter seeks to examine coordination (and thus consistency) in the 
vertical dimension, whereby it distinguishes between the EU multilevel system and the third-
country level as well as between strategic/political and functional aspects.  
6.2.1 EU multilevel system 
 
To ensure the implementation of EU energy policies, the EU institutions seek to work 
closely vertically, i.e. with the member states, whereby coordination takes place both bilaterally 
and multilaterally, involving different stakeholders and different degrees of complexity. Here, in 
the following, the focus will be on the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the 
External Action Service and the UfM, as well as on the Investment Bank and the European 
Financing Institutions (EFIs).  
As presented in Part 3, vertical consistency/coordination is concerned with the consistency 
between different institutions across different entity or governance levels. Here, the European 
Council is equally one of the most important institutions when it comes to establishing external 
consistency (GEBHARD, 2017:109) and in charge of ‘ensuring consistency between member 
states’ and EU foreign policy goals’ (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 26/27 June 2014 Conclusions). 
Likewise, and as indicated before, the Commission is responsible for ensuring consistency of the 
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EU’s foreign policies (LEAL-ARCAS and WOUTERS, 2017:39). In this regard, it has an overall 
important coordinating function which also encompasses energy where it is for example 
responsible for monitoring the member states’ foreign energy activities and assessing their 
compliance with EU law.692 In this role, it promoted for example the establishment of the 
Strategic Group for International Energy Cooperation (SGIEC) in 2011. Composed of 
representatives of the member states (energy & foreign affairs ministries) and the relevant EU 
services (such as the Commission and the EEAS), this group aims at contributing to greater 
coordination through regular joint reviews of cooperation with third countries.693 Meetings take 
place twice per year694 and the southern Mediterranean as a whole is part of its agenda 
(SCHUBERT, POLLAK and REUTLER, 2016:217).695 In addition to this, the Commission, via DG 
ENER, regularly updates the member states on EU activities in the Council’s Working Party on 
Energy which in fact provides a platform that may also allow for the preparation of common 
positions (KNODT and PIEFER, 2015:60).696 And whilst DG ENER, which primarily operates on 
the EU level, has not been identified as the leading DG when it comes to energy dialogue between 
this dissertation’s respondents (Interview EC; EEAS, 2017), it does, however, play a major role in 
establishing vertical consistency since it acts as the interface between the EU and the EU 
member states (Interview EEAS, 2017). In this context, it has, as pointed out by Helwig, Ivan and 
Kostanyan (2013:47), ‘an informational advantage in relation to the EEAS on the member states 
preferences in energy issues.’ Overall and as regards Morocco, it plays a decisive role in the 
coordination of supranational and national energy policy interests, together with DG NEAR 
(Interview EC, 2017; EEAS, 2017). 
Apart from DG-ENER, the HR or the EEAS also play a major role in vertical coordination, with the 
HR being actually in charge of coordination between the Commission and the Council, notably 
through his/her role as a chair of the Council’s FAC (Art. 9E Treaty of Lisbon).697 Furthermore, it 
liases with the foreign affairs ministries of the member states, with which it is supposed to 
closely cooperate (Art. 27 § 3 TEU; Interview EEAS, 2017).698 Here, efforts are largely facilitated 
by the service’s organisational structure, combining (apart from the Commission) forces from 
the Council (and comprising the submission of proposals and the chairmanship of Council 
working groups) and the member states (GATTI, 2016:305).699 In this context, the EEAS is 
supposed to cooperate with the General Secretariat of the Council (VAN VOOREN and WESSEL, 
2014:23), whereby, as pointed out by Helwig, Ivan and Kostanyan (2013:46), the MaMa group 
serves as the ‘primary fora for the EEAS and member states’ interactions in the area of 
neighbourhood.’ According to the literature, relations are considered as ‘efficient’ (BLOCKMANS, 
KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:129), an opinion that this thesis’s 
empirical research confirms (see Figure 26). Here, the fact that the service is partly comprised of 
staff from the national diplomatic services of the member states – who in turn are responsible 
for streamlining eventual outcomes to the relevant national actors – certainly plays a role 
 
692 Whilst in this context, it disposes of a tool to better coordinate the member states external energy policies towards third 
countries, the so-called information exchange mechanism, the latter is however of less relevance to this research, as it primarily 
covers the member states’ relations with supplier countries (focusing mainly on infrastructure projects) (COM/2011/0539; Decision 
No 994/2012/EU). 
693 Eurlex (Accessed on 31 October 2019).  
694 Council (Accessed on 28 February 2019). 
695 Council (Accessed on 28 February 2019). 
696 In fact, the Directorate General Energy (DG ENER) works with the Working Party on Energy on a constant basis (HELWIG, IVAN 
and KOSTANYAN, 2013:47) 
697 In this light, he/she is in first place accountable to the Commission and second to the Council. 
698 EEAS (Accessed on 31 October 2019).  
699 EP (Accessed on 14 August 2017). 
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(Interview AA, 2017). Overall, coordination between the DGs and the member states as well as 
between the EEAS and the member states is either limited or extensive (and consistency thus 
either medium or high), with consensus and the establishment of common priorities being 
achieved at times (see Figure 26). 
Apart from the DG ENER, DG NEAR and the EEAS, the EIB also closely coordinates with the 
member states and their respective financial institutions with whom it even establishes common 
priorities (see Figure 26). And as has been shown before, the EIB is, in line with Article 19 (§ 2) 
of its statute, obliged to request the opinion of the EU institutions on all financing operations 
outside the EU.700 This also applies to the member states which are to be consulted for 
evaluation of conformity of planned projects with EU legislation and policies. The reason for this 
is that it is a co-financing donor, i.e. it provides loans along with donors, contributing up to 50% 
of the total project cost. Its key cooperation partners701 are the German KfW and the French AFD, 
whereby this depends entirely on the region of investment. One important platform here is 
MORSEFF, the Morocco Sustainable Energy Financing Facility which, set up in 2015, is, as shown 
before, a financing facility with an investment volume of € 110 million aimed at supporting 
Morocco’s private sector via loans, investment subsidies702 or technical assistance.703 As of end-
2018, MORSEFF had funded 11 projects related to RES worth € 5,1 million. MORSEFF was 
developed by the EBRD, in cooperation with the EIB, the AFD and the KfW. Its local partners are 
the BMCE Bank and Banque Populaire.704  
In general, it can be noted that the budget process plays an overall important role when it comes 
to vertical coordination and a lot of interaction takes place around the annual programming of 
the EU budget (Interview EEAS, 2017). In fact, as stated by Peters (2018:7-8), negotiations over 
the budget reveal or reflect state priorities ‘expressed in dollars and cents’. Other than that, 
vertical coordination primarily takes place via the DG NEAR’s NIF or NIP, as it is called since 
2017 (all Interviews). Indeed, and as mentioned before, DG NEAR has been identified as a key 
actor when it comes to improving coordination between the EU institutions, the member states 
and Morocco, with all the interviewees showing overall great satisfaction with the work of the 
Directorate. The NIP is governed by a Board of Directors which is chaired by the Commission 
and consists of members of the EEAS, the EFIs and the member states.705 Board meetings take 
place on a regular basis, depending on the occasion. For example, when it comes to the strategic 
direction of the facility, the board meets once or twice a year to define common objectives, 
however, it comes together more often in order to approve operational programmes. In terms of 
application procedure and, as the potential beneficiary of the facility, Morocco must submit a 
request to the NIP Secretariat. Managed by (and located in) DG NEAR, the secretariat is de facto 
the single-entry point for requests, whilst a technical assessment group under the leadership of 
the Commission and with the participation of all the EFIs, examines the potential projects and 
decides whether to grant approval or not. Subsequently, and in cooperation with the partner 
 
700 EIB (Accessed on 07 December 2017).  
701 other than the World Bank (WB), the African Development Bank (AFDB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). 
702 These subsidies are finaned by funding from the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP) and the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean (SEMED) fund.  
703 As far as the European countries are concered, this fund is supported by Germany, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands and 
Sweden and the UK. MORSEFF (Accessed on 27 February 2019). 
704 MORSEFF (Accessed on 27 February 2019). 
705 Thanks to its governance structure, the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP) plays a major role in coordinating the different 
European funds. EC (Accessed on 29 Augut 2019). 
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countries, in this case Morocco, the EFIs develop their individual grant requests for the project 
(to benefit from the NIP, projects must be developed by eligible EFIs, i.e. by EFIs that are entitled 
to submit applications)706 and present them to the Board.707 Here it must be noted that all the 
European donors have the same underlying principles and criteria for granting loans (Interview 
AFD, 2016). Once presented to the board, two scenarios are possible: if the project is to be 
funded via the NIP Trust fund, the board’s approval is final. By contrast, if the project is to be 
funded from the EU budget, another additional approval from the Commission is necessary.708 As 
already stated, EFIs can decide to finance investments alone or in cooperation with other EFIs. 
Operations carried out by the AFD in Morocco are generally automatically financed in 
cooperation with the EIB or the KfW.709 Interestingly, the KfW and the AFD act as both 
partners710 and competitors here – as well as in Morocco in general – whereby the KfW has been 
clearly identified as an actor whose power has rapidly increased in recent years (Interview AFD, 
2016). The reason for this is that it has a much more diverse product portfolio than its French 
counterpart. For example, it is not only present in the energy sector but also in a variety of other 
domains (Interview AFD, 2016). Finally, it has not yet reached the limit of its equity capital 
(Interview AFD, 2016) and receives substantial financial support from the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) on whose behalf it acts (Interview AFD, 2016). 
To conclude this section, the NIP plays a key role in coordinating and streamlining the external 
financial energy activities of the different players involved in EU energy governance towards 
Morocco.711 In fact, it serves as the sole platforms for interregional exchange, and vertical 
coordination primarily takes place within the framework of this facility. 
Other than the NIP which is a bilateral instrument, the UfM, which is supposed to act as a 
coordination and monitoring agent in the Mediterranean region, equally plays a coordinating 
role via its already mentioned energy platforms and, despite frequent criticism of its efficiency, 
has been recognised as a valuable platform for political exchange and dialogue by this 
dissertation’s interview partners (see Figure 26). Supported by a different set of regional 
institutions, the UfM platforms foresee an overall stronger role for the EU member states and the 
Mediterranean target countries, as well as for the energy industry actors. The idea behind this is 
to ‘emphasize the bottom-up character and mechanisms conducive to mutual exchange rather than 
conditionality and legal authority’ (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:133). The gas platform is jointly 
run by the UfM, the OME (which primarily provides technical assistance) and the MedReg, with 
their common objective being the improvement of gas security in Mediterranean,712 rather than 
regulatory integration (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:133). Indeed, as noted by Herranz-
Surralles (2018:133), the stated aim of the platform was or is the creation of a ‘major gas 
marketplace’. The electricity platform is equally run by the UfM and MedReg, as well as by Med-
 
706 EC (Accessed on 28 November 2017). 
707 Eligible European Financing Institutions (EFIs) usually attend sessions of both the strategic and operational Board meetings. 
Bankwatch (Accessed on 10 December 2017). 
708 EC (Accessed on 29 August 2019). 
709 Bankwatch (Accessed on 10 December 2017). 
710 Overall, cooperation between the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Reconstruction Loan Corporation (KfW) and the French 
Development Agency (AFD) (as well as other European Development Finance Institution (DFIs)) has taken place since 2003 with the 
signing of a framework agreement for financial cooperation and exchange of services. Furthermore, since 2009, the EU has been 
facilitating the combination of EU internal investments and loans related to development projects via a pooling mechanism. EC 
(Accessed on 30 July 2017); Secteur Privé et Developpement (Accessed on 01 August 2017). 
711 EC (Accessed on 09 August 2017) 
712 OME (Accessed on 04 January 2018); OME (Accessed on 19 December 2017); MedReg (Accessed on 22 December 2017) 
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TSO,713 whereas the RES and EE Platform (REEE) is run by MEDENER and supported by 
RES4MED.714 Other stakeholders involved are MedReg and Med-TSO (Interview UfM, 2017)715 
(see Figure 25). Finally, the OME also closely cooperates with the electricity and REEE platforms, 
to which it provides valuable input.716 The energy platforms are co-funded by the EU717 whilst 
the annual plenary meetings take place in Barcelona (usually in combination with ministerial 
meetings),718 normal work meetings may also be organised in other cities (Interview Med-TSO, 
2018). Plenary meetings are usually attended by the UfM Secretariat, the EC and other 
stakeholders. Participants of the EU member states are either the ministries of energy or foreign 
affairs (Interview EEAS, 2017; Interview Med-TSO, 2018). Non-plenary meetings take place 
around three times per year (Interview MEDENER, 2017). 
Figure 25: UfM energy platforms  
Gas
•Progressive development of a Euro-Mediterranean gas market through the establishment of a regional structured 
dialogue 
REM
•Progressive integration of Euro-Mediterranean energy systems and energy markets through the enhancement of 
electricity exchanges and interconnections
REEE
•Progressive deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency measures
OME
MedReg
MedReg
Med-TSO
MEDENER
RCREEE
 
Source: Own elaboration based on UfM (Accessed on 07 September 2017). 
 
Figure 26: Vertical coordination in the EU multilevel system 
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713 MedReg (Accessed on 21 December 2017). 
714 MEDENER (Accessed on 26 February 2019). 
715 OME (Accessed on 19 December 2017); RES4MED (Accessed on 02 January 2017). 
716 OME (Accessed on 10 November 2018). 
717 UfM (Accessed on 28 February 2019). 
718 MedReg (Accessed on 04 February 2018). 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
6.2.2 Third-country level 
 
When it comes to examining vertical coordination on the third-country level, the focus is 
on the coordination between the EU-delegation and the member states’ embassies as well as 
between the EIB and the member states’ embassies.  
As shown before, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU delegations have become the main actors 
when it comes to representing the EU externally and to leading EU internal coordination of 
diplomatic action abroad. However, and although having replaced the national foreign services 
in this regard, they only have a complementary function to the national embassies here. In fact, 
as opposed to the latter, the EU delegation is not a ‘specialised’ entity but ‘deals with ‘political’ 
and ‘technical’ issues at once’ (GATTI, 2016:286). Depending on the region, this has often led to 
discrepancies in the past719 and this although both actors have a historical obligation to 
‘cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are 
complied with and implemented’ (Art. 10 Treaty of Amsterdam) (GATTI, 2016:217). Similarly, 
Articles 32 and 35 of the TEU require the EU delegations and national embassies to ‘cooperate’ 
 
719 For example, one recurrent point of division has been the role of the delegations with regard to consular services (HELWIG, IVAN 
and KOSTANYAN, 2013:64-65). 
- 125 - 
 
and to ‘contribute to formulating and implementing the common approach’, amongst other things, 
by ‘exchanging information’ and ‘carrying out joint assessments’. In fact, one problem here, as 
pointed out by Gatti (2016:218), is certainly the fact that it is not clear which kind of information 
the two bodies are supposed to share. Second, and as highlighted by Helwig, Ivan and Kostanyan 
(2013:66), the sharing of information ‘still suffers from a rather unstructured and ad-hoc nature 
of reporting’. Moreover, so the authors, information disclosed by the EU delegations is often 
‘filtered’ in order to disguise the source of information. Finally, in some countries, the EU 
delegations may simply not dispose of the technical means of sharing information safely with the 
national embassies.  
As a result of this, and as opposed to the horizontal dimension (intergovernmental), bilateral 
vertical cooperation on the third-country level, i.e. cooperation between the EU delegation and 
the national embassies, does exist, however, the degree of coordination is rather limited (see 
Figure 27) and this despite the fact that ‘the diplomatic missions of the Member States and the 
Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall cooperate and shall 
contribute to formulating and implementing the common approach’ (Art. 16 of the Treaty of 
Lisbon). As this suggests, the EU delegation is supposed to coordinate between the national 
embassies and speak for the EU as a whole,720 whereas the embassies are likewise obliged to 
adhere to the common positions of the EU. However, and as regards the local level in Rabat, 
there is paradoxically no fixed framework for bilateral European energy cooperation and 
coordination. And whilst the EU-delegation and the embassies regularly meet at the Head of 
Mission level (= ambassadors of the member states) to coordinate policies721 – in fact, they are 
required to share information on a mutual basis (Art. 5, COUNCIL 2010/427/EU) –722 the 
information exchanged is reciprocally limited723 and, overall, there seems to be little contact, at 
least as far as energy topics are concerned. Indeed, cooperation between the French embassy 
and the delegation focuses on commercial and market access-related questions, whereas energy 
topics are neglected (Interview French Embassy to Morocco, 2016). This is in line with the 
findings in the literature according to which the EU delegations are generally willing to share 
information, contrary to the national embassies whose ‘choice to share information at the 
diplomatic level’ is expected to ‘be motivated by national interests’ in the long run (GATTI, 
2016:218) and who overall, ‘seem to have a preference for clustering in smaller groups with 
common interests and do so without involving the EU delegation’ (HELWIG, IVAN and 
KOSTANYAN, 2013:8).  
Similarly, bilateral cooperation between the EIB and the embassies is as good as non-existent 
and so is coordination (see Figure 27). However, the bank maintains close ties with both the KfW 
and the AFD (Interview EIB, 2017). The same holds true for the UfM and the embassies which do 
not have any noteworthy relations. And whilst there are some multilateral frameworks for 
coordination, their energy focus is, however, limited:  
1) Groupe des chefs de coopérations européens (there is no official name for this group): 
The Group unites all bilateral representations of the EU and Switzerland, i.e. the EU 
delegation, the embassies of the EU member states and Switzerland, as well as the 
 
720 EP (Accessed on 05 December 2018). 
721 Euromedrights (Accessed on 10 December 2017). 
722 Council (Accessed on 10 November 2018). 
723 In fact, as pointed out by Helwig, Ivan and Kostanyan (2013:67), ‘the setup of the EEAS initially explicitly mentioned that Union 
delegations shall on a reciprocal basis, provide all relevant information’, however, this provision was subsequently not maintained.  
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principal European donors EIB, EBRD, AFD, KfW and the Society for International 
Cooperation (GIZ).724 Meetings are global and cover a wide range of sectors and topics, 
i.e. they are not energy sector specific and issues related to energy may or may not be 
discussed, depending on their urgency and the will of the participants to address them 
(Interview German embassy to Morocco, 2017). Nonetheless, it remains the only 
relevant multilateral framework for potential dialogue on energy policy issues. Meetings 
take place twice a year.  
2) Groupe principal des partenaires (GPP) (Principal Partners Group): Created on the 
initiative of the Moroccan office of the African Development Bank (AFDB) and in 
collaboration with the World Bank (WB) and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP),725 the GPP holds regular meetings with the principal donors (both international 
and European) present in Morocco: the WB’s Social Development Fund (SDF), the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Islamic 
Development Bank (ISDB), the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Qatar Development 
Fund (QDF), the EU delegation, the EIB and the EBRD, as well as the AFD and the KfW. 
Another participant is the Belgian Technical Cooperation. The aim of these meetings 
which take place every two months and whose focus is financial/technical,726 is to share 
and exchange information on the different operational approaches in order to achieve a 
certain harmonisation of interventions. As the meetings are global, i.e. not sector specific, 
they are supposed to be complemented by the so-called Groupes thématiques.  
3) Groupes thématiques: These groups are sector specific (and thus cyclical) and are 
supposed to be either organised either by the GPP administration or their members727 
whereby the EU-delegation generally delegates the organisation of these groups to the 
embassies of the EU member states. Corresponding meetings are supposed to take place 
once a year. However, with respect to energy, they take place rarely or not at all (the last 
time such a meeting took place was in 2013). According to the interview partners, this is 
due to a lack of interest in multilateral exchange, notably from the Moroccan side, but 
also from the European side. In fact, in the opinion of the interviewees, Morocco is 
generally more interested in bilateral dialogue patterns. This applies even more so to 
energy which is considered to be a strategic domain. But the EU has also shown little 
interest given that most of the intra-European meetings, i.e. among the European donors, 
already take place within the framework of the NIP, either in Brussels or in Rabat. 
4) Informal ad-hoc ‘NIF’ meetings’: As just mentioned, in addition to the regular meetings 
held in Brussels, the local representatives of the NIP partners also happen to meet in 
Rabat informally on an ad-hoc basis as necessary. Overall, these meetings were given a 
clear preference over the more formal frameworks by the interview partners who 
consider them to be rather efficient and more productive (Interview German Embassy to 
Morocco, 2017; EEAS, 2017; EIB, 2017).  
 
724 Other than its other European partners, the Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) is not involved in any cooperation or 
coordination processes at the EU level, but only operates on the ground.  
725 AFDB (Accessed on 09 August 2017). 
726 Portail Sud Maroc (Accessed on 12 November 2018). 
727 AFDB (Accessed on 09 August 2017). 
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By contrast and as shown before, although the UfM certainly plays a role when it comes 
to regional coordination (i.e. coordination between European, Moroccan and other 
member countries), it is not particularly active within Morocco. Overall, it can be stated 
that the UfM only plays a minor role in the establishment of consistency on the local 
level. In fact, it has not been identified as a relevant actor for the establishment of 
consistency by the interviewees and whilst it maintains some contact with the EU 
delegation in Rabat, it is not very effective with the national embassies. This corresponds 
with the preliminary findings of the MEDRESET study carried out by Bianchi, Colantoni, 
Mascolo and Sartori in 2018 (22), according to which there is a lack of knowledge 
amongst EU staff about multilateral European energy projects on the local level. By 
contrast, to realise its objectives, the UfM works closely with the Moroccan energy actors 
on the ground. For example, it is in close contact with MEM and MASEN regarding 
investments and the promotion of RES and energy efficiency. By contrast, with ONE, it 
rather cooperates on the integration of energy and water which is expected to be a huge 
problem in the future (Interview UfM, 2017). 
Figure 27: Vertical coordination on the third-country level 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
6.3 Diagonal dimension  
 
The relations of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the 
regional associations Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MedReg), Mediterranean Transmission 
System Operators (Med-TSO), Mediterranean Association of the National Agencies for Energy 
Conversation (MEDENER) and Renewable Energy Solutions for the Mediterranean (RES4MED) 
with the EU institutions and member states are a special case to look. In fact, they neither fall 
within the concept of horizontal, nor the concept of vertical coordination given that, as shown 
before, both the bank and the regional initiatives are de facto non-EU institutions. By contrast, 
relations are rather subject to diagonal coordination taking place in the EU multilevel system. 
The EBRD maintains extremely strong bonds with the EU, above all the Commission and the 
External Action Service, the Investment Bank and the member states and is in parts owned by 
these actors, a circumstance that allows them to exercise a strong influence on the bank’s 
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strategic policy direction (see Figure 28). For example, like every other shareholder, the EU, the 
EIB and the EU member states are each represented by a Governor/Alternate Governor on the 
Board of Governors728 which has overall authority over the bank. Through an Executive 
Director/Alternate Director, they are equally represented in the Board of Directors which, 
amongst other things, plays a key role in the coordination of EU and EBRD policies. Indeed, 
responsible for guaranteeing that EU interests and priorities are well reflected in the bank’s 
projects, prior to the approval or rejection of a project, the Executive Director/Alternate Director 
is required to consult both the EC and the EEAS as well as the member states regarding their 
opinion to make sure that their positions are aligned.729 Moreover, the EBRD highly depends on 
the EU as external donor for contribution730 – the EU is the EBRD’s largest single donor, having 
accounted for around two thirds of its total donor funding in 2016 and overall, has made up for 
36% of the bank’s total grants since its creation in the 1990s. Funding is generally channeled 
either bilaterally, i.e. via the ENI or through regional blending facilities like the NIP out of which 
the EBRD received for example € 126 million in 2016.731 Other than that, coordination between 
the EBRD and the EC is sought to be achieved via an MoU signed in July 2007.732  
As regards coordination between the EBRD and the EIB, cooperation dates back to the 1990s 
and is, as of today, based on an MoU signed by the EBRD, the EIB, the Commission and the 
European Investment Fund (EIF) in March 2011 (the aim of this agreement being the 
maximization of synergies amongst its signatories).733 However, the focus of this MoU is rather 
on the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and whilst the two banks closely cooperate in Central 
Asia,734 little cooperation has so far taken place in North Africa (Interview EIB, 2017). Indeed, 
here, the EIB rather cooperates with the World Bank (WB), the African Development Bank 
(AFDB) as well as with the KfW and the AFD. However, some cooperation does exist within the 
framework of the MORSEFF facility in which the EIB is regularly involved as a co-financer. 
Overall, when working together, the EIB usually carries out the economic and technical aspects 
of the work, whilst the EBRD does the financial analysis.735 As just mentioned, apart from the 
EIB, the EBRD also cooperates with the EU member states or their financing institutions, above 
all the KfW and the AFD736 and has for example regularly been the initiator of joint investment 
projects such as the Sustainable Energy Efficiency Facilities (SEEFs).737 Here, the EBRD notably 
seeks to cooperate on renewable energy projects with the KfW and the AFD and, wherever 
possible, to coordinate common financing. Most of this coordination takes place within the NIP 
or MORSEFF which, apart from the EIB, is also co-financed by the KfW and AFD. To a certain 
extent, the UfM is also an important coordination platform here.738 By contrast, one objective of 
the EBRD being the establishment of an independent regulator for the Moroccan electricity 
market, cooperation with both MedReg and Med-TSO has interestingly been rather limited so 
far, and this despite the prevailing opinion in the literature that such cooperation would be 
 
728 In fact, the Board of Governors consist of a representative from each shareholder country. In general, this representative is the 
Finance Minister. (MCCORMICK, 2015:229); EBRD (Accessed on 11 February 2018). 
729 The EU and the European Investment Bank (EIB) each hold a 3.05% share. EC (Accessed on 06 December 2017). 
730 In 2015, the EU accounted for more than half of the contributions. EC (Accessed on 06 December 2017). 
731 EBRD (Accessed on 05 December 2017). 
732 EC (Accessed on 06 December 2017). 
733 EC (Accessed on 06 December 2017). 
734 EIB (Accessed on 27 August 2017). 
735 EIB (Accessed on 07 December 2017).  
736 EBRD (Accessed on 01 September 2019). 
737 The aim of this facility: to extend credit lines ‘to local financial institutions that seek to develop sustainable energy financing as a 
permanent area of business.’ EBRD (Accessed on 18 February 2018). 
738 EBRD (Accessed on 01 September 2019). 
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beneficial for all partners (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:67; 
TAGLIAPIETRA, 2016:175). 
MedReg, Med-TSO, OME, MEDENER and RES4MED are all regional associations presenting 
themselves as centres for regional energy expertise as well as platforms for the exchange and 
coordination between relevant actors in the energy sector from both the northern and southern 
shores of the Mediterranean. In this light, they rather take on a meditation role and constantly 
seek to increase their network of stakeholders739 which is made up of supranational and 
intergovernmental organisations, financing institutions, local authorities and agencies, as well as 
industries and research institutes & academia (+ other regional associations). Further, they 
regularly organise thematic workshops or working groups in order to foster dialogue between 
both Moroccan and international as well as between international partners. As their ultimate 
aim, it can be recorded the development of a ‘shared vision among regional actors, policy makers 
and national authorities’740 with respect to an integrated energy market in the Mediterranean.741 
To achieve their aims, the regional associations pursue a cooperative approach with other 
energy stakeholders in the Mediterranean, including with the EU which considers them to be 
‘respected institutions, widely seen as above private interests as well as not involved in current 
political conflicts’.742  
Here, and sharing the same long-term energy goals when it comes to the Euro-Mediterranean 
region (including, for example, the set-up of a regional energy community by 2020),743 the EU 
maintains particularly close cooperative energy ties with both MedReg and Med-TSO and has 
regularly promoted regional cooperation with the two associations (JOIN/2012/036 final). For 
example, in November 2014, the EC, via DG ENER, signed a cooperation agreement with both of 
them which, unique in its kind, can be seen as being of utmost importance for the future EC-
MedReg-Med-TSO energy relationship.744 In fact, the Commission recognises the important roles 
the two associations play in achieving the Union’s global energy goals in the Mediterranean,745 
notably with respect to the building of a physical infrastructure,746 and targets to establish them 
as its long-term permanent institutional partners in the region. At this point, it must be stated 
that pursuing the same energy goals in the Mediterranean as the EU (market integration, market 
harmonisation…), MedReg is ‘clearly inspired by an EU agenda’ according to the literature 
(CAMBINI and RUBINO, 2014:55). Indeed, when considering its governance structure, evidence 
can be found that the association receives a lot of strategic EU guidance and serves as a sort of 
intermediary for the Union’s energy interests in the region (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA 
CAMPI, 2015:152). For example, an observer in MedReg’s General Assembly747 Steering 
Committee, the Commission is indirectly involved in defining the association’s strategy and 
Action Plan, and also supervises the implementation of the latter (see Figure 28).748 By contrast, 
it is not involved in any of Med-TSO’s governance structures and its influence on the 
 
739 For example, as part of their strategies, MedReg & Co. seek to continuously extend their stakeholder’s network in order to 
strengthen their external relations and to raise visibility (see MedReg by 2018). MedReg (Accessed on 22 December 2017); Med-TSO 
(Accessed on 04 February 2018). 
740 OME (Accessed on 04 January 2018). 
741 FERRANTE Angelo (09 May 2017), The Role of Med-TSO in the Mediterranean Region, MEDELEC 24th Annual Meeting, Med-TSO.  
742 EP (Accessed on 20 February 2018).  
743 Med-TSO (Accessed on 30 December 2017).  
744 MedReg (Accessed on 03 February 2018).  
745 Med-TSO (Accessed on 30 December 2017). 
746 MedReg (Accessed on 10 February 2018). 
747 MedReg (Accessed on 22 December 2017).  
748 MedReg (Accessed on 22 December 2017). 
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association’s political and strategic direction is therefore less pronounced or intense. 
Nonetheless, their relationship is described as overall good, reflected in the fact that EU 
representatives are regularly invited to Med-TSO events (Interview Med-TSO, 2018) (see Figure 
28).  
Overall, the EU has supported both MedReg and Med-TSO right from the beginning749 and has 
regularly provided operational and financial support, notably through DG ENER (or the 
electricity working group) and DG NEAR as well as through DG DEVCO, although to a lesser 
extent (SAROTRI, 2014:7; Interview MedReg, 2017).750 Whilst DG ENER and DG NEAR both 
provide content-related backing in this context (which implies that projects are under their 
audit), only DG NEAR is entitled to award grants and offers financing, acting as one of the main 
founders of both MedReg and Med-TSO. Funding is non-permanent, i.e. exclusively project-
related (Interview Med-TSO, 2018) and channelled through strategic financing contracts or so-
called service contracts. So far, four of such contracts751 have already been signed with MedReg, 
the most recent one having been signed for the period 2018-2019, with a budget of € 2 
million.752 As regards Med-TSO, the current grant is, for example, destined to the Med II 
project.753 Overall, EU funds account for around 70% of Med-TSO’s financing, whereas the rest 
comes from its member operators (Interview Med-TSO, 2017). Added to this, and for their 
objectives to be realised, MedReg and Med-TSO also depend on the EIB for financial support. 
However, despite the impact of regulatory changes on financing decisions, direct relations are 
relatively limited and interaction mainly takes place in the context of events aiming, for example, 
at promoting new investments in the Mediterranean.754 This lack of coordination is regularly 
criticised by both scholars and policy-makers who, considering it to be crucial for the 
deployment of renewable energy infrastructure and like MedReg, call for greater 
collaboration.755 For example, Simone Tagliapietra from the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei states 
that the work of both the EIB and the EBRD in the region ‘might turn out to be more effective if 
framed into a cooperation framework with Med-TSO and MedReg’.756 However, one underlying 
problem in this context is the fact that cooperation between the EIB and the EBRD is already 
relatively limited. 
Apart from the EU and fostering ‘cooperation with other relevant regional and international 
organizations and institutions, with particular focus on regional and Mediterranean issues in the 
field of energy’ being one of its key objectives, MedReg maintains close cooperative ties with a 
number of different energy stakeholders in the Mediterranean.757 Whilst their coordination is 
carried out by the MedReg Secretariat which is also responsible for ensuring that the 
organization ‘Speaks with one Voice’ on the external level (i.e. consistent with the message of the 
General Assembly), the association has also set up a working group on institutional issues (INS 
 
749 EU (Accessed on 20 February 2018). 
750 Coordination between the EU and Med-TSO is, apart from via DG NEAR, also ensured by a direct link with ENTSO-E (SARTORI, 
2014:7); MedReg (Accessed on 03 February 2018). 
751 for the periods 2008-2009, 2010-2012 and 2013-2016. CEER (Accessed on 20 February 2018).  
752 EU (Accessed on 19 February 2018).  
753 Med-TSO (Accessed on 06 November 2019). 
754 In fact, whilst a cooperation process between the Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MedReg) and the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) was first initiated in 2008, it was later suspended in favour of closer cooperation with the EC. JR (Accessed on 21 February 
2018); MedReg (Accessed on 21 February 2018). 
755 MedReg (Accessed on 22 February 2018). 
756 In this light, Tagliapietra suggested, for example, the set-up of a small platform in charge of coordinating the work of both the 
banks and the regulator in 2014. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Accessed on 22 February 2018).  
757 In addition to that, the Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MedReg) members have their own external relations (in which MedReg 
does not seek to interfere). MedReg (Accessed on 04 February 2018).  
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WG) to enhance these ties.758 Close cooperative ties of MedReg notably exist with Med-TSO 
(SARTORI, 2014:7). In fact, MedReg has supported Med-TSO right from the beginning, for 
example, by strongly promoting its establishment, a context in which it was also involved in the 
formulation of its statutes.759 Further, since 2013, both associations have been bound to each 
other by a cooperation agreement on the development of a shared vision for the integration of 
the Mediterranean electricity markets.760 Although non-binding, this agreement lays the basis 
for a deepened cooperation regarding ‘the adoption of harmonized rules concerning cross-border 
transmission activities at regional level’.761 It is the only agreement that MedReg has signed with 
another energy stakeholder in the Mediterranean so far762 and overall, relations between 
MedReg and Med-TSO are characterised by a high degree of complementarity, with Med-TSO 
notably complementing MedReg regarding infrastructure developments and the integration of 
resources (Interview MEDENER, 2017).763 Indeed, whilst MedReg is responsible for defining 
rules at the national level, Med-TSO rather is a technical entity which seeks to define a shared set 
of technical rules among its members (Interview Med-TSO, 2018). Meetings take place on a 
regular basis and primarily serve the exchange of information and work on activities of common 
interest.764  
Contrary to this, MedReg’s coordination with the EBRD is, as shown before, still in its infancy 
although the representatives of the bank are regularly present at the regulator’s general 
assemblies.765 Similarly, and as already mentioned, there is as good as no cooperation with the 
member states or the national embassies at the local level (Interview MedReg, 2017; Interview 
Med-TSO, 2018) and there is also no cooperation with the KfW, let alone the AFD (Interview 
MedReg, 2017). By contrast, and as already indicated in Part 5, there is some technical 
coordination between MedReg and the GIZ, with the former having already joined the latter in 
various conferences, amongst other things on energy market transformations.766 Overall, most of 
the cooperation between MedReg and its partners (except for the EU and Med-TSO) is based on 
ad-hoc collaboration, i.e. ‘on issues of common interest’. Meetings primarily take place along the 
margins of events or in the context of working groups and public consultations. One important 
platform for exchange to be mentioned here is the Mediterranean Forum on energy regulation 
which MedReg organised for the first time in 2014.767 The same applies to Med-TSO’s 
cooperation with external partners. Meetings either take place within the framework of 
technical committees/specialized working groups or on an ad hoc basis.768 
MEDENER seeks to steadily extend the network of its partners, signing for example an MoU with 
both RES4MED and RCREEE in July 2017 for enhanced cooperation in the deployment of 
renewable energies and energy efficiency in the Mediterranean region, including the exchange of 
information, capacity building, training and conferences.769 All three organisations share 
synergies notably in the field of renewable energy and, together with RCREE, MEDENER is also 
 
758 MedReg (Accessed on 20 December 2017). 
759 MedReg (Accessed on 30 December 2017). 
760 MedReg (Accessed on 08 February 2018). 
761 MedReg (Accessed on 20 December 2017). 
762 MedReg (Accessed on 03 February 2018). 
763 FERRANTE Angelo (09 May 2017), The Role of Med-TSO in the Mediterranean Region, MEDELEC 24th Annual Meeting, Med-TSO. 
764 MedReg (Accessed on 10 February 2018) 
765 MedReg (Accessed on 10 November 2019).  
766 EU Neighbours South (Accessed on 13 November 2018). 
767 MedReg (Accessed on 03 February 2018). 
768 Med-TSO (Accessed on 30 December 2017).  
769 RCREEE (Accessed on 07 January 2017); ENEA; RES4MED (Accessed on 02 January 2017). 
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part of the UfM’s REEE platform as shown before. Other than via the platform, the UfM is in 
permanent contact with MEDENER as regards networking with private companies (Interview 
MEDENER, 2017). MEDENER also closely collaborates with the Commission, piloting many of 
the projects financed by the latter. Other EU and EU member states partners are the EIB, the 
AFD, the FFEM and the GIZ.770 
Through its large network of partners on the European, regional and local levels, RES4MED acts 
as an important provider of input on EU-Mediterranean renewable energy coordination and, as 
stated by Leal-Arcas, Grasso and Rios (2016:275), also plays the role of facilitator (of dialogue 
and negotiations). As such, it regularly organizes executive seminars for representatives from 
the DG ENER, DG NEAR, DG DEVCO and DG Research & Innovation on policy & regulatory 
frameworks, financing of renewable energy projects or grid integration, for example. On the 
regional level, it is, apart from being a close cooperation partner with MEDENER, also an 
associate member of OME, whereby on the local level, it is one of the best-connected multilateral 
operators. Here it aims at building up partnerships by using a ‘bottom up’ approach, a context in 
which it seeks to establish contacts between its members and Moroccan stakeholders via 
networking events.  
All in all, the regional associations are largely considered to be key contributors to regional 
energy coordination in the Mediterranean,771 a context in which they have, as shown before, 
played a vital role in UfM initiatives like the MSP or the energy platforms.772 Being particularly 
involved in the REM and REEE platforms, they are, for example, together with the UfM 
CoPresidency, responsible for the elaboration of the work programme for the REM platform. 
This responsibility covers, amongst other things, the analysis of existing market structures and 
the coordination of infrastructure development.773 Further, they participate in meetings of the 
other platforms and provide input.774  
To sum up, it must be said that overall, coordination between the EU and the regional 
associations exclusively takes place on the supranational levels, meaning that the associations 
do not have any or only little contact with the EU delegations or the EU embassies on the local 
level (Interview MedReg, 2017; Interview Med-TSO, 2018).775 The only worth-mentioning 
exception here is the coordination between MedReg and the GIZ with both pushed, for example, 
for the establishment of the Moroccan Electricity Regulatory Authority (ANRE). As regards the 
multilateral aspects of diagonal cooperation, it can be noted that much of the coordination takes 
place in the context of the UfM energy platforms, whereas bilateral energy meetings take place 
outside the UfM on an ad hoc basis (Interview MedReg, 2017).776 In fact, the UfM, which is 
supposed to bring together both regional and national stakeholders – financial institutions, 
regional organisations, businesses and civil society in order to spark common interests and 
create relations – can be identified as an overarching framework for diagonal coordination. In 
 
770 MEDENER (Accessed on 31 December 2017). 
771 MedTSO (Accessed on 30 December 2017). 
772 MedReg; Med-TSO (Accessed on 30 December 2017). 
773 MedReg (Accessed on 19 December 2017). 
774 MedReg’s participation in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) Regional Electricity Market (REM) and Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency (REEE) energy platforms is, for example, coordinated by a specialised ‘Task Force on UfM Energy Platforms’ 
MedReg (Accessed on 22 December 2017); MedReg (Accessed on 03 February 2018). 
775 For example, as for the Mediterranean Transmission System Operators (Med-TSO), the reason is that the organization does not 
want to interfere with state affairs (Interview Med-TSO, 2018).  
776 Due to the fact that there is no pan-regional entity in the Mediterranean like the Energy Community in eastern Europe, there is no 
other comparable format for multilateral energy exchange in the Mediterranean regardless of the UfM and its energy platforms. 
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this context, the energy platforms serve as a forum for the exchange of information between 
various interest groups as well as for developing new or maintaining old relationships 
(Interview MEDENER, 2017).  
Figure 28: Diagonal coordination in the EU multilevel system 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
Overall, and to sum up coordination (and thus consistency) in the EU multilevel system, the 
empirical research shows that whilst there is strategic/political coordination (and thus 
consistency) occurring in all three dimensions (horizontal, vertical and diagonal), it is higher in 
the intra-institutional, inter-institutional and diagonal dimensions than in the 
intergovernmental and vertical dimensions. In fact, whilst as far as the intergovernmental 
dimension is concerned, it is particularly low when it comes to multilateral initiatives, as for the 
vertical dimension, there is some coordination between the Commission, the External Action 
Service, the Investment Bank and the member states. However, by far the most important 
coordination platform is the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP) which indeed serves as 
a major coordination platform (Interview KfW, 2016; AFD, 2016; MASEN, 2016; EC, 2017; EEAS, 
2017; EIB, 2017) but, as already known, rather deals with functional, i.e. financial and technical 
aspects. As this suggests and all in all, functional coordination (and thus consistency) in the EU 
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multilevel system is high, no matter in which dimension. The main actors are the Commission, 
the Investment Bank and the big European development finance institutions (DFIs) KfW and 
AFD.  
To sum up coordination (and thus consistency) on the third-country level, the empirical 
research shows that whilst there is both strategic/political and functional coordination when it 
comes to the intra-institutional and inter-institutional dimensions, there is only limited 
coordination (above all strategic/political) in the intergovernmental and vertical dimensions. In 
fact, overall, and contrary to the EU multilevel system – in which coordination (and thus 
consistency) may be both strategic/political and functional – there is only little 
strategic/political coordination taking place on the third-country level and whilst this applies to 
all dimensions, it is particularly true for the intergovernmental and vertical dimensions where 
interaction is often restricted to an exchange of information and views and does not extend to 
joint (and binding) actions. For example, whilst there is indeed a multilateral framework for 
strategic/political cooperation in Rabat, the Groupe des chefs de coopérations européens, it is, 
however, a rather broad structure and does not always have sector-specific, i.e. energy-related 
topics on its agenda. Moreover, it is not exclusively reserved to European policy makers or the 
EU delegation and the embassies of the EU member states but is also open to the banks and the 
GIZ. As a result, given that there is no other platform for political cooperation apart from this 
group – the GPP and the Groupes thématiques meetings have a rather technical and financial 
focus – it can be concluded that there is not really any energy-exclusive policy dialogue worth 
mentioning that takes place in Morocco. In fact, coordination on the third-country level is 
primarily functional. This is best explained by the theory of functionalism which, developed by 
David Mitrany in the 20th century, is, as its name suggests, closely associated with neo-
functionalism where a strong focus is placed on international institutions which are considered 
to be drivers of integration. For example, for Mitrany, who developed his theory of functionalism 
during and after World War II, nationalism and nation states were the main threat to peace and 
freedom which he was convinced only international and transnational organisations would be 
able to guarantee. For this reason, and in view of growing technical issues (like for example 
finance), he proposed setting up purely functional organisations that would be in charge of 
dealing with international problems (DIEZ, BODE and FERNANDES DA COSTA, 2011:63). 
According to this doctrine, integration starts on the functional or technical levels, with functions 
supposed to gradually replace sovereignty (MITRANY, 1966:31) as trust and loyalty are shifted 
from national organisations towards supranational organisations over time.777 Other than being 
primarily functional, coordination in Morocco takes place above all informally and ad-hoc, 
whereby it must be stated that the role of informal coordination should not be underestimated 
as it helps, via steady exchange, to gradually build ‘consensus on new directions and strengthen 
efforts that are eventually reflected in official positions’.778 As outlined by Thaler (2015:129), this 
process of repeated information exchange has often been described as socialisation in the 
literature, where socialisation is considered to lead to an ‘internalization of rules and norms’. 
 
 
777 Similarly, neo-functionalism equally lays a focus on technocratic decision-making. Another point in common between 
functionalism and neo-functionalism is the fact that both theories recognise that cooperation may be most easily achieved between 
non-governmental actors (such as the pressure groups of associations) (DIEZ, BODE and FERNANDES DA COSTA, 2011:63). 
778 OECD (Accessed on 06 March 2019). 
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6.4 Interim conclusion  
 
This Chapter has shown that EU energy governance towards Morocco is neither fully 
consistent, nor inconsistent but varies greatly, depending on the dimension (horizontal, vertical, 
diagonal) and level (EU multilevel system, third-country) in question, as well as on different 
aspects (strategic/political, functional). Yet overall, it tends to remain incomplete. 
Overall, consistency tends to be higher as regards the horizontal and diagonal dimensions, 
where coordination is extensive in both the EU multilevel system and on the third-country level 
(at least as far as the horizontal dimension is concerned) and with respect to both 
strategic/political and functional aspects. By contrast, consistency seems to be lower as regards 
the intergovernmental and vertical dimensions, where coordination takes primarily place in the 
EU multilevel system and is above all related to functional aspects, i.e. it centres around financial 
or technical issues. These conclusions are derived from the following observations (see Figure 
29):  
1. Horizontal coordination (and thus consistency) is strategic/political and functional 
(technical, financial).  
2. Diagonal coordination (and thus consistency) is strategic/political and functional 
(technical, financial). 
3. Intergovernmental and vertical coordination (and thus consistency) is primarily 
functional (technical, financial).  
This means that strategic/political coordination is overall more pronounced as regards the 
horizontal (intra-institutional and inter-institutional) and diagonal dimensions, rather than the 
intergovernmental and vertical dimensions. In fact, whilst horizontal coordination seems to 
work out well, intergovernmental and vertical coordination appear to be more of a perpetual 
problem and be generally more successful in the EU multilevel system. Contrary to this, 
functional coordination is pronounced as regards the horizontal, vertical and diagonal 
dimensions. It can be further summed up that (see Table 9): 
- Coordination (and thus consistency) in the EU multilevel system is strategic/political and 
functional (technical, financial).  
- Coordination (and thus consistency) on the third-country level is primarily functional 
(technical, financial).  
In other words, strategic/political coordination mainly takes place in the EU multilevel system, 
i.e. in Brussels, and is lower on the third-country level in Rabat. Functional coordination, by 
contrast, takes place on both levels and is overall higher in Rabat. Moreover, coordination 
frameworks differ in terms of bureaucratic and organisational obstacles, frequency of meetings, 
focus, outcome etc. and coordination takes place both formally or informally and whilst some of 
the actors wish to coordinate on a permanent or a more formal and more binding basis, others 
prefer ad hoc meetings which allow for a greater degree of spontaneity and flexibility and 
reunite relevant stakeholders only.  
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All in all, this empirical research shows that the occurrence of consistency or inconsistency 
strongly depends on a variety of factors such as the different dimensions, levels and aspects. 
Therefore, the following Chapter will seek to explain variation in consistency in EU energy 
governance towards Morocco.  
Figure 29: Strategic/political and functional consistency 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
Table 9: Evaluation of consistency in EU energy governance towards Morocco 
Level
Project/actors
European 
Council
Council EP EEAS UfM EIB EBRD
Member 
states
MedReg Med-TSO MEDENER RES4MED
DG ENER DG NEAR
European Council x S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F F S, F F F F F
Council S, F x S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F F S, F F F F F
EP S, F S, F x S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F F S, F F F F F
DG ENER S, F S, F S, F x S, F S, F S, F S, F F S, F F F F F
DG NEAR S, F S, F S, F S, F x S, F S, F S, F F S, F F F F F
EEAS S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F x S, F S, F F S, F F F F F
UfM S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F x S, F F S, F F F F F
EIB S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F x F S, F F F F F
EBRD F F F F F F F F x F F F F F
Member states S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F S, F F x F F F F
MedReg F F F F F F F F F F x F F F
Med-TSO F F F F F F F F F F F x F F
MEDENER F F F F F F F F F F F F x F
RES4MED F F F F F F F F F F F F F x
Level 
Project/actors DG NEAR EU delegation UfM EIB EBRD
Member states 
embassies
MedReg Med-TSO MEDENER RES4MED KfW AfD GIZ Industry 
DG NEAR x S, F S, F S, F S, F S,F F F F F F F F F
EU delegation S, F x S,F S,F S,F S,F F F F F F F F F
UfM S, F S,F x S,F S,F S,F F F F F F F F F
EIB S, F S,F S,F x S, F S,F F F F F F F F F
EBRD F F F F x F F F F F F F F F
Member states embassies na S,F S,F S,F F x F F F F F F F F
MedReg F F F F F F x F F F F F F F
Med-TSO F F F F F F F x F F F F F F
MEDENER F F F F F F F F x F F F F F
RES4MED F F F F F F F F F x F F F F
KfW F F F F F F F F F F x F F F
AfD F F F F F F F F F F F x F F
GIZ F F F F F F F F F F F F x F
Industry F F F F F F F F F F F F F x
Legend S
F
Extensive
Limited
Non-existent
Functional 
Coordination 
EU multilevel
EC
Third-country
Strategic
 
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.  
 
 
 
- 137 - 
 
Table 10: Energy cooperation networks towards Morocco 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.  
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Part Seven – Explaining consistency in EU energy governance 
towards Morocco 
Whilst the previous Chapter has provided first indications of the existence of 
consistency by having dealt with the question if, how and with which result the EU institutions 
and the member states coordinate their energy policies towards Morocco, this Chapter takes the 
analysis one step further. In fact, it will be dedicated to the ‘why’ aspect and will seek to explain 
variation in consistency. Recourse will hereby be taken to the three independent variables 
presented in Part 3: competencies, interests and interdependencies. 
7.1 Competencies  
 
This Chapter investigates the variable competencies and Hypothesis 1, namely: the 
clearer the allocation of competencies between the different stakeholders involved in EU external 
energy governance, the more extensive the coordination (and thus the higher the consistency) of 
their energy policies. 
Although from a legal perspective, the EU actors are, as shown before, obliged to strive for 
greater consistency in EU external energy policymaking and to coordinate their policies, energy 
governance has often been characterised by a lack of consistency in the past and coordination 
has not always been achieved so far or has been accidental and loose, a reality that this research 
has partly confirmed. There are many factors making such an alignment difficult to achieve, 
including, as has been shown before, the involvement of a multitude of actors in the 
policymaking process (THALER, 2015:147-148). Indeed, and in line with what is postulated by 
the theory of Multi-level Governance (MLG), policymaking competencies within the EU are 
spread across different actors, whereby energy is a special field to look at. Not only because it 
has traditionally been dominated by the member states and is a shared responsibility but also 
because it involves a wide range of other, non-governmental stakeholders which, as will be 
shown later, have been gaining an increasingly prominent role in recent years. 
As regards the horizontal dimension, there are, apart from the involvement of a multitude of 
actors and as has been indicated before, also several legal and institutional shortcomings such as 
an incomplete or restricted energy framework (DEBAERE, 2013:54) or the silence of Community 
primary law on energy matters (BLUMANN, 2012:3) that may prevent coordination (and thus 
consistency) from happening. In fact, despite the importance energy has had throughout the 
EU’s history and the fact that the Council had aimed at establishing a Community policy on 
energy as early as 1964 (MALTBY, 2013:437), up to the mid-2000s, there had been no specific 
energy chapter in any EEC treaty. Energy did not play an important role within the EEC and, in 
the absence of any Community policy, European energy policies were only based on voluntary 
general energy objectives (which were largely limited to nuclear energy) or linked to other 
policies’ objectives (EGENHOFER, BEHRENS, TOL, BETHELEMY, LEVEQUE and JANSEN, 
2011:124; TOSUN, BIESENBENDER and SCHULZE, 2015:5), a context in which the ECSC and 
EURATOM were the only supranational bodies that disposed of any energy competence. This 
was supposed to change with the launch of the SEA779 in 1986. However, the act remained 
 
779 which, as a reminder, first introduced some tangible measures for the establishment of a freer and common market by 1992. 
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limited to the internal market, a shortcoming that subsequent treaties such as Maastricht 
(1992),780 Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) equally failed to address (MALTBY, 2013:438).781 
And although the SEA was the basis for the internal market legislation introduced in the 1990s 
(MALTBY, 2013:438),782 it was only with the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) that energy policy (both 
internal and external) was first elevated to the Community level, i.e. the EU was first conferred 
explicit energy competence by its member states (NEFRAMI, 2012:167). Today, the Treaty of 
Lisbon forms the legal basis for the EU’s energy provisions, notably through Article 194, which 
for the first time sets out comprehensive common energy objectives, referring to the a) 
functioning of the energy market, b) security of energy supply as well as to c) energy efficiency 
and renewable energy (see § 1).783 Here, it must be stated though that this Article is afflicted 
with an important shortcoming (BRAUN, 2011:2), namely the fact that whilst energy objectives 
are framed by an internal market (‘the establishment and functioning of the internal market’) and 
an environment (‘to preserve and improve the environment’) perspective (see § 1), any external 
dimension is clearly excluded.784 Indeed, apart from a reference to the security of energy supply, 
which implicitly links to external action (LEAL-ARCAS and WOUTERS, 2017:39), the Article 
remains silent on EU external energy policymaking, leading some scholars to argue that external 
energy forms part of foreign, environmental/climate change and competition policies (BRAUN, 
2011:3). By contrast, the pursuit of external energy objectives is rather enabled by Article 216 § 
1 TFEU, according to which ‘the Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third 
countries or international organizations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of 
an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of 
the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely 
to affect common rules or alter their scope.’ Article 3 § 2 TFEU has a similar scope (PRADEL, 
2014:238), however, both Articles are relatively general and do not specify the EU’s 
competencies in external energy policy in detail. Therefore, there is overall consensus that 
‘European regulation addressing the external dimension of energy policy remained far and few 
between’ (AHNER, 2012:Abstract) and that ‘the EU has never had a built-in and purposive 
institutional framework that would allow for concerted external action’ (GEBHARD, 2017:104). 
Further, as regards the vertical dimension, one important factor that may prevent coordination 
(and thus consistency) from happening is Article 194 TFEU making energy policy a shared 
competence which is indeed considered in the literature to be one of the major shortcomings of 
the Treaty of Lisbon with respect to EU external energy policy. Basically, this means that 
although since Lisbon, energy policy is ‘no longer a matter exclusive to national administrations’ 
(SZULECKI, FISCHER, GULLBERG and SARTORI, 2016:549), the role of the EU institutions 
remains, as pointed out by Maltby (2013:441), however limited, notably when compared with 
 
780 In fact, the Maastricht Treaty introduced a new Article that included ‘measures in the field of energy as legitimate Community 
activities’, however, it did not introduce any new EU competencies (EGENHOFER, BEHRENS, TOL, BERTHELEMY, LEVEQUE and 
JANSEN, 2011:3). 
 
781 Overall, progress was notably made with respect to the internal market (competition, interconnection, including both electricity 
and gas connections) and with respect to energy efficiency and environment/climate protection. 
782 See the liberalisation directives introduced in 1996 (electricity) and 1998 (gas) respectively. EP (Accessed on 24 August 2018). 
783 Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, notably up to the 1980s, energy objectives were primarily driven forward by energy security 
concerns, but as of the 1990s, there was another leverage factor for closer energy cooperation: environmental concerns. Every time 
the member states were willing to abandon some sovereignty over energy and to transfer it to the EU this was either in the context 
of energy crises and/or of environmental or climate-related initiatives and primarily only concerned the internal market 
(EGENHOFER and BEHRENS in EGENHOFER, BEHRENS, TOL, BETHELEMY, LEVEQUE and JANSEN 2011:124; BAUMANN and 
SIMMERL, 2011:5; TOSUN, BIESENBENDER, SCHULZE 2015:4-5). 
784 Another shortcoming concerns the field of energy taxation, with corresponding decisions being subject to unanimity (BRAUN, 
2011:2).  
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the role of the member states, a circumstance that can be best explained with the theory of 
intergovernmentalism. According to this theory, there are doubts with respect to the 
applicability of institutionalism and neo-functionalism to the research problem, notably due to 
national considerations, with scholars like Van de Graaf and Colgan (2015:4) arguing that in 
reality, ‘national energy governance still reigns above regional or GEG’, a claim that also applies to 
the EU. However, and despite this recognition within the literature, addressing this issue has 
turned out to be a difficult task for one very simple reason, namely the fact that the member 
states fundamentally oppose it. In fact, and as mirrored in the fact that energy is a shared 
competence, they generally show any little or no interest at all in ceding some of their powers, 
seeking to vigorously protect their sovereignty. One telling example for this has been the 
development of the energy Chapter of the Treaty of Lisbon itself and the reason why, compared 
to other policy areas, it took so long to elevate energy policy to the Community level was the 
member states’ long-standing unwillingness to transfer any energy competencies to the EU. For 
example, whilst the Treaty was considered ‘a necessary legal basis for further integration of 
energy markets and the inclusion of environmental concerns into energy policy’, Germany was not 
an advocate of giving more competencies to the EU (SZULECKI, FISCHER, GULLBERG and 
SARTOR, 2016:554).785 Similarly, France, although principally in favour of a strong governance 
mechanism, seeks to keep state interference low in order to please national stakeholders and 
lobby groups (SZULECKI, FISCHER, GULLBERG, SARTOR, 2016:556). According to Pradel 
(2014:237), this reluctance to transfer any domestic energy competencies to the EU level stems 
from a time when the satisfaction of energy needs was still under the exclusive management of 
the member states.786 Against this background, there is widespread consensus in the literature 
that despite being a shared competence and although a ‘hesitant supranational turn in that area 
has been visible in the last decade’ (SZULECKI, FISCHER, GULLBERG, SARTOR, 2016:549), EU 
energy policy is still ‘dominated by national policies’ and ‘[…] governed on the basis of coordinated 
action by the Member States’ (LEAL-ARCAS and WOUTERS, 2017:40). This is, according to the 
scholars, all the more true for the external dimension of EU energy policies (AHNER, 
2012:Abstract), with Sartori (2014:5) noting that ‘the primacy of national energy strategies at the 
member state level still represents a decisive obstacle for all efforts to forge a external energy 
action at the EU level’. In this context, numerous are those who claim that energy policy under 
the Treaty of Lisbon ‘remains business as usual’ (BRAUN, 2011:8) and that the Treaty may 
actually serve as a breeding ground for disagreement and conflicts (METCALFE, 1996). Indeed, 
§§ 2 and 3 of Article 194 limit the competencies of the EU by giving the member states the right 
to preserve their national sovereignty on energy resources as well as the general structure of 
their energy supply787 which remains a ‘core area of national sovereignty’ (LEAL-ARCAS and 
WOUTERS, 2017:46). Further, Article 5 of the TEU stipulates that the EU only acts within the 
limits of these competencies (‘principle of conferral’) whose use is, in accordance with this 
Article, overall governed by the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality. This means that 
Community policies must be ‘complementary’ to member states policies (CREMONA, 2008:17) 
(implying mutual commitment). Moreover, as noted by Strunz, Gawel and Lehmann (2014:6), 
 
785 Indeed, as stated by Szulecki, Fischer, Gullberg and Sartor (2016:554), ‘in a long tradition of German energy policy, state 
intervention in energy markets in order to guarantee energy security is reduced to a minimum’ – a motto that is particularly reflected in 
Germany’s energy policies towards Russia (the context in which the German government opposes for example joint gas purchases). 
786 In fact, up until the late 1980s and the Single European Act (SEA), the member states and their state-owned energy industries 
were the only entities responsible for the conduct of national energy policies, a circumstance that only changed gradually and in the 
light of various energy crises, especially on energy supply, as well as with the threat of climate change. 
787 Concretely, Art. 194 refers here to the conditions for exploiting their energy resources, their choice between different energy 
sources and the general structure of their energy supply. 
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these Articles are formulated very vaguely, leaving room for broad interpretation, which in 
combination with the fact that EU energy law is inevitably imbued in or overshadowed by 
politics, may lead to task uncertainty (DEBAERE, 2013:46) as well as misunderstandings over 
competencies and thus a slow-down of coordination. This, in turn, reinforces the risk of 
inconsistency and contributes to situations of ineffectiveness and inefficiency (SARTORI, 
2014:1). 
Finally, overall, whilst the Treaty of Lisbon paved the way for addressing the issue of horizontal 
inconsistency by abandoning the EU pillar structure and reshuffling the EU’s external 
competencies – for example, through the creation of the EEAS and the post of the HR – this has, 
however, not necessarily implied the automatic creation of a single voice. By contrast, so 
Marangoni (2014:18), the addition of a new actor to the ‘EU’s institutional architecture’ 
contributed to ‘complicating institutional dynamics’, with the relinquishment of the EU pillar 
structure and the division between the CFSP and other external areas bearing a huge risk of 
inter-institutional conflicts.788 Here, Smith (2004:209) notes: ‘by attempting to create a closer 
link between the EC and the EU’s other external capabilities, the drafter of the TEU unwittingly 
created tensions, inconsistencies, and gaps between the rules governing these domains at the 
organisational and even individual levels.’ Further, although the creation of the HR was not meant 
to have any impact on the competencies of the member states within the CFSP domain which 
remains an area of intergovernmental competence, it however did have an impact on the 
Commission which saw its competencies decisively cut off (DAGAND, 2008:2).789 In fact, in 
setting up the HR and in order to increase horizontal consistency in EU foreign policy, the EU 
sought to incorporate the supranational and intergovernmental elements of the EU into one 
position (KOEHLER, 2010:66). As a result, the Commission did not only lose its right of initiative 
but is now also obliged to support proposals submitted by the HR (GASPERS, 2008:23). As 
regards the vertical governance level, there is no legal obligation or any other regulation 
solidarity (BRAUN, 2011:2) and, at the same time, the TEU also preserves the member states’ 
sovereignty. Moreover, there are several factors that the legal and institutional framework 
cannot control such as the international context or the member states’ national interests 
(GEBHARD, 2017:123). In other words, consistency is weakened by insufficient institutional 
reform (THALER, 2015:iii), the context in which a lack of enforceability or the absence of an 
accountability-imposing institution as well as a lack of control mechanisms capable of containing 
powerful actors are identified as particularly problematic in the literature (GEBHARD, 
2011:115). Indeed, after all, consistency remains a ‘normative requirement’ (THALER, 2015:37) 
that is not legally enforceable. This is first of all reflected in the fact that the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) does not have (with some exceptions) any jurisdiction in the field of the CFSP, i.e. it 
can legally enforce neither the horizontal nor the vertical consistency dimension.790 Therefore, as 
stated by Gebhard (2017:110), in reality,791 the issue is dealt with on a ‘case-by-case’ basis, 
wherby Koehler (2010:60) argues that ‘the exclusion of the principle of vertical coherence in the 
 
788 Indeed, as regards external consistency, the treaty reads that ‘the Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect’ (Art. 10A), whereby 
it must be distinguished between two different realms. In fact, whilst overall, the European Council and the Council notably play a 
role in intergovernmental policies like foreign and security or defense policies, the Commission rather dominates in the 
supranational domain (trade, agriculture, fisheries) (CARBONE, 2013:6). 
789 See Declaration 14 of the Lisbon Treaty: ‘the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to 
the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament.’ Eurlex (Accessed on 24 February 2019). 
790 Eurlex (Accessed on 11 November 2017). 
791 and although, over time, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) became increasingly involved in solving inter‐institutional disputes 
over competencies (PORTELA and RAUBE, 2009:10). 
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CFSP from the supervision of the ECJ illustrates the lingering discrepancy between the Member 
State’s general willingness to cooperate and their more specific willingness to determine the 
character of the European foreign policy in concrete situations’.  
7.1.1 The assignment of competencies in the energy policy cycle 
 
All the abovementioned factors may increase the risk of coordination failures and thus 
be a source of inconsistency. Therefore, to test Hypothesis 1, the assignment of competencies as 
a potential explanation for the empirical research outcome will be examined in the following. 
Whereas strategic/political and functional consistency is high in the horizontal and diagonal 
dimensions, it is low as far as the intergovernmental and vertical dimensions are concerned. 
Here, the fact that energy is a shared competence suggests that the assignment of competencies 
is clearer on the horizontal than on the vertical level also because, in the past, the shared 
responsibility for energy undertakings and the overall vague formulation of Article 194 has 
often led to disagreement. Basically, extensive coordination (and high consistency) in the 
horizontal dimension suggests that there is a clear assignment of competencies, whereas non-
extensive or limited coordination (and medium consistency) in the vertical dimension suggests 
the opposite. To determine whether this is true and whether there is any overlapping, the 
policymaking process will be broken down into its components, whereby three aspects will be 
looked at: agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation and financing & support. 
Agenda-setting 
There is consensus in the literature that in a system of Multi-level Governance (MLG) such as the 
EU, policy initiation is ‘a multi-actor activity’ and institutions are in competition with each other 
for control over agenda-setting (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:14, 16), a concept that can be 
defined as ‘the process of turning public issues into actionable government priorities’ 
(ZAHARIADIS, 2016:6). Or, as highlighted by Princen (2011:927), it is ‘about having an issue 
considered by policy-makers’ and is thus an important precondition for decision-making.  
In theory, the set-up of the agenda lies within the sole responsibility of the Commission as it is 
the only institution empowered to initiate and draft legislation (Art. 17 TEU) (any legislative 
proposal is then submitted to the Council and the Parliament), whereby its leverage ‘depends on 
its ability to anticipate and mediate demands, and its capacity to employ expertise derived from its 
role as the think tank of the European Union’, so Hooghe and Marks (2001:12, 16). However, 
impetus for any legislative proposal may come from outside the Commission (PRINCEN, 
2007:23) and although the latter has the overall competence to set or shape common policies, it 
‘has little margin to act alone’ (BRAUN, 2011:6) which is why it ‘is usually responsive to the wishes 
of the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, or interest groups’ 
(HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:16). Here, and with regard to energy, it has been revealed that 
coordination is particularly high between DG ENER and DG NEAR, as well as the EEAS, with 
corresponding agenda-setting powers being clearly separated. Indeed, with respect to projects 
of ‘European interest’ such as the MSP the lead lies with the Commissioner for Energy and DG 
ENER which ‘takes the lead and final decision’, whereas the HR can only ‘promote certain 
European preferences’. By contrast, when it comes to representing the EU externally and external 
negotiations, the HR dominates (BRAUN, 2011:5). In fact, whilst the EEAS’s role may at first sight 
seem to be similar to that of the Commission, their competencies are however different and 
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should not be confused. Most importantly, unlike the Commission, which retains overall 
responsibility over the EU’s foreign policy making, the EEAS does not dispose of any technical 
expertise, but only ‘feeds on’ the input of the corresponding DGs with whom it is in permanent 
contact and exchange (Interview EEAS, 2017). In fact, its declared mission being to serve the HR 
(Art. 27 TEU)792 and to assist the CFSP (COUNCIL DECISION 2010/427/EU), it has more of a 
support function and does not have any legal foreign policymaking powers in this context (VAN 
VOOREN and WESSEL, 2014:374). However, to carry out its mandate, it disposes of certain legal 
capacities (VAN VOOREN and WESSEL, 2014:374). For example, it supports the Commission and 
the EU member states in their work on the EU Energy Diplomacy Action Plan793 and is, together 
with DG NEAR, strongly involved in the programming of the EU’s external policy programmes, 
including the development of ENP Partnership Priorities. In fact, under § 9 of COUNCIL 
DECISION 2010/427/EU, the EEAS, in close cooperation with the Commission, has a role in the 
preparation of the country allocations under the Multiannual Financial Framework, the country 
and regional strategic papers, as well as the national and regional indicative programmes 
(Interview EEAS, 2017). Thus, it transpires that the EEAS does not really play a role in external 
energy policymaking but rather in external energy policy governance. 
As just mentioned, Commission proposals are subject to a wide range of influences, a context in 
which the European Council, given that the energy sphere remains above all a prerogative of the 
member states,794 is regularly identified as the (informal) agenda setter of the Union’s external 
energy policy (TOSUN, BIESENBENDER and SCHULZE, 2015:6-7).795 Being able to ‘give visibility 
to a topic’ (THALER, 2016:15), its corresponding agenda-setting competencies are hereby 
derived from Article 15 TEU which states as a responsibility the definition of ‘the general 
political directions and priorities thereof’ of the EU. In this light, the European Council has for 
example played a key role in the development of the European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy of 2006, the Energy Policy for Europe Action Plan of 2007, as 
well as in the completion of the EU’s internal energy market for which it laid out guidelines in 
2014. Furthermore, it has also pushed for the development of the climate and energy policy, 
asking, in 2011, the HR ‘to take fully account of the energy security dimension in her work’.796 
However, the role of the European Council should not be overestimated, as it does not dispose of 
any legislative powers (Art. 15 TEU § 1), but heavily depends on the Commission and the Council 
in this regard (BRAUN, 2011:4). Indeed, Article 15 specifies that the European Council ‘shall not 
exercise legislative functions’ which remain within the scope of the Commission, with critics 
arguing that the European Council’s agenda-setting powers are thus limited as the body is only 
entitled to issue general policy mandates rather than any specific policy proposals. Moreover, so 
the critics, the European Council’s powers are limited as it is highly dependent on the technical 
knowledge and input of the Commission (THALER, 2016:13) and meetings are held but rarely 
(HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:14). In this light, the Commission would ‘use and instrumentalize 
 
792 In this context, i.e. when serving the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) does not take any instructions from the Council or the Commission. By contrast, it takes instructions 
from the HR, who in turn is accountable to the EU institutions (VAN VOOREN and WESSEL, 2014:21). 
793 EEAS (Accessed on 03 December 2017).  
794 Overall, the member states influence the Commission’s agenda-shaping activities as the Commission usually anticipates their 
opposition (SZULECKI, FISCHER, GULLBERG, SARTOR, 2016:553). 
795 Europa (Accessed on 17 April 2019). 
796 EP (Accessed on 16 April 2019). 
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the European Council to advance in its goal’,797 implying a cooperative agenda and coordinated 
actions between the two institutions (THALER, 2016:13). 
Unlike the European Council, the Council and the Parliament actually both have some agenda-
setting or structuring powers (TOSUN, BIESENBENDER and SCHULZE, 2015:9), a context in 
which they already happen to be in competition with the Commission – see, for example, 
negotiations on the mandate for the UN Environment Programme on addressing mercury in 
2010 (BRAUN, 2011:5).798 In fact, although the Commission retains the sole power of initiation, 
the Council and the Parliament do act as co-legislators which means they can review 
Commission proposals and propose amendments. In this light, the Council may, in accordance 
with Articles 192 and 208 of the TEC, ‘request the Commission to undertake any studies’ it (the 
Council) considers desirable for the attainment of the common objectives, and to submit to it any 
appropriate proposals.’ Moreover, it can also make soft law, for example in the form of 
resolutions (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:14-15). Compared to this, the Parliament has a rather 
consultative role as far as the design of policies is concerned (TOSUN, BIESENBENDER and 
SCHULZE, 2015:9).799 Noteworthy here are its consultation and information rights with respect 
to international agreements. For example, it now approves or rejects the signature of 
Association Agreements (AAs) and trade agreements800 (Art. 218 TFEU).801 This also applies to 
energy where no project of ‘Common Interest’ can be established without its prior permission 
(BRAUN, 2011:7). Whilst such projects are negotiated by the Council and the Commission, the 
Parliament may however exercise influence upon their formulation beforehand and make 
recommendations, for example through parliamentary questions and resolutions to these actors 
(NATORSKI and HERRANZ SURRALLES, 2008:78), whereby in this context the Parliament is 
itself equally subject to internal and external influences (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:1, 8-9).802 
Finally, non-state actors also engage in the agenda-shaping process, either directly by submitting 
petitions to the Parliament or contacting the Commission (VANDEVEER, 2015:321) or by 
exerting influence on national actors, as will be shown later. 
 
Decision-making 
According to the theory of MLG, decision-making competencies are not monopolised by one 
group of actors or national governments, but shared by different actors (HOOGHE and MARKS, 
2001:3; LELIEVELDT and PRINCEN, 2015:39) which applies all the more to energy. Most energy 
areas being characterised by decentralised decision making, there are various EU institutions 
playing a major role in this domain, including the European Council, the Council, the Commission 
and the Parliament.  
As the voice of the member states, the European Council and the Council are the main bodies to 
represent the intergovernmental mode of decision-making within the EU, whereby the Council is 
by far the most important institution as regards decision-making (in comparison, the European 
 
797 For example, through officials from the Directorate General Energy (DG Energy) attending Council working groups and 
committees (THALER, 2016:16). 
798 Negotiations have above all been characterised by discussions between the Commission and the Council over the EU’s external 
representation (BRAUN, 2011:5). 
799 EP (Accessed on 14 August 2017). 
800 MoUs are generally excluded from the provisions of Article 218. In fact, they would only be included if they were legally binding 
(VAN VOOREN, 2012:221). 
801 EP (Accessed on 14 August 2017). 
802 Europa (Accessed on 17 April 2019). 
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Council has a rather limited role), with Article 352 § 1 of the TEU reading: ‘if action by the Union 
should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one 
of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, 
the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures’. The Council’s 
competencies were decisively cut in the context of the SEA of 1986, as well as with the Treaty of 
Maastricht of 1993 which respectively established and increased the scope of qualified majority 
voting (QMV) within the institution (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:1, 4-5). The aim was to curtail 
national sovereignty – in fact, whilst since the so-called ‘Empty Chair Crisis’ of the 1966,803 the 
states were allowed to veto on topics deemed to be vital to their national interests (see 
Luxembourg Compromise which de facto promoted unanimity as the standard procedure), they 
can now only sustain a veto if other governments approve it (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:19). 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, QMV was increasingly extended and, as of today, unanimity is only 
required for specific topics such as the accession of new member states, the approval of EU 
treaties & the multi-annual budget and the harmonisation of national tax legislation, as well as 
foreign and security policies. Yet, each member state retains the right to veto which makes 
decision-making an extremely complex affair and has actually hampered the achievement of 
consistency in the past (and ultimately of common objectives). For example, in 2008, the Climate 
Package was threatened to be vetoed by Italy and Poland804 and the MSP failed in 2013 because 
of a veto by Spain. Moreover, apart from their right to veto, so Hooghe and Marks (2001:19), the 
states have other ways of defending their domestic interests, for instance, by building in special 
safeguards in treaties, a popular practice in energy policies.  
Generally, the Council does not act alone, but is supported by a wide range of other players, 
above all the Commission and the Parliament (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:23). In fact, given that 
no decision can be taken without a prior proposal made by the Commission, the latter plays an 
important (although indirect) role as regards decision-making.805 Further, and as for the CFSP, 
the Commission actually has a support function to the HR as it may submit decisions in this area 
to the Council (Art. 30 TEU). As for the Parliament, and as far as legal procedures related to 
international agreements are concerned, the members (MEPs) must give their consent, implying 
that with respect to energy projects of European interests, no decision can be taken without 
prior consent of the Parliament. Moreover, both the Council and the Commission must inform 
the Parliament at all stages of the policy process (BRAUN, 2011:7). 
Implementation 
MLG is also a prominent theory as regards the implementation stage, with corresponding 
legislative and executive competencies being shared between the Commission and the Council or 
the national governments. In fact, whilst the Commission must implement EU laws (executive 
powers) (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:24), in its role as main legislator (legislative powers), it 
also oversees the application of EU law by the member states as decisions taken at the 
supranational level are expected to be transformed into national legislation.806 However, in 
 
803 The trigger for this crisis was French President Charles de Gaulle’s veto against an EU budgetary reform in 1965 (HOOGHE, 
MARKS, 2001:19). 
804 PHILLIPS Leigh (16 October 2008), Italy, Poland threaten to veto EU climate package, EUObserver (Accessed on 21 December 
2018). 
805 EP (Accessed on 17 April 2019). 
806 EC (Accessed on 17 April 2019). 
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reality, it has few powers of implementation as, according to Article 202 TEC, ‘the Council confers 
on the Commission powers for the implementation of the rules it lays down’, meaning that it (the 
Council) remains the actual holder of these powers. Also, the member states are supposed to 
monitor the Commission’s powers; this is done via the creation of committees attached to the 
Commission that are eventually capable of preventing the former from taking certain action, the 
context in which the rules of operation ‘are a source of friction’ between the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament807 (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:24).  
Another source of friction concerns the organisation of external representation between the 
European Council and the EEAS, with, as shown before, the President of the European Council 
being entitled to represent the EU externally concerning its common foreign and security policy 
‘without prejudice to the power of the High Representative’ (Art. 15 of the TEU). Indeed, as shown 
before, the competencies of the HR as regards the CFSP are extensive, comprising powers of 
initiative, management, implementation and representation (Art. 27 TEU) which may lead to 
difficulties with the President of the European Council. In fact, according to Article 27 of the TEU, 
the HR must implement the decisions adopted by the European Council and Council, raising the 
question of how this will harmonise with his/her powers of initiative on a daily basis. In other 
words, or as this suggests, there is no clear division of the two actors’ respective responsibilities 
and tasks with regard to representing the EU internationally and overall, the relations between 
the two actors have remained relatively vague.  
Likewise, the risk of overlapping is high as regards the relations between the HR and the 
Commission, given notably the latter’s competencies in a wide range of external areas. For 
example, both actors have the right to issue instructions to the EU delegations. In this light, the 
EEAS has in the past often been assigned a lack of cooperation with the Commission (CARTA, 
2016:205), an issue that has however been a topic of the Juncker Commission.808 One general 
problem here is the fact that the exact scope of the EEAS is relatively vague, with Article 27 of 
the TEU not really mentioning the service’s nature. Further, it has also often been attributed a 
lack of delimitation of powers (GATTI, 2016:301),809 which in turn may contribute to 
inconsistency. Similarly, as for the relationship between the HR and the Council, difficulties may 
arise between the FAC and the General Affairs Council,810 as both Councils (the FAC via the HR) 
are responsible for the CFSP.  
Finance & support 
Contrary to agenda-setting and decision-making, the competencies related to budgeting, 
financing and support are strictly separated across the different EU institutions and bodies. 
Budgetary responsibility and powers of control over the implementation of the budget on the EU 
level are shared between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. In fact, whilst the 
Commission draws up the annual draft budget (Art. 314 TFEU; Art. 317 TFEU), the Council and 
 
807 Holding several powers of scrutiny, the Parliament is in charge of monitoring the Commission’s delegating acts. EP (Accessed on 
08 September 2019).  
808 For example, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission are working together on the exchange of human 
resources devoted to external relations issues in headquarters and in EU delegations. Council (Accessed on 14 August 2017). 
809 According to GATTI (2016:303), this is due to the fact that neither the EU institutions nor the member states can completely 
control the European External Action Service (EEAS).  
810 The General Affairs Council is chaired by the rotating Presidency.  
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the Parliament may amend this draft.811 Similarly, and as for external energy policies, the 
Commission manages the Union’s external energy cooperation assistance programmes, 
including the management of the financing instruments of these programmes, but the 
Parliament may adopt financial instruments for external action too.812 By contrast, funding lies in 
the hands of the EIB and the EBRD which act as the main financing institutions. Finally, Med-Reg 
& Co serve as ‘technical’ supporters.  
7.1.2 Interim conclusion 
 
Based on the previous Section, it can be noted that competencies seem to serve only as a 
partial explanation for coordination (and thus consistency) in EU energy governance towards 
Morocco and whilst Hypothesis H1 cannot be disproved, it cannot be entirely confirmed either. 
By contrast, the fact that several examples have been found that are characterised by the same 
level of separation of competencies, but have different coordination outcomes, rather suggests 
that no matter the degree of clearness in the assignment of competencies, there is no actual 
guarantee for coordination (and thus consistency). For example, as regards agenda-setting, there 
is extensive coordination (which is also true for decision-making & implementation) even 
though there is a multitude of agenda-setters and that corresponding competencies do 
sometimes overlap. By contrast, on the vertical level where agenda-setting, decision-making and 
implementation is via the European Council and the Council, also in the hands of the member 
states, coordination is limited or lacking. Here, one may assume that one reason for seamless 
coordination in the horizontal dimension is the existence of a superordinate framework, the 
ENP, that, by uniting all the relevant EU-institutions and bodies, enhances the EU’s institutional 
capacity for coordination. Although this assumption seems to be plausible, it has however not 
been tested by this dissertation (neither with Morocco or a non-ENP country) and looking into 
this assumption in detail is beyond its scope and would require further research.  
The fact that competencies thus offer only a partial explanation for coordination (and thus 
consistency) in EU energy governance towards Morocco, confirms disagreement in the literature 
as to whether and to what extent the assignment of competencies determines EU coordination. 
In fact, on this point, this study rather concurs with the outcome of researchers such as Debaere 
(2013:123) according to whom there is no direct correlation between competencies and 
coordination or, as brought forward by Elgström and Jönsson (2004:219): ‘the internal 
distribution of competencies between member states and the Commission provides a necessary, 
although insufficient, explanation of variations in EU actorness’.  
7.2 Interests  
 
As shown in the theoretical part of this dissertation, other than competencies, interests 
are another important factor for explaining coordination (and thus consistency) or as stated by 
Jorgensen and Laatikainen (2013:320), the level of coordination ‘depends largely on the 
preferences’ and ‘differs per issue area’. To determine whether interests may also serve as an 
explanation for the research outcome and to test Hypothesis 2, namely that ‘the less diverse the 
 
811 In fact, following the Commission’s drafted annual budget, the Council adopts its position on the draft budget and forwards it to 
the Parliament which has 42 days to either approve or amend it. EP (Accessed on 08 September 2019).  
812 This includes the Multiannual Financial Framework which can only be adopted by the Council following consent of the Parliament 
(VAN VOOREN and WESSEL, 2014:28). EP (Accessed on 14 August 2017). 
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interests of the different stakeholders involved in EU external energy governance, the more 
extensive the coordination (and thus the higher the consistency) of their energy policies’, the focus 
in the following will be on the functional and strategic/political aspects.  
7.2.1 Functional interests 
 
As has been revealed in Chapter 6, coordination is above all extensive (and consistency 
high) when it is not political, i.e. when it centres around financial or technical issues. Indeed, 
functional coordination is extensive, no matter at which level and dimension, suggesting a 
convergence of interests in this regard. And indeed, as elaborated below, there seems to be a low 
level of polarisation in the interests of the different EU actors involved in EU energy governance 
towards Morocco, with their focus being globally on climate change concerns and sustainable 
forms of energy such as gas and renewables, as well as on energy efficiency. This is plausible 
given that the EU and the member states have committed to the same energy principles and 
goals, and the member states’ policies are, despite their being independent as regards energy 
mix, likely to be framed by overreaching EU interests in this regard.   
As for the EU institutions, both the European Council and Morocco agreed, amongst other 
things, to enhance cooperation in the fields of renewable energies and energy efficiency during 
the fourteenth meeting of the Association Council in July 2019.813 The way to these agreements 
was paved by the Parliament which, by approving amendments to the EU-Morocco Association 
and fisheries agreements, contributed to solving the dispute over the Sahara in early 2019.814  
The Commission has a similar focus and based on the European Council Action Plan (2007-
2009), it signed a declaration with Morocco in 2007 with the aim of strengthening Morocco’s 
role as ‘a transit country for gas supplies to the EU as well as an electricity exporter to the EU’.815 
The ultimate goal here is the integration of both the Moroccan and European energy systems. 
This interest has been long-standing: for example, already in 2007, in the side-lines of the 
Morocco-EU Association Council in July, the Commission signed a joint declaration on 
cooperation in the energy sector with its Moroccan counterparts, whereby the reinforcement of 
Morocco’s energy policy in view of the country’s energy market integration with the EU was 
identified as the main priority (other areas of interest were the enhancement of security of 
energy supplies, as well as the development of sustainable energy policies).816 Subsequent to this 
Council, great significance was given to the convergence of Moroccan energy policies with EU 
energy policies,817 thereby necessitating an opening-up of the Moroccan market818 with the 
primary objective of modernising the Moroccan energy sector. In this light, both partners signed 
a Financing Agreement for the Reform of the Energy Sector Support Programme in 2009 for the 
purpose of contributing to Morocco’s national energy strategy through the implementation of 
institutional capacity-building support instruments. Total costs stood at € 76.66 million, 80% of 
which were dedicated to budget support and 20% to project support.819 At the end of the reform 
processes, so the initiators of the programme, the country’s dependence on energy imports, 
 
813 European Council (Accessed on 15 November 2019).  
814 MORAN James (11 October 2019), EU-Morocco: stage set for a new partnership, Euractiv (Accessed on 16 November 2019).  
815 EC (Accessed on 18 April 2017). 
816 EC (Accessed on 20 August 2017). 
817 ENPI (Accessed on 21 August 2017). 
818 a requirement in line with the EU’s general development targets to support Morocco in its transition towards market economy 
and the promotion of sustainable development. 
819 Statut Avancé (Accessed on 30 August 2017); EC (Accessed on 25 November 2017). 
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notably from fossil fuels, would be reduced thanks to the reduction or control of energy 
consumption and the diversification of energy supplies, notably through the development and 
promotion of RES and energy efficiency.820 Here, and with regard to the EU’s objective to import 
renewable electricity from the southern Mediterranean, this dissertation has shown that 
multilateral initiatives like the MSP or Desertec have had limited success so far. Nonetheless, the 
idea of importing or exporting green power from or to North Africa has never been totally 
abandoned and the setting up or development of corresponding infrastructure has regularly 
been on the Commission’s agenda (see roadmap for Sustainable Electricity Trade (SET) of 2016), 
with the development of their investment having been subject to both bilateral821 and 
multilateral aid. Indeed, the UfM, in the context of its three energy platforms, equally focuses on 
the development of gas and electricity-related infrastructure as well as on renewable energy and 
energy efficiency in general. Finally, whilst the EIB primarily supports projects in the fields of 
energy infrastructure, renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, the EBRD funding 
notably targets the power sector, whereby the focus is on sustainable energy (see Table 11).  
Table 11: EU energy interests in Morocco 
Overall aim of energy policy Energy security, competitiveness, sustainable development
Energy policy approach Development approach
Energy interest RES, energy efficiency, electricity,  gas
Financed by EIB, EBRD, NIF
Managed by DG NEAR, EEAS, UfM
Ulterior motive Security (stability)  
Source: Own elaboration based on the reviewed literature and empirical research. 
Table 12: Energy interests of EU institutions and bodies in Morocco 
Institution/
body
Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Elec. RES EE Minerals
European 
Council
x x x x
EC x x x x
EP x x x
EEAS x x x x
UfM x x x x
EIB x x x x
EBRD x x x
Domain of interest
 
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.  
As regards the regional associations, interests are largely aligned and geared towards electricity 
and energy efficiency (see Table 13). For example, focused on the regulation of Mediterranean 
electricity markets, MedReg seeks to integrate RES in the Moroccan electricity market,822 
 
820 EEAS (Accessed on 19 November 2017). 
821 Eurlex (Accessed on 26 October 2019). 
822 EU Neighbours (Accessed on 16 November 2019).  
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whereas gas is another priority. Likewise, Med-TSO aims at establishing a secure and sustainable 
electricity grid, the context in which renewables and energy efficiency both play an important 
role. Finally, both MEDENER and RES4MED equally promote the use of renewables for electricity 
generation as well as energy efficiency. 
Table 13: Energy interests of regional associations in Morocco 
Institution
Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Elec. RES EE Minerals
MedReg x x x x
Med-TSO x x x
MEDENER x x
OME x x x x
RES4MED x x x
Domain of interest
 
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.  
Likewise, interests are largely aligned when it comes to the member states (see Table 14), a 
claim that will be investigated further in the next Section. Indeed, empirical research has shown 
that the interests of the most relevant member states active in the Moroccan energy landscape 
(France, Spain, Germany, Portugal, Italy) are quite similar and pretty much aligned – both with 
the EU institutions, as well as with each other – with renewables, energy efficiency and 
electricity or sustainable energy policies serving as connecting elements. The only exception 
here is France which, contrary to its fellow states, pursues an interest in nuclear power. To the 
knowledge of the author of this dissertation, this has, however not led to any conflicts so far.  
Table 14: Energy interests of EU member states (selected) in Morocco  
Country
Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Elec. RES EE Minerals
France x x x x x x x
Spain x x x x x x
Germany x x x
Portugal x x x
Italy x x x x x
Domain of interest
 
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.  
7.2.2 Strategic/political interests 
 
Whilst functional coordination is extensive (and consistency high), no matter in which 
dimension and on which level, Part 6 has also revealed that strategic/political coordination is 
more extensive in the EU multilevel system than on the third-country level and overall more 
pronounced as regards the horizontal and diagonal dimensions. By contrast, it is less 
pronounced as regards the intergovernmental and vertical dimensions. This seems curious at 
first sight given that both the EU institutions and member states pursue, as just shown, similar 
interests in Morocco which, in theory, suggests for a common governance approach which would 
lead one to assume an extensive level of coordination. However, this is not always the case and 
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the lack of coordination indicates a divergence in (underlying) views with respect to EU energy 
governance towards Morocco here. In other words, given that ‘the possibility of coordination 
greatly depends on the compatibility of the views of the EU member states’ (JORGENSEN and 
LAATIKAINEN, 2013:225), attempts to coordinate as regards to strategic/political aspects may – 
despite similar energy interests – be overshadowed by political divisions, an assumption that 
this Section seeks to examine.  
It has been shown in the previous Section that the energy interests of the EU-institutions and the 
member states seem to be identical, centring largely around sustainable energies and including 
both bilateral and multilateral agreements, whereby the enhancement of renewable energy 
cooperation, as well as the strengthening of electricity and gas interconnections (infrastructure) 
through both bilateral and multilateral channels is a shared objective. However, it has also been 
shown that notably multilateral energy initiatives generally do not deliver – see the MSP and 
Desertec which have only shown moderate success so far, at least as far as their original format 
is concerned. Further, strategic/political coordination between the EU and the member states, as 
well as amongst the member states, is particularly slow when it comes to multilateral 
initiatives823 and this although, as brought forward in a MedReg concept paper, ‘all 
Mediterranean countries are aware of the benefits of increasing market integration in the 
Mediterranean Basin’.824 Whilst against this background, it may seem to be common sense for the 
member states to align their interests towards the Mediterranean, there is evidence that some of 
them are not reconciled to the idea of a common approach, with Rubino (2015)825 arguing that 
the UfM energy platforms took place ‘in a political vacuum and in the absence of any credible 
multilateral dialogue established in the energy field in the region’ (here, the fact that the UfM, as 
well as MedReg and Med-TSO are not entrusted with any powers to issue legally binding 
decisions regarding energy policies towards North Africa, certainly is an issue). And indeed, 
whilst this research has shown that the platforms have an important function when it comes to 
diagonal cooperation, they, as well as the UfM in general, play an overall minor role in EU energy 
governance towards Morocco though (notably when compared with the NIP). 
In fact, it can be noted that in both the MSP and Desertec cases, political and economic backing 
began to evaporate over the course of time, mainly because the projects were thought to be 
overly ambitious or, as put by some critics, unrealistic (TAGLIAPIETRA and ZACHMANN, 
2016:4) or even ‘utopian’.826 Detractors notably argue that the development of renewable power 
must be carried out by small local initiatives rather than by European-based large regional 
projects (Interview MEDENER, 2017),827 all the more so because, in their opinion, Europe and 
North Africa are not a unified region.828 At this point, and given the absence of any scientific 
evidence for this assumption in the literature, one can legitimately ask whether these projects 
 
823 At this point, it must be noted that the literature and policymakers show strong consensus that projects including institutional 
initiatives aimed at enhancing regional cooperation, i.e. the Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MedReg) and the Mediterranean 
Transmission System Operators (Med-TSO) have been more efficient so far than projects not involving public stakeholders such as 
MED-ENEC or MED-EMIP (SARTORI, 2014:7). 
824 Medreg (Accessed on 11 September 2018). 
825 RUBINO Alessandro (04 May 2015), Three platforms for no Mediterranean (energy) policy, Istituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica 
Internazionale (ISPI) (Accessed on 03 November 2017). 
826 CALDERBANK Selwa (31 May 2013), Desertec abandons Sahara solar power export dream, Euractiv (Accessed on 14 January 
2018). 
827 KEATING Dave (05 February 2016), Could Morocco’s megaplant revive dreams of Saharan solar?, DW (Accessed on 14 December 
2017). 
828 HAMOUCHENE Hamza (01 March 2015), Desertec: the renewable energy grab? New Internationalist (Accessed on 14 December 
2017). 
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would have been more successful if they had been conceptualised on a smaller scale or if they 
had not involved so many stakeholders. Whilst such considerations are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, having examined the projects, the involvement of multiple stakeholders who had 
completely different roles and priorities has however been identified as a major obstacle to the 
project. Or as put in a nutshell by Escribano (2017:250, 254), one main limitation was a lack of 
integration within the EU or ‘inward Europeanization’829 and the fact that interests were not at 
all considered properly, whereby bottlenecks became notably apparent vertically i.e. between 
the EU institutions and the member states, resulting in a number of initial participants having 
progressively lost interest in the project. This was notably the case for Spain which bailed out of 
the project due to insufficient grid interconnectivity within the EU as well as between the EU and 
North Africa. In fact, during the global economic crisis, electricity demand in Spain decreased by 
8% between 2008 and 2013, leading to overcapacities in the country’s domestic electricity 
sector. Consequently, and being unable to export this electricity to its EU partners due to 
insufficient electricity connections, notably with France, Spain would have been the only country 
physically connected to Morocco via power cables.830 For this reason, and not accepting any 
statistical electricity transfers as proposed by Germany and Morocco, in 2012, it dropped out of 
a previously-agreed deal on three Moroccan 500 MW solar power plants which were part of a 
Desertec pilot project,831 bringing the whole Desertec undertaking to a halt. Parallel to this, 
Germany’s position with respect to Desertec changed as well, mainly for political reasons but 
also for economic reasons.832 Similar developments have also been observed on the European 
level, the financial crisis reduced available financial resources drastically (ESCRIBANO, 
2017:254).  
Suggesting a divergence of views as regards multilateral energy cooperation, i.e. the member 
states, despite pursuing similar energy interests in the region, do not work multilaterally with 
one another because of different policy views, an in-depth analysis of the underlying reasons for 
this drifting apart in beliefs will be presented in the following. The literature here proposes two 
major reasons which can be assigned to problems associated with the EU, national and local 
levels: 
a) the fragmentation of the multilateral logic of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and 
the member states’ preference for bilateral relationships (TAGLIAPIETRA and 
ZACHMANN, 2016:2), and 
b) the erroneous understanding of the fundamentals of the partnership and the third 
country’s preference for bilateral relationships 
 
829 Here, Escribano refers to the lack of electricity interconnections across the Pyrenees. Whilst the EU targets a 10% interconnection 
by 2030, as of 2015, the level of interconnection between Spain and France stood at 3%. 
830 IAE (Accessed on 30 September 2017). 
831 in which apart from Morocco (represented by the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy MASEN), France, Italy, Malta and 
Luxembourg were involved. Helioscsp (Accessed on 17 January 2018). 
832 On the political level, hesitance notably resulted from the fact that renewable energy projects at that time were more expensive 
than conventional energy projects (and thus generally required subsidies) and that the implementation of Desertec would, because 
of its scale, be particularly complicated. Further, the Fukushima catastrophe of 2011 had led to the government’s decision to phase-
out nuclear power by 2022 and to replace it with RES which in the following pushed German energy companies to increasingly focus 
on developing their own RES industries. Consequently, costs for domestic RES, notably solar power, started to drop, which, in turn, 
boosted domestic supply and made the idea of importing energy less attractive from an economic point of view. STONINGTON Joel 
(13 November 2012), Quagmire in the Sahara: Desertec’s Promise of Solar Power for Europe Fades, Spiegel Online (Accessed on 14 
January 2018).  
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As this suggests, both the member states and Morocco are reluctant to cooperate on a 
multilateral basis because of their preference for bilateral relations. And whilst this is, of course, 
not the only source of inconsistency, it is, however, the main reason why the EU is often 
perceived as a non-unified actor.  
a) Fragmentation of the multilateral logic 
Part 6 has revealed that multilateral strategic/political coordination between the EU and the 
member states, as well as amongst the member states is generally limited (and consistency low), 
a failure that is closely linked to the general limits of the EU’s multilateral approach towards the 
Mediterranean region which, as a reminder, has regularly come under the spotlight of criticism, 
as notably the EMP and the UfM have been unable to convince the countries of the region (DIEZ 
and TOCCI, 2017:90). In this context, one can detect a certain level of pragmatism as regards the 
coordination efforts undertaken by the EU member states, i.e. they generally support them when 
they can be sure they will benefit from this, whereas they refrain doing so when they fear any 
disadvantage. This fear is particularly pronounced when it comes to the member states’ relations 
with third countries and overall, it seems that they (the member states) prefer to conduct their 
own policies and to favour their own priorities with the EU being ‘challenged by the policies of EU 
member states that are acting autonomously in the field of energy’ (CEBECI, 2019:5).833 
Consequently, so the scholars, the EU has abandoned its macro-regional vision’ and started to 
create a ‘multiplicity of bilateral Mediterraneans’ instead, de facto resulting in a bilateralisation of 
relations (CEBECI, 2019:4).834 As a result, the target countries have the feeling that the EU ‘lacks 
a strategy for the Maghreb’ and that its approach was primarily motivated by ‘interest-driven 
member states’ (DIEZ and TOCCI, 2017:91).  
To elucidate the abovementioned behaviour of the member states, one must take a step back 
and examine their underlying motivations or put differently: whilst, as shown before, their 
overall energy interests are largely the same, their superimposed interests are not. One telling 
example here is the set-up of the UfM which is a ‘highly politicized’ project (GRECO, 2017:7) and 
was, as already mentioned, notably pushed for by France (supported by Italy, Spain and Greece), 
whereas fearing a splitting of the EU, notably Germany (as well as the UK) were rather sceptical, 
which is why the Union was later built on existing EU structures.835 The same applies to Morocco 
where France’s interests are above all geopolitical or political, whereas Spain’s interests are 
more of an industrial or commercial nature and Germany pursues more a development 
approach. In fact, as explained by Fernandez-Molina (2015:100), the two former colonial powers 
‘each have a web of particular interests – economic, social, cultural, ‘human’ and elite 
interdependence, which is almost symbiotic for France and more determined by territorial 
contiguity and security imperatives as far as Spain is concerned.’ In this context, Jorgensen, 
Aarstad, Drieskens, Laatikainen and Tonra (2015:920) raise an important issue, namely 
divergence over the fundamental question of which approach to follow – a market approach as 
proposed by the EU, or a national, more strategic foreign policy approach (including energy 
diplomacy). Another problem are the different attitudes of the member states towards the ENP, 
 
833 In other words, the member states have the tendency to increase their bilateral cooperation efforts with third states, whilst 
decreasing their respective effort within the EU framework. Or, as put by Cebeci (2019:4), ‘it is mostly the EU’s member states that 
undermine the EU’s image in and policies on the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean’. 
834 Or, as put by Greco (2017:5), ‘bilateral differentiation and selective cooperation have replaced the early holistic approach’. 
835 initially, the northern EU member states were to be excluded.  
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whereby, so Cohen-Hadria (2016:44-45), a lot of member states feel disengaged, because they 
find the procedures of the policy too unwieldy and because they are excluded from meetings.  
In fact, overall, the perception of the ENP and the attitude of the member states towards it ‘varies 
and depends on the interest of neighbours’ (BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA 
and VAN DER LOO, 2017:88), which in turn is closely linked to hard factors such as history and 
geography. As already pointed out, energy cooperation between the EU and the southern 
Mediterranean has on the whole been intergovernmental for the past decade, i.e. it has been 
based on strong bilateral links between notably the southern EU member states and the big 
energy producing countries Algeria, Libya and Egypt. The reason for this is twofold: whilst on 
the one hand, compared with Russia or Norway, the Maghreb countries have been considered 
less relevant to the EU, on the other hand, they have traditionally belonged to the geopolitical 
sphere of influence of the southern EU member states, namely, France, Italy and Spain 
(SARTORI, 2014:1, 3; BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 
2017:74). As stated by Medreg, ‘an historical tradition of relationships and strong 
complementarities exist between EU and non-EU countries within the area of the Mediterranean 
Basin’.836 Such complementarities which naturally also go along with common challenges, 
primarily lie within the fact that the EU is a net energy importer, whereas the Mediterranean 
possesses more energy resources than it actually needs, with its economies heavily depending 
on energy exports into the EU. Given these dependencies, in many cases, the relationships 
between the southern EU member states and the Maghreb countries have existed for several 
decades and are built on long-standing historical,837 cultural and diplomatic ties, with economic 
aspects prevailing. To be mentioned here are for example the relations between France and 
Algeria (although they were and are still not free from pain), Italy and Libya or the UK and Egypt.  
At this point and as just indicated, it must be pointed out that, in the past, these individual ties 
have often led to situations of conflicting preferences (BAUMANN and SIMMERL, 2011:13). For 
example, during the 2006 EU-Algeria Association Council, and in order to enhance energy 
cooperation, Spain, under Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who was highly 
committed to including Algeria in the EU’s energy policy dialogue, tried to convince the other 
member states that they should increase their financial commitments to Algeria. Apart from 
France, this proposal, however, did not meet with much interest. Consequently, Spain – which 
accused its EU partners, especially Germany, of being too focused on its Eastern gas supplier 
Russia – started prioritising its own bilateral initiatives towards Algeria, and so did France in 
2006 by offering a new energy treaty to Algeria. Likewise, during the May 2016 EU-Algeria 
business forum, Algeria showed interest in expanding its hydrocarbon export capacities towards 
the EU and, in order to gain new hydrocarbon markets, notably in eastern Europe, it therefore 
pushed for the construction of a gas pipeline connecting Spain and Portugal to France (Mid-Cat 
Pipeline). Whilst such a project would relieve the gas bottleneck across the Pyrenees and 
therefore receives strong support from the Commission and some of the member states,838 not 
all of them are convinced. By contrast, struggling with too much gas in their respective markets, 
Spain and Portugal favour the project, whereas France opposes it, as it does not see any 
 
836 Medreg (Accessed on 11 September 2018). 
837 which are often rooted in colonialism (COLOMBO and ADELKHALIQ, 2012:6). 
838 classified as a Project of Common Interest (PCI), the Commission signed two grant agreements of € 5.6 million for studies on the 
set-up of the pipeline in April 2016. 
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economic need.839 Overall, and given that their bilateral links with the third countries have been 
rather successful, particularly when it comes to infrastructure projects,840 the southern member 
states seek to maintain their influence and are sceptical about regional EU initiatives, a reality 
that, as reflected in the ENP review of 2015, the EU is slowly starting to take into account.841  
b) Erroneous understanding of the fundamentals 
As has been revealed in Part 6, the EU member states are not the sole actors to prefer bilateral 
relationships. Indeed, Morocco is also reluctant to engage in multilateral coordination although 
it has not at all been opposed to regional energy initiatives like the MSP and Desertec.842 
However, although there is some framework allowing for multilateral cooperation, all in all, 
Morocco’s energy authorities have shown little interest in fostering multilateral exchange so far 
and would rather opt for bilateral frameworks, be it with the EU institutions or the member 
states, a context in which they welcome bottom-up initiatives taking place on the local level (and 
involving few public stakeholders). At this point, it must be highlighted that Morocco is not an 
isolated case. On the contrary, all of the North African countries generally prefer bilateral energy 
partnerships, be it with the EU or with each other. And although in this context, the EU has, as 
shown before, ‘essentially taken on the vector of bilateral agreements’843 (see ENP), with respect 
to energy, it nonetheless lags behind the member states. This becomes particularly clear when 
looking at the EU-Algerian energy relationship: indeed, although both actors are bound to each 
other via a strategic energy partnership, multilateral cooperation is, as mentioned before, on the 
whole low. Overall, the target countries’ preference for bilateral relations can, apart from the 
historical and geographical configurations elaborated above, also be explained by regional 
dynamics (and rivalry), as well as by a fundamentally erroneous understanding of the EU-
Mediterranean partnership. 
In fact, regional dynamics play an important role in determining the way in which EU 
governance is carried out, and one reason why the target countries prefer bilateral relations is 
because they do not oblige them to share information or projects with any regional competitors 
like Israel in the context of the UfM projects, for example.844 Indeed, the outcome of UfM 
meetings is always a reflection of the respective political situation of the members, whereby one 
can identify an overall lack of relations (Interview UfM, 2017). Furthermore, whilst the UfM’s 
energy platforms have been designed to reclaim lost ground in the region, this research has, 
however, shown that this is only true to a limited extent. Notably, the fact that the Union is a 
highly politicised body is a problem as, instead of the Energy Ministers, platform meetings are 
attended by the Foreign Ministers who dispose of less technical expertise. Nonetheless, the 
meetings have been recognised as a platform for political exchange and dialogue by the 
interviewees.845 In recent years, regional dynamics have been largely dominated by war & 
 
839 According to the French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), the project would not help to enhance the gas security of either 
France or the EU, as there is already enough capacity. Further, the CRE considers the project to be too expensive.  
840 For example, in the 1960/70s, both Italy and Algeria, as well as Spain and Algeria worked closely together to respectively set up 
the Trans-Med and Maghreb-Europe Pipelines, transporting natural gas from Algeria to Europe (TAGLIAPIETRA, 2016:174). 
841 EP (Accessed on 16 November 2019).  
842 As stated by Fernandez-Molina (2015:99), ‘Morocco sees its relations with the EU as a Euro-Moroccan partnership and differentiates 
this from Morocco’s relations with Mediterranean countries.’ 
843 EP (Accessed on 07 September 2018).  
844 According to a MedReg study, the absence of political cooperation or coordination accounts for around 13% of the impact of 
barriers for regional electricity and gas projects. Other hurdles are of financial or technical character. RES4MED (Accessed on 01 
January 2018); Med-TSO (Accessed on 04 February 2018). 
845 EEAS (Accessed on 19 November 2019).  
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conflict and terrorism (BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 
2017:95-97). Indeed, in the context of the Arab Spring, accompanied by great political instability 
– ranging from an overthrow of the political system in Tunisia to state collapse in Libya and 
Syria – North Africa ‘[…] has quickly descended from being a bastion of continuity and consistency 
into a basket case, forcing European states to carefully monitor threats so as to limit spillover into 
Europe’ (GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, BARR, WILLCOXON and BASUNI, 2015:7). Together with other 
transformations associated with the Arab uprisings such as massive migratory flows (‘refugee 
crisis’) and the increasing threat of terrorism, this has, as has been shown, led to a shift in 
traditional policy cooperation patterns (SARTORI, 2014:9). Noteworthy here is the 
disengagement of the US from the region or the entrance of new players such as the Gulf states. 
In this context, another reason why the target countries prefer bilateral relations is because they 
have started to increasingly diversify their foreign relations and have hence become less 
dependent on the EU with which they do not always share the same ambitions.846 In this light, 
the presence of competing actors is an issue, simply because their agendas and values may suit 
the target countries better.847 Overall, it is important not to underestimate their role in 
influencing the perception of the EU, as Blockmans, Kostanyan, Remizov, Slapakova and Van der 
Loo (2017:117) note: ‘while supporting their own representation of value systems, such actors can 
potentially undermine the visibility and credibility of the EU, which to a large extent portrays itself 
as a normative actor.’848 Nonetheless or interestingly, it must be noted that this role, as well as 
the international context as a factor of interests, has remained largely under-researched 
(BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:116-117).  
Finally, and as regards the target countries relations with the EU, one major point of criticism is 
the fact that the EU seems to lack a unified strategic approach (THALER, 2015:155) and whilst it 
seems to be common sense that the establishment of consistency requires each EU actor to 
implement common policy guidelines, ‘the executive branches of the Union seem to have trouble 
defining common interests ahead of time, as a result of overly broad and sometimes redundant 
objectives’ (GAUTTIER, 2004:27). In this context, the EU’s approach towards the southern 
Mediterranean has often been characterised by contradictions, with the spotlight of criticism 
having most recently been the EU’s handling of the Arab rebellion and its attitude towards the 
revolutionary movements. Indeed, whilst the EU emphasises democracy and human rights as a 
key issue in North Africa (HOEBINK, 2005:59), 849 critics accuse the Union850 of having ‘preferred 
its ‘stabilization’ objective to the ‘democratization’ objective in its reaction to the Arab Spring’ 
(BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:117; CEBECI, 
2019:5).851 In this context, the EU was, according to Cebeci (2019:5), ‘regularly sidelined by the 
 
846 For example, in the case of Morocco and as regards energy, the EU does not share the same interest for shale gas as the Maghreb 
country.  
847 For example, whilst EU foreign policy interests are primarily of economic nature, US interests are much more related to security 
issues, with both Morocco and Algeria holding a strategic importance for the US with respect to the fight against terrorism (notably 
against groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Cooperation in this domain intensified with Morocco in 2002 and 
Algeria in 2001 and Algeria aligned itself in the US’s and Russia’s fights against terrorism). Russian foreign policy interests are also 
dominated by military issues, whereas Arab foreign policy interests concern political, economic and religious issues (ZOUBIR and 
WHITE, 2015). 
848 In fact, by offering new possibilities and options to the target countries, they may actually incite these countries to non-compliant 
behaviour. 
849 Here, it must be said that many of the Arab governments have not appreciated the EU’s focus on democracy and human rights.  
850 For example, so Cebeci (2019:6), whilst Italy and France initially supported the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, the 
UK rather supported the uprisings in Egypt. 
851 In fact, as stated by Greco (2017:14), ‘the EMP envisaged negative conditionality to foster political change in its Mediterranean 
partners but it was never really implemented given EU support for past authoritarian regimes in the Southern Mediterranean in the 
name of stability.’ 
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member states’. Likewise, and as regards migration, the EU’s approach is equally often perceived 
as lacking any consistency, including by Moroccan policymakers which reproach it to put too 
much pressure on transit countries like Morocco.852 Further, whilst Morocco guarantees almost 
unlimited access for Europeans (who do not need a visa to visit the country), it has become 
increasingly difficult for Moroccans to enter the EU (HOEBINK, 2005:55). Overall, as brought 
forward in the MEDRESET study carried out by Cebeci (2019:2), the EU is accused of pursuing 
‘asymmetric/unequal, top-down, Eurocentric, interest-driven, technocratic, depoliticizing policies 
in the Mediterranean prioritizing security and stability over democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law’. 
Asymmetric/unequal and interest-driven approach  
As indicated before, as a general obstacle to EU-southern Mediterranean relations, one can 
identify different and contrasting interpretations and perceptions concerning the aim of this 
relationship, a finding that also persists with regard to energy. As a result, and although the 
development of a common EU energy policy is a top priority, currently, the Union’s energy 
relations with third countries have often been managed on a case-to-case basis. For example, 
whilst relations with the eastern neighbourhood are framed in rather definite terms,853 this is 
less true for the relations with the southern neighbourhood which are more of an ad-hoc nature. 
In this context, one important factor regularly brought forward in the literature for the EU’s 
limited success in convincing the southern Mediterranean countries to adopt its energy acquis is 
its ‘one-size fits all’ approach (HERRANZ-SURRALLES, 2018:123).854 In fact, related documents 
as regards the implementation of common policy objectives tend to be vague and ‘provide ample 
room for interpretation’ (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:11). For instance, with respect to Algeria, 
the Association Agreement (AA) only refers to general goals for the energy sector, giving no 
incentives for the government to sign any Action Plan (AP), also because it is linked to 
conditionality855 and lacks any prospect of EU accession.856 There is a consensus amongst the 
scholars that this approach does not allow for the EU to adapt its energy policy to the political 
complexities of the target countries. For example, potential for regional integration in North 
Africa is, as shown before, rather low due to a lack of regional political and economic 
cooperation rooted in divergent national interests (regarding for example the Sahara question) 
(DIEZ and TOCCI, 2017:83). However, hardly considering geopolitics or geoeconomics,857 until 
today (and despite greater emphasis on differentiation in the 2015 ENP review), these 
 
852 BOZONNET Charlotte (02 November 2018), Maroc: «La seule politique migratoire cohérente de l’Europe, c’est mettre la pression 
sur les pays de transit », Le Monde (Accessed on 08 December 2019).  
853 for example, via the Country Strategy on Russia. 
854 YOUNGS Richard (18 May 2015), 20 Years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Carnegie Europe (Accessed on 07 April 2019). 
855 According to Blockmans, Kostanyan, Remizov, Slapakova and Van der Loo (2017:1), one major problem as regards the 
conditionality approach is the fact that the conditions of conditionality have not been very well defined. 
856 In fact, by 2003, Algeria had begun to doubt the added value of this cooperation which was partly because, in its view, the EU only 
gave limited support to its much-needed energy sector policy reforms at that time. And whilst it thus rejected the ENP in 2004, the 
EU was however unaware of anything being amiss (DARBOUCHE, 2010:74-75, 81). By contrast, the general opinion within the EU 
was that the rising oil prices of the mid-2000s had given Algeria the possibility to pay back its foreign debts, thereby reducing its 
dependence on financial aid from the EU and consequently reducing EU leverage. In the opinion of Boumghar (2013: 2017), the main 
reason for Algeria’s reservations, however, was the fact that it had not been involved in the development of the ENP which, according 
to the Maghreb country, did not mirror Algerian interests, particularly in the field of foreign policy (rapprochement with the US) 
(DARBOUCHE, 2010:75). Not being an advocate of top-down approaches (in fact, for historical reasons, Algeria considers democracy 
to be a state’s internal issue that should be handled without any external interference), Algeria also did not support the principle of 
conditionality inherent within the ENP (BOUMGHAR, 2013:207, 208). Further, Algeria could not agree with the EU in which order to 
apply the latter’s ‘stick and carrot’ approach: should reforms be preceded by aid – i.e. by financial and capacity building assistance 
through expertise and know-how – or vice versa (CARUSO and GENEVE:2015)? 
857 With respect to Algeria, Stein (2008) highlights for example the EU’s ignorance about the balance of power of Algeria’s political 
system, not taking into account the power Sonatrach (or the military leaders) exercise on Algerian energy policy-making.  
- 158 - 
 
circumstances have largely been ignored by the EU, with one consequence being that relations 
are overall rather market-orientated, a claim that is widely supported by policymakers. For 
example, as stated in a Medreg report, ‘so far, market integration and infrastructure development 
has been led and financed by business interests, including national companies of both EU and other 
Member States, supported by their Governments’.858 Furthermore, as stated by Youngs (2007:61), 
in the past, the approach of the EU and its member states, particularly the southern ones, 
towards North Africa was largely driven by security and economy-related issues such as 
terrorism and migration, with energy playing a secondary role. By contrast, and as far as Algeria 
is concerned, energy should come first and then provide a basis for wider strategic cooperation 
in security and economy (BICCHI and GILLESPIE, 2014:200). The same holds true for Morocco, 
with studies suggesting a lack of focus on energy (BIANCHI, COLANTONI, MASCOLO and 
SARTORI, 2018:22). 
EU-centrism and lack of local ownership 
Another recurrent point of critique refers to the fact that the EU primarily seeks to extend its 
own norms-orientated market regulatory framework to the southern Mediterranean countries, 
offering access to its internal market in exchange. According to the literature, this approach has 
proven to be unattractive as it follows a top-down logic (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA 
CAMPI, 2015:29) and lacks ‘local ownership’ and ‘consideration of local needs’ (BLOCKMANS, 
KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:2). By contrast, most of the North 
African countries, above all Algeria, have not been very interested in simply adopting the EU’s 
market rules but have rather sought to develop a shared or more equal form of cooperation that 
is more strategic and forward-thinking, considering, as regards energy, for example future global 
evolutions such as climate change (which would allow it to tackle the energy transition). In this 
context, scholars criticise the EU’s EU focus or centrism, a context in which they reproach the 
UfM, for example, to be ‘once again an initiative that claims to be Mediterranean but that actually 
originates from an EU Mediterranean country’ (GRECO, 2017:8). Another example here is the 
EU’s push towards the construction of gas pipelines from the south to the north for its own 
supply (one example is the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline that would feed into the existing 
Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline in northern Morocco), whereas it is slow in constructing electricity 
connections that would benefit both shores of the Mediterranean (ESCRIBANO, 2017; 
BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN, REMIZOV, SLAPAKOVA and VAN DER LOO, 2017:9). Furthermore, 
the fact that when it comes to EU energy governance towards Morocco, strategic/political 
coordination is, as this research has shown, concentrated in the EU multilevel system suggests a 
very EU-oriented or shaped approach, i.e. an approach that is primarily based on European 
political interests. 
EU-centrism is rooted in a contrary understanding of the basis of the EU-southern 
Mediterranean energy relationship which, as mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation, 
used to be very much dominated by the idea of the energy-rich south exporting first fossil fuels 
and then renewables to the energy-poor north. For example, Article 9 of the EU Directive on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (Directive 2009/28/EC) authorises the 
EU member states to cooperate with third countries on ‘joint projects regarding the production of 
electricity from renewable energy sources’ and to import this electricity so that it contributes to 
 
858 Medreg (Accessed on 11 September 2018). 
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the achievement of their individual national renewable targets.859 In this light, the initial 
rationale behind the MSP was that a greater deployment of renewables in the southern 
Mediterranean countries would ‘free up gas resources to sell on international markets’, ‘reduce 
the deficits’ of importing countries such as Morocco and provide the possibility of exporting 
green electricity to Europe, which, in turn, would contribute to security of supply and the 
achievement of climate targets (RUBINO, OZTURK, LENZI and COSTA CAMPI, 2015:31). 
Likewise, as far as Desertec is concerned, the import of green electricity from North Africa into 
the EU would have allowed the latter to ‘kill two birds with one stone’, namely a) to contribute to 
achieving its own CO2 targets as defined in the 2020 targets of its Climate and Energy Package860 
and to diversify the EU’s energy supply away from an unstable eastern Europe and b) to 
accelerate the North African energy transition (which was the reason why the project initially 
received strong backing). It is against this background, that both the MSP and Desertec faced 
resistance from the target countries which perceived the two projects as being excessively ‘EU-
centric’, i.e. as having been imposed by the EU (BERGASSE, 2011:1). In fact, the critics blame the 
EU for having designed the projects solely to achieve its own environmental objectives and to 
promote its own industries (MORATA and SANDOVAL, 2012:194).861 
By contrast, and as indicated before, Desertec was quite well received by the ‘supplying’ 
countries themselves in the beginning and whilst Algeria already joined Dii in 2011,862 Morocco 
did so in 2012 via the signature of an MoU between Moroccan ADEREE (now AMEE) and the 
Desertec Foundation.863 However, over time, Desertec was increasingly perceived as a neo-
colonialist attempt of the European countries to gain control over MENA energy resources 
(energy colonialism), especially, because the European stakeholders did not manage to properly 
address the question of access or transfer of technology (in which the supplier countries would 
have been strongly interested).864 In this context, notably the role of multinational energy 
companies was in the focus of criticism as concerns over national sovereignty were voiced (a 
development that was enhanced by the Arab spring). For the energy multinationals, in turn, 
undertaking investments in such large-scale projects as Desertec or Ouarzazate implied 
significant financial and operational risks, which notably in the light of the Arab uprisings, 
further fueled investment insecurity. Further, the northern and southern countries disagreed 
over which technology to use for generating solar power, as well as over which non-European 
 
859 Directive 2009/28/EC allows the EU member states to make arrangements for the statistical transfer (= exchange of Green 
Certificates) of a specified amount of energy from RES (Art. 6) and to cooperate on all types of joint projects related to the production 
of electricity, heating or cooling from RES (Art. 7). Similarly, and with respect to third countries, they are also able to cooperate on all 
types of joint projects regarding the production of renewable electricity (Art. 9). In order to be taken into account in the member 
states’ national action plans, the electricity produced in a third country must, however, be consumed within the Community (§ 2 Art. 
9). Further, the transfer of such electricity has to be physical, not statistical,859 if the third country is not a member of the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) (ESCRIBANO, 2017:252).  
860 The EU Climate and Energy Package comprises binding EU legislation that aims at meeting certain climate and energy targets for 
the year 2020. These so-called 2020 targets are: a 20% cut in greenhouses gas emissions (GHGs) (from 1990 levels), a 20% share in 
energy from renewables and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency. Having come into force in 2009 they are also part of the EU 
2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and in 2014, were extended by the 2030-targets. EC (Accessed on 20 
January 2018). 
861 Other than these rather political reasons, the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) would have required massive investments in 
infrastructure, particularly to build underwater high-voltage direct current connection, investments, which, given the instability in 
the Mediterranean region at that time, were considered to be too risky for potential investors (BERGASSE, 2011:1). This was also the 
reason why Ouarzazate which was initially conceptualised to export solar power from Morocco to the EU, was transformed into a 
purely national project, aiming now at meeting Morocco’s domestic electricity needs only.  
862 HeliSCSP (Accessed on 14 December 2017). 
863 Inhabitat (Accessed on 13 January 2017). 
864 See, for example, Daniel Ayuk Mbi Egbe of the African Network for Solar Energy in 2011: ‘Many Africans are sceptical about 
Desertec,’ he said. ‘Europeans make promises, but at the end of the day, they bring their engineers, they bring their equipment, and they 
go. It’s a new form of resource exploitation, just like in the past.’ HICKMAN Leo (11 December 2011), Could the desert sun power the 
world?, The Guardian (Accessed on 14 December 2017). 
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companies to include. And although in the context of the ENP review of 2015 today’s catchwords 
are mutual interdependence and exchange, the perception of the target countries is still largely 
that the supplier/buyer logic prevails which means that it takes them some time to adapt to the 
new reality. For example, the MEDRESET carried out by Bianchi, Colantoni, Mascolo and Sartori 
in 2018 (22) suggests that Moroccan energy actors still have the feeling that the EU considers 
Morocco ‘as only a potential exporter of energy’ and is therefore not interested in deeper 
involvement in the country’s energy sector reforms. It is in this light, that Escribano (2017:9) 
suggests that the EU should develop ‘an energy narrative that is more positive for its 
Mediterranean neighbours.’  
Conditionality  
Last but not least, it is worth considering the link between the Mediterranean’s/Morocco’s 
diversification of relations and the EU’s conditionality-approach under the ENP which is 
regularly contested by the North African countries, all the more so because, as identified by 
Cebeci (2019:4), most of them perceive the EU as a ‘closed space’ (implying that its top-down 
political conditionality has its limits in the region). In fact, one reason why there is high financial 
and technical cooperation between the EU and Morocco, notably in the context of the NIP, may 
be that conditionality at this level is less pronounced. The same is true for the bilateral relations 
between the member states and Morocco as they are, given that they are generally not coupled 
with any political conditionality, less demanding from a target country perspective. Therefore, 
they offer more stability and predictability865 or in other words: bilateral cooperation seems to 
make it ‘easier’ for the southern Mediterranean countries ‘to identify their partners and 
priorities.’866 In fact, contrary to the EU, the member states generally do not seek to impose any 
or, if any, fewer values on partner countries, for example, by promoting democracy, rule of law 
or human rights principles through their cooperation agreements (SARTORI, 2014:4). Indeed, as 
stated by Blockmans, Kostanyan, Remizov, Slapakova and Van der Loo (2017:74), ‘the member 
states leave to the EU the responsibility to carry difficult messages on human rights violations to 
the ENP states but avoid being in line with the EU statements while conducting bilateral relations 
with those partners.’ The same is true for third states, for example, whilst the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC’s) development aid is to some extent designed to exert a certain influence over the 
recipient country (in this case Morocco), the absence of any explicit political or commercial 
conditionality is a clear factor of success as it differentiates the Council from the EU and the US 
(COLOMBO, COATES-ULRICHSEN, GHABRA, HAMID and RAGAB, 2012:34; STRUYE DE 
SWIELANDE, 2013:159; EL-KATIRI, 2016:35, 190-191). 
Against this background, a decisive factor for Morocco’s preference for bilateral relations may 
well be freedom from political conditionality as regards the situation in the Sahara 
(FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2014:12). As for the EU, this argument is supported by the fact that 
diverging positions between the EU and Morocco on the Sahara issue have, as shown before, 
regularly led to diplomatic tension in the past and may have pushed Morocco towards further 
diversification. Further, it has been shown in Part 4 that Morocco’s foreign affairs and energy 
ties with external powers are very much built upon these countries’ positions on the Sahara 
which indeed acts as some sort of intervening variable of energy relations here. In this context, it 
 
865 As shown in the 2010 IEMed Survey, even though many southern Mediterranean countries, would like to receive more aid from 
the EU, they do not want to make themselves dependent on this aid, probably because of the political conditionality it comes with. 
866 EP (Accessed on 07 September 2018).  
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has been revealed that the states with whom (energy) cooperation is the strongest are those 
with an either positive (for Morocco) or neutral stance on the matter. Indeed, the countries with 
which the Kingdom is increasingly seeking energy cooperation either actively support it in its 
territorial claims in the Sahara or stay neutral. In this light, the economic influence of the GCC in 
the UN Security Council certainly plays a role when it comes to energy ties with Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE and Qatar, whereas similar reasoning can be applied to China and Russia, as both countries 
are known for their approach of non-interventionism in the UN organ.867 Therefore,  in what 
follows, the conflict as well as the role of the EU and the member states in it will be examined 
more in detail. 
Moroccan/Western Sahara: a decisive foreign policy shaper 
Despite possessing one of the largest diplomatic networks in the region, Morocco’s political 
relations with most of its neighbours are strained, above all because of territorial disputes. For 
example, as for its relations with Spain, tensions arise from the fact that in the north, both 
countries lay claims on the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, whilst in the west, they argue 
over maritime borders in the Atlantic Ocean. By contrast, regarding Algeria and Mauritania, 
tensions result above all from the Sahara, indeed by far the biggest source of border conflicts 
today and thus meriting particular attention. In fact, the Moroccan (as referred to by the 
Moroccan government) or Western (as referred to by the UN) Sahara868 (also known as Al-Sahra 
al-Gharbiyyah in Arabic), is a sparsely-populated disputed desert territory of around 266,000 
km² extending from the Atlantic Ocean on the west, to Algeria on the east, and Mauritania to the 
south. Composed of two provinces with Gold River in the south – biggest city is Laayoune – and 
Red Canal in the north,869 its population is small, estimated to stand at only around 584,000 
people.870 Given that there is only little agriculture, Sahara’s attractiveness can be best explained 
by its vast proven and potential natural resources. First, boasting a 1,100-kilometer Atlantic 
coast ‘of strategic importance’, the Sahara has also ‘one the richest fishing waters in the world’ 
(ZOUBIR, 2007:158),871 with its marine resources regularly being the object of maritime disputes 
between Morocco and its neighbours as will be shown more in detail later. Second, the Sahara, 
above all the northern part, is a phosphate-rich872 area873 whose phosphate deposits of around 
50 million tons, belonging to the largest in the world and accounting for around 72% of the 
world’s phosphate-rock reserves, have made Morocco one of the largest phosphate producers 
and exporters in the world.874 Other than phosphate, the region also disposes of iron ore and 
iron supplies, as well as titanium oxide and vanadium reserves (ZOUBIR, 2007:158). Finally, the 
region is thought to be rich in offshore oil and gas and has a vast solar power potential. Against 
this background, the Sahara has a decisive impact on Morocco’s foreign policy which 
consequently centres strongly around territorial integrity (ABOURABI, 2015:569). Given this 
high sensitivity, the Sahara issue is not only strongly linked to Morocco’s foreign affairs, but also 
 
867 In fact, their support even gains in importance in light of the evolution of the US’ position on the issue in recent years. 
868 As a reminder, for neutrality reasons, the author of this dissertation will hereinafter refer to the territory as Moroccan/Western 
Sahara or simply Sahara. 
869 Britannica (Accessed on 20 September 2018). 
870 UN (Accessed on 23 September 2018). 
871 CIA (Accessed on 06 October 2018). 
872 Phosphate is a finite resource that can be found in a wide range of different products, with industrial phosphates being used, for 
example, in synthetic fertilisers, detergents or personal care products pharmaceuticals. IHS Markit (Accessed on 26 September 
2018). 
873 The phosphate resources of the Sahara were first discovered in the 1940s (GILLESPIE, 1999:11). 
874 In 2015, Morocco accounted for around 13.5 % of global phosphate production. USGS (Accessed on 26 September 2018). 
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an important factor in the country’s foreign and external energy relations and therefore worthy 
of development. 
Like many other African or North African countries, Morocco has experienced colonisation in its 
past and to understand the Sahara conflict and its origins, one must, as with so many other 
conflicts, look at this colonial rule. Having become a protectorate under French rule in 1912, the 
central part of Morocco was controlled by France up to the country’s independence in 1956 
(GILSON MILLER, 2013:16), whereas Spain exercised control over the rest of the territory (see 
Figure 30). At this point, it must be noted that contrary to the French who left Morocco shortly 
after the latter had declared its independence, the Spanish did not drop their land claims at all 
and having de facto annexed the Sahara in 1958 by formally transforming it into a province to be 
known as Spanish Sahara, they continued to dominate the Moroccan south until 1976875 and 
Ceuta and Melilla even until today.  
Figure 30: Morocco under the French and Spanish protectorate 
 
Source: Euratlas (Accessed on 05 October 2018). In fact, whilst Spain already controlled southern Morocco, notably the Sahara (Ifni 
and the area of Cabo Juny, as well as the city of Tarfaya) since the 1880s, in 1912, the Spanish officially established a protectorate 
and took full control of a northern strip on the Mediterranean, covering the enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, as well as the Strait of 
Gibraltar (in order to build a geographical buffer zone with France).876 
However, in the late 1950s, nationalist pressures of a newly independent Morocco began to 
target Spain, laying claims to the annexed Spanish territories, notably Spanish Sahara, arguing 
that it was part of the pre-colonial Moroccan empire (‘Greater Morocco’). Likewise, and only 
shortly after having gained independence from France in 1960, Mauritania equally began to 
 
875 Britannica (Accessed on 20 September 2018).  
876 The French and Spanish spheres of influence excluded Tangier which had been under international control since 1924 (WILLIS, 
2014:270). 
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raise claims to the Sahara, also for historical reasons.877 On the strength of this, Morocco turned 
to the UN which in 1963 qualified Spanish Sahara as a non-self-governing territory that needs to 
be decolonised. Whilst in this light, in 1965, it ratified two resolutions that requested Spain to 
leave the territory and to organise a referendum on self-determination (which Spain under the 
leader Franco, however, refused to do)878 (GILLESPIE, 1999:17),879 the ruling did not imply that 
either Morocco or Mauritania were necessarily the rightful owners of the land. By contrast, in 
October 1975, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared in an advisory opinion to have 
found some legal ties of allegiance between Morocco and the Sahara (or the Moroccan Sultan 
and some tribe in the region). However, it also stated that these ties did not establish any ties of 
territorial sovereignty, further referring to the General Assembly’s 1960 Resolution 1514 (XV) 
and its Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.880 In 
reaction to this, in November 1975, under Hassan II, Morocco organised a mass manifestation 
under which more than 300,000 Moroccans entered the contested territory in order to 
reintegrate it into Moroccan territory. As one outcome of this march, later known as the ‘Green 
March’, Spain ceded its claims to the Sahara and in an agreement signed in 1975 (Madrid 
Accords), gave up its administrative control over the territory. Following Spain’s final 
withdrawal in early 1976, the Sahara was divided up between Morocco (northern two-thirds) 
and Mauritania (southern third) (HUTH, 2009:222). However, at the same time, a new player 
began to increasingly emerge on the scene – the Polisario Front – adding to the complexity of 
this situation. Initiated in 1973 in Zouerate in Mauritania,881 the Polisario Front or simply 
Polisario, the acronym for the Spanish Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y 
Rio de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro), is an 
Algerian backed independence movement formed by members of the Saharan Liberation Front 
(a guerrilla movement created to oppose Spanish colonialism) that fights for the independence 
of the Sahara and the right to self-determination of the people of the region. Shortly after Spain’s 
withdrawal from the Sahara, the Polisario, which highly depends on Algeria as well as to a 
certain extent on Libya, for military aid (WILLIS, 2014:277),882 began contesting Morocco’s 
sovereignty over the territory, referring to the principles of the inviolability of colonial 
borders.883 Over the years and claiming to officially represent the interests of the people of the 
Sahara, the Polisario has slowly transformed into a politico-military group according to which 
the Sahara belongs to the ethnic group of the Saharawis (HUTH, 2009:220), a nomadic people of 
Berber identity (CASTELLINO, 2000:254, 256).884 In this context, the group first got into an open 
conflict with Morocco in 1975 when it started a guerrilla war against Morocco (in reaction to the 
Green March) and in 1976, proclaimed a government-in-exile of the Saharan Arab Democratic 
 
877 In this context, the discovery of large phosphate deposits in Saguia el-Hamra (in Bu Craa) in 1963 rendered the situation all the 
more complex, as it spurred the different actor’s interest in the area. Britannica (Accessed on 20 September 2018). 
878 Instead, Franco chose to sign the Madrid Accords of 1975 in exchange of natural resource rights (KEENAN, 2013:286). 
879 UN (Accessed on 06 October 2018). 
880 ICJ (Accessed on 23 September 2018). 
881 FAUJAS Alain (25 April 2017), Pourquoi la Mauritanie est tiraillée sur la question du Sahara occidentale, Jeune Afrique (Accessed 
on 19 September 2018).  
882 CIA (Accessed on 26 September 2018). 
883 According to this principle, ‘the colonially imposed boundaries – not matter how illogical or arbitrary – should be accepted and 
respected’ in order to prevent ‘the unleashing of a torrent of debilitating border disputes between the decolonised states’ (WILLIS, 
2014:267). 
884 Living in the south of Morocco, as well as the southwest of Algeria and Mauritania, the anticolonial sentiment of the Polisario is 
thought to have been alimented by social and economic change, caused amongst other things by drought and desertification (WILLIS, 
2014:276). Britannica (Accessed on 20 September 2018); CIA (Accessed on 26 September 2018). 
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Republic (SADR) near Tindouf in Algeria885 which immediately recognised the SADR as a state.886 
In response this, Morocco suspended relations with Algeria and armed conflicts between the 
Polisario on the one side and Morocco and Mauritania on the other side erupted. However, 
whilst the conflict between the Polisario and Mauritania was settled in 1979,887 tensions 
between the Polisario and Morocco go on until today and Polisario’s guerilla war against 
Morocco only officially ended in the 1990s888 with a cease-fire and the establishment of a UN 
peacekeeping operation (KEENAN, 2013:287). In fact, whilst in 1990, the UN General Assembly 
declared that the Sahara question remains to be answered by the people of this region 
themselves (‘Settlement Plan’) and created the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (French acronym = MINURSO) (Resolution 690), with the purpose of establishing 
favourable conditions for the conduct of this referendum, in 1991, both parties agreed on a 
cease-fire which also foresaw the opening of a referendum.889 However, corresponding UN talks 
(in 2007, for example)890 failed (GILSON MILLER, 2013:20) and a referendum has not yet been 
held. 
The role of energy in the conflict 
It is important to note that throughout the entire conflict, energy, as well as natural resources in 
general, have played an important role, with the prospect of oil and gas reserves in the 
Moroccan/Western Sahara having undeniably boosted the attractiveness of the region (ZOUBIR, 
2007:158) and added ‘a layer of complexity to the conflict’ (KEENAN, 2013:299). In fact, although 
such reserves have not yet been found,891 this does not seem unlikely given the massive reserves 
the wider region boasts – indeed, the Algerian Sahara region has huge hydrocarbon deposits, 
making Algeria one of the world’s biggest producers and exporters of fossil fuels of today. Also, 
the Sahara is not only thought to be rich in hydrocarbons but also has a vast renewables 
potential that Morocco increasingly seeks to exploit (which, incidentally, the SADR is opposed).  
Here, it is interesting to mention that, having discovered hydrocarbons in the south of In Salah in 
1954,892 the French were the first to recognise the vast hydrocarbon potential of the Sahara and 
already before Algeria’s independence in 1962, tried to get control over the resource-rich Sahara 
 
885 First president of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and long-term Polisario leader was Mohamed Abdelaziz 
Ezzedine who died in 2016. CIA (Accessed on 26 September 2018).  
886 Apart from Algeria, the Polisario received support from Libya, Cuba and the Soviet Union. CIA (Accessed on 14 October 2018). 
887 Following a revolt against the Mauritanian president Mokhtar Ould Daddah in 1979 which overthrew the alliance between 
Morocco and Mauritania that had existed until then, under pressure from Polisario, Mauritania signed a peace treaty with the latter, 
de facto ceding its claims on the Sahara. Subsequently, the border between Mauritania and the Sahara was closed between 1979 and 
2002 (LUGAN, 2016:543); CIA (Accessed on 06 October 2018). 
888 Between 1980 and 1987, Morocco developed a fortified 2,700 km long sand wall in the Sahara which separates Moroccan-
controlled regions (west) from Polisario occupied regions (east) and in 1994, Algeria unilaterally closed its western border, 
following visa restrictions on Algerian citizens in the context of a terrorist attack in Marrakech (CEI, 2011:252). 
DAHAN Nadine (20 September 2018), Trump has suggested building a giant wall in the Sahara. But it already exists, Middle East Eye 
(Accessed on 22 September 2018). 
889 Under international pressure, Morocco already agreed to hold a referendum on the sovereignty and status of the Sahara in 1981. 
Whilst at that time, Hassan II was persuaded that such a referendum would result in the integration of the Sahara, he later refused to 
carry it out, amongst other things because both parties were not able to agree on the design of the electoral register (ZOUBIR, 
2007:161; GILLESPIE, 2013:50). 
890 Prior to 2007, Morocco and the US had come up with the so-called Baker I plan in 2001 proposing autonomy to the Sahara under 
the condition that the territory remained under Moroccan sovereignty for a period of five years until a referendum could be carried 
out. However, the plan was rejected by both the Polisario and Algeria and a revision in 2003, which foresaw the establishment of a 
Saharan Authority for the period of five years until the referendum, faced strong opposition by Morocco. In 2007, Morocco came up 
with a plan similar to Baker I, however, it was equally rejected by the Polisario and Algeria (CEI, 2011:94-95; LUGAN, 2016:544). 
891 CIA (Accessed on 06 October 2018). 
892 Hydrocarbons were first discovered by the French Bureau des Recherches Pétrolières (BRP) (later known as Elf Aquitaine which 
since 2000 belongs to Total) (MALTI, 2012:15). 
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by cutting it off judicially from the rest of the country, a project reflected in the Sahara Oil Law 
(CPS) (n°58-1112) which was enacted in 1958 under General Charles de Gaulle.893 Similarly, the 
French were also one of the first to be involved in the exploration of oil in Morocco and, 
following the discovery of some oil deposits in the Rif and Rharb basins between 1880 and 1914, 
participated in the creation of the BPRM in 1928894 as well as in the set up of the ‘Société 
Chérifienne des Pétroles’ (SCP), a venture comprising several drilling companies to which the 
French state provided a valuable contribution, in 1929. The SCP which carried out most of the oil 
exploration activities, made its first important discovery, the Jebel Tselfate deposit located close 
to the city of Sidi Kacem in 1934. Subsequently, oil prospecting missions multiplied and by 1951, 
the SCP had around 1,000 exploration licenses. However, and although other deposits were 
found, notably in the regions around Essaouira and Agadir, leading to an increase in production 
able to meet around 15% of Morocco’s oil needs at that time (in 1954), overall production 
outcomes remained modest (BOUQUEREL, 1966:73-75). Nonetheless, Morocco continued its 
search for oil and gas and by the early 1960s, the BPRM and the SCP, in cooperation with 
international oil companies such as Preussag (Germany), Pétrofina (Belgium), Canadian Dehli 
(US) or SOMIP (Morocco-Italy) had extended their oil exploration activities to almost all the 
basins of Morocco (BOUQUEREL, 1966:75). As of 1960, the Spanish equally began promoting the 
exploration of oil in Spanish Sahara and based on law of 12 December 1958 on oil investments, 
to give wide concessions (40) to foreign (or mixed) companies (11). Off-shore exploration 
operations first began in 1966 and although they only showed mixed results, operations 
continued both off and on shore following Spain’s withdrawal from the Sahara in 1976. For 
example, in 1977, the BPRM signed a offshore contract with BP and the Phillips Oil Company for 
the exploration of a more than 30,000 m² large area between Laayoune and Boujdour.895 In 
parallel, Morocco forged ahead with the institutionalisation of its hydrocarbon sector and in 
1972, adopted a new law on hydrocarbons with the aim of attracting international operators for 
the exploration of oil and in 1981, set up the National Office of Oil Research and Exploitation 
ONAREP, whose mandate was to explore hydrocarbons, either on its own or jointly in 
cooperation with international oil companies.896 And although between 1986 and 1999, oil 
exploration activities were interrupted due to the oil shock of 1986, Morocco never buried its oil 
dream and during the last decade, a new impulse for the exploration of oil has been observed. 
Indeed, in 2000, the Moroccan government amended the hydrocarbon law with the intention of 
attracting more international investors in the hydrocarbon sector.897 In the same line, ONAREP 
merged with the BPRM in 2005 to form the ‘Office National des Hydrocarbures et des Mines’ 
(ONHYM, National Office of Hydrocarbons and Mines), for the purpose of developing the 
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in cooperation with the private sector.898 In this 
light, in 2001, Morocco signed an offshore oil reconnaissance contract with the US oil major Kerr 
 
893 In 1957, France created the ‘Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes’ (OCRS), a territorial collectivity with the aim ‘to 
promote the economic expansion’ of the Sahrawi ‘départements’ Oasis and Soura (MURAT 1969:90). In reality though, the OCRS was 
an attempt to get control over resource-rich Sahara and to cut it judicially from the rest of Algeria. 
894 The ‘Bureau des Recherches Pétrolières’ (BPRM) was a public body whose aim was to promote mining research in cooperation 
with the private sector. (June 1962), Le Bureau de Recherches et de Prospection Minières: Organisme d’intervention minière et 
pétrolière, Le Monde diplomatique (Accessed on 08 October 2018). 
895 ASSIDON Elsa (Février 1978), A Vingt Ans d’Intervalle, La Stratégie Française En Afrique Occidentale: De l’opération «Ecouvillon» 
à l’intervention en Mauritanie, Le Monde diplomatique (Accessed on 08 October 2018). 
896 Overall, the ‘Office National de Recherches et d’Exploitation Pétrolières’ (ONAREP) drilled 91 wells (of which 50 in cooperation 
with international companies). ONHYM (Accessed on 08 October 2018). 
897 ONHYM (Accessed on 08 October 2018). 
898 ONHYM (Accessed on 07 October 2018). 
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McGee for the exploration of a zone north of Boujdour (KEENAN, 2013:291),899 whereas the 
southern zone was to be explored by the French company TotalFinaElf (KEENAN, 2013:291). 
Likewise, in 2004, the country signed an agreement with Danish Maersk Oil for the exploration 
of a 15,000 km² area including the Tarfaya Laayoune basin.900  
However, and overall, past events have shown that the exploration and exploitation of Saharan 
energy resources, be it fossil fuels or renewables, is not without difficulties, but, given the 
political delicacy associated with this region, a regular source of tensions. Most of the potential 
reserves being located offshore, notably the delimitation of maritime boundaries, in particular 
those off the Canary Islands, has regularly led to disputes between Morocco and Spain. In fact, 
both countries claiming sovereignty over the natural resources of Saharan waters, in 1997, Spain 
defined the maritime limit to be the median line between Canary Islands and the Moroccan 
coast. However, Morocco did not accept this limit, arguing that the maritime limit goes beyond 
the median line. Consequently, no maritime zones have been defined so far.901 However, as laid 
down in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the two players have the right to extend their 
respective maritime zones to between 200 to 350 miles. In this light, in 2014, sea border 
disputes were further fueled by Spain’s discovery of large offshore oil deposits off its Canary 
Islands. In fact, after the discovery of oil 200 km away from the Canary Islands, the Spanish 
government granted the national energy major Repsol an oil prospecting license for a 600 km² 
area between Fuerteventura and Tarfaya, which was naturally contested by the Moroccan 
monarchy.902 In addition to Morocco and Spain, the SADR equally claims sovereignty over 
Saharan waters, having signed a technical cooperation agreement with the Australian oil 
company Fusion in 2001 for the evaluation of the oil potential of a 210,000 km² offshore area 
between Mauritania and the Canary Islands. According to this agreement, Fusion would get the 
future right to three other exploration licenses once the Sahara becomes a member of the UN.903  
Moreover, insecurity regarding the status of the Sahara has in some cases even affected 
Morocco’s business relations, with sympathizers and friends of the SADR claiming that industry 
activities in the Sahara would undermine the UN peace process. For example, Total, which was 
granted an offshore oil drilling license in 2001 to explore off the Saharan shores, did not extend 
its exploration licenses in 2004, with the reasoning that it did not find any oil. Nonetheless, the 
company continued with its exploration activities (on the data already collected) and in 2011 
was again granted some permits (for the southern Anzarane offshore field). However, in 2014, 
the company withdrew from the region and although this was officially because the outcome of 
the first analysis of seismic data was not positive, presumably, the region’s delicate political 
situation also played a role.904 Similarly, in 2016, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global decided to divest its shares in Irish San Leon Energy which had been drilling for oil 
offshore. 
 
899 WATKINS Eric (25 October 2018), Kerr-McGee to continue work off Morocco, OGJ (Accessed on 06 October 2018) 
900 Moroccan Ministry of Finance and Privatisation (Accessed on 08 October 2018). 
901 Morocco ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 2007, which foresaw a period of 10 years for the country to 
demarcate its maritime zones. In 2017, and in a move to define its territorial waters, the Moroccan government approved two bills 
and a draft decree, in order to ‘include the maritime space facing the coasts of the Moroccan Sahara in the national legal arsenal.’ 
Ministry of Culture and Communication (Accessed on 09 October 2018).  
902 However, one year later, in 2015, Spanish energy major Repsol abandoned its search for the deposits, claiming that the deposits 
were too small and non-exploitable. BURGEN Stephen (26 March 2014), Spain’s oil deposits and fracking sites trigger energy gold 
rush, The Guardian (Accessed on 18 September 2018); (19 January 2015), Repsol scraps controversial oil exploration off Canary 
Islands, The Guardian (Accessed on 18 September 2018).  
903 ARMBRUSTER Stefan (04 March 2003), Oil: Western Sahara’s future, BBC News (Accessed on 08 October 2018).  
904 WATKINS Eric (25 October 2018), Kerr-McGee to continue work off Morocco, OGJ (Accessed on 06 October 2018). 
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Status of the conflict as of today 
Although Morocco has over the years gradually granted more and more autonomy to the Sahara 
– in fact, the country allows for the Sahrawis to aspire to some autonomy, but not an 
independent state –905 as of today, the conflict is largely a frozen one as, since its inception, the 
various parties involved have never really altered their positions. In this line, both Morocco and 
the Polisario continue to lay claims to the Sahara, whereas the UN, which have never recognised 
the Madrid accords, recognise neither Moroccan nor SADR sovereignty over the region. As a 
result, the region’s status is still not clarified from an international law point of view and the 
territory continues to figure on the UN List of Non-Self-Governing Territories.906 By contrast, the 
SADR has been a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union AU) 
since 1984,907 and, as of 2017, was reportedly recognised as a state by some 35 countries (above 
all African and Latin American),908 a circumstance that, as will be shown later, regularly causes 
political tensions. In this light, the region can be shown in different ways on a map, for example 
as part of Morocco or as separate (unbroken line) or disputed (dotted line) territory, as well as 
by zones of control (Morocco vs. Polisario).  
In view of the complexity of the situation, the Sahara is the dominant issue in Moroccan foreign 
affairs (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2014:4-5), with the management and resolution of the conflict 
being attributed the highest priority under King Mohammed VI (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 
2015:76). This first became clear in the King’s inaugural speech in 2000 in which he identified 
the recognition of his country’s sovereignty over the Sahara by the international community, as 
well as the preservation of his country’s territorial integrity in general,909 as a main objective 
(FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2015:20),910 an objective that must not be viewed separately but is 
closely linked to Morocco’s policy of opening-up. Indeed, the increased conduct of a policy of 
non-alignment allows Morocco to develop new partnerships, with both large or small states 
(each country represents a voice within the UN), whereby the country pursues two vital 
interests, namely to ensure international support for the Saharan cause and to consolidate its 
regional weight. Here, a lot of leverage also comes from its ‘Economic diplomacy’ (ABOURABI, 
2015:577, 601) which, leading to tighter economic links and a higher level of mutual economic 
dependence, contributes to gaining a country’s diplomatic support. To some extent, leverage 
also comes from Morocco’s cultural & religious diplomacy and the King’s status as the 
‘commander of the faithful’ (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2015:6), which, amongst other things, aims a 
spreading the country’s special cultural and religious identity911 across the region.912 Finally, to 
 
905 See Moroccan Autonomy Plan for the Western Sahara, aiming at granting the Sahrawis a special status and widespread 
competencies, excluding state-reserved domains like national security & defense or external relations. Furthermore, in the context of 
the reform of the Moroccan constitution in 2011, Morocco began promoting Hassani, the Sahrawi’s language or dialect. Autonomy 
plan (Accessed on 05 October 2018); IEA (Accessed on 18 October 2018). 
906 UN (Accessed on 05 October 2018). 
907 The African Union (AU) is, amongst other things founded, on the principles of inviolable borders. 
908 Sénat (Accessed on 06 December 2019); Le Journal International (Accessed on 06 December 2019), Britannica (Accessed on 14 
October 2018). 
909 See for example: Royal speech of Mohammed VI on the occasion of the 3rd anniversary of his accession to the throne. Moroccan 
Ministry of Culture and Communication (Accessed on 18 September 2018). 
910 On this occasion, the monarch also listed other important policy objectives that he aimed to pursue during his reign such as the 
promotion of economic development (going along with the integration of the national economy in the global economy) or the 
promotion of the country’s image as a democratic and modern nation and model of stability in a region etc. (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 
2015:20).  
911 an identity based on moderation, pluralism and openness (FERANDEZ-MOLINA, 2014:6).  
912 including amongst other things, the opening of cultural centres abroad, the awarding of grants to African students or the 
theological training of imams. However, this form of diplomacy, as well as soft power tools in general, play an overall minor role here 
(ABOURABI, 2015:605).  
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assert its interests, Morocco eventually also relies on its geographical position at the crossroads 
of Europe, Africa and the Middle East, a context in which, as put by Abourabi (2015:590), the 
country may in some cases be willing to exploit the EU’s susceptibility with regard to security 
(including terrorism and drug trafficking) and migration-related issues. Overall, the Sahara 
question is not just another foreign policy issue, but a nationalistic cause perceived as ‘the 
ultimate core issue’, ‘the final goal’ or the ‘raison d’être’, a sort of ‘existential question which is 
deeply rooted in the Moroccan political culture’ (FERNANDEZ-MOLINA, 2015:46) and, as pointed 
out by Keenan (2013:290), even beyond. As such, it not only concerns the members of the royal 
family and politicians, but Moroccan society as a whole, as manifested in the March 2016 
protests against UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon who used the word ‘occupation’ to describe 
Morocco’s relationship with the desert territory. In reaction to this, millions of Moroccans went 
on the streets to demonstrate their disagreement.913  
As regards the role of the EU in the conflict, on a whole, by recognising neither the 
Polisario/SADR movements nor Morocco’s claims to the Sahara,914 the EU has tried to take a 
rather neutral stance in the Sahara question. This is reflected in the fact that neither the 
Association Agreement (AA),915 nor the Action Plan of 2013 include or make any reference to the 
region. Moreover, there is no special EU envoy or similar function. However, the EU’s relative 
neutrality in the matter does not mean that it has remained silent on the conflict. Indeed, not 
only has it regularly provided humanitarian aid to Sahrawi refugees in Algeria (COLOMBO and 
HUBER, 2016:24), but has also regularly expressed concern about the negative consequences of 
the conflict, notably with respect to human rights. In this context, dealing with this issue has, 
however, revealed a relatively high degree of inter-institutional inconsistency within the EU. For 
example, whilst the Commission’s support to Morocco’s Reparation Community Programme, 
targeting regions affected by human rights violations, has never covered the Sahara (DIEZ and 
TOCCI, 2017:91), interestingly, in 2010, the Parliament approved a resolution to investigate 
alleged human rights violations in the context of the dismantlement of the Gdeim Izik protest 
camp which caused several deaths and injuries.916 Another example, and probably the most 
significant, of inter-institutional inconsistency regards fishing in the Sahara. In fact, whilst past 
fisheries agreements concluded between the Commission and Morocco such as the EU-Moroccan 
Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) of 2005, allowed vessels from 11 EU member states917 to 
obtain fishing licenses from Morocco and used to cover the Sahara, various members of the 
Parliament have regularly contested this. Therefore, and backed notably by Sweden, in 2011, 
they voted against a proposed extension of the agreement, a move that resulted in Morocco 
prohibiting Spain from fishing in its waters. Economically dependent on the resources from 
these waters though, Spain consequently exerted enormous pressure on them to renegotiate the 
agreement or negotiate a new one.918 As a result, in 2014, a new version of the agreement of 
2005 was adopted which also included the Sahara (COLOMBO and HUBER, 2016:24).919 
 
913 Reuters (Accessed on 14 June 2017). 
914 EC (Accessed on 15 October 2018). 
915 According to the ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of December 2016, the association (2000) and liberalisation (2012) 
agreements between the EU and Morocco were ‘not applicable’ to the Morocca/Western Sahara, as the treaties did not specifically 
refer to the region. EP (Accessed on 04 November 2017).  
916 The Gdeim Izik camp was established in October 2010 near the city of Laayoune. EP (Accessed on 23 September 2018). 
917 France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain. EC (Accessed on 15 
October 2018). 
918 DOVE Chris (17 April 2012), EU, Spain still at odds over Morocco agreement, SeafoodSource (Accessed on 25 September 2018). 
919 (01 June 2017), European Commission for Fisheries Included Western Sahara in Morocco-EU Agreement, Morocco World News 
(Accessed on 04 November 2017); EC (Accessed on 05 December 2019).  
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However, five years later, on 27 February 2018, a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
found that the agreement of 2014 was only valid as long as it does not include the Sahara.920 
Since it was about to expire in July 2019,921 the Commission therefore asked the European 
Council to open negotiations on the renewal of the agreement, a proposal that was strongly 
supported by Spain. As a result, the new agreement, which was ratified by the Parliament in 
early 2019, now includes the Saharan waters.922 By contrast, and as regards energy, in November 
2016, around fifty deputies of the Parliament urged the EU not to import any solar or wind 
energy from the Sahara which they consider a ‘non-self-governing territory’.923 
Summarising the above, it can be noted that the EU’s Sahara policy clearly lacks a common 
position and high levels of inconsistency can be found not only at the inter-institutional level, i.e. 
between the Commission and the Parliament but also, or more notably, at the vertical level, i.e. 
between the Parliament and the member states (see Spain), as well as amongst the member 
states (see Sweden vs. Spain). This lack of consistency within the EU has not gone unnoticed by 
Morocco’s political elite, which qualifies the abovementioned decision of the ECJ to invalidate 
the existing trade agreements as ‘incoherent’.924 This judgment is shared by Diez and Tocci 
(2017:92) according to whom the decision of the ECJ perfectly reflects the EU’s ambivalent 
position towards the issue. Overall, so the two authors (2017:92), the absence of any common 
position shows that the EU ‘has not manifested great interest in playing an active role in the 
dispute’. Following this line of thought, one can ask whether this reasoning also applies to the EU 
countries – do energy relations between Morocco and the EU member states depend on the 
Sahara or are they particularly strong with those member states whose position on the Sahara 
converges with Morocco’s position? This question seems to be legitimate as the EU’s ‘negative 
neutrality’ in the Sahara conflict can above all be explained by intergovernmental inconsistency 
between the member states (DIEZ and TOCCI, 2017:96) whose positions on the conflict ‘remain 
elusive’.925 To answer this question and to better understand the underlying dynamics in the 
member states’ dealing with the Sahara question, the member states are classified in the 
following into three groups: anti, neutral and pro. In fact, the identification of the different 
positions of the member states as regards the Sahara question will allow to draw first 
conclusions as regards correlation with their energy interests/relations. In fact, contrary to the 
EU, the member states are typically not neutral about the conflict and, depending on their own 
bilateral interests, are generally quite biased as to whether the Sahara belongs to Morocco or 
should be autonomous.926 Moreover, national energy companies are not bound by the political 
directions of their national governments and free to invest wherever they like (Interview 
German Embassy to Morocco, 2016). For example, whilst French Total used to be very active in 
 
920 ECJ (Accessed on 21 September 2018). 
921 EC (Accessed on 26 September 2018). 
922 EC (Accessed on 25 September 2018), EC (Accessed on 05 December 2019).  
923 Likewise, in January 2019, the Parlimanet backed a proposal to extend the preferential tariff rates on Moroccan exports already in 
place to the Sahara so that the local population can benefit from it. EP (Accessed on 15 October 2018); EP (Accessed on 05 December 
2019).  
924 (06 April 2016), Morocco and EU, a business alliance or Mediterranean disorders?, Mediterranean Affairs (Accessed on 09 
September 2017). 
925 LAPERROUZE Jeanne (23 February 2016), EU-Morocco fishing deal casts doubt on EU future foreign policy, Euobserver (Accessed 
on 17 September 2018). 
926 SAKTHIVEL Vish (10 June 2016), The EU, Morocco and the Western Sahara: a chance for justice, ECFR (Accessed on 04 November 
2017). 
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conventional energy offshore operations in the Sahara,927 German Siemens and Italian Enel have 
ultimately been investing into renewable energy projects in the region.928  
Part of the anti-group, as already shown before, are notably the northern European or Nordic 
countries, above all Sweden, which has been particularly critical towards Morocco’s Sahara 
policy. For example, in December 2012, its Parliament, the Riksdagen, voted for recognition of 
the SADR as a free and sovereign state and urged the government to promote this within the 
EU.929 However, and in line with a review of its Sahara policy following threats of the Moroccan 
government to boycott Swedish companies and products such as IKEA,930 the Swedish 
government, in January 2016, decided to not comply with the request of the Parliament, stating 
that ‘the situation in Western Sahara differs from that of states which Sweden has recognized in the 
past’.931 Similarly, on 2 June 2016, the Danish Parliament voted in favour of a motion that seeks 
to make it more difficult for Danish companies to trade with the Sahara and also for the public 
sector to invest into the region.932 Unlike the northern European or Nordic countries, Germany 
rather adopts a neutral stance on the Sahara issue, whilst Italy and Portugal equally follow a 
rather neutral approach by advocating in favour of the resumption of a negotiation process 
under the aegis of the UN (PEREIRA COUTINHO, 2019:Abstract).933 As a result, and as regards 
Germany, Morocco trusts the country as a partner, which is equally reflected in the fact that 
former President Horst Köhler was appointed Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for 
Western Sahara between 2017 and 2019.934 In fact, concerned with the issue of human rights in 
the Sahara, Germany endeavours to find political solutions that are consistent with the UN 
resolutions 1979 and 2044 on the extension of the MINURSO mandate.935 In this context, critical 
voices have increasingly been raised, notably amongst the leftist and green deputies of the 
German Parliament, the Bundestag but also amongst some central deputies from the CDU/CSU, 
stating that the delay on the referendum on the sovereignty of the Sahara must end.936 At the 
same time though, Germany gave its consent to support Morocco in the latter’s appeal procedure 
against the ECJ’s decision in the context of its December 2016 ruling.937  
Part of the pro-group are the southern European countries France and Spain although their 
positions on the matter are rather ambiguous. France’s role in the Sahara conflict is highly 
interesting, given that the country has somehow decisively contributed to its emergence by 
drawing the so-called Trinquet Line on a map in 1938 – separating Algeria and Morocco, this line 
was initially a purely administrative boundary given that at that time, both countries were under 
French control (TROUT, 1969:416). However, it later began to serve as a basis for the 
determination of the Algerian-Moroccan border, thus laying, as brought forward by Boussois 
 
927 Multinationals Observatory (Accessed on 03 November 2016). 
928 SAGENER, Nicole (09 November 2016), European companies help Morocco maintain control over Western Sahara, Euractiv 
(Accessed on 03 November 2016). 
929 (07 December 2012), Riksdag push for Western Sahara vetoed, The Local, (Accessed on 05 November 2017). 
930 (02 October 2015), Sweden softens line on Western Sahara recognition of boycott threat, Radio Sweden (Accessed on 05 
November 2017). 
931 By contrast, it decided to uphold its support for the the UN process whose purpose is to satisfy the right of the Sahara to self-
determination. Swedish Government (05 November 2017); Swedish Government (05 November 2017). 
932 W Christian (02 June 2016), Danish Parliament passes motion on Western Sahara, CPH Post (Accessed on 04 November 2017); 
ERIKSSON Alexandra (03 June 2016), Danish MPs warn firms not to trade with Western Sahara, Euobserver (Accessed on 04 
November 2016). 
933 UN (Accessed on 20 November 2019).  
934 Spiegel (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
935 Bundestag (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
936 Bundestag (Accessed on 04 November 2017). 
937 (29 February 2016), Marokko und Algerien nehmen Flüchtlinge zurück, Handelsblatt (Accessed on 04 November 2017); SCHULZE 
Tobias (01 March 2016), Das Völkerrecht verscherbelt, TAZ (Accessed on 04 November 2017). 
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(2017),938 the grounds for what would later be known as the Sahara conflict. Nonetheless, 
France can be currently assigned to the pro Morocco group and this despite the fact that the 
country’s official position is aligned with the position of the UN (a context in which France is 
supportive of the MINURSO mission).939 In fact, officially, France does not recognise Morocco’s 
sovereignty over the Sahara, however, the country has, in its role as one of Morocco’s most 
important long-term allies, ‘decidedly’ taken the Moroccan side in the conflict (COLOMBO and 
HUBER, 2016:23). For example, in 2003, French President Jacques Chirac declared that France 
seeks ‘a political solution which fully takes into account Morocco’s interests and regional 
stability’.940 In this light, France supports Morocco’s opposition against a referendum by backing 
its autonomy proposal (MARTIN, 2012:44) – an initiative proposed in 2006 that foresees giving 
the Sahrawi people a special status of governance within the Kingdom (which Polisario however 
refused).941 In this context, and as Morocco’s ally in the UN Security Council, France has often 
been suspected of using its veto right in case the UN imposes a solution that is not acceptable to 
Morocco.942 And although France has denied such a practice on several occasions, 943 the country 
has however undeniably been ‘in the forefront of efforts to steer the EU towards a more pro-
Moroccan position on the Western Sahara’ (GILLESPIE, 2005:5). This, as well as the French 
support for Morocco in general, has become a major subject of disagreement with Algeria, which 
regularly asks for a review of the French Sahara policy. The French support for the Moroccan 
cause can be best explained historically and goes back to the Cold War during which Morocco, 
then aligned to the Western camp, played an important proxy role in helping the US and France 
to fight communism, whereby, in turn, it could count on international support as regards the 
Sahara question (ZOUBIR, 2007:158). For Zoubir (2007:158), it is only against this background 
and thanks to support from the US, France and the Gulf countries that Morocco was able to ‘seize 
the Western Sahara’. Nowadays, French support can be best explained by the fact that France 
considers the potential independence of the region to be a destabilising factor for the Franco-
Moroccan partnership (MARTIN, 2012:56). Stability in its relations with Morocco is however 
essential, given that France considers Morocco a strategic country for the fight against terrorism 
and migration (ABOURABI, 2015:593) and pursues, as will be detailed later, various commercial 
and economic interests in the country.  
Bearing a certain responsibility for the conflict as it failed to decolonise the region as had been 
mandated by the UN in 1963 (ZOUBIR, 2007:172), Spain plays an equally prominent role in the 
Sahara question. However, or precisely for this reason, its position on the conflict is rather 
ambiguous (BENLABBAH, EL GHISSASSI, AKMIR, DKHISSI and BAROUKI, 2012:60). Indeed, 
whilst officially, Spain ‘supports a just, sustainable and mutually acceptable political solution’ that 
foresees ‘the free self-determination of the Sahrawi people in the framework of the principles and 
propositions of the Charter of the UN’,944 in reality, the Spanish position vacillates ‘between 
alignment with France's position and return to a solution within the UN framework’ (ZOUBIR, 
 
938 BOUSSOIS Sébastien (26 April 2017), Western Sahara: the responsibility of colonial France in the birth of the problem, Jeune 
Afrique (Accessed on 21 September 2018). 
939 KASRAOUI Safaa (30 April 2017), France Reiterates Supports for Security Council Resolution on Western Sahara, Morocco World 
News (Accessed on 01 October 2018) 
940 (09 October 2003), Jacques Chirac salue le Maroc, L’Obs (Accessed on 23 September 2018) 
941 CALCUTTAWALA Zainab (30 November 2016), Western Sahara: France Reiterates Support for 2007 Autonomy Proposal, Morocco 
World News (Accessed on 04 November 2017). 
942 including resolutions that are not in favour of Morocco’s Sahara policy or critical of the human rights situation in the region. 
BOLOPION Philippe (22 December 2010), Sahara occidental: la France contre les droits de l’homme?, Le Monde (Accessed on 05 
November 2017). 
943 (21 April 2014), Non, la France n’utilisera pas son droit de veto pour le Sahara, Bladi (Accessed on 05 November 2017). 
944 Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Accessed on 25 September 2018). 
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2007:172-173). Doubtlessly, Spain’s role in the Maghreb allows for little room in which to 
manoeuvre, leaving the country constantly juggling between Moroccan and Algerian interests. 
On the one hand, Spain is, just as France, a traditional ally to Morocco with whom it seeks to 
maintain good relations and to strengthen political and economic/commercial ties as will be 
detailed later and in 1983, both countries signed a fishery agreement that allows Spanish vessels 
to operate along the coasts of the disputed territory (DEL MAR HOLGADO MOLINA and DEL SOL 
OSTOS REY, 2002:194; ZOUBIR, 2007:172). Against this background, Spain is, just as France, in 
principle opposed to the idea of a referendum (MARTIN, 2012:44) and has regularly supported 
Morocco’s autonomy plans for the Sahara.945 On the other hand, and interested in improving its 
relations with Algeria, parts of Spain’s political class have also supported the Polisario/SADR, 
even though indirectly, by fancying the possibility of a referendum in the desert region 
(GILLESPIE, 2005:5; COLOMBO and HUBER, 2016:23), with notably the leftist (Izquierda Unido, 
IU) and pro-European (Union Progreso y Democracia, UPyD) parties having regularly expressed 
their unconditional support to the Polisario (BENLABBAH, EL GHISSASSI, AKMIR, DKHISSI and 
BAROUKI, 2012:59). This ambiguous behaviour can be best explained by the fact that Algeria has 
regularly made the support of Spain for the SADR’s right to self-determination a condition for 
the conclusion of agreements on the exchange of gas between the two countries (MARTIN, 
2012:52).946 Moreover, the idea of holding a referendum is rather popular amongst the Spanish 
people, and support for the Sahrawi cause within Spanish civil society high.947 In this line, the 
Spanish government has regularly provided humanitarian aid to Sahrawi refugees.948  
7.2.3 Interim conclusion 
 
Based on the previous Section, Hypothesis H2 can be confirmed as converging and 
diverging interests play a role in respectively extensive and non-extensive or limited 
coordination (and thus in high and medium consistency).949 However, there are shades of 
difference and one must distinguish between functional and strategic/political interests or 
subordinate and superordinate interests. In fact, as far as the horizontal and diagonal 
dimensions are concerned, interests do largely converge and there is an extensive level of 
coordination as regards both strategic/political and functional aspects. The same is true for the 
intergovernmental and vertical dimension, i.e. there are few to zero discrepancies as regards the 
member states’ respective energy priorities and coordination on the functional level is extensive, 
yet, coordination on the strategic/political level is limited.  
Energy interests being, as shown before, highly complex constructs, one of the reasons why 
intergovernmental and vertical strategic/political coordination is limited is that there are 
diverging underlying policy views – notably as regards multilateral energy initiatives – reflected 
 
945 CEMBRERO Ignacio (15 December 2010), Spain favored Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara: Government under fire 
after embassy cables show extent of consultations with Rabat, El Pais (Accessed on 09 April 2019). 
 
946 For example, in January 2010, an arbitration court ruled that Algerian state-owned Sonatrach can increase the price of gas 
supplied to Spanish Gas Natural Fenosa via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline. Spain, itself highly dependent on Algerian gas imports (in 
2016, 58% of Spain’s gas imports came from Algeria) has thus been forced to change its policy in the region. ICIS (Accessed on 23 
November 2019); OEC (Accessed on 05 November 2017). 
947 CEMBRERO Ignacio (24 April 2015), Difficile équilibre de la politique espagnole au Sahara occidental, Orient XXI (Accessed on 25 
September 2018). 
 
948 Cooperación Española (Accessed on 25 September 2018). 
949 This outcome confirms the existing international relations and behavioural literature according to which coordination is more 
likely when interests are aligned (STEIN, 1982:302; GOODIN, 2011:97; DEBAERE, 2013:118; SITZIA and ZHENG, 2019). 
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in the fragmentation of the multilateral logic of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership as well as in 
the bilateralisation of relations with cleavages to be found on the side of the EU/member states 
and Morocco. On the side of the member states, the reasons for the bilateralisation of relations 
lie within the fact that past relations have above all been intergovernmental, whereby they 
strongly depend on hard factors such as geography or history. On the Moroccan side, they are, 
apart from regional dynamics, due to a fundamentally erroneous understanding of the EU-
Mediterranean partnership, a context in which the Sahara issue seems to play an (increasingly) 
important role. Here, it can be noted that Germany, France and Spain are, from a Moroccan 
perspective, the most important EU countries when it comes to Morocco’s dealing with the 
Sahara issue. This is either because they favour a political solution in the context of the UN or 
because they openly support the country’s autonomy plans for the region. In this light and given 
that these are, as will be shown more in detail in the following, also the countries Morocco has 
the closest foreign and energy ties with, one can assume that there is a link between their energy 
standing and their Sahara policies. Here, a new hypothesis could be added that postulates a 
connection between these two elements.  
7.3 Interdependencies 
 
As regards the variable interdependencies, it was hypothesised that ‘the less 
interdependent the intergovernmental relations between the member states and the third country, 
the more extensive the coordination (and thus the higher the consistency) of their energy policies’ 
(Hypothesis 3). 
The empirical research has shown that there is limited strategic/political coordination (and thus 
medium consistency) amongst the EU institutions and the member states as well as amongst the 
member states in both the EU multilevel system and in Morocco where coordination is most 
likely to happen when it is not institutionalised or when it is informal. As Part 7.2 suggests, this 
is due to diverging subordinate views as regards the EU’s governance approach and a clear 
preference for bilateral relationships, whereby on the part of both the member states and 
Morocco, one reason for this may be interdependencies. This is in line with Knodt, Piefer and 
Müller (2015:24) according to whom ‘’cooperation conflicts’ occur when actors have highly 
diverging interests, whereas ‘coordination conflicts’ arise when actors follow similar interests but 
are bargaining for the greatest benefit within their benefit sets’. Indeed, the fact that every 
political actor or entity follows its own policy interests which it seeks to promote both internally 
and externally in order to extend its sphere of influence afford a plethora of opportunities for 
frictions (BRAUN, 2011:8; DEBAERE, 2013:49), notably in the intergovernmental and vertical 
dimensions.950 For example, although with respect to Morocco, the member states pursue 
similar energy interests, past attempts at establishing closer energy cooperation on the regional 
level have been undermined by (geo)political or economic rivalries, a circumstance that can be 
best explained by the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI).951 Here, one can assume that 
the beforementioned interdependencies between the member states and Morocco shape the 
context in which these actors interact. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 seeks to establish a connection 
 
950 In reality, turf wars occur in all dimensions, including in the horizontal dimension (to be mentioned here is the turf war between 
the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) on energy security) (THALER, 2015:152). 
951 In fact, for Multi-level Governance (MLG) to be valid, one should find that ‘state sovereignty is compromised in collective national 
decision making’, however, this is not the case for energy, a domain in which the member states are keen on keeping their 
sovereignty (HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001:12). 
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between these interdependencies and coordination and to find out to what extent the two 
elements affect each other. In this context, it also raises the question of whether the coordination 
mechanisms in place rather aim at coordinating the different energy policies to avoid getting in 
each other’s way or to create synergies? Answering this and the other questions requires for a 
mapping of relations, with the analysis to cover both public and private actors active or present 
in the Moroccan energy sector. To this end, and to test Hypothesis 3, the following Chapter will 
investigate the bilateral energy activities of the EU member states towards Morocco. The focus 
will hereby be on France, Spain and Germany, which have, as mentioned before, been identified 
as the most important energy stakeholders in Morocco by both European and Moroccan 
interview partners. Asking how energy relations of these stakeholders with the Kingdom have 
developed over the years and what their characteristics and main features are, the focus of 
interest will be on the general structure and fundamental functioning – aims, strategies, policies, 
actors (and their roles) and instruments – as well as on the challenges of these relationships. 
Particular emphasis will be placed on the individual specificities of each partnership, including 
political, economic and commercial aspects, as well as the role played by private companies 
given that the private sector generally plays very significant role when it comes to energy 
relations as it generally has a ‘de-risking’ or ‘depoliticising’ function (as is the case with science) 
(LEAL-ARCAS and WOUTERS, 2017:47).952  
7.3.1 Case I: France  
 
Boasting an energy consumption of around 152,2 million tons of oil equivalent (toe) in 
2016, France is one of the countries with the highest level of gross inland consumption of energy 
within the EU, with its primary energy supply being dominated by nuclear power (~42%), crude 
oil (~24%), natural gas (~16%) and renewables (~3%), whereas its power mix is primarily 
made up of nuclear power, which accounts for 75% of the total and allows for a low carbon 
intensity.953 Its energy policy centres around four objectives – energy access, security, 
competititivity and sustainability – and the country follows, partly due to economic necessity 
and partly due to environmental conviction, ambitious energy goals. These are reflected in its 
Law for Energy Transition and Green Growth which, adopted in 2015, foresees the reduction of 
final energy consumption (by 20% by 2030 and 50% by 2050 to 2012 levels), the reduction of 
CO2 emissions (by 40% by 2030 and by 75% by 2050 to 1990 levels) as well as an increase in 
the share of RES (to 32% of final energy consumption by 2030).954 In this context, France also 
plans a reduction of the share of nuclear power from 75% to 50%, an undertaking that has so far 
gone along with the closure of several obsolete nuclear sites.955 In the same spirit, it hosted the 
COP21 in 2015, one of the largest international conferences ever held in the country, leading to the 
signature of the Paris agreement. France only produces around half of all the energy it consumes 
and the rest is imported, a context in which notably its dependence on crude and derived 
products is extremely high.956 Most of the crude imports come from Asia but the African 
continent acts as a main supplier too, with Algeria, Libya and Tunisia accounting for around 17% 
 
952 A good example for this is Algeria. Indeed, whilst political energy relations often prove to be difficult in the Maghreb country, 
private sector cooperation works out well.  
953 IEA (Accessed on 25 March 2018). 
954 French Ministry of Ecological and Solidary Transition (Accessed on 13 March 2019). 
955 French Ministry of Ecological and Solidary Transition (Accessed on 20 December 2018). 
956 IEA (Accessed on 25 March 2018). 
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of the total supply.957 This is partly due to France’s historical interest and its traditionally strong 
foothold in the Mediterranean region. 
French-Moroccan cooperation: strategic partners, despite up-and-down relationship 
Morocco not only has a privileged relationship with the EU but also with France in particular 
with which it is deeply entwined through political, economic and cultural ties due to both 
geographical proximity and historical legacy (in fact, notably the country’s colonial past has been 
a driver of relations). As a result, of all the member states, France is clearly the one with the 
most influence upon Morocco and is, as has been shown before, one of the country’s most 
important long-term allies when it comes to the Sahara question.958 However, relations have 
often been complex in the past, notably when compared with Germany whose relationship with 
the Maghreb country has never been overshadowed by colonialism. For example, most recently, 
relations suffered cracks when Morocco decided to suspend all contact with France in February 
2014 after the French police had come to the private residence of the Moroccan ambassador in 
Paris to inform him about a French court summons regarding a complaint of torture against 
Abdellatif Hammouchi, the Director of the Directorate of Surveillance of the National Territory 
(DGST)959 (overall, it took almost one year for relations to return to normal in January 2015).960 
Prior to this, relations also suffered a significant setback when François Hollande decided to 
organise the first diplomatic visit after his election as French President in 2012 to Algeria, and 
not, as had been tradition for many years, to Morocco. Apart from these incidents though, 
Franco-Moroccan diplomatic ties are overall outstanding, with both countries considering each 
other as strategic allies which, apart from regular visits by the Heads of State (7 since 2015), is 
reflected in the fact that there are 6 French General Consulates in Morocco.961 There is a great 
dependence with regards to migrant labour, with France accounting for one third of the 
Moroccan diaspora in Europe962 and whilst Moroccan students make up for most of the foreign 
students in France, Morocco hosts the 2nd largest French school network worldwide.963 France is 
one of the most important donors of Official Development Assistance (ODA), for example, the 
country transferred US$ 537 million to Morocco in 2017, whereby the majority of assistance 
went to economic infrastructure projects (US$ 253 million), four of which were dedicated to 
energy.964 But also on the economic and commercial levels, relations are excellent and France is 
one of Morocco’s leading private investors and trade partners. For example, in 2018 and with a 
share of 11.4% of total foreign investments into Morocco, the country was the biggest source of 
FDI after the UAE.965 The majority of investments is generated in the automotive industry which 
has proven to be a particularly promising sector for French companies as demonstrated by 
Renault’s investment in Tangier966 and PSA Peugeot-Citroen’s announced plans to invest in the 
country.967 However, these success stories cannot conceal the fact that French FDI has declined 
considerably in recent years. Indeed, in 2009, France still accounted for around half of Morocco’s 
 
957 as of 2017. OEC (Accessed on 25 March 2019). 
958 In fact, France’s support for Morocco as regards the Sahara is a decisive factor for its outstanding relationship with the country. 
959 The Directorate of Surveillance of the National Territory (DGST) is the Moroccan intelligence agency. 
960 HUBERT-RODIER Jacques (10 February 2015), France-Maroc, ou l’impossible rupture, Les Echos (Accessed on 01 October 2018). 
961 France Diplomatie (Accessed on 14 March 2019). 
962 OECD (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
963 France Diplomatie (Accessed on 14 March 2019). 
964 OECD (Accessed on 10 April 2019). 
965 Moroccan Exchange Office (Accessed on 12 April 2019). Data for 2018 = preliminary. 
966 Renault (Accessed on 10 July 2017). 
967 ROUAUD Pierre-Olivier (20 April 2016), PSA au Maroc: démarrage mi 2016 des travaux de l’usine de Kenitra, L’Usinenouvelle 
(Accessed on 10 July 2017). 
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FDI, while in 2018 it was surpassed by the UAE.968 Similarly, French trade dominance has been 
increasingly contested by Spain. In fact, whilst France used to be Morocco’s most important EU 
trading partner, this changed in 2013 when for the first time France ranked second to Spain.969 
Currently, France accounts for ~12% of Morocco’s imports and for 22% of its exports.970  
7.3.1.1 French energy governance towards Morocco 
 
Throughout this research, France has been identified as the most important European 
player in Morocco, in general and as regards energy and as with Germany and Spain (see 
following sections), energy cooperation mainly concentrates on renewables (see Table 15). For 
example, on September 17, 2015, France and Morocco signed a renewable energy cooperation 
agreement, covering institutional, technical and scientific aspects. However, overall, and notably 
compared with Germany, this does not imply reinforced cooperation in this regard, at least as far 
as the political level is concerned. Apart from renewables, France is the only EU member state to 
also focus on nuclear power which has been a priority of French-Moroccan energy cooperation 
in the past, with Morocco having sought to construct a nuclear power plant since the 2000s (see 
Table 15). In fact, in 2006, France, together with the US (which provided the technology), 
contributed to financing Morocco’s only research reactor to date, located in the Maamora 
research centre (Interview French Embassy, 2017). And in 2007, the French nuclear company 
Areva (now Orano) and the Moroccan phosphates company OCP – which had already been 
cooperating on a scientific level since 2005 – signed an MoU on the development of cooperation 
in the fields of natural uranium contained in phosphoricacid feedstock (phosphates).971 Nuclear 
cooperation is not only scientific and industrial. On the contrary, in 2014, the Moroccan 
Parliament approved an agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy signed with France in 
2010.972 France and Morocco also cooperate in research, with notably the French Alternative 
Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) being an important actor here. In July 2016, the 
CEA and MASEN signed an agreement on solar technologies,973 and the French National Institute 
of Applied Sciences (INSA) opened a branch in Fes.974 
Table 15: France’s energy policy towards Morocco 
Overall aim of energy policy Energy security, competitiveness, sustainable development
Energy policy approach (Geo)political, economic and industrial approach
Energy interest RES, energy efficiency, electricity, nuclear, gas, coal, environmental protection 
Financed by MEAE, MTES, AfD
Managed by MEAE, MTES, AfD (GERES only to a certain extent)
Ulterior motive (Geo) political interests (military, stability), economic growth, soft power  
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.  
 
968 UNCTAD (Accessed on 14 March 2019). 
969 partly due to lower French wheat exports and higher Spanish oil product exports. French Embassy to Morocco (Accessed on 26 
March 2019). 
970 OEC (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
971 AREVA (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
972 Sortir du nucléaire; Sortir du nucléaire (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
973 Renewables (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
974 French National Institute of Applied Sciences (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
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Energy relations between France and Morocco are, just as for Germany, primarily bilateral, 
whereby, contrary to its European neighbour, France has not established a fixed political energy 
framework with Morocco but cooperation is framed by global government meetings on a higher 
level (‘elite interdependence’) that take place ad hoc (Interview BMZ, 2017). In fact, French 
(energy) diplomacy is above all based on rigid hierarchical structures and negotiations primarily 
materialize at the level of the Prime Minister, with corresponding meetings, the so-called 
Rencontres de Haut Niveau (RHN) taking place every two years under the aegis of the Prime 
Minister and in the presence of numerous ministers from both countries.975 The reason for this 
is that French energy interests are built upon both geopolitical and political interests and are not 
part of a separate but of a superordinate diplomatic strategy. Having a ‘strong desire to re-
establish a robust industrial base to its economy’ (SZULECKI, FISCHER, GULLBERG and SARTOR, 
2016:556), the French governance approach is also highly market-oriented, whereby French 
energy companies do largely negotiate contracts on their own, i.e. without any external 
interference (JEGEN, 2014:17). Overall, France applying both a hierarchical and market-related 
mode of governance suggests a relationship of high and middle symmetrical interdependence. In 
fact, the more a third country depends on the EU or a member state, the higher is the latter’s 
leeway as regards external governance, whereby the mode of governance depends very much on 
the nature of the relationship the actors in question have. If relations are characterised by high 
and asymmetrical interdependence, the most likely mode of governance is hierarchy. By 
contrast, in cases of high and symmetrical interdependence, market governance is the most 
likely mode. Finally, network governance rather occurs in cases of medium interdependence 
(LAVENEX and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:803-804).  
Whilst overall, French energy governance towards Morocco has been successful so far, it 
however faces several internal and external challenges. Internally, one major challenge 
interestingly (as it is also one of its greatest benefits) is the energy sector’s strong connection to 
or interdependence with higher politics or policies. In fact, although energy is certainly always 
innately tied in with politics because of its large-scale procedure, France, partly due to its 
centralised administrative system, as well as for historical reasons, is a special case to look at. 
For example, after WWII, and in order to boost economic expansion, large parts of the French 
energy industry (EDF, GDF) were nationalised and despite a wave of liberalisation that occurred 
in the late 1980s/early 1990s, as of 2018, the French state held a share of 83.7% in electricity 
provider EDF,976 and a 23.64% share in energy company Engie977 (VIALLET-THEVENIN, 
2015:469). Although up to the present, the French-Moroccan energy relationship has never been 
negatively impacted by this mixing of politics and business, the strong involvement with politics 
may, however, expose it to certain risks and make it susceptible to eventual interference. 
Another challenge in this context is France’s role in the Sahara conflict and its relationship with 
Algeria. In fact, whilst France has, as shown, historically supported Morocco on this matter, in 
recent years, the French government has also increasingly shown interest in normalising its 
relations with its former colony Algeria. Externally, one main challenge lies within France’s 
growing rivalry with Spain, which has undeniably strengthened its bonds with Morocco in 
recent years, be it in the area of security, migration or the economy. Here, the Iberian country 
has turned out to be a threat to French interests notably as regards trade, having replaced 
 
975 The last meeting took place in 2017, a context in which around 22 partnership agreements were signed. French Embassy to 
Morocco (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
976 EDF (Accessed on 11 April 2019). 
977 Engie (Accessed on 11 April 2019). 
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France as Morocco’s main trading partner in 2013. By the same token, another although less 
apparent challenge at first sight, is the emergence of Germany as a more and more important 
actor in the Moroccan energy sector. Indeed, as will be elaborated more in detail in the 
following, Germany is not only a vital actor in the development sector but has also evolved into a 
main actor as regards the financing of large-scale energy projects in Morocco. Finally, another 
challenge for France’s role as a nuclear power is the entrance of other nuclear powers into the 
Moroccan energy market, such as China or Russia.  
7.3.1.2 Institutional overview and key actors 
 
In an environment of rivalry, internal competition, i.e. competition between different 
national stakeholders plays an important role, whereby according to Duke (2006:14), other than 
the Foreign Ministries, the Ministries of Economy or the development and the environment may 
equally have some legitimate external relations interests. Nuttall (1993:138) writes on this 
topic: ‘The problem [of consistency] cannot be solved only, or even principally, within the Union 
itself. It stems from the separate responsibilities of the different national Ministries, each of which 
will use the framework of the Union as a means of escaping from the supervision of its fellow 
Ministries at home. Rivalries between the political and economic sections of the Foreign Ministries 
and between the Foreign Ministries and other Ministries will come to the fore. The way in which the 
Member States organize themselves at home is a problem which must be tackled in parallel with 
the organization of the Union.’  
As this suggests, there are two main actors as regards national policymaking: 1) the Foreign 
Ministry, which, represented by the Permanent Representation in Brussels,978 plays the most 
important monitoring and coordination role, and 2) a so-called ‘lead’ Ministry which depends on 
the subject matter979 and which is in charge of the coordination with the Foreign Ministry, as 
well as between the Foreign Ministry and other Ministries (see Figure 31). Here, each Ministry 
usually disposes of a ‘European’ division, i.e. a division that takes care of the coordination with 
EU institutions, notably the Commission’s DGs, whereby one aim is to ‘europeanise’, i.e. to make 
use of the European frame for the implementation of projects. These divisions play an active role 
in ’interpreting, understanding and making technical suggestions in their respective fields of 
competence’, with the purpose of making sure that before going into Council negotiations, 
national policies are aligned with EU policies (DUKE, 2006:14-16). For instance, on the national 
level, France has set up the Secrétariat général des affaires européennes (SGAE) to coordinate its 
European policy and come up with a consistent policy.980 Finally, there are domestic interest 
groups, which may make coordination difficult as they may undertake ‘direct lobbying at the 
European level when they believe their government does not hold their position or will not defend 
their interests and that the Commission will’ (DUKE, 2006:14). 
No matter which Ministry takes on the role of lead actor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will 
always serve as the key coordinator, ‘carrying the main responsibility for preparing and 
presenting national positions not only on a day-to-day basis but also Council meetings and 
intergovernmental conferences’ (DUKE, 1999:15). This gate-keeping role is even more important 
 
978 According to Duke (2006:16), the Permanent Representation in Brussels has a sort of gatekeeper role, as it disposes of numerous 
contacts in the Commission. 
979 In many cases, it is the Ministry of Economy.  
980 SGAE (Accessed on 10 April 2019). 
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in that the member states ’not only have to coordinate their initiatives and responses within their 
own bureaucracies, as well as between themselves, but they also have to deal with the Commission 
as in many respects a co-equal’ (DUKE, 1999:18). However, and as will be shown, in some cases 
domestic interest groups may directly initiate negotiations or contact the EU institutions, 
partially rendering the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s gate-keeping function obsolete. 
Figure 31: Bilateral coordination of national external energy policies  
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.  
In the case of France, and as will be laid out in the following, there is wide range of actors 
contributing to French energy governance towards Morocco, with responsibilities spread across 
two ministries (MEAE, MTES) and two agencies (ADEME, AFD). This implies that French energy 
governance towards Morocco is rather more centralised compared to the German governance 
system, for example.  
Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MEAE), Ministry of Ecological and Solidary 
Transition (MTES) and French Embassy to Morocco 
As highlighted by Jegen (2014:17), ‘France has a large diplomatic service, which deals with all 
issues, including with energy policy’. In this context, the main actors on the EU and national levels 
as regards steering the direction of French energy policies towards Morocco are the Ministry for 
Europe and Foreign Affairs (MEAE) and the Ministry of Ecological and Solidary Transition 
(MTES) and most of the energy cooperation between France and Morocco is channeled through 
these institutions. On the local level, the MEAE is supported by the French Embassy to Morocco 
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which plays a key role in the promotion of French energy interests internationally. In this 
respect, it works closely with the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.981 
Environment & Energy Management Agency (ADEME) 
Alongside the MEAE and the MTES, the Environment & Energy Management Agency (ADEME) 
which closely operates with the MTES, is another important actor in the governance of energy 
policies, with its aim being the implementation of France’s energy and ecological transition 
policies. More specifically, ADEME is ‘active in the implementation of public policy in the areas of 
the environment, energy and sustainable development’, and ‘provides expertise and advisory 
services to businesses, local authorities and communities, government bodies and the public at 
large, to enable them to establish and consolidate their environmental action’.982 In this regard, it 
‘supports French delegations and represents France in various agreements that aim to strengthen 
international commitment to sustainable development’.983 Made up of several regional divisions, it 
contributes to financing projects, whereby it focuses on renewable heat and waste prevention 
and management, with one recurrent topic of interest being, for example, energy-efficient 
buildings. On the local level, ADEME closely cooperates with AMEE (former ADEREE) with which 
it signed a cooperation agreement for the first time in 2010 and which was renewed in 2015.984  
French Development Agency (AFD) 
Another, if not the most important actor on both the EU and local levels, at least as far as 
functional aspects are concerned, is the French Development Agency (AFD) which is owned by 
the French state and has the legal status of a public bank. Through the AFD, France has been 
operating in Morocco since 1992 and of all the partner countries, Morocco is the first recipient 
country of the agency’s financing activity.985 In this regard and with respect to energy, the AFD 
works in close cooperation with both MASEN and ONEE (Interview AFD, 2016). For example, 
during the last RHN round, it signed a financial protocol with MASEN on the strengthening of the 
French-Moroccan partnership as regards solar energy.986 The main areas of interest here are 
energy production, especially from renewables (as mirrored for example in the signature of a 
letter of intention regarding the launch of training centres relative to RES and energy efficiency 
in 2011),987 as well as electric transport, i.e. infrastructures and connections (Interview AFD, 
2016). In these segments, the agency is responsible for both financial and technical assistance, 
whereby financial support largely dominates (Interview AFD, 2016) and whilst this kind of 
support is not subject to any conditionality, it is however often linked to climate objectives 
(Interview AFD, 2016).  
In fact, the AFD regularly provides loans for energy projects, particularly regarding RES and 
energy efficiency or projects related to the fight against climate change, a context in which it 
almost exclusively finances public projects (Interview AFD, 2016). For example, it contributed to 
financing the first phase of Ouarzazate (NOOR I) with € 100 million, and the second phase 
(NOOR II & III) with € 50 million (see Table 16). It also awarded a subsidy of € 300,000 to 
 
981 French Embassy to Morocco (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
982 ADEME (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
983 ADEME (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
984 ADEME (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
985 French Embassy to Morocco (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
986 French Embassy to Morocco (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
987 French Embassy to Morocco (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
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MASEN for conducting several studies, for example, on the socio-economic impacts of 
Ouarzazate or on technical, economic, financial and judicial aspects of the export of green 
electricity in the framework of Article 9 of the European Energy and Climate Directive 
(2009/28/CE). Contrary to the KfW, the AFD is not involved in Morocco’s Wind Programme 
(Interview AFD, 2016), however, it contributed to financing the first and third phases of the 
Reinforcement of Electricity Transmission Programme (Réseaux I and III), in which it also 
served as a leader (Réseaux III), next to other funders. Moreover, between 1996 and 2009, it 
supported Morocco’s Rural Electrification Programme (PERG) with various electricity 
infrastructure projects, among others the improvement of connections between Morocco and 
Spain as well as between Morocco and Algeria.988 Finally, it also indirectly financed the Tanger 
wind park with € 15 million via the French company EDF. And, last but not least, its latest 
project has been a € 10 million loan to IFMEREE in whose creation it has been actively involved 
along with the EU and the GIZ.989 
As already mentioned before, the AFD regularly cooperates with the German Reconstruction 
Loan Corporation (KfW) and the EIB under the NIP and on the national level, it coordinates with 
the French Ministry for Economy and Finance (MINEFI) which in turn coordinates with the 
MEAE.990 
 
Table 16: AFD energy projects in Morocco 
Timeframe Project description
Project 
value (in €)
Partner 
institutions 
France/EU
Partner 
institutions 
Morocco
2018 ECODEV 1,848,474 GERES diverse
2015 IFMEREE 10,000,000 EU, GIZ MEN
2011-2016 Accompanying the thermal solar plant Ouarzazate (NOOR I) 150,000,000 EIB, BMUB, BMZ, 
KfW
MASEN
2012 Reinforcing the Electricity Transmission System (Réseaux III) 57,000,000 EIB, EC (NIF), KfW ONEE
1996-2009 Supporting the Global Rural Electrification Program (PERG) 240,000,000 EIB ONEE
2007 Reinforcing the Electricity Transmission System (Réseaux I) 50,000,000 ONEE
2002 Reinforcing the Electricity Interconnection between Morocco-Spain and 
Morocco-Algeria
50,000,000 EIB ONEE
1999 Accompanying the wind farm Tanger 15,000,000 EIB ONEE
Total 572,000,000  
Sources: Own elaboration based on information from the AFD.  
Group for Environment, Renewable Energies and Solidarity (GERES) 
In addition to the AFD, France is active in Morocco via the non-governmental association 
Environment, Renewable Energies and Solidarity (GERES) which in turn closely cooperates with 
ADEME. With the aim of accelerating the energy transition, the GERES has been primarily 
focusing on RES or the sustainable management of biomass energy, as well as on the energy 
efficiency. For example, the association concentrates on the reduction of wood consumption in 
 
988 French Embassy to Morocco, AFD (Accessed on 29 July 2017). 
989 Energymed (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
990 OECD (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
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hammams. Overall, the association is mainly responsible for smaller projects and works a lot 
with micro-credits.991 In Morocco, it works closely with the AMEE. 
The French industry 
The industry or private companies are key players when it comes to external energy relations, a 
context in which they pursue their own energy ambitions and might not always be aligned with 
their government’s interests and policies (see the North Stream 2 pipeline, for example). As for 
France, the country has been present in Morocco via its private energy sector which ‘negotiates 
contracts on [its] own’ (Jegen, 2014:17), whereby, contrary to Spain, private cooperation mainly 
involves big companies to the detriment of Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SMEs) (see 
Table 17). In fact, considering Morocco as an entry point for Africa, these companies use the 
country as a launching pad, for example, by investing in Africa alongside local companies. One 
important player in this regard since 1980 has been Engie, formerly known as GDF Suez. For 
example, in a 50:50 JV with Nareva Holding, Engie built the Tarfaya wind farm, Africa’s largest 
wind park, with a capacity of 301 MW provided by 131 wind turbines. Via its subsidiary LCV 
Morocco, Engie also participated in the construction of the two wind farms Koudia el Baida and 
Lafarge (60.2 MW in total). Further, via its subsidiary Safi Energy Company S.A. (SAFIEC), which 
it holds together with Nareva Holding and Japanese Mitsui & Co. Ltd., it also participated in the 
building of the Safi thermal power plant. Including two thermal power generation units with a 
capacity of 293 MW each, the construction of the plant was entrusted to South Korean 
Daewoo.992 Whilst for the moment Engie is, apart from Morocco, only present in South Africa, the 
company, however, seeks to expand its activities in Africa, especially in view of the continent’s 
low electrification rate, plans in which its presence in Morocco might indeed serve as a 
catalyst.993 In this light, in June 2016, Engie and Nareva Holding signed a cooperation agreement 
for the development of energy projects in North and West Africa.994 
Apart from Engie, EDF entered the market in 2012 by winning the tender for the construction of 
the 150 MW Taza wind farm (whose wind turbines will be provided by French Alstom) in a 
50:50 JV with Mitsui & Co. Ltd. Commissioning is planned for 2034.995 Other than energy 
production, French companies are also very active when it comes to energy infrastructure. For 
example, French technology company ABB supplied the Jorf Lasfar Energy Company, the leading 
private power station and subsidiary of TAQA Group generating over 50% of the national 
electricity needs, with control rooms and systems.996 Total, another major energy player in 
France, signed a contract with Morocco in 2001 (KEENAN, 2013:291) to explore oil off the 
Sahara coast, alongside US Kerr McGee. However, the company withdrew from the region in 
2004, presumably because of the delicate political situation in the Sahara.997  
 
 
 
 
991 GERES (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
992 ENGIE (Accessed on 29 July 2017). 
993 L’Economiste (Accessed on 29 July 2017). 
994 ENGIE (Accessed on 29 July 2017). 
995 EDF, DoingBusiness (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
996 ABB (Accessed on 11 April 2019). 
997 WATKINS Eric (25 October 2018), Kerr-McGee to continue work off Morocco, OGJ (Accessed on 06 October 2018). 
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Table 17: French energy companies active in the Moroccan energy sector 
Company Project Energy 
source
ENGIE Thermal power plant Safi (586 MW) Coal, gas
ENGIE Wind farm Tarfaya (301 MW) (50% stake) Wind
ENGIE Wind farms Koudia el Baida and Lafarge (60.2 MW) Wind
EDF Wind farm Taza (150 MW) (50% stake) Wind
ABB Control room and system Jorf Lasfar Infrastructure  
Source: Own elaboration based on information from French energy companies.  
7.3.2 Case II: Spain 
 
With an energy consumption of around 82,2 million toe in 2016, Spain has a rather low 
gross inland consumption of energy within the EU when compared to France, with its primary 
energy supply being dominated by crude oil (~53%), natural gas (~22%), nuclear power 
(~12%) and renewables (~7%).998 The country is a strong advocate of green energy policies and 
whilst it had been subsidising solar and wind power since 2004, it saw itself forced to cut 
subsidies with the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2009. However, it now seeks to attract 
investors again, with the purpose of achieving a 100% renewable electricity supply by 2050 and 
of cutting CO2 emissions by 90%.999 Like France, Spain produces less than half of all the energy it 
consumes and thus heavily relies on imports, particularly crude oil.1000 Most of the imports come 
from Africa, with Libya, Algeria and Egypt accounting for around 36% of this supply.1001  
Spanish-Moroccan cooperation: privileged partners, but relationship characterised by an 
asymmetrical balance of power 
Just as with France, Morocco has a privileged relationship with Spain which has a visible 
influence in history, culture, art and culinary tradition and, dating back to the 8th century, 
relations are based on strong historical ties, with both countries sharing similar political1002 and 
economic interests. Bound to each other by a Treaty of Friendship signed in July 1991,1003 
relations have, however, undergone several crises over a series of matters in the past and have 
sometimes even been marked by violence.1004 On the whole, so Abourabi (2015:572), they are 
characterised by an asymmetrical balance of power and are highly sensitive to public opinion 
and media attention (BENLABBAH, EL GHISSASSI, AKMIR, DKHISSI and BAROUKI, 2012:53, 58). 
As indicated before, the biggest source of conflict by far is territorial affairs, with the relationship 
between the two Kingdoms ‘gravitat [ing] around the legacy of the protectorate’, as formulated 
by Stenner (2019:11). In fact, the enclaves Ceuta and Melilla are, as mentioned before, still under 
Spain’s sovereignty, and so are the Alhucemas Islands (close to the town of Al Hoceima) and the 
Perejil or Tura (in Arabic) Island, a circumstance that Morocco contests and that has regularly 
 
998 IEA (Accessed on 25 March 2018). 
999 HOOK, Leslie (04 December 2018), Spain unveils ambitious green energy plan: Madrid aims to produce all electricity from 
renewables by 2050 and cut emissions by 90%, Financial Times (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1000 IEA (Accessed on 25 March 2018). 
1001 as of 2017. OEC (Accessed on 25 March 2019). 
1002 for example, security and the fight against terrorism, as well as migration.  
1003 FARHANE Mohammed (20 November 2018), Maroc-Espagne, une coopération qui passe à la vitesse supérieur, 2M (Accessed on 
29 March 2019). 
1004 For example, in the 17th and 18th century, both countries were involved in military fights over Kenitra, Tanger, Larache, Ceuta and 
Melilla (BENLABBAH, EL GHISSASSI, AKMIR, DKHISSI and BAROUKI, 2012:17). 
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led to diplomatic tensions (GILLESPIE, 2013:49; ABOURABI, 2015:590). For example, when 
Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar visited Ceuta and Melilla in 2000, Morocco called back 
its ambassador to Spain and relations remained tense for about 3 years. When the Royal couple 
of Spain visited Ceuta and Melilla in 2007, this caused renewed strains (ABOURABI, 2015:572; 
STENNER, 2019:9).1005 Another incident, possibly better known to the public, was the so-called 
Perejil Island crisis that occurred in 2002. A small, uninhabited rock located in the 
Mediterranean about 8 km from Ceuta and at around 200 meters off the Moroccan coast, this 
island is a disputed territory whose Spanish sovereignty is contested by Morocco.1006 The crisis 
of 2002 erupted when Moroccan police landed on the rock with the intention of establishing a 
base-camp for security (migration, drug trafficking) purposes. Although this intervention did not 
last long, ending with their expulsion by Spanish security forces after only 9 days, the crisis 
highlighted the EU’s incapacity to ‘Speak with one Voice’ on foreign policy issues. Whilst the EU 
and most of the member states affirmed their support for Spain, France and Portugal 
abstained.1007 In addition to this, Morocco and Spain are engaged in recurrent conflicts over 
maritime borders and territorial waters in the Atlantic Ocean, notably regarding the maritime 
line between the Canary Islands and Morocco, a context in which they regularly argue about 
marine resources, above all oil and fish. Another point of dispute is security, with one example 
here being the participation of Moroccan citizens in the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and 
Barcelona (2017) (STENNER, 2019:10), whereby it must be mentioned that both countries 
closely cooperate on that matter. Finally, migration is equally putting strains on relations, 
primarily because both countries are part of an important migration route and serve as a 
gateway to Europe for migrants. And whilst both countries thus play an important role in the 
management of migrants, Morocco has lately been accused of having allowed migrants to cross 
its borders, using its border control powers as leverage in negotiations with the EU.1008 Apart 
from the geopolitical or political spheres, tensions also persist on the economic level, where the 
two countries compete in the agricultural sector as they both highly depend on revenues 
generated from fruit and vegetable exports to Europe. Competition also prevails in the fishing 
sector and the fact that Spain is the biggest producer and consumer of sea products within the 
EU, means that the country highly depends on the exploration of and expansion into the waters 
of other countries, including those of Morocco. However, the presence of Spanish vessels in 
Moroccan waters has regularly sparked conflicts in the past and in view of its own dependence 
on the sector and difficulties in the bilateral relationship, Morocco has been progressively 
reducing the granting of fishing licenses. Finally, industrial relocation is another issue, as it is 
considered to pose a threat to Spanish employment by some (BENLABBAH, EL GHISSASSI, 
AKMIR, DKHISSI and BAROUKI, 2012:67-69).  
However, despite the complexity of the Iberian-Maghribi relations outlined above (GILLESPIE, 
2013), Spain continues to favour Morocco as a partner in North Africa which is reflected, 
amongst other things, in more than 105 bilateral treaties (MOUFTI, 2015:4). This is all the more 
important as Spain seeks to maintain control over its enclaves Ceuta and Melilla as well as access 
 
1005 Finally, most recently, Morocco’s unilateral shut-down of its commercial borders with Melilla (an attempt to prevent smuggling) 
led to outcries on the part of policymakers, demanding the central government in Madrid to revise the Treaty of Friendship of 1991 
to include the claims of Ceuta and Melilla, a demand that was however rejected by Madrid. ALI Amal Baba (01 February 2019), Traité 
d’Amitié et de Voisinage. Madrid dit ‘non’ à Sebta et Melilla, LesEco (Accessed on 29 March 2019). 
1006 In fact, according to Morocco, Perejil island is part of the Moroccan territory, whereas in the opinion of Spain, the island has a 
special status and should not be physically occupied by either Morocco or Spain (ABOURABI, 2015:573). 
1007 Similarly, Morocco received support from the League of Arab States (LAS), but not from Algeria (ABOURABI, 2015:572). 
1008 HARRIS Chris, RODRIGUEZ MARTINEZ Marta, MONTALTO MONELLA Lillo (08 August 2018), Did Morocco let more migrants 
make dangerous Spain crossing?, Euronews (Accessed on 12 April 2019).  
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to the resources of the Sahara.1009 Moreover, there are around 1 million Moroccan migrants 
living in Spain1010 (ZOUBIR, 2007:171-172), with one main objective in this regard being the 
achievement of stability and prosperity in the region (BENLABBAH, EL GHISSASSI, AKMIR, 
DKHISSI and BAROUKI, 2012:46),1011 be it through development or economic cooperation. In 
fact, both countries are bound to each other by very strong commercial and economic ties which 
are supported by a strong regulatory framework (Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement of 1997…). Indeed, having accounted for 18% of Morocco’s exports, and for 14% of 
its imports in 2013, Spain first surpassed France as its most important EU trading partner and 
commerce has been growing ever since (to 22% and 24% in 2017, respectively).1012 Also, 
steadily seeking to step up its investments,1013 Spain is Morocco’s second most important EU 
investor after France, having accounted for 10.2% of Morocco’s overall FDI in 2018.1014 By 
contrast, development aid is, compared to France, rather low (MOUFTI, 2015:10). As this 
suggests, Morocco clearly represents an emerging market for Spain1015 and, thanks to its 
strategic position, serves as an entrance point for Spanish companies looking for business 
opportunities beyond North Africa. In this context, energy plays a key role and Morocco is 
considered a strategic partner with oil products being the most traded commodity between the 
two countries. Morocco accounted for 8.7% of Spain’s oil product exports in 2017,1016 whilst vice 
versa, Spain accounted for 30% of Morocco’s oil product imports.1017 Further, Spain exports 
electricity to Morocco, accounting for around 95% of Morocco’s electricity imports, with most of 
this electricity being produced from renewables in Andalusia. It is the only EU country physically 
connected to Morocco through a gas pipeline (Maghreb-Europe) and two submarine power 
cables providing a maximum capacity of 1,400 MW.1018 They went into operation in 1998 and 
2007 respectively, and since 2009, both countries have been interested in the possibility of 
setting up a third cable to increase the overall capacity to 2,100 MW (from 1,400 MW). A 
corresponding MoU between the Spanish Ministry for the Ecological Transition and MEM was 
signed in February 20191019 and the development of the cable which is planned to enter into 
service by 2026, has been entrusted to the Spanish electricity system operators Red Eléctrica 
Española (RED) and ONEE.1020 Being synchronised with the European high-voltage transmission 
 
1009 Conversely, Spain acts as an important ally and partner within the EU. 
1010 OECD (Accessed on 30 March 2019). 
1011 In this regard, and with both countries being key transit routes, Spain has regularly urged the EU to enhance cooperation on 
migration with Morocco. TEEVAN Chloe (30 June 2019), EU-Morocco: a win-win partnership?, Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis 
(Accessed on 16 November 2019).  
1012 In this context, declining oil prices, reducing Morocco’s energy bill, and rising exports, notably of oil products (partly stimulated 
by a recovery of the Eurozone, notably in Spain) played an important role. Moroccan Ministry for Economy and Finance (Accessed on 
27 March 2019); Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1013 Overall, Morocco is the African country that benefits most from Spanish investment. In fact, subsequent to Spain’s economic 
crisis, a process of externalisation of Spanish companies has started which, despite the country’s economic recovery, continues to 
intensify. For example, whilst there are currently around 40,000 Spanish companies involved in trade with Africa, 1,500 are 
physically established on the continent, of which 800 are in Morocco. (02 July 2019), Espana quiere elevar sus inversiones en 
Marruecos al nivel de su comercia, El Economista (Accessed on 10 November 2019); (21 November 2016), Spanish companies work 
increasingly and better in Africa, The Diplomat (Accessed on 13 April 2019). 
1014 Moroccan Exchange Office (Accessed on 12 April 2019). Data for 2018 = preliminary. 
1015 In this context, Spain has two Chambers of Commerce in Morocco, one in Casablanca and one in Tangiers, whose aim is the 
exchange of information and experience. Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Casablanca; Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Tangiers 
(Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1016 IAE (Accessed on 28 March 2019). 
1017 OEC (Accessed on 26 March 2019). 
1018 Red Electrica de Espana (Accessed on 28 March 2019). 
1019 RTVE (Accessed on 11 November 2019).  
1020 In this context, the setting-up of a Monitoring Committee, to be chaired by the respective Energy Ministers, is planned, with 
meetings to take place twice a year. Spanish government (Accessed on 11 April 2019). 
- 186 - 
 
network, the goal is to exchange electricity and to enhance security of supply, with Spain 
positioning itself as an ‘electricity corridor’ here.1021  
7.3.2.1 Spanish energy governance towards Morocco 
 
As regards energy, this research has identified Spain as one of the most important 
European players in Morocco and, as shown before, the Iberian country is an important source 
of refined products and electricity for the Maghreb Kingdom, a context in which both countries 
have regularly confirmed their desire to continue cooperating on energy and electricity 
connections (see Table 18). For example, apart from having agreed on the construction of a third 
power line, they have also decided to set up various working groups on renewables and gas1022 
and in November 2016, they signed an agreement (together with Portugal, France and Germany) 
aimed at facilitating the exchange of electricity from renewables between their borders.1023 As 
mentioned before, in recent years, the idea of developing a more integrated regional electricity 
market has been more and more replaced by previous plans to transform Morocco into a ‘green’ 
electricity exporter to the EU. In fact, in the 2000s, the Kingdom had increasingly shown interest 
in the provisions of EU Directive 200928/EC of 23 April 2009, and the possibility it affords to 
export renewables to the EU (see the MSP). However, since the Directive does not allow any 
virtual, i.e. statistical transfers of green certificates, and as Spain has been struggling with 
overcapacity ever since the global economic crisis (along with some sort of ‘renewables fatigue’), 
these plans have not borne any fruits.1024 Consequently, so far, the level of energy exchange from 
Morocco to Spain is still very low, not representing even one percent of the level of exchange 
from Spain to Morocco.1025 Therefore, Spanish-Moroccan energy cooperation also focuses on 
electricity generation in Morocco itself,1026 whereby renewables have been identified as a key 
sector for future bilateral collaboration. Indeed, as stated by Amirah-Fernandez (2015:51), one 
of Spain’s greatest geopolitical realities is the country’s proximity to North Africa’s renewables. 
Finally, and as indicated before, gas is also a focus and the Spanish government has, for example, 
financed the Ain Beni Mathar power plant (solar, gas) with € 100 million, just as Tanger.1027 
Table 18: Spain’s energy policy towards Morocco 
Overall aim of energy policy Energy security, competitiveness, sustainable development
Energy policy approach (Geo)political, economic and industrial approach
Energy interest RES, energy efficiency, electricity (+interconnection), refined oil, gas, 
environmental protection
Financed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Energy, Tourism and the Digital Agenda
Managed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Energy, Tourism and the Digital Agenda
Ulterior motive (Geo) political interests (military, stability), economic growth, soft power  
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.  
Relations are founded on (geo)political interests as well as on economic needs and cooperation 
is carried out on a high-level, with meetings taking place at the government/royalty and 
 
1021 MedReg (Accessed on 28 March 2019). 
1022 Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation (Accessed on 28 March 2019). 
1023 Smartgridsinfos (Accessed on 28 March 2019). 
1024 IAE (Accessed on 28 March 2019). 
1025 MedReg (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1026 Inversion finanzas (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1027 WB (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
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ministerial levels (‘elite interdependence’).1028 In fact, like France, Spain places relations in a 
global strategic cooperation framework for the purpose of integrating other fields of interest 
such as mining and sustainable development.1029 By contrast, it must be noted that despite a 
wide range of bilateral energy business initiatives, the political bilateral energy relationship 
between Spain and Morocco is primarily framed by EU Directives such as the Directive 2009 
28/EC of 23 April 2009 and overall, the Spanish approach is highly market-oriented with the 
Spanish energy industry enjoying a strong presence in Morocco.  
However, and as is the case for France, there are several factors that weigh heavily in Spanish 
energy governance towards Morocco, the issues being of both (geo)political or economic nature. 
The most important point of conflict are territorial disputes (Ceuta, Melilla) and the Sahara 
question, with one important issue being Spain’s ambiguous position as regards an agreement 
between the Moroccan government and the Polisario which enjoys the support of some Spanish 
parties (BENLABBAH, EL GHISSASSI, AKMIR, DKHISSI and BAROUKI, 2012:59; GILLESPIE, 
2013). Further tensions persist because of migrant and (drug) trafficking (BENLABBAH, EL 
GHISSASSI, AKMIR, DKHISSI and BAROUKI, 2012:63; MOUFTI, 2015:15). Trade is also a source 
of tension, notably as regards agriculture and fishing which is closely linked to maritime conflict 
(BENLABBAH, EL GHISSASSI, AKMIR, DKHISSI and BAROUKI, 2012:66). On the economic side, 
one key challenge to Spanish energy governance towards Morocco is the strong presence of 
France, which is notably a threat to Spain’s industrial competitiveness, another is the emergence 
of third players on the terrain in general. One issue here is that although Spanish companies 
have a strong industrial foothold in the Moroccan market, project financing is primarily carried 
out by other actors, notably France and Germany or the Gulf countries. Indeed, institutional 
cooperation is limited and, apart from the AECID and with the CGEM, it principally takes place 
between the ADEREE and the Spanish Institute for Diversification and Saving of Energy (IDAE), 
the Energy Catalan Institute (ICAEN) and the Andalusian government as well as the government 
of the Canary Islands.1030 R&D cooperation is coordinated by IRESEN.1031 
7.3.2.2 Institutional overview and key actors 
 
Like for France, and as will be laid out in the following, the responsibilities for Spanish 
energy governance towards Morocco are shared by two ministries (the MAEC and the Ministry 
for Ecological Transition) and one agency (AECID). Therefore, Spanish energy governance 
towards Morocco is, just as French governance, rather centralised.  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC), Ministry for Ecological Transition 
and Spanish Embassy to Morocco 
The main actors on the EU and national levels as regards steering the direction of Spanish 
energy policies towards Morocco are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) 
and the Ministry for Ecological Transition with most of the energy cooperation between Spain 
and Morocco being channeled through these institutions. On the local level, the Spanish Embassy 
to Morocco provides support to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and 
 
1028 MEM (Accessed on 28 March 2019). 
1029 MEM; MEM (Accessed on 28 March 2019). 
1030 ADEREE (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1031 IAE (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
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Cooperation. In this regard, it works closely with the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation. 
Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) 
At the agency level, the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) –
Spain’s main instrument for cooperation –1032 is the most important actor. Via the AECID, and 
together with the MEM (and the Moroccan Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Investment and 
Digital Economy), the Spanish government, under the Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation 2013-
2016, considering Morocco as an associated country, has identified economic development as a 
priority axis for Spanish-Moroccan cooperation.1033 Whilst in this context, one focus is on the 
green economy, with Spanish companies supporting Morocco’s progress regarding renewables 
and energy efficiency,1034 the AECID, however, does not directly support Morocco with loans in 
the energy sector as this is not part of the agency’s cooperation focus in the Maghreb country 
(Interview AECID, 2017). 
The Spanish industry 
Given that Spanish energy companies – primarily SMEs (see Table 19) – dispose of high 
technology know-how in both the electricity and renewables sectors, they are very present in 
Morocco and cooperation with the Moroccan Confederation of Business Associations (CGEM) is 
close. Most importantly, in 2013, the Saudi power generation company ACWA awarded 
construction contracts for the first phase of Ouarzazate to the Spanish companies Acciona, Sener 
and TSK (see Table 20).1035 Whilst Acciona and TSK were only involved in NOOR I, Sener will 
also be involved in Ouarzazate’s remaining two construction phases.1036 Similarly, Spanish 
Gamesa was also involved in the construction of the Tangiers wind farm, which was partly 
financed by the Spanish government with € 100 million1037 and also installed the park’s 165 
wind turbines (for whose maintenance it is also responsible). Apart from Tangiers, Gamesa also 
installed wind turbines in Tarfaya (300 MW), Essaouira (60 MW) and Haouma (50 MW).1038 
Here, it must be stated, that electricity cooperation is not limited to RES exclusively but open 
towards fossil energy sources and overall, Spanish companies are very active in Morocco’s gas 
sector. For example, Spain, via the company Abengoa (or its subsidiary Abener) which has been 
active in Morocco since the 1970s, constructed and operates the 470 MW Ain Beni Mathar 
combined cycle power plant (gas, solar)1039 and has also been involved in the operation of the 
Tahaddart gas power plant (through Endesa’s 32% participation interest).1040 Further, the 
Moroccan section of the Maghreb-Europe pipeline is operated by Metragaz and EMPL, both 
subsidiaries of the Gas Natural Fenosa which holds shares of 72.3% and 72.6% in each company 
respectively. Gas Natural Fenosa also participates actively in gas exploration activities in 
Morocco and has a 24% participation interest in the Tangier-Larache offshore gas field which 
used to be operated by Repsol through a 36% stake (other partners are Morocco’s ONHYM with 
 
1032 Spanish-Moroccan cooperation is framed by the Basic Agreement on Technical Scientific Cooperation of 1979. AECID (Accessed 
on 27 March 2019). 
1033 Spanish cooperation (Accessed on 29 March 2019). 
1034 AECID (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1035 Acciona (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1036 Sener (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1037 Windpowermonthly (Accessed on 27 March 2019) 
1038 SiemensGamesa (Accessed on 22 July 2019) 
1039 Abengoa (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1040 Endesa (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
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25% and Emirati Dana Petroleum with 15%).1041 However, Repsol decided to abandon Tangier-
Larache in 2014 due to a lack of potential and now rather focuses on the Boudenib area and the 
sale of lubricants.1042 In 2014, the company was also involved in drilling activities near the 
Canary Islands.1043 Finally, Spanish companies are also interested in providing energy services in 
Morocco. 
Table 19: Spanish energy companies active in the Moroccan energy sector 
Company Project
Energy 
source
ACCIONA, 
SENER, TSK
Thermosolar plant Ouarzazate (NOOR I) (160 MW) Solar
SENER Thermosolar plant Ouarzazate (NOOR II and III) Solar
ABENGOA Combined cycle power plant Ain Beni Mathar (450 MW gas, 20 MW solar) Gas, solar
ENDESA Combined cycle power plant Tahaddart (384 MW) (32% stake) Gas, solar
GAMESA Wind park Tangiers (140 MW) Wind
GAMESA Wind park Tetouan Wind
GAMESA Wind park Essaouira Wind
FENOSA Exploration and operation of Tangier-Larache gas field (24 % stake) Gas
FENOSA Gas pipeline connecting Algeria with Spain via Morocco (Maghreb-Europe) Gas
REPSOL Exploration of minerals (Gharb and Bechar) Minerals
REPSOL Sale of lubricants Lubricants
REPSOL Operation of Tangier-Larache gas field (36% stake) Gas
 
Source: Own elaboration based on information from Spanish energy companies.  
Table 20: Solar energy projects in Morocco 
Project Time Capacity Technology Development Construction Financing Sum
NOOR I 2013-2016 160 MW CSP ACWA Acciona, Sener, TSK EU (NIF), EIB, KfW
(BMU), AfD, WB,
ADB
730 million €
NOOR II 2016-2017 200 MW CSP ACWA Sener, Sepco, Power
China
EU (NIF), EIB, KfW
(BMU), WB, ADB
810 million €
NOOR III 2016-2017 150 MW CSP ACWA Sener, Sepco, Power
China
EIB (NIF), EIB, KfW
(BMU), AfD, WB,
ADB
645 million €
NOOR IV 2017-2018 70 MW Photovoltaic n/a n/a n/a n/a
Midelt n/a 600 MW CSP, photovoltaic n/a n/a n/a n/a
Tata n/a 600 MW CSP, photovoltaic n/a n/a n/a n/a
Laayoune n/a 80 MW n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Boujdour n/a 20 MW n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
MASEN
 
Source: Own elaboration based on information from NOOR Ouarzazate and ACWA Power (Accessed on 25 June 2016). 
 
 
1041 Fenosa (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1042 Repsol (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
1043 However, they turned out to be disappointing. CUNNINGHAM Nick (20 January 2015), Spain to Consider Fracking Following 
Canary Island Failure, Oilprice (Accessed on 27 March 2019). 
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7.3.3 Case III: Germany 
 
With an energy consumption of around 224 million toe in 2016,1044 Germany is not only 
the country with the highest level of gross inland consumption of energy within the EU – and this 
although its primary energy consumption saw a decrease in demand of -3.5% y-o-y in 2018 –1045 
but also the world’s sixth biggest energy consumer after China, the US, India, Russia and 
Japan.1046 In this regard, it is highly dependent on fossil fuels with its energy portfolio being 
largely dominated by crude oil (~31%), coal (~23%) and natural gas (~24%), whereas 
renewables account for only around 5%.1047 In this context, Germany highly depends on imports, 
with the bulk of crude oil imports, for example, coming from Russia (~33%), the Netherlands 
(~14%) and Norway (~10%),1048 whereas its most important natural gas suppliers are equally 
Russia (~34%), Norway (~31%) and the Netherlands (~22%).1049 In this light, and in view of 
global rising energy consumption and competition over energy resources as well as climate 
change, it is in Germany’s primordial energy interest to reduce or change its energy 
consumption patterns.1050 Therefore, domestic energy policies are driven by ambitious energy 
transition targets, based on the concept of the so-called Energiewende, meaning energy 
transformation or energy turnaround. Although this term was already coined in the 1980s when 
the Green Party first entered the German Parliament with its anti-nuclear energy and fossil fuel 
policies (MAUBACH, 2014:32-33), it is now generally associated with the government decision 
to phase-out nuclear energy – nuclear plants are scheduled for decommissioning by 2022 –1051 in 
the wake of the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe in 2011.1052 This, however, is misleading as the 
energy turnaround also means a shift away from fossil fuels towards more sustainable forms of 
energy like renewable energies as well as energy efficiency (SZULECKI, FISCHER, GULLBERG, 
SARTOR, 2016:554).1053 And indeed, with a greater awareness of the impact of climate change, 
the Energiewende has seen a major focus on the fight against global warming in recent years.  
In this spirit, Germany ratified the Paris Climate Agreement in the context of the COP21 in Paris 
in 2015 and presented its Klimaschutzplan 2050 (Climate Action Plan 2050) one year later at the 
COP22 in Marrakech, setting ambitious greenhouse gas emissions targets. In fact, Germany seeks 
to achieve global leadership in the fields of RES and energy efficiency, with one primary element 
here being the communication of the energy turnaround. In this context, and as an ‘international 
frontrunner’, the country enjoys strong credibility and has played an important role in 
institution-building (ROEHRKASTEN, QUITZOW, AUKTOR and WESTPHAL, 2016:3, 6), having, 
for example, decisively pushed for the establishment of the Abu Dhabi-based International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), ‘an intergovernmental organisation supporting countries in 
 
1044 IEA (Accessed on 25 March 2019). 
1045 AGEB (Accessed on 01 April 2019). 
1046 Enerdata (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1047 IEA (Accessed on 25 March 2019). 
1048 as of 2017. OEC (Accessed on 18 September 2019). 
1049 as of 2016. BMWI (Accessed on 18 September 2019). 
1050 BMWI (Accessed on 27 April 2017). 
1051 with the phase-out of nuclear energy being ‘based on a broad societal consensus’ (SZULECKI, FISCHER, GULLBERG, SARTOR, 
2016:554). 
1052 This assumption is, however, not only wrong, but also ironic. Indeed, in 2010, one year before Fukushima, the government 
described a long-term strategy for achieving the energy transition in its ‘Energiekonzept’ (energy concept) that foresaw an extension 
of the operating periods of nuclear plants by another 12 years. 
1053 In fact, RES not only present a way of reducing dependence on energy imports by offering an alternative that may also serve to 
compensate the power deficit resulting from the nuclear power phase-out but are also the only energy sources able to sustainably 
reduce the greenhouse gas emissions caused by climate change. 
- 191 - 
 
their transition to a sustainable energy future’, in 2011.1054 Likewise, it has supported the 
creation of the Regional Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (RCREEE), ‘an 
intergovernmental organization1055 with diplomatic status that aims to enable and increase the 
adoption of renewable energy and energy efficiency practices in the Arab region’, to which it 
serves, through the International Society for Cooperation (GIZ), as a co-financer.1056 Further, and 
in the context of the COP22, the country has also initiated a climate partnership for developing 
countries whose aim is to support developing countries in their efforts against global warming 
and climate change by providing them with political and technical know-how.1057 Here, and ‘with 
its vast but under-exploited potential for RE & EE, North Africa is an important target for German 
cooperation in the energy sector’ (ROEHRKASTEN, QUITZOW, AUKTOR and WESTPHAL, 2016:2). 
In fact, Germany’s external energy objectives are, to a certain extent, built upon its dependence 
on foreign energy sources and, in this light, it seeks to secure reliable energy supplies, for 
example, through diversification of its energy suppliers or routes. Another option is the 
diversification of energy sources, not only on the domestic but also on the international level and 
particularly, as shown, regarding RES and energy efficiency,1058 a context in which countries 
disposing of a vast RES potential might become future suppliers. In this context, external energy 
policies entail the expansion of dialogue with energy producer, transit and consumer countries 
as well as facilitation of economic and scientific expertise transfer to partner countries (and 
cooperation with multilateral organisations).1059 Against this background Morocco is of strategic 
interest to Germany. 
German-Moroccan cooperation: partners at eye level but with a long way to go 
Whilst trade relations between Germany and Morocco have existed since the 16th century,1060 
diplomatic relations were established in 1956 and ever since, the two countries have maintained 
‘close, friendly and untroubled’ relations1061 which have been regularly framed by high-level 
political meetings (although to a lesser extent than in the case of France). For example, Angela 
Merkel and Mohammed VI last met in 2010, whereas Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
met with his counterpart Salaheddine Mezouar in 2014 in Berlin and in 2015 in Rabat.1062 Apart 
from this, the relationship was reinforced in 2013 by the signature of the Rabat Declaration 
which outlines the further development of relations with the aim of strengthening political, 
economic and cultural ties, a context in which energy was identified as one field of 
cooperation.1063 Subsequently, relations have come into the spotlight in the context of the 
refugee crisis which, although having peaked in 2015, still goes on and whilst the majority of 
refugees having sought asylum come from civil-war torn Syria or Eritrea, a large number also 
comes from Morocco and Algeria.1064 In this context, the question of whether to declare Morocco 
a so-called ‘safe country of origin’ has arisen. This motion, which went through the Bundestag in 
early 2019, means that deportation of rejected Moroccan asylum seekers is to be expedited in 
 
1054 In addition to the promotion of RES and energy efficiency, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) focuses on the 
creation of a regional energy and electricity market. IRENA (Accessed on 02 April 2019). 
1055 based in Cairo.  
1056 RCREEE (Accessed on 02 April 2019). 
1057 BMZ (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1058 AA (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1059 AA (Accessed on 14 March 2017); BMWI (Accessed on 11 March 2017). 
1060 Moroccan Embassy to Germany (Accessed on 06 July 2017). 
1061 AA (Accessed on 01 July 2017). 
1062 German Embassy to Morocco (Accessed on 06 July 2017). 
1063 AA (Accessed on 13 April 2019). 
1064 In 2015, the number stood at 24,000. German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Accessed on 01 July 2017). 
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order to get the crisis under control. However, the Bundesrat, the upper chamber of the 
Parliament, rejects this initiative which ultimately, could fail.1065 No matter the outcome of this 
initiative, the reduction of migrant flows from Morocco is likely to remain an important aspect of 
cooperation,1066 reflected in the fact that since January 2017, both countries share the chair of 
the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD)1067 and in December 2018, Angela 
Merkel travelled to Morocco to attend the UN Intergovernmental Conference on the Global 
Compact for Migration.1068 
Bilateral political relations are overall good with Germany having adopted a rather neutral 
stance on the Sahara question, but are, compared with France and Spain, less developed, with 
Germany not having ‘the same access’ to the King as France and Spain (lack of ‘elite 
interdependence’) (Interview German Embassy to Morocco, 2016). A traditional key pillar of 
relations clearly has been development cooperation1069 and in 2017, Germany was the biggest 
ODA donor to Morocco, even before the EU institutions and France, with US$ 459 million. Just as 
France, one focus was on economic infrastructure projects, whereby, with US$ 385, Germany 
spent US$ 132 million more than its Western neighbour and most of this sum was assigned to 
energy projects, particularly in the field of renewable energy sources.1070 In fact, dating back to 
1961, Morocco is the largest recipient of German development aid in the MENA region1071 and 
between 2014 and 2018, Germany committed € 441 million annually on average to Morocco, 
whereby around 90% of this sum was destined to financial cooperation and around 10% 
contributed to technical cooperation.1072 Traditionally, this form of cooperation has 
concentrated on the RES and water sectors as well as on sustainable economic development and 
the environment sector including, for example, waste management and recycling.1073 In this 
light, Germany and Morocco also closely cooperate in the field of climate change where, in the 
context of the COP22, they have taken the lead in launching a climate partnership for developing 
countries (see previous section).1074 Similar to political relations, economic ties are solid but do 
leave room for improvement: in 2017, trade with Germany accounted for only 4.6% of Morocco’s 
exports,1075 and for 6.2% of its imports. Nevertheless, Germany is Morocco’s fourth biggest EU 
export and its third biggest EU import partner.1076 Likewise, German investment into Morocco is 
marginal, having accounted for only 2.4% of overall FDI into Morocco in 2018.1077 Nonetheless, 
the Maghreb country represents an emerging market for German companies – currently, there 
are around 120 of these operating in Morocco, notably Casablanca (in comparison, Spain has 
800 companies).1078 
 
1065 DW (Accessed on 14 March 2017); (18 January 2019), Bundestag stuft Maghreb-Staaten und Georgien als sicher ein, Die Welt 
(Accessed on 02 April 2019). 
1066 BMZ (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1067 AA (Accessed on 01 July 2017). 
1068 SCHWINGHAMMER Benno, BLANK Joerg (09 December 2019), Merkel arrives in Morocco for UN migration conference in 
Marrakech, DPA (Accessed on 02 April 2019). 
1069 AA (Accessed on 01 July 2017). 
1070 OECD (Accessed on 01 July 2017). 
1071 AA (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1072 German Embassy to Morocco (Accessed on 04 April 2019). 
1073 Apart from Morocco, development cooperation with Maghreb countries in the energy sector only exists with Tunisia and Egypt. 
BMZ (Accessed on 02 July 2017); BMZ (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1074 BMZ (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1075 OEC (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
1076 OEC (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
1077 Moroccan Exchange Office (Accessed on 12 April 2019). Data for 2018 = preliminary. 
1078 AA (Accessed on 25 June 2017). 
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7.3.3.1 German energy governance towards Morocco 
 
Compared with the southern EU member states France and Spain, Germany is a relatively new 
actor in the Moroccan energy landscape1079 and energy relations – with Morocco as well as with 
African countries in general – are primarily bilateral (Interview German Embassy to Morocco, 
2016; BMZ, 2017), with only some cooperation taking place on the multilateral and regional 
levels. In this light, Germany has been present in the Moroccan environment sector for over 25 
years, a period over which cooperation has been very much linked to environmental 
development aid and has been rather technical, i.e. for example no German Minister of the 
Environment has ever visited his or her Moroccan counterpart (Interview German Embassy to 
Morocco, 2016). Over the years, the tide has turned though and although still inextricably linked, 
the environmental development dimension of German energy policy making towards Morocco 
has increasingly given way, first, to political economic (Interview BMWi, 2016), and second, to 
financial cooperation aspects.  
Political economic cooperation was first launched with the establishment of the so-called Energy 
Partnership and the Mixed Economic Commission in 2012 (Interview AA, 2017).1080 In this 
context, dialogue was further enhanced in recent years by a more frequent exchange of visits on 
the ministerial level (Interview German Embassy to Morocco, 2016; see Table 21) leading, in 
2016, to the signature of a Declaration of Intent to promote further cooperation in the energy 
sector (see Figure 32).1081 With both countries sharing the same vision of a sustainable energy 
future, the main focus here is undeniably on RES and energy efficiency.1082 This approach clearly 
differs from that of the French or Spanish who, although concentrating on green energies, also 
have a wider focus seeking, for example, an intensification of cooperation in the fields of nuclear, 
gas or electricity. High-level energy topics are amongst other things discussed in the context of 
government consultations (which are not exclusively limited to energy topics) between 
Germany and Morocco in which, apart from the Federal Government and the Federal Foreign 
Office (AA) as well as the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), the BMU, 
the BMZ, the KfW and the GIZ, also participate (Interview KfW, 2016; GIZ, 2017). The chair of 
these consultations which are supposed to take place every other year, is held by the Foreign 
Ministers and the Foreign Offices.1083 The general objective is to decide on German energy 
activities in Morocco, whereby priority is clearly given to initiatives brought forward by the 
Maghreb Kingdom itself (ROEHRKASTEN, QUITZOW, AUKTOR and WESTPHAL, 2016:6). Finally, 
financial cooperation began to thrive under Mohammed VI’s reign and is notably driven by the 
KfW. 
Despite its focus on bilateral aspects, German-Moroccan energy cooperation also takes place on 
the regional and multilateral levels. For example, when Germany initiated the Club der 
Energiewendestaaten (Renewables Club) in 2013, Morocco was one of the founding members.1084 
 
1079 In fact, cooperation particularly intensified with the Kingdom’s policy of diversifying its partners and at a time when bilateral 
relations with France had cooled off. Afriqueinside (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
1080 AA (Accessed on 01 July 2017). 
1081 Moroccan Government (Accessed on 03 July 2017). 
1082 EC (Accessed on 29 October 2018). 
1083 BMZ (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1084 Other founding members are China, Denmark, France, India, South Africa, Tonga, UAE and UK. BMU (Accessed on 11 March 
2017).  
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The aim of the latter is the global promotion of the energy transition and with its work, the Club 
seeks to support the IRENA which Morocco joined in 2015.1085  
Table 21: German-Moroccan energy visits  
Germany Morocco
2016
November COP22; participation of Barbara Hendricks
April Working visit Abdelkader Amara Participation of Sigmar Gabriel in economic round table
March Working visist Parliamentary delegation*
2015
July Working visit SIEMENS delegation
2014
April
Meeting between Abdelkader Amara and  Secretary of State of 
the Environment ; Participation of Abdelkader Amara in the 8th 
German-African Energy Forum
Visits at the ministerial, parliamentary and industry levels
 
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. *The Bundestag can play an important role in Germany's foreign energy policy 
because through its Committe on Foreign Affairs as well as its Committee on Economic Affairs and Energy, it can make 
recommendations to the FO and the BMWi respectively. 
Figure 32: Germany’s external energy activities in Morocco; timeline (selected milestones) 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
Overall, Morocco matters to German energy interests for various reasons (see Table 22) despite 
the fact that in terms of energy security, Morocco as well as the entire Maghreb region, is rather 
of marginal interest to Germany or, as put by one of the interviewees, a ‘nice to have’, but not a 
‘must’ (Interview AA, 2016; BMWi, 2016, BMU, 2017). In fact, a net energy importer itself, 
Morocco would only be relevant in this regard if Germany imported significant amounts of gas 
 
1085 German Embassy to Morocco (Accessed on 01 July 2017). 
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from Algeria since Morocco serves as a transit country for Algerian supplies to the EU.1086 
However, from a more general cooperation point of view, Morocco is interesting to Germany as 
it is one of the few stable countries in the Northern African region. This means that it is also one 
of few countries with which development cooperation, in general or in the field of energy, is 
(still) possible. This becomes especially obvious in the example of climate policies where 
Morocco is Germany’s only partner in the whole MENA-region (Interview German Embassy to 
Morocco, 2016). Here, it is strategically important in terms of sustainable development 
(Interview German Embassy to Morocco, 2016) and may, given its efforts towards sustainability 
and its pioneering role in energy transition policies, serve as a good example to the world that 
the Energiewende is possible (Interview German Embassy to Morocco, 2016). In this context, 
Germany naturally has an economic interest in Morocco, with the country representing an 
emerging market for German companies which was, for example, one of the reasons why the 
German industry was particularly interested in projects facilitating the supply of green 
electricity from regions like North Africa (see Desertec project).1087 Furthermore, Germany is 
important to Morocco, as the latter counts on the former’s support within the EU to accelerate 
the necessary reforms for the integration of North African electricity systems which would 
ultimately improve Morocco’s access to the EU’s power grids. The overall aim of both Morocco 
and various EU member states and players (such as Portugal as will be shown later) is the 
creation of a Pan-European/North African electricity market that enables the exchange of 
electricity in both directions.1088 In this light, in the context of the COP22, Morocco and Germany, 
together with France, Spain and Portugal signed a roadmap for sustainable electricity trade in 
order to identify eventual obstacles to renewable electricity trade between these countries.1089 
Table 22: Germany’s energy policy towards Morocco 
Overall aim of energy policy
Energy security, sustainable development, export of
Energiewende
Energy policy approach Development approach
Energy interest RES, energy efficiency, electricity, environmental protection 
Financed by KfW (partially on behalf of below mentioned actors)
Managed by AA, BMWI, BMZ, BMU
Ulterior motive
Security (stability), economic growth (opening up of new markets), credibility
for Energiewende  
Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research.  
At this point, it must be pointed out that, contrary to other actors, Germany pursues a non-
hierarchical mode of governance and has never pursued any top-down policies but rather a 
bottom-up approach (Interview German Embassy to Morocco, 2016), i.e. it was Morocco itself 
that chose and asked Germany for support in its sustainable energy policies. In this context, the 
Maghreb country notably seeks to benefit from Germany’s experience with the Energiewende, be 
it through the transfer of know-how or technology, notably solar and hydro technology. For 
 
1086 However, this is not the case and in 2018, Algerian oil only accounted for only around 0.8% of Germany’s overall oil imports. 
Libyan and Egyptian oil accounted for around 8.5% and 1.3% of imports, respectively. Other than for oil, the German Federal Office 
for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) does not publish any gas imports (Contacted BAFA on 10 July 2017). AGEB 
(Accessed on 04 April 2019). 
1087 BMWi (Accessed on 27 April 2017). 
1088 MEM (Accessed on 08 July 2017). 
1089 EC (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
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example, German pump water treatment technology is highly appreciated by Morocco 
(Interview German Embassy to Morocco, 2016).1090 But also Germany’s experience with LNG is 
of interest to Morocco.1091 Indeed, as stated by the former Moroccan Minister of Energy, Mines, 
Water and Environment, Abdelkader Amara (2013-2016), Germany’s Energiewende clearly 
represented a model for his own country’s energy transition. Moreover, Germany has played an 
important role in the implementation of Morocco’s big renewable energy projects.1092 In this 
context, Germany has increasingly become a key player with respect to financing. For example, 
as already mentioned, Germany, notably via the KfW, has been one of the top financiers of the 
large-scale pioneering Ouarzazate and Taza projects, as well as several other important wind 
projects and the total contribution of BMU, BMZ and KfW to the Ouarzazate project will be 
around € 864 million, or 39% of the overall costs.1093 In the opinion of the German Embassy to 
Morocco, the fact that Germany approaches Morocco from the bottom up rather than from the 
top down implies a low or lower level of conditionality, for example, regarding economic 
aspects. According to the Embassy, this clearly distinguishes the German from the French 
approach. For instance, contrary to the French, the Germans would not ‘put any pressure on’ 
Morocco to grant eventual licenses to German companies in the context of or following the 
closure of political agreements. 
Despite its successes, German-Moroccan energy cooperation is not yet complete and struggles 
with several problems and challenges that are above all on the political rather than on the 
technical level. In fact, it can be observed that energy relations between Germany and Morocco 
are underexposed, i.e. they are technically good but politically not well staged (Interview BMZ, 
2017), especially from the German side. For example, whilst Moroccan Energy Ministers, above 
all, Abdelkader Amara who served as Energy Minister between 2013 and 2016, have regularly 
visited Berlin in order to promote the German-Moroccan energy relationship and to seek 
political dialogue, little such effort has been made by the German counterparts. As a result, there 
is little knowledge about Germany’s energy political efforts in Morocco within German society 
(Interview BMZ, 2017). This is unfortunate as Morocco pursues exactly the policies required 
under the Desertec project, i.e. the export of green electricity towards Europe (Interview BMZ, 
2017). In this context, and as highlighted by Roehrkasten, Quitzow, Auktor and Westphal 
(2016:6), it is essential to ‘link RE investments to efforts to support the development of other 
sectors’ and to ‘improve private sector competitiveness as a means to enhance job creation’. In fact, 
one problem here is, as already mentioned before, that Morocco and the Moroccan market are 
overall of less interest to Germany than other markets such as, for example, India (Interview 
BMZ, 2017). Similarly, Germany is of less interest to Morocco than France (Interview German 
Embassy to Morocco, 2016; BMZ, 2017). However, there is the possibility that this might change 
in the future, notably in the context of the issue of migration. In fact, with closer cooperation in 
this field, Morocco as a whole might gradually move up the political agenda in Berlin which, in 
turn, might then positively affect energy cooperation (Interview BMZ, 2017). Other than that, 
and although political cooperation under the Energy Partnership started in 2012 with highly 
ambitious ideas and plans from both sides, it soon encountered organisational issues in its 
everyday work. For example, whilst thematic meetings are supposed to be organised and take 
place under the Partnership, they are very much dependent on the individual political situations 
 
1090 Entreprendre Maroc (Accessed on 08 July 2017). 
1091 MEM (Accessed on 08 July 2017). 
1092 MEM (Accessed on 08 July 2017). 
1093 KfW (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
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in both countries and are therefore often cancelled (for example, during the Moroccan 
parliamentary elections only a few or no meetings took place). Finally, one external challenge to 
German energy governance towards Morocco may be German efforts in the RE & EE domain 
facing competition from nuclear energy promoted by Russia and France (ROEHRKASTEN, 
QUITZOW, AUKTOR and WESTPHAL, 2016:9). Furthermore, Germany’s EU neighbours, notably 
France and Spain, clearly have a head-start with respect to private or industry cooperation.  
7.3.3.2 Institutional overview and key actors 
 
As will be laid out in the following, institutional cooperation – be it on the political, 
economic, financial or technical levels – is overall very well developed and Germany is, 
compared with other EU member states or non-EU countries, well-positioned in this regard. 
There is a wide range of actors contributing to German energy governance towards Morocco, 
with responsibilities spread across four ministries (AA, BMWi, BMZ, BMU) and two agencies 
(KfW, GIZ) (see Figure 33). Involving thus a relatively large number of institutions or actors 
(ministries and agencies), German energy governance towards Morocco is, compared to the 
French and Spanish governance systems, rather fragmented and whilst this bears the risk of 
uncoordinated action (ROEHRKASTEN, QUITZOW, AUKTOR and WESTPHAL, 2016:6, 10),1094 
there is also an awareness of the significance of a coherent perception of Germany’s external 
interests.1095 
Figure 33: Germany’s external energy policy approach towards Morocco 
Germany's external 
energy policy 
approach  towards 
Morocco
Development 
cooperation
•BMZ
Financial 
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Source: Own elaboration based on empirical research. 
Responsible institutions for the development of external energy policies towards Morocco are: 
the Federal Foreign Office (AA), the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), 
the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Federal Ministry 
for Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMU). Acting on the behalf 
of the latter, the German Reconstruction Loan Corporation (KfW) as well as the German Society 
for International Cooperation (GIZ) are also key institutions. Until 2013, energy-related 
 
1094 A lack of clarity on the roles and competencies of the various national actors involved may lead to overlapping and double work. 
1095 AA (Accessed on 01 July 2017). 
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competences of the AA, the BMWi, the BMZ and the BMU were, except for strategic questions 
which have traditionally been dealt with by the AA and the BMWi (Interview GIZ, 2017), not 
rigidly separated from each other. This particularly concerned RES and energy efficiency and has 
provoked recurrent conflicts of jurisdiction, notably between the BMWi and the BMU (Interview 
BMZ, 2017).1096 However, currently, main energy competencies covering conventional and RES, 
energy efficiency, energy infrastructure and energy research,1097 are bundled under the BMWi, 
whereas the BMU covers all climate-related competencies. Despite this bundling of 
competencies though, each ministry has a different focus. For example, whilst the AA is primarily 
concerned with energy security, the BMWI is more interested in creating economic 
opportunities like employment (Interview BMWi, 2016). Overall, the AA and the BMWi are the 
most visible actors as regards German energy governance towards Morocco, notably with 
respect to policy questions, whereas the GIZ as well as, to a certain extent, the KfW, are the most 
active actors with respect to technical and financial questions. By contrast, the BMU and the BMZ 
rather act behind the scenes (Interview GIZ, 2017).  
German coordination mechanisms are generally decentralised, which means that the lead is 
usually given to the ministry most concerned with the policy issue at stake, the so-called 
federführendes Ministerium which apart from within its own jurisdiction, coordinates on two 
levels, the inter-ministerial and the parliamentary levels (JENSEN, JOPP and NEDERGAARD, 
2016:639). Having once agreed on a common house position (which needs to be accepted by the 
Minister) within its own jurisdiction, the Ministry seeks to agree on a common position with the 
other ministries involved, via a process called Ressortabstimmung. Finally, it then communicates 
the outcome of this process to the permanent representation in Brussels (JENSEN, JOPP and 
NEDERGAARD, 2016:639). Throughout this entire process, the Ministry is required to take into 
consideration the opinion of different interest groups. Overall, coordination generally takes 
place from the bottom-up, i.e. from a desk officer level (= energy expert of the respective 
ministries) (Interview GIZ, 2017) and may be formal or informal, whereby informal procedures 
notably exist at the department management level. As for the Ressortabstimmung or inter-
ministerial cooperation, coordination is conducted on both formal and informal levels. One key 
platform here and an important forum for discussions are the so-called Länderstrategie-
Ressortkreise. Chaired by the AA, these are country specific cross-thematic ad-hoc meetings at 
the department management level (of the three ministries, i.e. BMWi, BMZ and BMU), which are 
supposed to serve as an information exchange and coordination platform, whereby thematic 
priorities are set in close cooperation with Morocco (Interview GIZ, 2017). Like government 
consultations, these meetings are not exclusively limited to energy topics (Interview BMZ, 2017) 
but provide a platform for closer cooperation on external energy issues. Overall, they have more 
of an advisory function and take place around every three months.1098 As regards European 
affairs, it is worth noting that each Ministry disposes of an EU department, each of which is 
equipped with a team of EU coordinators headed by an EU delegate (Europabeauftragter) and a 
European Affairs Director General (Europaabteilungsleiter). Whilst EU coordinators meet on a 
weekly basis, with meetings being alternately chaired by the AA and the BMWi, EU delegates 
come together rather on an ad-hoc basis (around every four to six weeks). Meetings take place in 
 
1096 For example, whilst the main responsibility of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) was energy security, 
including security of supply and security of infrastructure, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and 
Nuclear Safety (BMU) used to be primarily responsible for climate protection and nuclear safety.  
1097 AA (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1098 AA (Accessed on 05 November 2018). 
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the AA and mainly basic issues are discussed (COLLINS, 2002:55). More complex issues are 
discussed by the European Affairs Directors General, who are also supposed to follow up on 
decisions of the State Secretaries’ Committee (Staatssekretärsausschuss für Europafragen). 
Meetings, which are co-chaired by the AA and the BMWi, are held once a month (COLLINS, 
2002:55). The State Secretaries’ Committee for European Affairs is composed of the EU State 
Secretaries from the ministries and meets every month to deal with difficult cases. It is chaired 
by the AA or the State Minister for European Affairs. The latter in turn participates in the weekly 
Cabinet meetings. Chaired by the Chancellery, the Cabinet meeting which is the highest level in 
the hierarchy, discusses ‘EU affairs as a specific agenda item’. Once a common position is found, 
the German government, via the AA or the BMWi,1099 is then theoretically enabled to go into 
negotiations with the Council in Brussels. Before that, however, and as laid down in Article 23 of 
the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), it must inform and consult the Bundestag or its EU 
Committee (Ausschuss für Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union). In this context, and in the 
spirit of MLG, the Bundesrat has a major say. For example, it must approve any transfer of 
sovereignty to the EU, can participate in the process of coordinating issues and define the 
German position and represent it in negotiations in Brussels (as far as certain topics are 
concerned). Moreover, the government is obliged to inform the Bundesrat about new EU policies 
and initiatives1100 (JENSEN, JOPP and NEDERGAARD, 2016:639-645). 
Federal Foreign Office (AA) and German Embassy to Morocco 
As shown before, one main interest of German foreign energy policymaking is the energy 
turnaround which, apart from being subject to political considerations, is also an important 
aspect of external trade and scientific promotion of external trade.1101 The focus is hereby on the 
promotion and use of RES and energy efficiency. In fact, according to Article 9 of EU-Directive 
2009/28/EG, the EU member states are allowed to cooperate with third states regarding the 
production of electricity from renewable energy sources in order to achieve the EU 2020 
renewable energy targets.1102 In this context, Moroccan Law n° 13-09 on renewable energies 
plays an important role as it authorises private generation of electricity from RES whilst 
promoting its export.1103  
In this regard, and overall, the AA, together with the BMWi, is the by far most important actor, 
not only on the national, but also on the EU and local levels. Indeed, responsible for the 
development of Germany’s foreign diplomatic relations, the AA plays a key role in the promotion 
of German energy interests on the international level. These are channeled through the AA’s 
foreign representations, the German Embassies. Added to this, the AA also has a decisive 
function in the development of a consistent energy approach towards Morocco as it is the official 
central point of coordination for energy questions in Morocco. In fact, by law, all energy 
development in and with Morocco must involve the AA or its specialist Office Division Unit for 
Energy and Raw Material Foreign Policy 410. In this context, the official way for eventual 
requests by Moroccan energy actors is to establish contact with the German Embassy in Rabat or 
 
1099 In fact, whilst the Foreign Office (AA) primarily deals with intergovernmental affairs, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy (BMWi) is responsible for sector policies (JENSEN, JOPP and NEDERGAARD, 2016:639). 
1100 GG (Accessed on 04 November 2018). 
1101 AA (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1102 Eurlex (Accessed on 19 September 2019). 
1103 Private generation of electricity was first authorised by Decree n°2-94-503 of 1994. Today Independent Power Producers (IPPs) 
account for 26% of electricity generation. RCREEE (Accessed on 19 September 2019). 
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the AA in Berlin which then either resolves the question on its own or transfers it to the BMWi 
(Interview GIZ, 2017). Here, it must be mentioned that, despite its significance for the 
development of energy relations with Morocco, the AA does not have the same necessary 
specialist expertise on energy issues as the BMWi. This is, amongst other things, because the 
permanent staff is subject to a rotation system1104 and the reason why a lot of energy 
cooperation is often also carried out on an ad-hoc basis between the BMWi, BMU and BMZ and 
their Moroccan counterparts (Interview GIZ, 2017). 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) 
After the AA or together with the AA, the BMWi is the most important actor when it comes to the 
development of Germany’s energy policy towards Morocco. Responsible for covering the whole 
energy political dialogue with Germany’s external partners, it hereby primarily focuses on 
export promotion, a focus that clearly distinguishes it from the BMZ and the BMU and which in 
some cases (as already mentioned before) can even lead to discrepancies with these actors 
(Interview BMZ, 2017). As already shown before, the BMWi’s main instruments are its bilateral 
Energy Partnerships which are accompanied or complemented by its Energy Export1105 and 
Energy Efficiency Export Initiatives.1106 The strategic aim of these initiatives is the sensitisation 
of the German Energiewende experience,1107 notably by giving advice on regulatory and 
technological aspects.1108 Projects under these umbrellas have a political, economic and 
technological component, and primarily seek to promote and support energy projects related to 
climate change and development cooperation – including climate funding under the BMU’s 
International Climate Initiative and Climate Technology Initiative.1109  
The Energy Partnership with Morocco is based on a binding joint declaration of intent1110 and 
came into effect on July, 3, 2012.1111 Since July 2013, the partnership has had a permanent 
secretariat for its implementation at the MEM in Rabat1112 which is led by the GIZ and is meant 
to serve as a local contact point.1113 The primary aim of the partnership is the development and 
implementation of Morocco’s national energy policy, putting emphasis on low GHG emissions 
and consequently on RES and energy efficiency. In this context, the focus is on the establishment 
of framework market conditions and the opening of national power networks for green 
electricity. Other topics are market-related corporate and scientific cooperation, as well as 
development cooperation.1114 The strategic political orientation to the partnership is given by an 
intergovernmental steering group which meets at least once a year, with the German side being 
represented by the BMWi, the BMU, the BMZ, the GIZ and the KfW and the Moroccan side by the 
MEM (Interview AA, 2017). On the operational level, the partnership takes place in different 
 
1104 AA (Accessed on 01 July 2017). 
1105 BMWi (Accessed on 12 March 2017). 
1106 BMWi (Accessed on 12 March 2017); AA (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1107 BMWi (Accessed on 12 March 2017). 
1108 BMWi (Accessed on 11 March 2017); AA (Accessed on 02 July 2017). 
1109 BMWi (Accessed on 11 March 2017). 
1110 Apart from Morocco, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) has an Energy Partnership with Tunisia, 
while plans to set up one with Algeria are also ongoing The Energy Partnership is in line with the Rabat Declaration signed in 2013, 
and outlining the further development of relations between Germany and Morocco. AA (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
1111 Prior to 2012, Germany had already been advising Morocco on legislation and capacity-building for renewable energy sources 
and energy efficiency. 
1112 AHK (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
1113 Apart from Morocco, such an office has been established in Tunisia, India and China. BMWi (Accessed on 12 March 2017). GIZ 
(Accessed on 12 March 2017). 
1114 GIZ (Accessed on 12 March 2017). 
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working groups (see Figure 34), with meetings being held every three months (in which the 
Secretary of State participates). Bringing together partners from different backgrounds, i.e. 
representatives of the public and private sectors, these meetings seek to improve coherence of 
energy cooperation by addressing common political and economic key challenges related to 
energy. Participation of the business community is also strongly encouraged, not only, to 
contribute with business solutions to specific political problems, but also to enhance 
networking, which, in turn, helps to identify and remove eventual barriers for German market 
access and corporate cooperation. In fact, German companies above all have an interest in 
exporting renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. Apart from the business 
community, civil society organisations are welcome to participate as well.1115 Cooperation 
mechanisms are, among others, the exchange of information and experience, co-designing of 
programmes and projects as well as support for the development of financing solutions.1116 The 
AA and the German Embassy to Morocco are responsible for the implementation.  
Figure 34: Organisation of the Energy Partnership  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on information from BMWi and GIZ (internet and interviews) (Accessed on 12 March 2017). 
The Energy Partnership has been identified as the most important platform by all the interview 
partners when it comes to the coordination of different German energy policies towards 
Morocco (Interview BMZ, 2017; GIZ, 2016). In fact, in this framework, coordination not only 
takes place between German and Moroccan actors but also between the German actors 
themselves, i.e. AA, BMWi, BMZ and BMU.  
Federal Environment Ministry (BMU) 
The main institution with respect to climate policies is the Federal Environment Ministry (BMU), 
which, via its climate partnerships, is an important actor for setting Germany’s external 
renewable energy agenda, along with the BMWi (WESTPHAL in KNODT, PFIEFER and MÜLLER, 
2015:89). The BMU is primarily active through its International Climate Initiative (ICI), a funding 
initiative set up in 2008 in order to finance climate projects in developing and transition 
 
1115 BMWi (Accessed on 11 March 2017). 
1116 BMWi (Accessed on 11 March 2017). 
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countries, with its main focus being the development of national competencies in climate 
mitigation and adaptation, i.e. the development of national know-how, especially on solar 
technologies, primarily CSP. With the help of the ICI, the BMU has been supporting Morocco’s 
climate strategy since 2010 and has contributed significantly to the Ouarzazate project.1117 For 
example, by providing a grant of € 15 million in 2011 for NOOR I via the KfW1118 and later by 
subsidising a loan for NOOR III via the KfW (technical cooperation implemented by the GIZ). It 
also played a role in the creation of a climate competence centre (€ 4.5 million grant)1119 and 
supports the expansion of Morocco’s south-south cooperation (see Table 23).1120  
Table 23: BMU energy projects in Morocco (of the ICI) 
Project value
(in €)
2012-2026 Ouarzazate I Solar Power Plant (NOOR I) 15,000,000 KfW MASEN
2014-2018 Climate partnership with the private sector 4,165,402 Private companies, DEG n/a
2014-2018 Political dialogue and knowledge management on low-emission strategies in 
the MENA-region, particularly involving renewable energies*
5,900,000 GIZ MEM
2013-2018 New solar thermal power plant in Ouarzazate under Moroccan Solar Plan n/a GIZ, KfW MEM
2013-2017 National competence center for climate change mitigation and adaptation in 
Morocco
4,500,000 GIZ MEM, environmental 
observatories, 
universities, private 
sector
2010-2016 Solar Resource Atlas for the Mediterranean** 2,154,750 OME, RECREE, DLR n/a
2011-2014 Support for the Mediterranean Solar Plan and Union for the Mediterranean 
Initiatives***
3,464,918 GIZ MEM, ADEREE, 
MASEN
Partner institutions 
Germany/EU/World
Partner institutions 
Morocco
Timeframe Project description
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on information from ICI. *Multilateral project, including Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Jordan. ** 
Multilateral project, including Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Palestinian National Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, 
Syria, Turkey. *** Multilateral project, including Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. 
German Reconstruction Loan Corporation (KfW) 
After the EIB, the KfW – a German government owned bank – is not only one of the most 
important instruments of German development cooperation as well as of German climate 
finance support, acting on behalf of the BMZ and the BMU as part of the IKI,1121 but also the most 
important financer of energy projects in Morocco, followed by the AFD. Following strict 
principles of development and sustainability, the KfW is strongly supported by the GIZ and both 
organisations are well connected, with a lot of the coordination taking place ad-hoc (Inverview 
AA, 2017).  
Headquartered in Frankfurt in Germany, the KfW also has a liaison office to the EU in Brussels 
which is one of the most obvious ways for subnational actors to participate in EU policymaking 
and carry out lobbying work according to the theory of MLG. In this light, it regularly cooperates 
with other development banks, notably the AFD and the EIB, with cooperation taking place 
within the NIP. Its clear advantage over other banks is the fact that it disposes of more financing 
possibilities (Interview German Embassy to Morocco, 2016; AFD, 2016). In this regard, it has 
been a big financial supporter of the Ouarzazate project, having, for example, contributed to 
NOOR I with a € 100 million ODA loan and a € 15 million loan under the IKI of the BMU which 
equates to around 20% of the total cost (see Table 24).1122 Further, on behalf of the BMZ and the 
 
1117 ICI (Accessed 11 March 2017). 
1118 ICI (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
1119 ICI (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
1120 ICI (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
1121 KfW (Accessed on 29 July 2017). 
1122 KfW (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
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BMU, it also contributed to NOOR II & III with a total € 654 million loan – € 300 million for 
NOOR II and € 354 million for NOOR III.1123 Moreover, the bank will also contribute to NOOR IV 
with € 95 million as the sole lender1124 and overall, is the largest lender for the second phases of 
the Ouarzazate project. Other financing parties are the AFD, the WB, the EIB and the AFDB. In 
addition to Ouarzazate, the KfW provided a € 130 million loan for six wind park sites in the 
North of Morocco of which € 50 million are foreseen for the Taza wind farm.1125 The other sites 
are Tanger, Boujdour, Tiskrad, Midelt and Jbel Lahdid.1126 The KfW also gave a donation worth € 
1.7 million for studies on the Atlas solar project.1127  
Overall, the KfW is well connected and maintains excellent relations with both its international 
and EU partners, especially the AFD with which it signed an agreement on closer cooperation on 
04 April 2019.1128 As far as the local level is concerned, the KfW works in close cooperation with 
both MASEN and ONEE (Interview, MASEN 2016). Seeking to remain neutral in the conflict, it 
does and will reportedly not finance any projects located in the territory of the Sahara.1129  
Table 24: KfW energy projects in Morocco  
Project value
(in €)
na Green hospitals 41,500,000 BMZ FCKM
na Grid connection NOOR Midelt 50,000,000 BMZ MASEN, ONEE
2019- Thermal solar plant Midelt (NOOR Midelt) 604,210,000 BMZ, BMUB, EC 
(NIF), EIB, AfD
MASEN lead institution
2017-2018 Thermal solar plant Ouarzazate (NOOR IV) 60,000,000 BMZ, BMUB, EC 
(NIF), EIB, AfD
MASEN
2015-2018 Thermal solar plant Ouarzazate (NOOR III) BMZ, BMUB, EIB, 
AfD
MASEN
2015-2018 Thermal solar plant Ouarzazate (NOOR II) BMZ, BMUB, EIB MASEN
2013-2016 Thermal solar plant Ouarzazate (NOOR I) 115,000,000 BMZ, BMUB, WB, 
AfDB, EC, EIB, AfD
MASEN ~ 20% of total costs
2010-2020 Wind Program III
54,043,000
BMZ, EC (NIF), EIB, 
AfDB, CTF
ONEE
2010-2020 Wind Program II
36,043,000
BMZ, EC (NIF), EIB, 
AfDB, CTF
ONEE
2010-2020 Wind Program I
40,043,000
BMZ, EC (NIF), EIB, 
AfDB, CTF
ONEE
Comments
largest single lender; 
lead institution for 
NOOR II
Timeframe Project description Partner institutions 
Germany/EU/World
Partner institutions 
Morocco
654,000,000
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on information from KfW.  
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
The BMWI, BMU and BMZ are strongly supported by the GIZ to which they act as donors, 
alongside the AA, the EIB, the OCP, the DEZA or the ADM. In fact, the GIZ basically has a 
supportive function to the Federal government, supporting the ‘Strategic Energy Partnership’ on 
a non-policy level by providing (political or) technical assistance. A federal non-profit entity 
present in Morocco since 19751130 and with its own office in Rabat since 1999,1131 the GIZ covers 
a wide range of projects (51 in 2018),1132 whereby it places a strong focus on energy and climate 
 
1123 KfW (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
1124 KfW (Accessed on 09 July 2017).  
1125 KfW (Accessed on 29 July 2017). 
1126 BMWi (Accessed on 12 March 2017).  
1127 Spanish Embassy to Morocco. 
1128 KfW (Accessed on 05 April 2019). 
1129 (03 January 2014), Western Sahara dispute dims Morocco’s solar hopes, Euractiv (Accessed on 29 July 2017). 
1130 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
1131 GIZ (Accessed on 04 June 2017).  
1132 For example, the Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) supported projects focus on administration & good governance, 
sustainable economic development, water & environment, climate and health. AHK Morocco (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
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(or environmental)-related initiatives (16 in 2018), particularly on RES and energy efficiency.1133 
As of Q1 2019, it has supported 8 purely energy-related projects, mainly on RES and energy 
efficiency, representing around 30% of the volume of commissions (see Table 25).1134 
As mentioned before, the GIZ disposes of a large network of contacts, be it at the EU, national or 
local levels where (like the KfW), it maintains close relations with MASEN (Interview MASEN, 
2016) and also with AMEE1135 and IFMEREE in whose creation it has been actively involved by 
contributing € 3 million for technical assistance.1136  
Table 25: GIZ energy projects in Morocco  
Project value
(in €)
2017-2020 Improvement of energy infrastructure in the oriental region (APIELO) 4,000,000 BMZ MEM
2017-2019 Support of the Moroccan Energy Sector 243,485 na MEM
2016-2020 Energy Efficiency Morocco 5,000,000 BMZ MEM
2015-2018 Advice on and support of bilateral energy partnerships with developping and 
emerging countries
14,411,923 BMWI na
2015-2020 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in the Provinces of Tata and Midelt 6,000,000 BMZ MEM
2014-2021 Employment promotion through energy efficiency and renewable energies in 
mosques
8,500,000 BMZ MEM
2013-2018 DKTI-Moroccan Solar Plan 12,000,000 BMUB MEM
2008-2019 Support of the Moroccan Energy Policy 11,199,069 BMZ MEM
Timeframe Project description Partner institutions 
Germany
Partner institutions 
Morocco
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on information from the GIZ.  
The German industry 
Compared to Spain and France, private energy cooperation between Germany and Morocco is 
less important, with German energy companies not having as significant an industrial presence 
in the Moroccan energy sector as Spanish or French energy companies. However, this might 
change in future as companies are increasingly interested in extending their activities in 
Morocco. This first became clear in the context of the Desertec project under which the industry 
was particularly interested in projects facilitating the supply of green electricity.1137 Moreover, 
similar to Spain, private cooperation not only involves big energy companies but also SMEs, like 
Fichtner. The major player, however, is Siemens (see Table 26). Present in the country since 
1956, this industrial manufacturing company entered the Moroccan wind power market in 2012 
by supplying, installing and commissioning the wind turbines of the Haouma and Foum El Oued 
wind farms together with Nareva Holding.1138 In this context, the manufacturer has been 
regularly criticised by several NGOs like Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) of doing 
business in the Sahara (Foum El Oued) without having obtained prior approval from the local 
population.1139 At this point, it must be stated that given the absence of any common position on 
the Sahara within the EU, economic players are not bound by any corresponding political 
considerations and are therefore free to establish business in this territory. Despite these early 
 
1133 AHK Morocco (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
1134 GIZ (Accessed on 04 June 2017).  
1135 AMEE (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
1136 Energymed (Accessed on 04 June 2017). 
1137 BMWi (Accessed on 27 April 2017). 
1138 Siemens (Accessed on 09 July 2017). 
1139 SAGENER Nicole (09 November 2016), Westsahara: Siemens schmutzige Geschäfte mit Marokko, Euractiv (Accessed on 09 July 
2017). 
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wind power activities, it was, however, only in December 2015 that Siemens won a bigger tender 
for the construction of five sites (150 MW Tanger 2, 300 MW Tiskrad, (Laayoune), 200 MW Jbel 
Lahdid (Essaouira), 100 MW Boujdour, and 100 MW Midelt (Casablanca) to implement the 850 
MW wind project, together with Nareva Holding and Italian Enel Green Power (the competitors 
for this tender were Engie, EDF and Alstom) (see Table 27).1140 The wind farms are expected to 
be completed and operational by 2020, the context in which Siemens constructed a wind turbine 
blade company, which became operational in 2017.1141 Further, the company, which had already 
supplied the blades for NOOR I, will also manufacture the blades for NOOR II and III.1142 Apart 
from Siemens, Germany has no major industrial presence in Morocco (Interview BMWi, 2016). 
Table 26: German companies active in the Moroccan energy sector 
Company Project Energy 
source
SIEMENS Wind farms Tanger II, Midelt, Jbel Lahdid, Tiskrad, Boujdour (850 MW) Wind
SIEMENS Combined cycle power plant Tahaddart (384 MW) Gas  
Source: Own elaboration based on information from German energy companies.  
Table 27: Wind energy projects in Morocco 
Project Capacity Construction Financing
Akhfennir II 100 MV NAREVA, Engie
Khalladi 120 MW UPC Renewables
(ACWA Power)
EBRD, BMCE, CTF
Taza 150 MW Engie, Mitsui KfW
Tanger II 100 MW Siemens KfW
Boujdour 100 MW Siemens KfW
Tiskrad 300 MW Siemens KfW
Midelt 150 MW Siemens KfW
Jbel Lahid 200 MW Siemens KfW
ONEE
Integrated Wind Program Phase I
Integrated Wind Program Phase II
 
Source: Own elaboration based on information from MEM, ONE (Accessed on 05 June 2017). 
7.3.4 Interim conclusion  
 
As the previous Section suggests, there appears to be a link between the 
interdependence of the member states with Morocco and coordination (and thus consistency) 
and Hypothesis 3 can be confirmed.1143 In fact, coordination seems to vary with patterns of 
interdependence or to correlate with the intensity of intergovernmental relations. It can be 
noted that the higher the interdependence, the lower the coordination, with bottlenecks being 
 
1140 DJAMA Nasser (10 December 2015), Maroc: Nareva, Siemens et Enel décrochent le marché éolien géant de 850 MW, 
L’Usinenouvelle (Accessed on 06 April 2019). 
1141 ROUAUD Pierre-Olivier (10 March 2016), Au Maroc, Siemens investit 100 millions d’euros dans une usine de pales d’éoliennes à 
Tanger, L’Usinenouvelle (Accessed on 06 April 2019); FROESE Michelle (11 October 2017), Siemens Gamesa inaugurates new wind-
turbine blade plant in Morocco, Windpower (Accessed on 06 April 2019). 
1142 (18 June 2016), Morocco: Siemens to manufacture Noor II and III turbines, Ecofin Agency (Accessed on 06 April 2019). 
1143 At this point, it is difficult to determine how this outcome fits into the existing literature, given that so far, the relationship 
between interdependencies and coordination has been primarily dealt with in the organisational literature.  
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particularly pronounced between France and Spain (YOUNGS, 2007:59). Both countries 
maintain highly interdependent relationships with Morocco and are generally rather hesitant 
when it comes to cross-governmental cooperation.1144 Given that France actively participates in 
functional coordination with the EU and Germany (in contrast to Spain),1145 this observation, 
however, applies to the strategic/political level. In fact, as just indicated, the EU member states 
with whom Morocco’s energy relations are most developed are its former colonial rulers, France 
and Spain, as well as Germany. And although, as mentioned before, these players pursue similar 
external energy objectives in Morocco, particularly with respect to renewable energy sources 
and sustainable energy policies, they do, however, all use different approaches to achieve these 
goals. Whilst France and Spain are the traditional players in the Moroccan energy landscape, 
over the past few years, Germany, which had long been active only in the field of development 
aid, has turned out to be an increasingly important player. However, the country remains rather 
a technical than a political player, which is reflected in the fact that diplomatic and political 
relations are les developed, compared to France or Spain.  
Overall, both the empirical research and the interviews conducted have revealed a certain 
reticence on both the French and Spanish side to engage in political or politicised multilateral 
projects like the MSP or Desertec and there is generally little awareness in Morocco about the 
approaches of the other member states. Apart from diverging views as regards EU energy 
governance, this research suggests that this is because of the type of relations that these 
countries maintain with Morocco (which, in turn, feed competitive attitudes). Indeed, as has 
been shown, both players share particularly strong ties with Morocco and therefore do not 
‘depend’ on any further coordination or cooperation with the EU or other member states. 
Hypothesis 3 thus appears to confirm itself, also, because the chapter has shown that 
coordination efforts towards Morocco are often led by Germany with whom intergovernmental 
relations are less developed compared to France and Spain.1146 In fact, the two former colonial 
rulers, France and Spain, have a completely different relationship to Morocco than Germany and 
therefore pursue, as shown before, different strategic interests and consequently different 
energy governance approaches. For example, whilst the approaches of both France and Spain 
have a big top-down component, with a lot of meetings taking place at the higher levels, 
Germany rather pursues a bottom-up approach. The fact that France and Spain have a different 
relationship with Morocco than Germany, is, regardless of geographical proximity, notably due 
to historical reasons, whereby a ‘country’s colonial history can have a significant impact on its 
policy decisions’ and countries generally have a ‘strong sense of moral responsibility towards 
former colonial possessions’ (WICKETT, 2018:31). The circumstance that both France and Spain 
as Morocco’s former colonial powers maintain strong bilateral energy relations may be due to 
the fact that ‘third-country actors are more likely to accept modes of external governance that 
resonate with their domestic institutional structures’, including with their ‘domestic rules, 
traditions and practices’ (LAVENEX and SCHIMMELFENNIG, 2009:804), whereby the likelihood 
for this to happen may be higher when countries share a common past.  
 
1144 Reflected in the fact that they do not always seem to pull together as past events have shown. Germany, by contrast, gives the 
impression of having less of a problem. 
1145 As a reminder, in this context, the Reconstruction Loan Corporation (KfW), the French Development Agency (AFD) and the 
International Society for Cooperation (GIZ) were identified as the main actors. 
1146 However, all the abovementioned countries show a limited or reduced interest in fostering political coordination with their 
fellow member states and thus share a common responsibility. 
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Part Eight – Conclusion 
This final chapter attempts to summarise and synthesise the key findings of this 
dissertation, to interpret them and identify the strengths and limitations of this research and, 
finally, to point out directions for further examination.  
The topic of this dissertation was EU energy governance towards Morocco with a focus 
on consistency, whereby the research question was two-dimensional, i.e. it concentrated on both 
the questions of whether/to what extent and why the EU is consistent in its approach. In this 
context, this research conceptualised policy consistency as a dependent variable whereby it 
made use of policy coordination as a proxy variable. Here, coordination was defined as a process 
and, based on Les Metcalfe, a six-point scale was developed as a means for measurement, 
whereby the focus was on the horizontal, vertical and diagonal dimensions and on the EU 
multilevel system and the third-country level, as well as on strategic/political and functional 
aspects. Finally, several explanations for consistency in EU external energy governance were 
identified based on which three hypotheses on competencies, interests and interdependencies 
emerged.  
As regards Research Question 1, the findings of this dissertation’s empirical research indicate 
that whilst there is some degree of coordination and consequently, consistency, it is, however, 
necessary to distinguish between the various levels. In fact, the research has revealed that the 
EU is above all coordinated (and thus consistent) in its energy governance approach towards 
Morocco as regards functional aspects. Indeed, the interviews conducted have shown that 
coordination on this level functions smoothly with respect to all dimensions (horizontal, vertical 
and diagonal) and levels (EU multilevel system, third-country level). By contrast, as far as 
strategic/political aspects are concerned, several bottlenecks that hamper coordination have 
been identified, notably as regards the intergovernmental and vertical dimensions. Overall, the 
analysis has revealed that in both the EU multilevel system and on the third-country level, 
horizontal coordination is both strategic/political and functional, whereas vertical and 
intergovernmental coordination is primarily functional. This suggests that on the whole, 
functional coordination is more extensive than strategic/political coordination and that 
horizontal and diagonal coordination is more extensive than intergovernmental and vertical 
coordination, an outcome that not only meets the author’s expectations but equally supports 
previous research and confirms the central argument found in the literature on 
intergovernmentalism.  
As regards Research Question 2, several factors were conceived to serve as an explanation for 
(variation in) coordination (consistency), namely competencies, interests and 
interdependencies, whereby the empirical research has shown that the roles these determinants 
play are not equally important. Indeed, competencies only provide a partial explanation for 
coordination in EU energy governance towards Morocco as they were found to explain 
coordination in the horizontal and diagonal dimensions, at least to some extent, but were not 
found to explain coordination in the intergovernmental and vertical dimensions. The same 
applies to interests for which the empirical research indicates that they only seem to play a 
subordinate role in explaining coordination in the intergovernmental and vertical dimensions, 
based on the existing evidence on coordination conflicts provided by previous research. In fact, 
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one of the reasons why there is a lack of coordination in these dimensions is that although 
functional interests are converging, there are divergencies with respect to strategic/political 
interests and the actors’ views on EU energy governance. Consequently, to better understand the 
member states’ behaviour and grasp why they are reluctant to coordinate in certain areas, this 
study identified interdependencies as the main reason for the lack of intergovernmental and 
vertical coordination.  
As a general conclusion or practical implication of this dissertation it can be reasoned that the 
EU remains a political heavyweight and an energy actor of utmost importance to Morocco and 
that there is coordination (consistency) of EU energy governance towards this country. 
However, there is still room for improvement, even more so in the long-term as a lack of 
consistency may have both internal and external repercussions. Internally, it may put the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy at risk, whereas externally, it may hamper it from achieving its goals and 
jeopardize its competitiveness. In short, it could weaken the EU as an international actor.  
Whilst overall, this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of EU-Morocco energy 
relations, it also has several particular strengths:  
- Original & unique research topic: One key strength of the present dissertation is that it 
is both original and unique, i.e. a study of this kind, aiming at an examination of 
consistency in EU energy governance towards Morocco has not been attempted before 
and the data obtained is first-hand. In fact, Morocco is by far an under-explored area of 
study in this regard and, up to now, the focus has only been on the study of EU-
Mediterranean energy relations in general and these studies were rather Eurocentric. 
- Innovative research design: Another main strength of this dissertation in view of the 
beforementioned methodological constraints, is the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of the research questions, i.e. the attempt to look at coordination as an 
indicator or proxy for consistency rather than trying to measure consistency itself.  
- Comprehensive research: A further strength includes this study’s comprehensiveness 
or in-depth analysis. In fact, this study provides a comprehensive overview not only of 
the EU-Morocco energy relationship but also of the Maghreb country’s energy relations 
with third actors and the market itself.  
- Extensive field research: Finally, another strength of this study is its extensive field 
research which was aimed at taking a variety of actors & perceptions into account.  
As with most studies, this study is not only subject to strengths but also to weaknesses and 
during this research, the author encountered, as already indicated throughout this dissertation, 
several limitations related notably to the methodology as well as to information and 
generalisation:  
- Limited access to information: Although certainly related to organisational constraints, 
limited access to information does not mean a lack of information per se, but a lack of 
relevant information. In fact, external energy being a highly sensitive policy topic of great 
geopolitical value, the author observed a certain reluctance of the interviewees to 
respond to certain questions and to open-up (which is also reflected in the fact that all 
actors insisted on not being directly cited). Such scepticism was notably observed on the 
political level, i.e. within the French institutions (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign 
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Affairs, French Ministry of Ecological and Solidary Transition which both did not react to 
interview requests and the French Embassy to Morocco) and the Moroccan Ministry of 
Energy, Mines, Water and Environment (which first agreed to an interview but later 
refused). The UfM was at first also rather sceptical and would not accept a telephone 
interview (however, as later determined, this depended very much on the interviewee). 
By contrast, there was greater accessibility to the German institutions and valuable input 
was provided by the German government, the BMWI and the KfW, whereas on the local 
level, the German Embassy, the GIZ, the AFD and MASEN were of great help. As for the EU 
institutions, the most accessible interviewees in Brussels and Rabat were the 
representatives of DG NEAR and the EEAS or the EU delegation.  
- Information bias: Information bias arises when different interviewees do not dispose of 
the same piece of information/background to answer the interview questions. For 
example, consistency or coordination may mean different things to different people and 
therefore, they may perceive events differently (‘interpretation bias’). Here, two different 
groups were identified: the EU institutions/Morocco and the EU member states. Indeed, 
whilst the first two largely agree that coordination and ergo consistency between the 
different EU institutions is well established, the latter claim that the level of consistency 
is low. In fact, one factor that might have influenced this outcome is the lack of a common 
general understanding of the term coordination/consistency and although the interview 
partners were given a working definition, it is conceivable that when formulating their 
answers, they expressed themselves in other, previously acquired, terms. 
- Generalisation: Generalisation refers to the extent to which the findings from one study 
can be applied to another study. However, in this case and given the qualitative character 
of the analysis, the results provide a solid understanding as far as Morocco is concerned, 
but these cannot be automatically transferred to other cases.  
 
Taking into consideration the findings of this dissertation as well as its inherent shortcomings, 
several key aspects are, in the eyes of the author, worth being examined more extensively in 
future. For example, as regards this study’s conceptual aspects, future research might look closer 
into the relationship between consistency and coordination and examine whether there is any 
causality. Further, although this study has already briefly presented and commented on the 
different energy interests of third-party, i.e. non-EU players, it would, in extension to this work, 
be worthwhile intensifying this research to not only incorporate the geopolitical realities but 
also the positions and interests of these actors, including those of the private sector, in more 
detail. Likewise, and although already touched upon, it would be equally interesting to extend 
this work to see what role exactly the Sahara question plays in Morocco’s energy relations. Also, 
this paper could provide the basis for comparative research on consistency in EU energy 
governance across the different Maghreb countries. Finally, its results could serve as a basis for 
future policy recommendations.  
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Recurrent interview questions 
The recurrent interview questions were:  
I) General information on the work of the interviewed institutions 
Cooperation with European (EU, EU member states, banks, agencies, regulators, etc.) 
and Moroccan actors  
➢ Which are the most important European and Moroccan actors or partners in 
terms of energy cooperation and what are their policy/governance interests? 
o What is the current focus of energy cooperation of these partners and 
what are or may be future priorities?1147  
o What are the current problems and what are or may be future 
challenges? 
II) Specific information on the coordination of the interviewed institutions 
Coordination with European (EU, EU member states, banks, agencies, regulators, etc.) 
and Moroccan actors 
➢ Coordination mechanisms: How does coordination with the actors 
identified above take place? 
o What are the current enabling measures (frameworks, mechanisms 
and tools) and roles1148?  
➢ Coordination results: What are the results of the abovementioned 
measures (intentional or unintentional)? 
o What factors determine coordination, i.e. in which cases and 
situations does coordination take place and in which not? Why, and 
why not? 
o What are the constraints or opportunities encountered whilst 
implementing the above-mentioned measures? How are they dealt 
with? 
➢ Would you say that the EU’s external energy policy or governance approach 
towards Morocco is coordinated or uncoordinated? If uncoordinated, do you 
think this is a problem?  
 
 
1147 This analysis aimed, amongst other things, at detecting any potential conflicts of interest, or even worse, power struggles 
between the different actors. 
1148 For example, do actors contribute actively to coordination or do they assume a rather passive role?  
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